Showing posts with label BoE's Financial Policy Committee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BoE's Financial Policy Committee. Show all posts

Thursday, April 11, 2013

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane and the campaign to reduce financial regulatory complexity

In case you missed his fabulous speech on Turning the Red Tape Tide, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane has elevated his campaign to reduce financial regulatory complexity.

Specifically, Mr. Haldane focuses on the pattern of regulation increasing at an exponential rate.
The facts are striking. 
In the UK, the Banking Act (1979) covered 52 sections and 75 pages. By the mid-1980s, the Financial Services Act (1986) and an updated Banking Act (1987) had expanded primary legislation to 110 sections (106 pages) and 212 sections (299 pages) respectively. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) took this to 433 sections or 321 pages. And the new Financial Services Act (2012) takes this to 695 sections or 534 pages – a tenfold increase in primary legislation in a generation. 
In the US, the picture is no less dramatic. Contrast the legislative responses in the two largest financial crises of the past century – the Great Depression and the Great Recession. The Great Depression spawned the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) – perhaps the single most important piece of financial legislation of the 20th  century. That ran to a mere 37 pages. 
As an aside, I disagree with Mr. Haldane that Glass-Steagall is the single most important piece of financial legislation of the 20th century.  That distinction belongs to the Securities Act (1933) which made the FDR Framework the foundation for our financial system.

It is the Securities Act that introduces the philosophy of disclosure.  This Act makes it the government's responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.
More recently, the Great Recession has spawned the Dodd-Frank Act (2010). It runs to 848 pages or more than 20 Glass-Steagalls. Once completed, Dodd-Frank might run to 30,000 pages of rulemaking.
Clearly, the facts speak for themselves that we have seen a tremendous increase in the number of financial regulations.   We have also seen a tremendous increase in the complexity of the individual regulations.

For example, as Mr. Haldane previously observed, you could calculate the Basel I capital requirements on the back of an envelope.  By the time Basel III capital requirements are done, you will need a powerful computer to handle the millions of assumptions.

What has caused this increase in both amount and complexity of regulation?
In this respect, financial regulation shares many evolutionary characteristics with elements of the legal framework – for example, the tax code. It too has been responsive to events and circumstance including crises, scandals, innovation and liberalisation. And for many of the same reasons, it too has resulted in a rising tide of rulebook complexity....
Viewed through the lens of history, it is not difficult to explain this evolution. As cracks have emerged in the plaster – for example, regulatory and tax loopholes – they have been papered over. Like a bad painter and decorator, new layers have been applied to support the layers below. These were rational responses to real problems. And for a time they will have filled cracks, reduced uncertainties, corrected incentives. 
Yet this evolutionary path leads inexorably towards a framework – whether regulatory or tax – which is a patchwork of make-do-and-mend. History locks in the idiosyncrasies and complexities of the past, generating a steadily rising tide of red tape. As the regulatory and tax codes attest, the resulting frameworks can be Byzantine in their complexity and Heath-Robinson in their design.
In short, regulation is a response to market failure and the complexity of the regulation is a direct result of the market failure that is being fixed.

For the financial system, the market failure the regulations are trying to address is opacity.

For example, regulators are proposing complex rules to limit interbank exposures so as to reduce the risk of financial contagion.

The risk of financial contagion would be reduced if the banks provided ultra transparency and disclosed on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, banks could assess each of the other banks they do business with and limit the risk of their exposure to these banks based on the riskiness of each bank.

Mr. Haldane then effectively renders complex financial legislation, like the Dodd-Frank Act and its resulting regulations, as much ado about nothing and heading in the wrong direction by simply observing
complex frameworks tend ultimately not to solve the problems for which they were a response. 
They may be ineffective. In filling old cracks, complex rulebooks tend to open up opportunities for new ones to emerge. Indeed, they may increase the likelihood of new loopholes or workarounds emerging. 
Regular readers know that the areas of the financial system that failed in the current financial crisis were those areas where the FDR Framework was not adhered to.

Rather, there was substitution of the combination of complex regulation and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.  Examples of these opaque areas include banks and structured finance securities.

Since August 9, 2007, it has been obvious that the FDR Framework was not adhered to and that transparency needs to be brought to all the opaque areas of the financial system.

Mr. Haldane offers an explanation for why that hasn't happened yet.
Resistance is strong, particularly among those who gain most from squeezing through the loopholes. 
There is also an in-built professional inertia among regulators [and] lawyers... with large amounts of human capital invested in complexity. 
In removing complexities, society’s gain would be their loss.
He then suggests that there is hope that we will in fact bring transparency to all the opaque areas of the financial system and adhere to the FDR Framework.
Nonetheless, in the light of the financial crisis, we may be nearing an inflection point, where the societal pendulum begins to swing in the opposite direction. There are certainly signs of the red tape tide beginning to turn in the area of financial regulation. A growing chorus of concern has emerged recently about complexities and inconsistencies in banking regulation.... 
For financial regulation, that means asking some big questions [and answering them in light of the banks providing ultra transparency as required under the FDR Framework]. 
Is risk-weighting of bank assets worth the costs? Are bank’s internal risk models more regulatory trouble than they are worth? Does complexity unduly advantage large incumbents over small new entrants? Are armies of supervisors and compliance officers a sign of success or failure?...
When market participants have access to each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the answer to the questions is easy: No, Yes, No (in fact, market discipline will reward banks that are less complex with a lower funding cost as they are more easily understood), Failure.
This could transform the regulatory framework, for the simpler, for the better.
Requiring banks to provide ultra transparency transforms the regulatory framework for the simpler and better because now the regulators can piggy-back off the analytical and disciplinary capabilities of the markets.

When market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank for themselves, or use third party experts to assess the risk for them, the focus is where it should be: on the risk each bank is taking.

The focus is on risk because under the FDR Framework, market participants know they are responsible for all loses on their exposures and therefore they have an incentive to limit their exposures to what they can afford to lose given the level of risk.

Not only does this end the risk of financial contagion, but market participants can help the regulators identify potential problems by highlight what they see as the risks of each bank.

Saturday, February 23, 2013

Head of UK bank regulator: "banks' assets wrongly valued"

The Telegraph reports that the newly appointed head of the Bank of England's bank supervision area says that banks are not valuing their assets correctly.

That banks are not valuing their assets correctly is not news.  Your humble blogger has been talking about this since the beginning of the financial crisis and the adoption of regulatory forbearance (which turns non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans the banks claim are performing) and the suspension of mark to market accounting (which lets bank management mark their securities to mythology).

What is newsworthy about the statement is that the regulator wants to end these deceptive practices and have the assets actually properly valued.

Regular readers know that the only way to properly value the assets is to have the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, the market can an will value the assets.

This has several advantages including:

  1. Markets are designed to price assets so the price of the assets reflects not just the regulators' or bankers' opinions; and
  2. Markets are not influenced by the lobbying of the banks for higher asset valuations;
With this information, the market will also exert discipline on the banks so that any losses that are currently being hidden on or off the banks' balance sheets are recognized.

The new PRA, which will be a division of the Bank of England, will take over the prudential operations of the FSA – ensuring banks hold enough capital and liquidity to withstand shocks unaided. 
It is intended to be the first line of defence in preventing the UK’s largest banks from ever returning to the point they reached four years ago, when their failure threatened to bring down the entire financial system.
The new PRA should use the market as leverage to fulfill its role as the first line of defense in preventing UK banks from threatening to bring down the entire financial system.

PRA can easily do this by championing requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

With this information, the PRA can access the market's ability to analyze data to identify banks that have a higher risk profile.

With this information, the PRA can piggyback on the market's ability to exert discipline on these banks to reduce their risk profile.
Among the body's first tasks will be an assessment of the risks being taken by large banks. 
An assessment that the market and its experts is more qualified to perform than the PRA and its staff.
Mr Bailey told The Times there was a need to "bring this capital debate to a head and ask what is it we are concerned about". 
He added that regulators believed there were still problems with bank balance sheets: 
“Some assets are valued in a way I don’t think is sufficiently prudent. That is not lying. That’s a matter of judgment.”
In matters of judgment like asset valuation, it is better to have an independent third party value the assets than the regulators or the bankers.  That independent third party is the market.
The Cambridge-educated economist cautioned that banks remained too big to fail.
A problem that requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency cures as the market exerts discipline on these banks to reduce their risk profile.
He believed too that the industry faces a small “tail risk” that fines over Libor, mis-sold interest rate hedging products and other wrongdoing could cause institutions to “keel over”.
Banks are not like non-financial firms.  They don't keel over.  They only go out of business when the regulators close them down.

Banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.  They can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.
Mr Bailey will also become the third deputy governor of the Bank of England. In his role as one of the three deputy governors of the Bank, Mr Bailey will have responsibility for prudential regulation. He will also become a member of the Court of Directors (the governing board of the Bank) and a member of the Financial Policy Committee.

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

BoE's Mervyn King: banks not healthy until private investors willing to fund without central bank support

In his speech at the CBI Northern Ireland mid-winter dinner, Bank of England governor Mervyn King laid out the number one policy to pursue that would complement monetary stimulus was restoring confidence in the banks.

He then described a test for when this confidence had been restored.  Confidence had been restored when private investors were willing to "provide them with funds at reasonable spreads over Bank Rate without central bank support".

Regular readers know there is only one way to restore confidence in the banks:  transparency.

Specifically, requiring the banks to provide all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Confidence in the banks will flow from the independent analysis by market participants because market participants trust their own analysis.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, market participants have learned their lesson not to trust the financial regulators when they give the all clear signal about the level of risk at the banks.  First, the regulators missed the problems the banks faced leading up to the crisis.  Second, the regulators have repeatedly missed problems when they conduct stress tests and pronounce banks well capitalized that subsequently need to be bailed out or nationalized.

For banks, all the useful, relevant information that needs to be disclosed on an ongoing basis consists of their global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this information that market participants can independently assess the risk and solvency of each bank.  Market participants use their assessment to adjust both the price and amount of their exposure to each bank.

An example I frequently use for why ultra transparency is needed is the interbank lending market.  Currently, it is frozen as banks with deposits to lend cannot assess either the risk or solvency of banks looking to borrow.  With ultra transparency, banks with deposits to lend can make this assessment and subsequently lend to the banks looking to borrow.

If restoring confidence in the banks is the number one complementary policy, this can be easily done by simply requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  A requirement that the BoE can easily implement either through the Financial Policy Committee or its role as the banks' regulator.

So if we cannot rely on monetary stimulus alone, what additional policies should we consider? The right prescription now is a programme that complements monetary stimulus with measures to promote the necessary long-run rebalancing of the economy, enabling us to return eventually to more normal levels of interest rates. Only then can we return to a sustainable growth path. We must not be inactive, but we must be selective in order to be effective. 
What are those other policies? They come under three headings: restoring confidence in our banks, reforms to raise the future potential supply of our economy, and changes in the world economy and exchange rates.
Much has already been done to fix the banking system in this country. And there has been a real improvement in the position of UK banks. Capital ratios have risen, leverage has fallen, liquidity has improved, and bank funding costs have fallen sharply, especially since the announcement of the Funding for Lending Scheme last summer and an improvement in market sentiment towards the euro area. 
Banks are now overflowing with liquidity, largely as a result of the enormous increase in central bank reserves held by commercial banks. Yet there remains anxiety in markets about the resilience of UK banks.
Of course there is anxiety about the resilience of the UK banks.  These banks are 'black boxes' and nobody knows if they are solvent or not.

What the market does know is that between regulatory forbearance and changes to accounting rules it is highly likely that the banks are hiding large amounts of losses.  The fact that the banks are hiding large amounts of losses has been repeatedly confirmed by the banks themselves.

So it is no surprise that the market does not think they are solvent.

Ultimately, the only way to convince the market that the banks are solvent is if the banks provide ultra transparency.

Without ultra transparency, market participants must assume that the banks have something to hide and therefore they should stay away.
That is affecting the terms on which banks can obtain funding and so their ability to lend to the rest of the economy. Some argue that UK banks’ capital ratios compare favourably with many of their continental counterparts. They do, and we should welcome that.
Market participant anxiety about the solvency of the banks does not affect the banks' ability to lend.

The reason this is true is that banks can always sell the loans they make to other financial institutions including banks that are long deposits and are looking for loans, insurance companies and pension funds just to mention a few.
But there is only one simple test of whether UK banks now have sufficient capital. It is whether they can convince investors that it is safe to provide them with funding at reasonable spreads over Bank Rate without central bank support. 
As the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) noted in its recent Review, UK banks are still some way from being able to convince the market in this respect.
Until banks provide ultra transparency, they will never be able to convince the market that they are solvent or have sufficient capital.
Regulators ... are now working hard to ensure that banks are making adequate provisions for future losses, the likely costs of regulatory penalties and compensation to customers, and stating the riskiness of their assets in a more prudent way.
This lists highlights just some of the issues that cast doubt on the solvency of the UK's banks.

Conspicuously left off of this list is their manipulation of benchmark interest rates like Libor.  Clearly, banks face a sizable liability as every transaction based on the benchmark interest rate has someone who lost as a result of the manipulation.
A lesson from past crises, and also from this one, is that it is important to act now rather than hope that problems will go away of their own accord. 
True.  Until we have ultra transparency, there is no reason to believe that the banks will act now and recognize their losses.  Bankers have an incentive not to recognize their losses as they continue to receive bonuses made possible by delaying the recognition of the losses on and off their balance sheets.
As the FPC said last December, it is likely that banks will be required either to raise more capital or to restructure their businesses or exposures, and the FPC will review the position in March. 
There is no single remedy appropriate to all banks. 
With proper implementation, there is no reason why the two banks with significant state shareholdings could not largely be back in the private sector within a relatively short period. After all, in the United States banks that received state support are already back in private hands. 
Restoring our banking system to full – and transparent – health is only one of the structural changes that will be necessary to rebalance the economy.
Please note that Sir Mervyn King understands that transparency is needed for without it, it is impossible to restore the "banking system to full - and transparent - health".

Thursday, January 17, 2013

BoE's Andrew Haldane: have we solved 'TBTF'? No!

In an interesting article on VoxEU, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane asks the question of have we solved the Too Big to Fail problem and answers with an emphatic 'no'.

Regular readers are not surprised by this answer as the only way to solve the TBTF problem is to require all banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The reason ultra transparency solves the TBTF problem is it subjects the banks to market discipline.  Specifically, with this information, market participants can truly assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure accordingly.  The result is to link each bank's cost of funds to its risk.

Linking risk to each bank's cost of funds will put pressure on the banks to reduce their risk.  Pressure that banks will respond to by becoming smaller and more easily understood.  In short, market discipline will cause the TBTF to break themselves up into smaller units with less risk that the market places a higher value on (please note that this happened with corporate conglomerates).

Today, a bank's cost of funds is not related to its risk because the banks are in Mr. Haldane's words 'black boxes'.

Leading up to the financial crisis, market participants understood the banks were black boxes and turned to the financial regulators for insight into the risk of each bank.  The reason market participants turned to the financial regulators is they have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on each bank in an appropriate, timely manner.  Recall that the financial regulators have examiners at the banks 24/7/365.

One lesson from the financial crisis is that even if the examiners correctly assess the risk of each bank, the financial regulators will not communicate this risk to the market.  There are a number of reasons this occurs including political pressure and concerns over the safety and soundness of the financial system.

That financial regulators will not communicate the risk of each bank to the market has been shown time and time again with the bank stress tests.  We had banks throughout Europe collapse shortly after the financial regulators said they were well capitalized.  In the US, we had at least two banks who required a subsequent bailout.

It is interesting to note that besides the banks there is another part of the financial system that is Too Big to Fail:  the financial regulators.  Without ultra transparency, market participants are dependent on the financial regulators.  When the financial regulators fail, and they did because we had a bank solvency led financial crisis, the taxpayers bailed them out.

Not only that, but the policy responses since, like the Dodd-Frank Act, have increased the size and role of the financial regulators and made them even more TBTF.

Like the TBTF banks, financial regulators and their role is also cut down to size by requiring ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, market participants can see if the financial regulators are doing what they are suppose to do.

Mr. Haldane's answer to the question of have we solved the TBTF problem:

No. 
That is not my pessimistic verdict; it is the market’s. Prior to the crisis, the 29 largest global banks benefitted from just over one notch of uplift from the ratings agencies due to expectations of state support. Today, those same global leviathans benefit from around three notches of implied support. Expectations of state support have risen threefold since the crisis began. 
This translates into a large implicit subsidy to the world’s biggest banks in the form of lower funding costs and higher profits. Prior to the crisis, this amounted to tens of billions of dollars each year. Today, it is hundreds of billions (Haldane 2012). In other words, if the market’s expectations are to be believed, the regulatory response to the crisis has not plugged the 'too-big-to-fail' sink.... 
What is certainly true is that, in the light of the crisis, regulation to quell the too-big-to-fail problem has come thick and (at least in regulatory terms) fast. This reform effort falls into roughly three categories: 
(a) Systemic surcharges: of additional capital levied on the world’s largest banks according to their size and connectivity. ... Last year, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed a sliding scale of systemic surcharges for the world’s largest banks. The highest surcharge was set at 2.5% of capital. 
Yet therein lies the problem. Based on my estimates (Haldane 2012), a charge levied at this rate would leave the majority of the systemic externalities associated with the world’s biggest banks untouched. The reduction in default probabilities associated with lowering leverage by a percentage point or two would not offset the higher system-wide loss-given-default associated with the world’s largest banks. The systemic tax is being levied at rates which are too low...
If the banks were required to provide ultra transparency, there would be no need for complex rules like systemic surcharges.

Market participants could independently assess the banks' default probabilities, also known as risk.  The result would be the banks would be under pressure to reduce their risk as their cost of funds increases and makes much of their risk taking unprofitable.

As your humble blogger has said repeatedly, the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight is an inferior substitute to transparency and market discipline.
(b) Resolution regimes: In principle, orderly resolution regimes for banks could lower the collateral costs of a big bank defaulting, thereby tackling at source these systemic externalities. .... A key component of these plans is the ability to impose losses on private creditors – so-called 'bail-in' – rather than have those losses borne by taxpayers. 
As with systemic surcharges, the issue here is not to so much the bail-in principle, but its application in practice. Bail-in, whether of big banks, sovereigns or companies, faces an acute time-consistency problem. Policymakers face a trade-off between placing losses on a narrow set of tax-payers today (bail-in) or spreading that risk across a wider set of tax-payers today and tomorrow (bail-out). 
A risk-averse, tax-smoothing government may tend towards the latter path – and historically has almost always done so, most notably in response to the present financial crisis. Next time may of course be different. But the market is sceptical.... 
As I have repeatedly said, the idea of bail-in completely misses how our financial systems were designed based on the FDR Framework.

Regular readers know that the FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

There is no need to be discussing bail-in or bail-out under the FDR Framework because market participants know under the principle of caveat emptor that they are responsible for losses on their exposures.

By definition under the FDR Framework, all unsecured debt and equity holders are subject to losses if a bank is insolvent and the financial regulators close it.

The reason these debt and equity holders will exert discipline on bank management to limit the risk of the bank is to avoid these losses.

Please note, the FDR Framework only holds true so long as the governments ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Given the financial regulators information monopoly, this is not currently true for banks.  Hence, the discussion of bail-in versus bail-out.  A discussion that is rendered moot by requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.
(c) Structural reform: One way of lessening that dilemma may be to act on the scale and structure of banking directly. Several recent regulatory reform initiatives have sought to do just that, notably the “Volcker rule” in the US, the 'Vickers proposals' in the UK and, most recently, the 'Liikanen plans' in Europe. While different in detail, each of these proposals shares a common objective: a degree of separation or segregation between investment and commercial banking activities. 
In principle, these ringfencing initiatives confer both ex-post (improved resolution) and ex-ante (improved risk management) benefits. Because they act on banking structure, they have a greater chance of proving time-consistent. While this is a clear step forward, those benefits are only as credible as the ringfence itself. The issue raised by some is whether, in practice, the ring-fence could prove permeable. Without care, today’s ring-fence could become tomorrow’s string vest. 
Again, ultra transparency addresses the issue of structural reform.  As I have previously said, regulation has two components:  the rule and the enforcement.

The Volcker Rule says that banks should not take proprietary bets.  By making the banks provide ultra transparency, market participants can assess the bank's positions and see if they are in compliance.

Oh, by the way, ultra transparency will also improves the banks' risk management.  Recall that market discipline has a bias towards banks taking less risk.
If each of these initiatives is necessary but none is individually or collectively sufficient to tackle too-big-to-fail, what is to be done? 
One solution might lie in strengthening these proposals. For example, re-sizing the capital surcharge, perhaps in line with quantitative estimates of the 'optimal' capital ratio (Miles et al (2012), Admati et al (2011)), would be one option for bearing down further on systemic externalities. 
Another more radical option, mooted recently by a number of commentators and policymakers, would be to place size limits on banks, either in relation to the financial system as a whole or, more coherently, relative to GDP (Hoenig (2012), Tarullo (2012)). 
Proposals of this type typically face two sets of criticism. 
The first, practical issue is how to calibrate an appropriate limit. ....
The second, empirical issue is whether size limits would erode the economies of scale and scope which might otherwise be associated with big banks....
What is to be done is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Contrary to what the banking industry lobbyists say, there is no limit on transparency as there are a number of market participants who are capable of assessing the exposure details from the global banks (not the least of which are the competitor global banks).
Too-big-to-fail is far from gone. It is even more important it is not forgotten.
And it won't be gone until the banks are required to provide ultra transparency so that they can be subject to market discipline and forced to reign in their risks.

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

BoE says that Lloyds and RBS need billions more in capital

The Telegraph reports that the Bank of England has said Lloyds and RBS need billions more in capital to shore up their balance sheets.

This "news" confirms that the Swedish Model and not the Japanese Model is the appropriate choice for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and eliminates the need for policies like austerity that undermine the social contract.

A modern financial system is designed so that banks can protect the real economy by absorbing the losses on the excess debt.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

This combination allows the banks to continue operating and supporting the real economy while they have low or negative book capital levels because deposit insurance makes the taxpayers the silent equity partners of the banks.

The need for billions more in capital is an explicit confirmation that a modern financial system works as designed.  These banks have been operating with we now find out were low or negative book capital levels for the last several years after the losses hidden on their balance sheets have been taken into account.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  One of the policies adopted to achieve this goal was to bailout the banks.

The need for billions more in capital also confirms that the bailouts under the Japanese Model were unnecessary.  Again, the banks operated just fine with the taxpayers as silent equity partners.

Finally, the need for billions more in capital confirms that the only beneficiaries of the Japanese Model are the bankers.  Think of all the money paid as cash bonuses by these banks since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Cash bonuses that would not have been paid had the Swedish Model been pursued and banks required to retain 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings until their book capital levels had been rebuilt.
UK regulators have given Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group until March to begin dealing with a black hole that Brooks Newmark, a Tory member of the Treasury Select Committee, suggested could be as large as £30bn. 
Bank officials refused to quantify the capital shortfall in evidence to the TSC yesterday, but they confirmed it was substantial. Michael Cohrs, a member of the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee, said it was “a big number” while Andy Haldane, the Bank’s executive director for financial stability, agreed it was “material”. 
The warning came as regulators admitted that the government had overpaid when rescuing the banks in 2008 and that the taxpayer would never make as large a profit from the bail-outs as the US, if at all. 
Asked whether returns for the UK taxpayer might match the 15pc made in the US, Mr Cohrs said: “I don’t think the UK taxpayer will get those returns.” Pressed on whether the taxpayer would make a profit at all, he added: “I don’t know.” 
Sir Mervyn King, the Bank’s Governor, said: “The sad truth is, in 2008, the idea of focusing efforts on recapitalising the banking system was a UK idea. We got there first but, like many UK ideas, the Americans developed it faster and better.”...
Given that both the UK and US have modern financial systems, the bailouts were unnecessary in the first place.
Although RBS and Lloyds will have to take action to boost their capital, the taxpayer may not have to inject any more than the £65bn already invested, the regulators said. 
The two banks can sell assets or “reduce their investment bank balance sheets, for instance”, Andrew Bailey, head of prudential regulation at the Financial Services Authority, suggested....
Of course there is a third alternative, the banks can boost their capital by retaining 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.
The UK’s other banks and building societies are under similar regulatory scrutiny, following the FPC’s warning in November that the industry had up to £60bn of hidden losses on its balance sheet – from understated bad debts to underestimated provisions to cover fines and compensation for Libor rigging and other scandals. 
Lloyds and RBS need billions more in capital despite a taxpayer funded bailout that supposedly took into account all the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets.

Given that the UK financial regulators appear to have under-estimated the true amount of capital Lloyds and RBS needed, there is no reason to believe that the FPC's estimate does not suffer from the same problem.

The only way market participants will ever know if the banks are solvent again is if the UK requires its banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency will give UK banks a global competitive advantage.  Market participants will be able to assess the risk of the banks and adjust the amount and pricing of their exposure to the banks based on each bank's risk.

At the same time, market participants know that any bank not providing ultra transparency is undoubtedly hiding something and is far riskier than the UK banks.  As a result, market participants will require a higher return to provide capital to these banks.  This gives the UK banks a competitive advantage until the other banks also provide ultra transparency.
The FPC wants capital positions reinforced to support economic growth....
Regular readers know that it reinforcing bank capital positions is not necessary to support economic growth.  The solution so that credit is available to support economic growth is the originate to distribute model with transparency.

Under this model, structured finance securities ranging from covered bonds to securitizations provide observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies on the underlying assets by the beginning of the next business day so that investors can know what they own.

It is the ability to know what you own or know what you are buying that will bring investors back to the structured finance securities and insure that there is sufficient capacity to support economic growth.
Sir Mervyn argued the best course of action was to deal with a lack of capital “straight away”. “Banks have two options – either they raise more capital or they restructure... Investors may not like it, but they will be better off over time,” he added.
Sir Mervyn is wrong.

The best course of action is to adopt the Swedish Model and the originate to distribute model with transparency.
Mr Bailey said: “If you want to sell the Government’s shareholding [in RBS and Lloyds], you have to have a balance sheet and business model that have a stable future.” The taxpayer owns 41pc of Lloyds and 82pc of RBS.

Monday, January 14, 2013

BoE power to change bank capital requirements and need for new banking model

The Bank of England published a draft statement explaining how its Financial Policy Committee would use its power to change bank capital requirements and improve the resilience of the UK economy.

A Wall Street Journal article highlighted how this statement implied that in using its power to change bank capital requirements the FPC would effectively be trading off growth for financial stability.

Underlying both the FPC's statement and the WSJ article is an assumption about how the financial system operates.  Specifically, that loans are carried on bank balance sheets.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger agrees with the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane that the traditional banking model where loans are carried on the balance sheet is R.I.P.

The question is what will replace this traditional model and will the FPC's power to change bank capital requirements still be effective.

In an earlier post, I answered the question of what I think should replace the traditional banking model.
The financial crisis confirmed for all time that banks are bad holders of risk.  This includes credit, interest rate and liquidity risk. 
This should come as no surprise given past financial crises:  Loans to less developed countries (credit), US Savings and Loans (interest rate) and the Great Depression (liquidity). 
It was this recognition that banks were bad holders of risk that drove the creation of the 'originate to distribute' model.  Under this business model, banks were suppose to transfer these risks to other financial market participants who were better able to hold these risks. 
Clearly, the 'originate to distribute' model failed in the run-up to the Great Recession.  The key question is why? 
It failed along two correctable dimensions. 
First, it failed because of a lack of transparency in the securities that were sold to transfer the risk.  Structured finance securities from covered bonds to securitizations are brown paper bags where buyers are blindly betting on the value of the contents. 
This is correctable by simply requiring observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the next business day.  With this information, market participants can know what they are buying (which exerts market discipline on the pricing of the underlying collateral) and, on an ongoing basis, know what they own. 
Second, it failed because of a lack of transparency into the banks themselves and the risks that they were taking on.  Banks are, in Mr. Haldane's words, 'black boxes.'  As such, they are not subject to market discipline as market participants cannot figure out how risky the banks are.  
Instead, the financial system is dependent on regulators to both correctly assess and communicate the risk of the banks.  The failure by regulators to do both correctly (and regulators are biased to not properly communicate the riskiness of the banks over concerns about "safety and soundness") results in the potential for financial contagion as market participants have too much exposure given the real risk of the banks. 
This too is correctable by simply requiring ultra transparency and having the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details. 
The new business model should be the 'originate to distribute' model with transparency.
This business model restrains risk taking by banks while assuring that the economy has the access to credit it needs for growth.  So the tradeoff that the Wall Street Journal article fears is eliminated.

But the question still remains as to whether the FPC's powers will be effective under this new business model.

Transparency under this new business model actually enhances the effectiveness of the FPC.  It does this by allowing the FPC to harness the analytical ability of the market to identify potential problem areas in the financial system.

This allows the FPC to deploy the most important tool in its toolkit:  the power to call attention to a problem.

At a minimum, by calling attention to a potential problem, the FPC is telling market participants that the risk is higher than market participants are currently anticipating.  This warning should result in market participants adjusting their exposures to reflect this higher risk and in doing so mitigate the potential problem.

Friday, December 21, 2012

BoE's Robert Jenkins: plan to increase bank share price

In his speech to the ABI Annual Investor Conference, the Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins laid out a plan for what he thinks it will take to a) increase bank share prices and b) reduce risk in the financial system.

Naturally, the starting point for his plan is transparency of the risks that are on and off the bank balance sheet.

He presented the plan in a hypothetical speech by a bank CEO.
As you know we have weathered the crisis reasonably well. Loss-making quarters have been few. Earnings are recovering. Our balance sheet is stronger. By the standards of the industry we have much of which to be proud. There is only one not-so-small problem. Loyal shareholders – you, have made no money. 
Why have you made no money? Because the dividend was cut by us and bank share prices were cut by the market. 
Why did we cut the dividend? Because we wished to re-build capital. 
Why were bank share prices“cut?” Because the market fears that the capital we have built is insufficient. 
Why might our capital be insufficient? Well there is concern about the past and worries about the years to come. Investors fear that losses from the past will drag down earnings in the future. And in thinking about the future they are more conscious of the risks that financial firms take and the leverage with which they take them. 
Finally, there is uncertainty over the regulatory playing field on which banks will compete. 
Are these perceptions likely to change soon? Not unless we change. 
What must such change accomplish? It must lay to rest worries of vulnerability. It must remove to the extent possible the threat of surprise. It must clarify the earnings we hope to achieve and the risks we must take in order to achieve them. 
It must prove to prospective shareholders that management will do what is necessary to create shareholder value. And it must convince investors that such value will include a dependable dividend. 
So what is the plan? 
1) we will invite independent specialists to review our holdings and confirm our valuations. They will publish the results. 
2) we will increase provisions to the extent permissible; 
3) where the accounting standards do not permit prudent provisioning, we will ensure that in capital excess to regulatory requirements is there to absorb the losses...
Investors no longer strive for high short term returns unadjusted for risk. They strive for attractive relative risk-adjusted returns. 
The market will reward balance sheet strength, greater transparency, lower volatility and a predictable dividend - with a higher earnings multiple
Why invite a select few independent specialists to review each bank's holdings and the bank's valuation when the market is, by definition, the entity best equipped to review and value the holdings?  After all, the market includes all the specialists plus the rest of the valuation experts.

Why should anyone trust a few independent specialists?

If there is anything that has been learned from having accounting firms and specialists like BlackRock Solutions review banks in Ireland, Greece and Spain, it is that markets do not trust their results.

In theory, after the specialists have done their review, the facts are suppose to be disclosed to the market.  Then why hide the underlying data and not let the market independently confirm their assessments?

The bottom line of using independent specialists in place of the market is that you are raising a very large red flag and saying that the banks have something to hide.

Regular readers know that Step 1 of Mr. Jenkins' plan should be to provide ultra transparency.  Step 1 should be rewritten as follows:
1) We will disclose on an ongoing basis all of our current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so that all market participants can confirm our valuations and our conservative management of risk and see that we have nothing to hide.

Monday, December 3, 2012

BoE's Andrew Haldane: Losses caused by banks as bad as a 'world war'

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane put a price tag on the size of the loss from the financial crisis caused by the banks:  a 'world war'.

As reported by the Telegraph,
The financial crisis has been as economically devastating as a world war and may still be a burden on “our grandchildren”... 
Andy Haldane, the Bank’s executive director for financial stability, added that public anger at the banks was fully justified and that pay in the industry remained too high. 
“In terms of the loss of incomes and outputs, this is as bad as a world war,” he said. “It would be astonishing if people weren’t asking big questions about where finance has gone wrong. 
“If we are fortunate, the cost of the crisis will be paid for by our children. More likely it will still be being paid for by our grandchildren. There is every reason why the general public ought to be deeply upset by what has happened – and angry.” 
Four years since the crisis struck, the economy is still 3pc smaller than at its peak. The scale of the problems will be exposed again on Wednesday when the Chancellor updates the country on the economic outlook and his austerity plans. 
To boost “growth, job creation, exports, investment, and business confidence”, George Osborne needs to be “bold” in his mini-Budget, the British Chambers of Commerce said as it downgraded its growth forecasts for next year and 2014....
Regular readers know Mr. Osborne needs to end the pursuit of the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and adopt the Swedish Model.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses have been protected at all costs.  As a result, the burden of the excess debt in the financial system has been shifted to the real economy.

As Mr. Haldane notes, 'our grandchildren' will still be paying on this burden.  If and only if we keep pursuing the Japanese Model.

Under the Swedish Model, banks recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and allows it to continue growing.

As for the banks book capital levels and banker bonuses, they take a hit as they are responsible for 'paying' for the financial crisis.  The way the banks pay is through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings until such time as they have rebuilt their book capital levels.
Mr Haldane told BBC Radio 4’s The World at One that banks remained one of the major impediments to the recovery because they need to own up to their bad debts to restore confidence and get credit flowing again. Failure to come clean would mean “the fog will persist”, he said.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Haldane has nicely summarized what the banks need to do under the Swedish Model and how continuing with the Japanese Model will result in a prolonged Japan-style economic slump.
“Investors will be much less willing to put their money into the banking system. They will lack confidence in the banking system and will either charge very high rates for lending that money to banks or will just withdraw their money entirely,” he said.
The only way to restore confidence in the banking system is for the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, investors can independently confirm that banks recognized all of their losses.
“More could and should be done to get lending moving as a springboard to getting the economy moving.”
This cannot happen until banks step up and recognize their losses.  Until they do this, the bankers know that their use of 'extend and pretend' to turn bad loans into zombie loans distorts the value of the underlying collateral.

If a banker doesn't have confidence in the value of the underlying collateral, they cannot make a loan.  Hence, banks need to recognize their losses so that there is certainty surrounding collateral values.
He added that bankers pay had been “ratcheting down” but that there was “still some way to travel”. “Back in 1980, your average investment banker was paid the same as your average lawyer or doctor. By the time we got to 2006, they were being paid four times as much,” he said. 
“Have we got further to travel south? I suspect probably yes.”
Adopting the Swedish Model will help to get bankers pay back in line.  After all, they are unlikely to receive much in the way of cash bonuses while the bank is rebuilding its book capital levels.
He also admitted that “with 20-20 hindsight” the Bank should have done more to deflate the bubble ahead of recession.
This is an incredibly important admission by Mr. Haldane.  In essence, he is saying that the BoE knew it should take away the punch bowl, but didn't.

Regular readers know that with adoption of the Swedish Model, the Bank of England can also stop pursuing the zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies that are part of the policy menu under the Japanese Model.  Ending these policies should further boost growth in the real economy.

Saturday, December 1, 2012

Mervyn King: are banks helping people to avoid denting balance sheets?

As reported by the Guardian, the Bank of England's Mervyn King is concerned that banks are helping people struggling to pay their loan for fear of denting their own balance sheets and in the process making the bad debt problem even worse.

[Sir Mervyn King] discussed at the Treasury select committee the use of "forbearance" by banks to help customers in difficulty to schedule their loans. 
"Bad forbearance is where the banks don't insist on repayment not because they care about their customer but because they're worried about the implications for their own balance sheet, given the accounting conventions under which banks operate," he said. 
"That is undoubtedly a concern, because the issue is ... to what extent are the balance sheets giving an accurate representation of the underlying position of the banks?"...
Investors argue that one reason the share prices of the banks are lower than the value of their assets is because they are nervous about a potential wave of bad debts in the future.
Clarity on this subject would be welcomed by investors...
And the only way to provide clarity on this subject is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, investors and regulators like the Bank of England can assess exactly how bad the 'forbearance' problem is.

Equally importantly, investors can exert market discipline on the banks so that the banks recognize their losses on this bad debt upfront rather than try to slowly recognize the losses over time as the banks generate earnings in excess of what is needed to pay banker bonuses and increase book capital levels.
 

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Bank of England to call for banks to provide transparency

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee will call on banks to provide transparency so that market participants can independently assess the value of each bank's assets and each bank's solvency.

Regular readers know that the only way to accomplish this is if the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The Bank of England is expected Thursday to heap further pressure on U.K. banks to come clean about the value of their assets, a move aimed at rebuilding investor confidence in the sector and freeing up idle resources to make more loans and foster a stronger economic recovery. 
The central bank's Financial Policy Committee, which brings together regulators, BOE officials and finance industry veterans to assess the health of the financial system, warned in September that banks will find it difficult to attract capital as long as investors are unsure of precisely how much bank assets are worth. 
The issue is also causing a headache for regulators--who say the banks' opaque balance sheets mean they can't decide whether lenders are safe or not--and for rate-setters steering U.K. monetary policy....
Please re-read the highlighted text as it appears that your humble blogger's argument for requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency has been both heard and understood.
"Capital needs could be better clarified, and the task of attracting fresh capital facilitated, if steps were taken to reduce uncertainty about valuations of on-balance sheet assets," the committee concluded, according to a record of its September policy meeting. 
Participants noted "market doubts" about the price tags banks currently place on some of their loans and other holdings, and vowed to consider how to tackle the issue this month after assessing the latest data....
Everyone knows that the price tags are wrong because of suspension of mark to market accounting and the adoption of regulatory forbearance that allowed banks to engage in extend and pretend with their bad debt.
Outgoing BOE Governor Mervyn King ... told lawmakers Tuesday there are "fundamental questions" that need to be addressed over whether banks' published balance sheets truly reflect their real-life positions.
 This can only be answered if the banks provide ultra transparency.
BOE officials and bank supervisors at the Financial Services Authority fret that, cheap funds or not, one reason some banks may be unwilling or unable to lend is that their balance sheets may be clogged with bad loans. 
Rather than foreclose and take losses, lenders have instead tweaked loan conditions or given borrowers more time to pay up, tying up capital that could be used to fund loans elsewhere. 
As far back as June last year, the central bank was warning that while such "forbearance" provides a lifeline to struggling homeowners and businesses and can, therefore, enhance financial stability, banks were nonetheless unsettling investors by failing to make adequate provisions for any potential losses.
Meanwhile, officials on the BOE's Monetary Policy Committee, which sets interest rates, worry that banking sector problems mean capital may be stuck in unproductive industries and isn't being shifted to the productive bits of the economy where it is sorely needed, a phenomenon that is severely impairing growth. 
British policy makers are desperate to ensure that the country doesn't succumb to a "lost decade" of stagnation like Japan did in the 1990s. Japanese banks' unwillingness to recognize losses--an endless "evergreening" of bad loans to "zombie" companies that the authorities took too long to tackle--has been identified as one of the key factors that kept Japan's economy in stasis.
 Regular readers have seen this argument presented on this blog in too many posts to count.
Richard Barwell, an economist at Royal Bank of Scotland and a former BOE official, believes policy makers are poised to act. He anticipates the FPC will Thursday set out fresh guidance on how best to ensure banks are valuing their assets prudently. 
"It is hard for investors to be sure which banks are weak and which are strong, and which if any need more capital, given the lack of consistent information. It all boils down to whether there is a difference between how the banks are valuing their assets and what they are really worth."
 And the only way to solve the question that has dogged the banking industry since the beginning of the financial crisis is if each bank provides ultra transparency.
To be sure, demanding banks open up about the true state of their balance sheets is fraught with risk. It may expose banks dangerously short of capital, potentially a big problem when two--Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group PLC (LYG)--are largely in the hands of the taxpayer. It could also force banks to call in souring loans, leading to a surge in foreclosures and economic hardship. But policy makers hope that confronting an issue that has been festering since the crisis started may also allow the U.K. economy to finally get back on its feet.
I hope that I have answered the question of capital (not to worry as bank are designed with deposit insurance and access to central bank funding to operate with low or negative book capital levels).

I hope I have also handled the issue under the Swedish Model of banks recognizing their losses upfront.  As Iceland showed, banks can recognize their losses without throwing families out of their houses.


Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane: traditional banking model, R.I.P.

In his testimony before a Parliament committee, Reuters reports that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane observed that banks need a new business model.
Banks need a new business model and the threat of forced separation of investment and retail banking should be put into law to help curb risky behaviour... 
The question is what should the new business model be?

The financial crisis confirmed for all time that banks are bad holders of risk.  This includes credit, interest rate and liquidity risk.

This should come as no surprise given past financial crises:  Loans to less developed countries (credit), US Savings and Loans (interest rate) and the Great Depression (liquidity).

It was this recognition that banks were bad holders of risk that drove the creation of the 'originate to distribute' model.  Under this business model, banks were suppose to transfer these risks to other financial market participants who were better able to hold these risks.

Clearly, the 'originate to distribute' model failed in the run-up to the Great Recession.  The key question is why?

It failed along two correctable dimensions.

First, it failed because of a lack of transparency in the securities that were sold to transfer the risk.  Structured finance securities from covered bonds to securitizations are brown paper bags where buyers are blindly betting on the value of the contents.

This is correctable by simply requiring observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the next business day.  With this information, market participants can know what they are buying (which exerts market discipline on the pricing of the underlying collateral) and, on an ongoing basis, know what they own.

Second, it failed because of a lack of transparency into the banks themselves and the risks that they were taking on.  Banks are, in Mr. Haldane's words, 'black boxes.'  As such, they are not subject to market discipline as market participants cannot figure out how risky the banks are.

Instead, the financial system is dependent on regulators to both correctly assess and communicate the risk of the banks.  The failure by regulators to do both correctly (and regulators are biased to not properly communicate the riskiness of the banks over concerns about "safety and soundness") results in the potential for financial contagion as market participants have too much exposure given the real risk of the banks.

This too is correctable by simply requiring ultra transparency and having the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The new business model should be the 'originate to distribute' model with transparency.

This business model restrains risk taking by banks while assuring that the economy has the access to credit it needs for growth.
Andrew Haldane, director of financial stability at the Bank of England, told a panel of lawmakers that Britain's Vickers plan to impose extra capital on the deposit-taking arms of banks by 2019 to make them safer, may not be enough to protect the taxpayer.... 
Haldane urged them to consider inserting a "backstop" so that if the "ring fence" leaked or was hard to police, regulators could forcibly split up the banks into retail and investment units. 
"That could be a clever way of ensuring Vickers is implemented faithfully and achieves what it is meant to achieve," Haldane said. 
Regular readers know your humble blogger is not into "clever", particularly when it involves financial regulation.  Clever is what drives the creation of complex rules/regulations like ring-fencing as a replacement for transparency and market discipline.
The ring-fence will comprise deposits and overdrafts, leaving flexibility on other products, but Haldane said this "grey area" created perilous risks for regulators. 
"There is a case for moving the ring-fence outwards to mandate a broader set of activities that lie within," he said. 
Small business loans, trade finance and mortgages should be inside the ring-fenced arm which should have its own governance, risk management, balance sheet, treasury operations and even human resources to ensure the right culture, he said....
Anything that creates "perilous risks for regulators" by definition is an unacceptable risk for the financial system and therefore should not be part of financial reform.

I say this because the Great Recession showed that regulators are fallible and when they fail it comes at a huge cost to the taxpayer.
The Bank of England's new prudential regulation authority (PRA) ... will aim to move away from the "box ticking" approach of the past and be more judgement led in its approach which Haldane likened to a swat team pursuing "random sampling".... 
Many top banks were also unable to "simply add up the numbers" and calculate risks across the group, he added. 
The risk-based Basel rules forcing banks to hold more capital from January were also built on the "shakiest foundations". 
It would be a thankless task of deciding how much capital banks should hold against each asset, a game of "cat and mouse" that no regulator can win, Haldane said.
By requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, financial regulators like the PRA can truly move away from a box ticking approach or engaging in no win games like determining capital adequacy.

With ultra transparency, the PRA can ask each bank's competitors and other market participants what they are most concerned about with that bank.  Asking this question harnesses the ability of the market to assess the banks and the risks they are taking.


Friday, October 26, 2012

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane calls for 'curbing King Kong banks'

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane in his speech 'on being the right size'  became the latest regulator to call for cutting the Too Big to Fail banks down to size.

Besides Mr. Haldane's typical insightful analysis, his speech reiterated many of the observations made by Paul Volcker on why the regulations proposed since the beginning of the current financial crisis are not going to be effective at dealing with the Too Big to Fail banks.

Regular readers know that there is only one way to right size these banks:  require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency harnesses the market in shrinking these global financial institutions.

For example, the market shrinks these banks by charging the banks more for their complexity.  It is one thing to say these big banks have 14,000+ subsidiaries, it is another to make these banks disclose the intimate details of each subsidiary so the market participants can assess their risk.

In addition, the market shrinks these banks by restraining proprietary trading.  Management and traders know that disclosing their positions limits how much can be earned from proprietary trading.  At a minimum, market participants can use programs similar to IBM's Watson to identify trades that appear to violate the Volcker Rule and call these trades to the regulators' attention.

More importantly, ultra transparency ends contagion in the financial system.  With ultra transparency, market participants have the information they need to independently assess the risk of each of these banks and adjust the amount of their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk assessment.

As reported by the Telegraph,
Andrew Haldane, the Bank’s executive director for financial stability, claimed that current bank reforms – including the Government’s plans to ringfence retail banks – do not go far enough and further measures should be considered. 
To address properly the “too-big-to-fail” problem, he said regulators should consider doubling banks’ loss-absorbing capital buffers to around 20pc, “placing limits on bank size”, or imposing a “full separation of investment and commercial banking” rather than a ring-fence.
Each of these alternatives has problems.

The OECD observed and your humble blogger has fully documented why the accounting construct known as bank capital is meaningless.  It bears repeating that bank capital is meaningless because it is easily manipulated by both banks and their regulators.

Limiting the size of banks sounds nice in theory, however, the question is whether it is size that makes the Too Big to Fail problematic or the risk that if they fail it will cause damage to the rest of the financial system.  The way to mitigate this risk is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Ring-fencing or full separation of investment and commercial banking sounds nice in theory, but the reason that Glass-Steagall fell was banks and their regulators had discovered that banks were bad holders of credit, interest and liquidity risk.  It was far more sensible for banks to originate and service loans and distribute these loans to investors who were better able to hold the loans.

The freezing of the structured finance market is a reflection of the failure to require that each deal provide observable event based reporting so that investors could know what they own.  The fact that the market froze does not say that it is a bad idea to have banks reducing their credit, interest and liquidity risk.
He added that the evidence pointed to the optimal size for a bank to be as small as $100bn (£62bn). ... 
Although banks claim to be more efficient the larger they are, Mr Haldane said the analysis ignored the cost of the implicit taxpayer guarantee that he calculated was worth $70bn a year for the world’s largest banks between 2002 and 2007, and $300bn a year now. 
Without the subsidy, “there is no longer evidence of economies of scale at bank sizes above $100bn. If anything, there is now evidence of dis-economies which rise with bank size, consistent with big banks becoming ‘too big to manage’,” he said. 
“Subtracting this subsidy, removing the state crutch, would suggest a dramatically lower socially-optimal banking scale. Like King Kong and Godzilla, these giants would arguably then be physiological impossibilities ... the weight transfer associated with a single step would have shattered their thigh bones.”
Mr. Haldane does have a wonderful way with words.

I know what his analysis suggests, but it is not clear to me that a bank that provides ultra transparency and operates as a utility doesn't have economies of scale when it gets larger than $100 billion.
Mr Haldane was warning that, despite regulators efforts to build regimes that allow banks to fail without taxpayer support, the risk is that – in the practical event of a giant lender’s imminent collapse – the government would discard the theory and step in. 
“Consider that trade-off when a big, complex bank hits the rocks,” Mr Haldane said. “On the one side is a simple, but certain, option – state bail-out. On the other is a complex, and less certain, option – resolution. If governments are risk-averse ... then bail-out may look attractive on the day. 
“The history of big bank failure is a history of the state blinking before private creditors.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as the point that Mr. Haldane makes is extremely important.

Our modern banking system is designed not to require government bailouts of the banks, however, there is a long tradition of bank regulators urging governments to bailout failing institutions (think Savings & Loans for example).
In his speech at the Institute of Directors, he argued that “one way of lessening that dilemma, and at the same making resolution more credible, is to act on the scale and structure of banking directly”....
The most direct way to act on scale and structure of banking is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It would be amazing how much the banks would change by simply shining the bright light of transparency on them and letting it act as the best disinfectant.
Mr Haldane warned of potential loopholes in the structure. “Today’s ring-fence [can become] tomorrow’s string vest,” he said. He also questioned whether banks would properly separate “cultures and capital” as long as the two operations remained under one roof.
Both of these loopholes were identified by Paul Volcker in his testimony before Parliament prior to Mr. Haldane's speech.

As I learned when working for Mr. Volcker, what he says might not be the word of god when it comes to banking, but it does come from closer to god given his 6'7" height.
Although he welcomed the progress made on bank reforms so far, he added: “Claims that they have solved the too-big-to-fail problem appear to me, however, premature, probably over-optimistic. Worse, they risk sending a false sense of crisis comfort.”
His comments were released shortly after Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, spoke out against the “vested interests” in banking and said that unfinished reforms were hampering economic recovery. 
“There are many vested interests working against change and push-back is intensifying,” she said. “It is interesting how some banks say the new regulations will be too burdensome, but then spend hundreds of millions of dollars lobbying to kill them.”
The leading unfinished reform that is hampering economic recovery and that is being strongly resisted by the banks is requiring them to provide ultra transparency.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency the market will force them to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This will take the burden of supporting this debt off of the real economy and, as shown by Iceland, result in the economy growing again as capital that was used for debt service is now used to buy goods and services.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency they will be forced to shrink dramatically.  Gone will be the subsidiaries to arbitrage rules and regulations.  Gone will be proprietary trading.  Gone will be behavior like manipulating Libor.
She added that progress was needed on resolution regimes to allow banks to fail and for regulators to coordinate and align their rules, particularly over new rules on bank structures such as ring-fencing or proprietary trading bans. “We need a global level discussion of the pros and cons of direct restrictions on business models,” she said.
Actually, we need to stop talking and simply implement ultra transparency.

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Bank of England's Paul Tucker warns banks that worse yet to come

The Guardian reports that the Bank of England's Paul Tucker has warned banks that the worse is yet to come and that banks need to end their get-rich-quick culture.

The lead candidate to take over from Sir Mervyn King as governor of the Bank of England, Tucker told a City audience: "There is a tangible probability – not a high probability – that the worst may still be ahead" for banks, which was why they needed to hold more capital....
Regular readers know that your humble blogger feels sick every time I hear another economist or regulator call for banks to hold more capital.

Apparently the economist or regulator did not get the message from the OECD that bank capital is meaningless.

At the top of the list of reasons why it is meaningless is that regulators have engaged in regulatory forbearance which allows the banks to push off recognition of losses on bad debt through the use of extend and pretend.

Next on the list of reasons why bank capital is meaningless is that the accounting profession allowed banks to end mark-to-market accounting on all those toxic securities the banks are holding.  Since there is no deep, liquid market for those securities, nobody knows how much the current book value of these securities overstates what would be realized if the securities had to be sold.

Since losses haven't been realized, bank book capital is overstated.  Hence, it is meaningless.
"I would say that the Bank believes what it always believed: that sound and honest finance is not only essential for the economy, it will be good for the City too."
Regular readers know that at the heart of sound and honest finance is ultra transparency.  It is only when banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that sound and honest finance occurs.

Without sunlight as the best disinfectant, we have ample evidence that bankers will engage in bad behavior (think Libor manipulation, interest rate swap mis-selling,....).
He said the Financial Policy Committee, on which he sits, was concerned a "tidal wave" could be coming. "We may all be grateful that there is a few billion more of capital here and there in the banking industry, keeping banks in the private sector rather than the dead hand of state ownership."...
Modern banking systems are designed not to require the 'dead hand of state ownership'.

Banks can operate and support the real economy for years even if they have low or negative book capital levels.  They can do so because of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.

With deposit guarantees, taxpayers are effectively the silent equity partner for the banks when they have low or negative book capital levels.
Tucker said bankers needed to be paid in subordinated debt and put more focus on customer service rather than sales and on the medium-term success of the firm. 
"Putting it bluntly that would make it less easy to get rich quick irrespective of the quality of the business transacted or the compliance culture in their part of the firm," Tucker said, indicating this would require changes to the codes on remuneration....
As I have repeatedly said, there are two problems with paying bankers with subordinated debt.

First, it takes the regulators' focus off of ensuring that banks provide ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, the banks are subject to market discipline and as a result a restraint on their risk taking.

Second, this debt does not represent 95% of their compensation.  Bankers will receive other forms of compensation.  For example, bankers are likely to continue to receive stock options.  The reward from taking risk and boosting share price could easily offset the risk of loss on the subordinated debt.

Bottom line:  market discipline made possible by ultra transparency is superior at restraining bank risk taking than compensating using subordinated debt.
While changes are under way, Tucker said that all risk could not be avoided: "We need to find broadly the right balance between, on one hand, safety and, on the other hand, the contribution that sound and honest finance can make to economic prosperity. 
A balance that can only be achieved if banks are required to provide ultra transparency and the invisible hand of the market allowed to work properly.
"We may not be able to abolish the occasional waves of optimism that grip humanity and the tendency to excess when they set off. But we can and must dampen their effects on the financial system and economy. This must include changing the incentives that bankers face."
Without ultra transparency, the financial system is dramatically more unstable as it is dependent on the Financial Policy Committee to dampen the occasional wave of optimism or pessimism that grip humanity.

As the financial crisis showed, when there is a single point of failure in the system like dependence on regulators, the single point of failure will fail.

It is simply unacceptable to have a single point of failure in the financial system.  I am not advocating doing away with the Financial Policy Committee.  I am simply saying that the system needs ultra transparency so that the financial markets are not dependent on the FPC for stability.

Thursday, September 27, 2012

Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee embraces transparency

As reported by the Telegraph, the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee is recommending that
To give investors the confidence to put their money in the banks, lenders need to be more honest about the scale of bad debts they are carrying, the FPC said. 
“The task of attracting fresh external capital [could be] facilitated if steps were taken to reduce uncertainty about valuations of on-balance sheet assets,”
Please re-read the highlighted text as the FPC has effectively called for banks to provide ultra transparency as your humble blogger has been advocating and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this level of granular information that uncertainty about valuations is reduced and investor confidence is restored.

Uncertainty is reduced because market participants can independently confirm the valuations.

Bank of England's Robert Jenkins: A debate framed by fallacies

In a must read speech, Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins looks at how the financial industry framed the debate on regulation after the financial crisis on three myths.

Specifically, the myths were

we must choose between safety and growth. The banking lobby would have us believe that higher capital requirements and lower leverage will damage economic growth and retard the recovery. “Increase our capital requirements and we will reduce our lending!”... 
To the exposure of myth number one, bankers retort: “How dumb can you be?” “Equity is expensive. Make us double our equity and you will lower our Return on Equity, damage shareholder value and discourage the supply of bank capital.” Here we have myth number two.... 
The third myth follows from the second – to wit: governments must choose between domestic financial stability and the competitiveness of their domestic financial centers. Clearly, if you believe that higher capital requirements damage bank profitability and shareholder returns then you must also fear for the competitiveness of your domestic banking champions, the attractiveness of your country as a global finanz platz and the tax take for your treasury. 
Let me go on record as saying that I agree with Mr. Jenkins that each of these is a myth.

However, the first two of these myths obscure a more important myth.  The myth that the level of the accounting construct known as the bank capital is important in a modern banking system.

Regular readers know that in a modern banking system, banks are designed to protect the real economy by absorbing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and still continue operating.  They can continue operating because of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, taxpayers become the silent 'equity' partner for any bank with low or negative book capital levels as a result of absorbing the losses.  With taxpayers as a silent 'equity' partner, there is no reason to bail out a bank that is capable of generating earnings and rebuilding its book capital.  As for the banks that cannot generate earnings, they need to be closed.

All three of Mr. Jenkins myths obscure a second important myth.  The myth that the level of the accounting construct known as bank capital is synonymous with financial stability.

Regular readers know that financial stability is a function of transparency.

Financial systems that are characterized by complex regulations and regulatory oversight as a substitute for transparency are prone to crash.  Our ongoing financial crisis demonstrates this on a daily basis.

Financial systems that are characterized by transparency are not only stable, but have a competitive advantage.  How many times have you heard that investors are drawn to the US financial markets because they are the most transparent?

Regular readers know that I have advocated bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

For banks, this means requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

For structured finance securities, this means that all activities like a payment or default involving the underlying collateral are reported on an observable event basis before the next business day to all market participants.

Monday, September 24, 2012

Financial Policy Committee worried about losses from 2008 still on UK bank books

As reported by the Guardian, the UK's Financial Policy Committee
is worried that UK banks are still sitting on huge losses from loans to businesses and mortgage holders dating back to the Lehmans crash that have yet to be fully written down on their balance sheets.
The fact that these losses are still hidden on and off UK banks balance sheets is the direct result of the adoption of the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are preserved at all costs.

As a result, policies like regulatory forbearance are adopted.  Regulatory forbearance allows banks to create 'zombie' loans by engaging in 'extend and pretend' rather than recognizing the losses on the loans and the related decline in bank book capital levels.

Equally troubling to your humble blogger is the idea that the UK's Financial Policy Committee might not know the actual size of the losses that are being hidden.  Doesn't this lack of information clearly call into question the ability of the Financial Policy Committee to do its job?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been calling for the adoption of the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis since the beginning of the crisis.

Under the Swedish model, banks recognize all of the losses on the excess debt in the financial system today.

This was done in Iceland and it has successfully put the financial crisis behind it.  Iceland required its banks to recognize the losses that they would have experienced if the banks had gone through the long drawn out process of default, bankruptcy and foreclosure without going through the process.

I have also been calling for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can exert discipline on the banks to both recognize their losses and clean up their troubled exposures.

Had ultra transparency rather than additional complicated regulations and more regulatory supervision been adopted in response to the financial crisis, the Financial Policy Committee would not have to worry in 2012 about losses occurred in 2008 still being hidden by the banks.