Showing posts with label Policy Failure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Policy Failure. Show all posts

Sunday, March 24, 2013

Michael Pettis: When do we call it a solvency crisis

In a very interesting column, Michael Pettis looks at how there can be a bank solvency crisis going on for years before the banks and regulators are willing to publicly acknowledge that there is a bank solvency crisis.

The example that Mr. Pettis focuses on is the handling of loans to Less Developed Countries (LDC).

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has written about the LDC experience extensively.  The key takeaways were market participants knew that from a book value perspective the banks were insolvent, this did not matter and banks can operate for years while rebuilding low or negative book capital levels.

Why did market participants know the banks had negative book capital levels as a result of the LDC loans?

Because the banks disclosed the size of their exposures to each Less Developed Country.  By simply taking the price that the loans traded for in the market, market participants had a way of approximating the value of these exposures and what the true book capital level was for each bank.

Compare and contrast this with the current situation where banks do not disclose their exposures.

There is no way for market participants to know just how negative the true book capital levels are for each bank.

To take one possibly illuminating example, I started my trading career during the Latin American debt crisis, which officially began in August 1982. 
I joined the market in 1987, when bankers and policymakers were still assuring everyone that the problem Latin America was facing was a liquidity problem.
Nobody believed them nor because of disclosure of the LDC loans did anyone have to believe them.

I have referred to the handling of the LDC loans and the Savings & Loans as Fed Chairman Paul Volcker's regulatory legacy.  He believed in handling solvency issues behind closed doors.

This philosophy ultimately resulted in what I refer to as the policy of financial failure contagion and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine (via Yves Smith:  do nothing that will harm the profits or reputations of big and/or politically connected banks).

This policy is built on the notion that financial contagion is minimized by hiding the truth behind closed doors.

As discussed above, this policy was absolutely the wrong conclusion to draw from the LDC loan experience.

The conclusions to have drawn are that markets understand that banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels and that markets can handle the truth.
As long as we could keep rolling loans over, they earnestly explained, the problem would eventually resolve itself at little to no relative cost (well, Latin America was struggling with unemployment, capital flight, hyperinflation and political turmoil, but I guess that doesn’t really count). 
It wasn’t until 1990 that the first formal debt forgiveness took place – known as the Mexican Brady Bond restructuring – and before the end of the decade nearly every country except Chile and Colombia had their own Brady bonds. 
Even those two countries, and all the others, had managed to obtain for themselves a significant amount of informal debt forgiveness through debt-equity swaps and debt repurchases at huge discounts from face value (some legal and some not quite legal). 
Why did it take so long for bankers and policymakers to recognize the truth – that this was not just a liquidity problem? 
Actually it didn’t. Most bankers knew by 1985-86 that the region was actually suffering from a generalized solvency problem, and among the big banks JP Morgan had been taking substantial provisions all along. 
No one could formally acknowledge the possibility of insolvency, however, because to have done so would have required that all of banks take much greater provisions than they already had. 
This would have created a problem. Of the top ten banks in America, only JP Morgan would not have been technically insolvent had the banks been forced to mark their LDC loan portfolios to market.
Mr. Pettis is confusing having negative book capital levels with being technically insolvent.

The banks all were technically insolvent as the book value of their liabilities exceeded the market value of their assets (the definition of technical insolvency).

Recognizing their losses would have had two impacts.  First, it would have in fact made the banks reported book capital levels negative.  Second and far more importantly, it would have hammered banker bonuses.  These bonuses couldn't be paid when banks have low or negative book capital levels.
In May 1987 Citibank, after many years of replenishing its capital, was able to announce suddenly and to the great surprise of the entire market that it had decided to take a huge amount of provisions against dodgy sovereign loans.
When it did so, Security Pacific became the poster bank for everyone knowing that its "true" book capital levels were massively negative.

However, everyone knew it would not be closed as it had a franchise that was capable of generating a significant amount of earnings even with a negative book capital level.
By 1989-90 the rest of the big American banks were also able to accept the write-offs without becoming technically insolvent. That is when everybody formally “discovered” that in fact the LDC debt crisis was a lot more than just a liquidity crisis.
No, this is when the regulators and bankers were willing to formally acknowledge the LDC debt crisis was a solvency crisis. It was well known by the market that it was a solvency crisis since 1982.
This is the key point. The American bankers weren’t stupid. They just could not formally acknowledge reality until they had built up sufficient capital through many years of high earnings – thanks in no small part to the help provided by the Fed in the form of distorted yield curves – to recognize the losses without becoming insolvent.
American bankers were not stupid.  They knew that formally acknowledging reality would end their lucrative bonuses.

This is exactly what has happened globally during our current bank solvency led financial crisis.  
And this matters to Europe. There is simply no way European banks, especially in Germany, can acknowledge the possibility of sovereign insolvency until they, too, have built up enough capital to absorb the losses. 
They have, unfortunately, been painfully slow to do so, even with yield-curve help from the ECB, and so I suspect that this is going to remain a “liquidity” problem for many more years. 
While it does, the debt-burdened countries of peripheral Europe are going to suffer a decade of weak growth, high unemployment, and contentious politics, all the while the debt growing faster than the economy.
Mr. Pettis re-iterates a series of points that your humble blogger has previously made.  These points boil down to two simple observations:

  1. when bankers are allowed to pay themselves bonuses, banks cannot rebuild their book capital levels quickly; and
  2. when banks are not required to recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system, the real economy and the borrowers suffer as a result.


Thursday, March 14, 2013

Sheila Bair: don't call it a housing recovery, Fed just blowing bubbles

According to an NPR post, Sheila Bair is less than enthusiastic about the idea we are seeing either a housing or economic recovery.

But one banking expert who grappled with the colossal housing bust during the Great Recession says it's too soon to celebrate. 
Despite a recent upturn in sales and prices, "the housing market is still very weak," said Sheila Bair, who headed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. from 2006 to 2011. Bair, speaking at a Washington "economic summit" organized by The Atlantic magazine, warned homeowners that "we need more experience and data to know if it's really turned around." 
Bair said lenders may be sitting on huge numbers of foreclosed upon houses that have been held back from the market. As housing prices start to perk up, that hidden inventory may come flooding into the market - and pushing prices back down, she said. 
Moreover, millions of homeowners are "under water," i.e., they still owe more on mortgages than they could get by selling their homes. As soon as they can sell at prices high enough to pay off old loans, they'll put their properties on the market— and again drive down prices, she said. 
And there could be another worry: prices for all sorts of assets may already be too high now because interest rates have been held too low for too long by the Federal Reserve, she said. 
The Fed policy makers have had good intentions, but their low-interest-rate efforts have not revived the economy. 
"We are not getting new lending and new jobs out of this," Bair said. However, we do have "the risk of asset bubbles developing... well, they've already developed," she said. 

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

UK Guardian: Policy response to financial crisis wrong

In a column by its editors discussing why the Funding for Lending Scheme has failed, the Guardian exposes why the entire policy response to the financial crisis has been wrong since the very beginning of the crisis.
The problem with the government's funding for lending scheme – and indeed its entire strategy for growth – can best be expressed in an old cliche: you can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink. 
With its policy of monetary activism, the coalition has concentrated on laying on the H2O of credit.
Please re-read the highlighted text as the justification used by each of the western governments and Japan for bailing out its banks was to preserve their ability to extend credit.

Regular readers know that this justification was built on a number of false assumptions.

One false assumption was that banks had to have capacity on their balance sheets if they were to be able to extend the credit that the real economy needs for growth.  Your humble blogger has documented why this is assumption is wrong.  The simple fact is that lending and funding for loans are completely separate as for at least the last 4 decades banks have had the alternative of selling the loans that it originates to buyers like insurance companies and pension funds.

The Guardian editorial focuses on a different false assumption.  It focuses on the assumption that there is a great unmet need for credit in the presence of an economy facing a major shortfall in demand.
Ministers have exhorted banks to lend, the Treasury has signed up to the Merlin agreement with financiers – as well as encouraging the provision of £375bn of quantitative easing and the £80bn scheme of funding for lending. 
These wheezes have cost hundreds of billions of pounds and taken up months of policymakers' time – and the net result has been sorely disappointing....
They have been good for banker bonuses though as they have enhanced bank profitability.
Faced with a major shortfall in domestic demand, he has depressed demand still further by laying out the biggest programme of spending cuts ever seen in peacetime Britain. 
And to spur growth, he has relied instead on trying to offer as much credit as possible. Put another way, an unthirsty horse has been offered gallons of surplus water.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes why the response to the financial crisis has not worked to date (even when there was some stimulus as in the US).
Going by reports this week, Mr Osborne will next week announce yet more policies to boost lending to small and medium-sized businesses; perhaps by more closely targeting the funding for lending scheme administered by the Bank of England. 
This could once be chalked up as foolishness, but now it surely goes beyond that – it is wilful, damaging blindness on the chancellor's part....
Willful, damaging blindness about the ineffectiveness of the policy responses to the financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007 are not limited to the UK's chancellor.  This extends across countries and central banks.

As a group, they choose to implement the Japanese Model that Japan deployed for handling its bank solvency led financial crisis.  As a group, they apparently believed they would get a different result than  a Japan-style economic slump.

As a group, they are unwilling to admit that their experience parallels the Japanese experience and they have pushed their economies into a Japan-style economic slump.  A result predicted by your humble blogger.

One of the reasons that your humble blogger has advocated for adopting the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis is that it avoids the Japan-style economic slump.  It does this by requiring the banks to recognize upfront all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

As a result, the burden of servicing the excess debt is not placed on the real economy where it would divert capital needed for growth and reinvestment.
But it must surely be evident by now that the main problem is not the lack of loans available to firms; it is that businesses do not see the growing markets or buoyant economy that would justify them spending and borrowing to invest.
The chief executives and managing directors can hardly be blamed for this: as Tuesday's industrial production figures and bleak forecasts from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research indicate, the economy is still stuck in the doldrums. 
While this remains the case, the government's focus on credit is misplaced.
The Guardian editors have eloquently summarized the current state of the global economy and why the policy response to the bank solvency led financial crisis was and still is wrong.

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Why low interest rates policies are not the answer

In her Guardian column, Ros Altmann explains why the the low interest policies being pursued in the EU, Japan, UK and US are not the answer to a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Her column is interesting for a number of reasons.

First, it comes out on the day after the Bank of England's Mervyn King said the Swedish Model under which banks recognize the losses on the excess debt in the financial system is the answer.  This comes from an individual who has tried low interest rate policies and seen that they do not work.

Second, she confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis about why low interest rate policies don't work.
It is four years since the Bank of England cut the base rate to 0.5% and started its £375bn money-creation programme, quantitative easing.... monetary measures pushing lending rates lower in order to revive the economy have failed, merely resulting in stagflation. 
Yet, still the Bank believes the problem is that rates are not low enough, even floating the astonishing possibility of "negative" interest rates.
Good doctors, whose patient is not recovering, would not just continue prescribing more of the same medicine, they would look for a different cure....
To his credit, Sir Mervyn King suggested exactly what is needed.  If policymakers were to follow his advice, the Bank of England could immediately raise interest rates back up to the 2% minimum level set by Walter Bagehot and end the distortions going on in the real economy.
I believe the damaging side-effects of the monetary medicine may actually be undermining recovery. 
Yes, those with large mortgages have had a bonanza, and banks have benefited hugely, but ultra-low interest rates are hurting important sections of the economy. 
Savers' and pensioners' nominal and real incomes have fallen sharply, while companies providing pension schemes have had to pour billions into their funds rather than their businesses, as low rates push up deficits.
Your humble blogger has referred to what has happened to savers, pensioners and companies as the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.

The death spiral refers to the simple fact that savers, pensioners and companies make up for the lack of earnings on their retirement plans/pensions by cutting back current demand and saving more.  This creates an economic headwind that more than offsets any stimulative benefits from lower interest rates.
Since 2008, Bank of England policy has focussed entirely on bringing down interest rates in order to boost growth. 
Academic models predict lowering rates will boost bank lending and increase access to credit for purchases of homes or other goods and services, ensuring economic recovery. However, this hasn't happened here.
That is because the academic models are wrong!!!

Regular readers know that these academic models did not predict the financial crisis either.  So there is absolutely no reason to believe they should predict what is happening now.
Rather than rushing to spend their extra money, over-extended mortgage borrowers have taken advantage of lower rates to accelerate repayments and clear their debts. 
Meanwhile, older savers' and pensioners' incomes have been squeezed by falling rates and soaring pension costs, leaving them poorer. 
Savings rates have lagged behind inflation, reducing real incomes, eroding the real value of savings and lowering consumer confidence. Fearing for their financial future as their current or prospective income plummets, many have cut spending.
Nice description of the retirement plan death spiral that is left out of the academic models.
Of course, no one wants to see home repossessions, but artificially propping up house prices locks future generations out of the housing market, distorts rental costs and delays the banks and building societies recognising their losses. 
Around four in 10 mortgages are interest-only – with many having no strategy for capital repayment – so low rates are just a politically expedient short-term sticking plaster, not a solution....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has succinctly summarized how banks are the primary beneficiary of a politically expedient policy that is not a long-term solution.
Low interest rates act like a tax increase on savers and pensioners, by reducing their income. 
This quasi-tightening of fiscal policy has transferred national income from older savers, to younger borrowers and banks. For example, since 2008, borrowers with a £100,000 mortgage are over £2,400 better off every year. However, savers with £100,000 in Cash Isas or fixed-rate bonds are over £2,750 a year worse off.
If the Chancellor were to announce a huge tax increase on older workers and pensioners, particularly to help people who had borrowed or lent too much, there would be uproar. 
But, by doing this via monetary policy rather than fiscal policy, there has been no democratic debate....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has highlighted why the current policy responses to the bank solvency led financial crisis are undermining democracy around the world.

The policy response has benefitted the bankers at the expense of the voting taxpayers.  The voting taxpayers sense that something is wrong with how elected officials are behaving and Ms. Altmann has just spelled out what it is.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

UK debt downgrade represents opportunity to adopt policy that will benefit real economy

At the end of last week, Moody's downgraded the UK's debt.  Initial reaction to this was best summarized by the Guardian,

[from Ed Balls] "The downgrading of Britain's credit rating is, in the chancellor's own words, a 'humiliation' for this government … The first economic test he set himself has been failed by this downgraded chancellor. 
Yet, as we have seen today, he remains in complete denial, offering more of the same failing medicine, even though Moody's now agrees that 'sluggish' growth is the main problem."... 
"Over a weekend, he went from saying he must stick to his plan to avoid a downgrade to saying that the downgrade is the reason why he must stick to the plan. He used to say that a downgrade would be a disaster; today he says it does not matter. 
But he still warns that a downgrade in future might be a problem – until it comes along; then he will have the same excuses. It is utterly baffling and completely illogical. He is just making it up as he goes along."...

[From George Osborne] the downgrading was a "stark reminder" of the debt problems built up in Britain. ... 
"We can either abandon our efforts to deal with our debt problems, and make a difficult situation very much worse, or we can redouble our efforts to overcome our debts, make sure that this country can earn its way in the world, and provide for our children a very much brighter economic situation...
The debt downgrade was not a surprise.  As your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis, so long as the burden of the excess debt in the financial system is placed on the real economy, the result will be a Japanese style economic slump.  The debt downgrade is simply confirmation of this.

What Moody's downgrading the UK debt did do is create an opportunity for UK policymakers to step back and evaluate the results of the policy of financial failure containment and the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis that was adopted in 2008.

An examination of the results would show that the financial crisis was a blip for the bankers who have continued to receive outsized pay packages and has been a disaster for the real economy with the elderly, the poor, savers and the under 30 year olds being particularly hard hit.

If a policymaker was not angling for a Tony Blair high paying advisory role with a bank, a policymaker might be tempted to look around and see if there was an alternative policy that might work better.

Finding this policy is not too hard as Iceland recently received an upgrade on its debt rating.

While not perfectly implemented, Iceland's policymakers understood that the policy of financial failure prevention and the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis was better for both the real economy and maintaining the social contract.

Under the Swedish model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy as capital that is needed for growth and reinvestment is not diverted to debt service on the excess debt.  This protect the social contract as the real economy continues to generate the funds need to pay for the social contract.

The Swedish model does have one significant downside.  It dramatically reduces cash payments to bankers or policymakers/senior advisors to the banks for a number of years - until such time as the banks have been able to retain sufficient earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.

As always, your humble blogger is hopeful that there exists a country whose policymakers but the citizens of the country ahead of the banks.  If the UK is that country, I expect that the policymakers will acknowledge what they are doing is not working and turn to the Swedish model.

If the UK were to do so, I confidently predict that the real economy will show significant improvement within 12 months.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

Neil Barofsky: Geithner doctrine lives on in Libor scandal

In his Financial Times editorial, Neil Barofsky looks at the results of the policy of financial failure containment championed by Tim Geithner.  His conclusion:  the policy is a disaster and needs to be abandoned.

Regular readers know that there is an alternative to the policy of financial failure containment and that is the policy championed by your humble blogger and built into our financial system:  financial failure prevention.

Our financial system is based on the FDR Framework.  Under this framework, the government is responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate timely manner so the market participants can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Under this framework, market participants have the incentive to use this information as they are responsible for all losses on their exposures under the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

By design, the FDR Framework is focused on preventing a systemic financial crisis.  It achieves this because each market participant has an incentive to limit their exposures to what they can afford to lose.

The reason we had the financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007 is that global financial regulators, led by the US Treasury adopted the policy of financial failure containment.  By adopting this policy they effectively abandoned the government's responsibility to ensure access to all the useful, relevant information (no reason to butt heads with Wall Street over what to disclose if you plan on mopping up after the crisis hits).

If you look at the financial system, what you see is that adoption of the policy of failure containment coincided with a dramatic increase in the size of the opaque parts of the financial system (think banks and structured finance securities).

Bottom line:  we are not having a financial crisis in the parts of the financial system where the legacy of the policy of failure prevention still prevails and we have transparency and market discipline.  We are having a financial crisis in the parts of the financial system where the policy of failure containment was adopted.

In his editorial, Mr. Barofsky shreds the policy of financial containment.
Now that Tim Geithner has resigned as US Treasury secretary, it is time to survey the damage wrought from four years of his approach to the financial crisis. 
The “Geithner doctrine” made the preservation of the largest banks, no matter the consequences, a top priority of the US government. 
Aside from moral hazard, it has also meant the perversion of the US criminal justice system. The US faces a two-tiered system of justice that, if left unchecked by the incoming Treasury and regulatory teams, all but assures more excessive risk-taking, more crime and more crises.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Barofsky nicely summarizes the policy of financial containment (his term is the "Geithner doctrine", but this gives too much credit to Mr. Geithner as the policy was adopted under Robert Rubin's leadership) and the practical fallout from pursuing it.
The recent parade of banking scandals, such as the manipulation of Libor rates by Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland and other major banks, can be traced back to the lax system of regulation before the financial crisis – and the weak response once disaster struck.
One result of the adopting the policy of financial containment is that banks were not required to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Had they been required to provide ultra transparency, the Libor scandal would not have occurred as Libor would have been based off of actual trades that market participants could see and confirm.
Take the response of the New York Federal Reserve to Barclays’ admission in 2008 that it was submitting false Libor rates and was not alone in doing so. Mr Geithner’s response was to in effect bury the tip. 
He sent a memo to the Bank of England suggesting some changes to the rate-setting process and then convened a meeting of regulators where he reportedly described only the risk but not the actual manipulation of the rate. He then put the government imprimatur on the rate via bailout programmes. His inaction helped permit a global crime to continue for another year.
The changes that Mr. Geithner suggested and that are being belated adopted would in fact not have prevented Libor from being manipulated.  The NY Fed got the proposed changes from the very banks that were manipulating Libor.

The only way to prevent the manipulation of Libor is by requiring that banks provide ultra transparency  and base the rate on actual transactions.  With ultra transparency, banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.  This keeps the unsecured interbank market unfrozen.  Once the trades have occurred and been reported, it is easy for market participants to select the trades on which to base Libor and similar benchmark interest rates.
When it was UBS’s turn to settle its Libor charges, even though a significant amount of the illegal activity took place at the parent company level, only a Japanese subsidiary was required to take a plea. 
Eric Holder, US attorney-general, demonstrated his embrace of the Geithner doctrine (a phrase coined by blogger Yves Smith) in explaining the UBS decision. He said that a more aggressive stance against the parent company could have a negative “impact on the stability of the financial markets around the world”. 
This week we saw the latest instalment of the saga. In fining RBS £390m, the DoJ only indicted one of the bank’s Asian subsidiaries, avoiding the more damaging result that would have stemmed from charging the parent company. 
Instead of seeking deterrence and justice, the US government increasingly appears to have fully absorbed the Geithner doctrine into its charging decisions by seeking a result that has a minimal impact on the target bank but will generate the best-looking press release. Some banks today are still too big to fail – and they are still too big to jail. 
The lack of robust enforcement is of course not limited to the Libor scandal. 
It was seen in the recent settlement talks with HSBC, when Treasury officials reportedly pressed the DoJ to consider the broad economic consequences that would follow an indictment. After hearing these arguments the DoJ chose not to criminally charge HSBC. 
And, of course, it is seen in the stunning dearth of criminal prosecutions arising out of the crisis. 
This was all but preordained given who the government turned to when the crisis struck: the same captured regulators who had blindly advanced bankers’ self-serving calls for a “light touch” before the crisis and who unsurprisingly embraced the Geithner doctrine afterwards. 
Having done so, of course, there would be no criminal prosecutions while the banks still teetered on the brink of collapse. The risk of causing them to fail, and thereby undoing all of the bailout efforts, was too high.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Barofsky makes the critical point that so long as banks are perceived by policymakers to be fragile, they will escape any form of discipline either from the market or the judiciary.
But that these arguments continue to resonate with officials in 2013 shows that the Geithner doctrine, perhaps justified by the conditions in 2008-09, has planted deep roots in our system of government. 
Again, what Mr. Barofsky and Yves Smith refer to as the Geithner doctrine has its roots in the policy of financial failure containment established during Mr. Rubin's years heading the US Treasury.

The policy of financial failure containment is the Treasury's default policy.

Unfortunately, it is also the Federal Reserve's default policy.  This policy is a legacy of the Volcker Era and can be seen in the attempt to handle behind closed doors the failure of Continental Illinois and the savings and loans.

Of course, Alan Greenspan took this policy to new heights with his explicit statement about how it was hard to identify a bubble and the role of monetary policy was to clean up afterwards.
This forbearance will have potentially devastating long-term effects, as each settlement on favourable terms reinforces the perception that, for a select group of executives and institutions, crime pays. 
It is only rational. They know that they will get to keep all of the ill-gotten profits if they go undetected, and on the small chance that they’re caught, most probably only the shareholders will pay – and only a relatively minor fine at that. 
The lack of meaningful consequences for those committing these frauds encourages future fraudulent conduct. Ultimately, the financial crisis was a game of incentives gone wild, and the lack of accountability in the aftermath of the crisis has only reinforced those bad incentives. 
The financial crisis was about opacity and the use of opacity by bankers whose incentives had gone wild.

It is only by restoring transparency to all the opaque corners of the global financial system that we are going to restore accountability and create proper incentives (after all, sunshine is the best disinfectant).
Breaking those incentives requires ditching the Geithner doctrine, which has led to the banks becoming even larger and more systemically significant than they were before the crisis. 
It means ditching the whole policy across the government of financial failure containment and returning to the policy of financial failure prevention that worked for 7+ decades.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Prudential CEO says QE "depressing growth"

Prudential's CEO, Tidjane Thiam, explains in a few brief comments why quantitative easing (QE) is a barrier to economic growth.

These comments should be familiar to regular readers as your humble blogger has been making this point for several years now.

As reported by the Telegraph,
“QE was a good short-term fix,” Mr Thiam said at a private breakfast last week. “In 2008, 2009 and 2010 it was the right answer. But now, it is different.  “We are just storing long term trouble by minimising short term pain.”
I would disagree with Mr. Thiam that QE was ever a good short-term fix as monetary policy is not a cure for a bank solvency led financial crisis.
The Prudential CEO ... said that the deepening market distortions created by quantitative easing had a negative effect on growth and damaged savers. 
Mr Thiam said that there was now a reliance on cheap money without a sensible exit plan. This, he warned, left the door open for inflation shocks that could throw the economic recovery off course. 
Mr. Thiam is absolutely right that QE damages savers and as a result has a negative effect on growth.  I refer to this effect as an economic headwind as savers cut back on current consumption to offset the loss in earnings on their savings.

Mr. Thiam's next point about the lack of a sensible exit plan is incredibly important.

Central bankers will say they have a sensible exit plan.  Unfortunately, these are the same central bankers who did not see the financial crisis coming and are frustrated that savers are not acting in the same way that the central bankers' models say they should act (with rates at 0%, they should be drawing down their savings rather than cutting back their current consumption).
“In the macro economy: savings equal investments. But QE is depressing savings and therefore depressing investment. This means, QE is depressing growth,” he said. 
While I agree with Mr. Thiam that QE is depressing growth, I don't agree with his causality.

QE and similar low interest rate monetary policies are depressing both return on savings and demand as savers offset the loss of income on their savings by cutting back on consumption.  By reducing consumer demand, QE is depressing the return on investment by companies.  Companies respond by reducing investments and this in turn further depresses growth.  Bottom line:  QE is depressing growth.
“It is a really strange economic strategy because everyone is looking for growth – but the monetary policy is completely anti-growth. There is no other exit to indebtedness than growth,” he said, referring to the UK’s £120bn or so deficit..... 
I agree with Mr. Thiam that it is a really strange to pursue anti-growth monetary policies like QE and similar low interest rate policies when the central bank is trying to stimulate growth.

I disagree with Mr. Thiam that the only way out of the indebtedness is growth.

There is a much quicker way.  Adopt the Swedish Model and have the banks recognize upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.
“I am very worried we are creating bubbles, everywhere. Interest rates will have to normalise. And it is not clear to me what the exit strategy is. I ask central bankers this all the time and I still have not heard a single sensible answer,” he said.... 
“QE creates a total distortion in the economy,” said Mr Thiam. “The risk free rate is possibly the single most important piece of economic information we have and we shouldn’t mess with it. That is a dangerous game, because, to manipulate the risk free rate is to introduce huge distortions.”
The role of central banks has always been to "distort" the risk free rate in an effort to smooth the business cycle (lower highs in economic expansion and lower lows during recessions).

What makes QE and similar low interest rate policies different this time is they have been shown to be ineffective at generating economic growth, but the central banks keep doubling down despite the lack of a sensible exit strategy and the huge distortions these policies are causing in the economy. 

Sunday, January 13, 2013

Why Wall Street thanks Tim Geithner for his service

In a must read Guardian column, Dean Baker credits Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner with the choice to pursue policies that were good only for banks and banker bonuses at the expense of the real economy, society and the social contract.

Regular readers know what Mr. Geithner pursued was the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

This results in a series of polices like bailouts, zero interest rates, quantitative easing, austerity and failure to enforce securities laws that are bad for the real economy and society.

For example, the burden of servicing the excess debt is place on the real economy.  This diverts capital that is needed for reinvestment and growth to debt service.  This diversion triggers a negative self-reinforcing spiral for the real economy:  less capital leads to less demand which leads to even less capital...

As the real economy shrinks, so too does tax revenue.  As tax revenue drops, the call for austerity policies and changing the social contract to limit money spent on social programs which have acted as automatic stabilizers to the real economy grow.  As these policies are implemented and spending on social programs declines, this further harms the real economy and society.

From the perspective of the real economy, society and the social contract, the Japanese Model has never worked positively.  But this is not surprising as the goal of the Japanese Model is not positive for the real economy, society and the social contract.  The goal of the Japanese Model is to protect the banks and the bankers' ability to loot society.

Regular readers also know that there is an alternative to the Japanese Model that Tim Geithner had to lead a rejection of every day.  The alternative is the Swedish Model.  Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize today all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

This protects the real economy as capital is not diverted to service the excess debt.  This protects society and the social contract as tax revenue can be used not to bailout the banks and pay for the debt incurred in bailing out the banks, but instead can be used to maintain and expand the social programs.

Finally, regular readers know that the global banking system is designed to support implementation of the Swedish Model.  Because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding, banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner while they have low or negative book capital levels.  So the banks have time to rebuild their book capital levels after recognizing the losses.

Rebuilding the capital levels requires the banks to retain 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings until such time as the banks have achieved the book capital levels required by both financial regulators and market participants.

To keep the banks from gambling on redemption as they rebuild their book capital levels, the banks have to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can assess the risk each bank is taking and adjust both the amount and price of their exposure so that the bank's cost of funds reflects this risk.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's departure from the Obama administration invites comparisons with Klemens von Metternich. Metternich was the foreign minister of the Austrian empire who engineered the restoration of the old order and the suppression of democracy across Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. 
This was an impressive diplomatic feat – given the widespread popular contempt for Europe's monarchical regimes. In the same vein, protecting Wall Street from the financial and economic havoc they brought upon themselves and the country was an enormous accomplishment. 
During his tenure as head of the New York Fed and then as treasury secretary, most, if not all, of the major Wall Street banks would have collapsed if the government had not intervened to save them.... Had it not been for Geithner and his sidekicks, therefore, we would have been permanently rid of an incredibly bloated financial sector that haunts the economy like a horrible albatross. 
Along with the salvation of the Wall Street banks, Geithner also managed to restore their agenda of deficit reduction. 
Even though the economy is still down more than 9 million jobs from its full employment level, none of the important people in Washington is talking about measures that would hasten job creation. 
Instead, the focus is exclusively on deficit reduction, a process that is already slowing growth and putting even more people out of work. While lives are being ruined today by the weak economy, Geithner helped create a policy agenda where the focus of debate is the budget projections for 2022.... 
Nonetheless, the path laid out by Geithner's team virtually ensures that these distant budget targets will serve as a distraction from doing anything to help the economy now. 
There are two important points that should be quashed quickly in order to destroy any possible defense of Timothy Geithner. 
It is often asserted that we were lucky to escape a second Great Depression. This is nonsense. 
The first Great Depression was not simply the result of bad decisions made in the initial financial crisis. It was the result of ten years of failed policy. There is zero, nothing, nada that would have prevented the sort of massive stimulus that was eventually provided by the second world war from occurring in 1931, instead of 1941. We know how to recover from a financial collapse: the issue of whether we do so simply boils down to political will.... 
Correct, implementing the Swedish Model requires political will.  At the start of the current financial crisis, Iceland found the political will because it simply did not have the resources to adopt the Swedish Model.

Interestingly, even an imperfect adoption of the Swedish Model has left Iceland's economy far ahead of the EU, UK and US that adopted the Japanese Model in recovering from the bank solvency led financial crisis.
Finally, the claim that we made money on the bailouts is equally absurd. We lent money at interest rates that were far below what the market would have demanded.
Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said that the central banks should lend freely against good collateral at penalty rates of interest.  Clearly, the interest rates charged were not punitive.
Most of this money, plus interest, was paid back. But claiming that we thus made a profit would be like saying the government could make a profit by issuing 30-year mortgages at 1% interest. Sure, most of the loans would be repaid, with interest, but everyone would understand that this was an enormous subsidy to homeowners. 
The claim we made money on the bailouts is actually a distraction from the real issue that modern banks do not need to be bailed out in the first place.  Deposit insurance means the taxpayers are already the banks' silent equity partner.  A bailout is only in the interest of the bankers protecting their bonuses and continuing to loot society.
In short, the Geithner agenda was to allow the Wall Street banks to feed at the public trough until they were returned to their prior strength. Like Metternich, he largely succeeded. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Baker nicely summarizes the Geithner agenda although he misses the crucial fact that letting Wall Street banks feed at the public trough until they return to their prior strength is effectively letting the bankers feed at the public trough through their bonuses.
Of course, democracy did eventually triumph in Europe. Let's hope that it doesn't take quite as long for that to happen here. 

Thursday, December 27, 2012

Surprise, big companies used 'enhanced relationship' to minimize taxes

A Reuters article describes how since the UK tax collectors adopted a policy of 'enhanced relationship' taxes from large corporations have fallen at the same time profits at these corporations have increased.

This is likely to be a coincidence as companies and their accountants have become far more aggressive in booking taxable profits in low tax countries.

However, it does highlight how companies have limited their focus on doing well by all their stakeholders to only doing well by one group of stakeholders:  management/investors.

In the not so distant past, management and Boards of Directors use to include the impact of their decisions on stakeholders like the countries they did business in.  It was thought that doing well by the broader set of stakeholders contributed to doing well by the company over the long run.

After all, it was shown by Henry Ford that it is good for business to pay your workers enough so they can buy the company's product.

Big companies in Britain now pay less tax than they did 12 years ago despite a big jump in profitability, a Reuters analysis of official data shows. Tax campaigners say the trend is the clearest signal yet that tax avoidance has blossomed under a more business-friendly strategy at the UK tax authority Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC). 
Large companies' payments of corporation tax - the UK equivalent of corporate income tax - totalled 21 billion pounds ($34 billion) in 2011/12, HMRC data shows. That was down five billion pounds or 21 percent since 2000/01 when the government, then controlled by the Labour Party, took the first steps towards a more collaborative approach to big business. 
At the same time, the gross operating surplus for all companies in the UK - a widely watched measure of companies' profitability compiled by the Office of National Statistics - has risen 65 percent, to 329 billion pounds. The economy has grown by 55 percent over the same period, and receipts of both personal income tax and small companies' income tax are higher....

John Christensen of Tax Justice Network, a tax campaigning group, said the figures show successive governments' attempts to create a more business-friendly administration - which includes a policy known as "enhanced relationship" based on mutual trust - have encouraged companies to use such tactics....

Prem Sikka, a professor of accounting at Essex University who has written extensively about tax avoidance, said that even allowing for the tax cut, the figures were "paradoxical". 
"How are they managing to reconcile higher profits with lower taxes?" he said. "It can't be done ... unless they are booking these profits somewhere else." Companies reporting for tax purposes are increasingly diverting UK profits to lower-tax jurisdictions, he said.

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

US banks hold $2 trillion more in deposits than loans

Bloomberg reports that US banks are holding $2 trillion more in deposits than loans.

This suggests that the financial system is awash in liquidity even if $1.5 trillion in deposits leave the banks with the expiration of the Transaction Account Guarantee program that extended deposit insurance to all non-interest bearing deposit accounts.

I would expect that deposits covered under this program would leave the banks and be used to purchase short term US treasury securities.  I expect this because there is no reason for the depositors to bet on the solvency of these banks when the frozen interbank lending market shows that other banks will not lend to these banks.

The effect of the withdrawal of deposits will be seen in the pricing of US Treasury bills.  It is entirely possible that interest rates will become negative as the depositors take their money out of the banks and use the funds to purchase US Treasury bills.

A negative interest rate would reflect the fact that the owners of the funds are more concerned about the guaranteed return of their funds than the return on their funds.  In effect, they are paying to have the government give them back their money at a later date.

Monday, December 10, 2012

Bank for International Settlements: global economic fundamentals do not support market prices

The Guardian reports that the Bank for International Settlements has issued a warning about the growing disconnect between prices for stocks and bonds and the underlying economic reality.

This warning effectively undermines the central assumption supporting current monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

These policies are justified by central bankers by the wealth effect argument.  Under the wealth effect argument, the high stock and bond prices that result from pushing investors out on the risk curve are suppose to make investors feel "wealthier" and as a result they will increase their spending.

Clearly, this has not happened.  Anyone not trained as an economist immediately recognizes that the wealth effect the central bankers are hoping for relies on amnesia.  Investors have to forget that the markets collapsed in 2008/2009.

If investors don't have amnesia, then they see the gains in their investments as temporary and not something that can be spent.

Asset prices are rising to levels not seen since before the crisis despite continuing long-term risks to the markets, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has warned. 
The warning should ring alarm bells across the world as the Swiss-based organisation can claim to be one of the few organisations that saw the financial crash coming. 
In its quarterly report, the bank said: "Unusually, equity and fixed income gains coincided with a weakening of the global economic outlook. In the past, falling growth forecasts have usually been associated with rising expected default rates and higher bond yields." 
It noted that equity prices had risen even as the outlook for companies deteriorated. 
Companies' earnings expectations have dropped and "an unusually high proportion of firms warned that future profits could fall short of analysts' forecasts". 
The bank said investors were taking on more risk for lower returns – driving prices higher – in the hunt for returns in a world where central banks are keeping interest rates at record-low levels. 
"Numerous bond investors said that they felt less well compensated for risk than in the past, but that they had little alternative with rates on many bank deposits close to zero and the supply of other low-risk investments in decline." 
In some cases that has caused asset prices to reach levels that no longer reflected the risk involved. "Some asset prices appeared highly valued in a historical context relative to indicators of their riskiness," it said....

Friday, December 7, 2012

Wages in developed world slump for second time since start of banking crisis

The Guardian reports that wages in the developed world have slumped for the second time since the beginning of the financial crisis.

By definition, a slump in wages feeds back negatively into the real economy.  Consumers represent approximately 70% of demand so lower wages result in shrinking demand.

What is interesting about the report is that the lower wages are occurring at the same time as companies are reporting near record profits.  This indicates that more of the revenue is going towards shareholders.

By definition, pushing more of the revenue towards the shareholders is not sustainable in the long run as a company needs someone to buy its products.  The lack of sustainability is a direct result of the negative feedback loop from lower wages.

Henry Ford had a number of innovations, but perhaps his greatest innovation was recognizing that his workers needed to be paid enough so they could afford his company's product.

This report on wages suggests that owners of businesses and their managers are forgetting this simple lesson.

Wages in the developed world have fallen in real terms for the second time since the banking crisis, continuing the long-term trend of workers being made to cope on a smaller share of national income. 
Steep falls in pay packets in eastern Europe and a wage freeze across the richest western countries, including the UK, sent monthly salaries into reverse in 2011 after taking inflation into account, said the International Labour Organisation. 
The fall is likely to intensify the debate over the contribution made by employers to the communities where they operate....
The ILO director-general, Guy Ryder, said: "This report clearly shows that in many countries, the crisis has had a strong impact on wages – and, by extension, workers." 
The report found wages have also failed to keep pace with growing productivity. "This trend has resulted in workers benefiting less from the fruits of their work while the owners of capital are benefiting more," it said. Ryder added: "Workers and their families are not receiving the fair share they deserve." 
The report highlights recent findings that show wages have grown at a slower pace than labour productivity – the value of goods and services produced per person employed – over the past decades in a majority of countries for which data is available. In developed economies, labour productivity has increased more than twice as much as wages since 1999.... 
He said the trend over the past 30 years, especially in the west, was for companies and their owners to accrue most of the benefits of economic growth. 
In 16 developed economies, labour took a 75% share of national income in the mid-1970s, but this dropped to 65% in the years just before the economic crisis. It rose in 2008 and 2009 – but only because national income itself shrank in those years – before resuming its downward course.

Thursday, December 6, 2012

Matthew Lynn: the era of central bank independence is over

In his MarketWatch column, Matthew Lynn presents a case for why the era of central bank independence is coming to an end.

He cites a variety of factors like how quantitative easing redistributes wealth or how zero interest rate policies punishes savers.

What he leaves off the table is the elephant in the room.  The justification for central bank independence was that it was needed so they could take away the punch bowl and keep the financial system from collapsing.  The central banks in the EU, UK and US all failed to take away the punch bowl that let the financial sector get out of control leading up to the current financial crisis.

When you are independent and don't do your job, you lose the right to this independence.
for the last decade there has been one principle that everyone has agreed on. Independent central banks free of political interference are a good thing. 
But now that is under attack everywhere. 
Increasingly it looks like the model of the independent, technocratic central bank is on the way out — and will be replaced by direct control of monetary policy by governments. And that will change the rules of the game for investors. 
Central bankers used to be grey, colorless figures. ...
Now they are in the thick of the day-to-day political battle....
The days when central bankers were above the political fray are long gone. It is not hard to figure out why. 
First, the game has changed. The main intellectual argument for independent central banks was that they could make long-term decisions without short-term politics getting in the way. They would have more credibility with the markets when they set inflation targets, because investors would know they wouldn’t get blown off course by the need to pump the economy up and get incomes rising ahead of an election. 
That doesn’t seem so important anymore. Central bankers aren’t fighting inflation — there is not much sign of it — and recession is their main enemy. They don’t have that much credibility either: very few investors believe something is going to happen just because the Fed or the ECB say it will. 
And the assumption that there are simple mechanical choices to make — slightly slower growth this year, for example, in exchange for healthier long-term expansion — no longer seems to apply. 
The result? There isn’t any reason to suppose that an independent central banker will do a better job than an elected politician. 
Second, central bankers are now acting like politicians anyway. They always have to some extent, of course. But it has become more obvious. 
Take quantitative easing, for example. It redistributes wealth. It punishes savers and rewards debtors. It permits a far-larger state than would otherwise be possible — although at the expense of future generations who will have to pick up the bill for current spending. 
Or take near-zero interest rates. They help younger people who are trying to buy their first home. But they punish older people who are getting far-lower pensions from their savings than they could have expected. They are all choices about who gets what, and who picks up the bill. 
You can agree or disagree with them; there are perfectly respectable arguments to be made on both sides of the issue. But they are political choices, of the sort that used to be settled by politicians and involve elections. When they are making those kind of choices on behalf of society, central bankers have to expect to get drawn into the public debate.
But central bankers are going to struggle in that role. There are two big problems. First, they have no mandate. They are chosen from within a narrow pool of career bankers and officials. They don’t have the legitimacy that comes from having won an election, and that makes them easy to attack. Next, none of them know the language to defend their decisions. They have no training in oratory, nor do they know how to win support for their decisions. Again, they are an easy target.
I disagree with his two reasons for why central bankers struggle.

First, central bankers adopt policies that support the policies of the elected officials.  It was the elected officials who chose to pursue the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

As a result, the central banks have adopted policies designed to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.  Even if this means destroying the financial markets, the real economy and the social contract.

Second, central bankers are trained to verbally defend their decisions.  For most of them, this training came in the oral defense of their PhD dissertations in economics.
By the end of the decade, it is unlikely any central banks will still be independent. 
Instead, governments will take direct control of monetary policy. 
The U.K. may well go first. It was only in 1997 that the Bank of England became independent. Until then, interest rates were set by the government. Europe will be next. The ECB president is already running half the continent. The Fed may hang on longer. Americans are historically reluctant to give their government any more power. But it will be put under tighter political control.

Monday, November 19, 2012

France loses AAA-rating at same time UK bank risk managers reduce worries about high impact EU event

From the you cannot make this stuff up file:

As reported by the Guardian:
Threat to the financial system from sovereign risk was the biggest concern of 94% of those asked by the Bank of England – but fears over a 'high impact event' have fallen.

The eurozone crisis will not go away. More than nine out of 10 risk managers at financial firms asked about the greatest threat to the financial system cite sovereign risk. In the second half of 2012, it was the biggest concern of 94% of those asked by the Bank of England, while 77% were most worried about the risk of the economic downturn. 
"Sovereign risk is now cited by a greater proportion of respondents than previously recorded for any risk," the bank's systemic risk survey found. 
Yet, while the prospect of a eurozone meltdown is uppermost in bankers' minds, the overall concern about a "high impact" event is falling dramatically. 
Some 20% still feel the probability of such an event is high or very high but this is a 16 percentage point fall in the last six months while 34% now believe such an event is a low probability, a rise of 11 percentage points. 
Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that Moody's has downgraded France (is this a high impact event?)

France lost its top credit rating with Moody’s Investors Service, dealing a blow to President Francois Hollande’s efforts to show budget credibility in the face of a stalled economy. 
France was cut to Aa1 from Aaa, the rating company said today. 
The Moody’s downgrade follows one by Standard & Poor’s in January and increases pressure on Hollande to find ways to bolster growth in Europe’s second-largest economy in the midst of the region’s three year-old debt crisis. 
“The timing of this sort of announcement is awkward,” said Nicolas Veron, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “This downgrade comes a few days after announcements of structural reforms that are probably the strongest for a long time in France but it also signals that while they are ambitious the recent announcement of reforms is not enough to reassure investors that France is on the right track.” 
Moody’s said its decision to downgrade the rating and maintain the negative outlook reflects France’s long-term economic growth outlook is negatively affected by multiple structural challenges and the fiscal outlook is uncertain as a result of its deteriorating economic prospects.

Friday, October 12, 2012

BoE's Paul Tucker sees 'uncontainable' backlash to another bank bailout

In a speech to the Institute for International Finance, the Bank of England's Paul Tucker, the favorite to become the next governor, observed that the backlash to another bank bailout would be 'uncontainable'.

Given that Spain is under enormous pressure from Germany to bailout its banks, we are going to test his theory shortly.  As regular readers know, Spain's financial system is designed so that it doesn't need to bailout its banks.

It needs to adopt the Swedish Model with ultra transparency.  This results in the banks absorbing all the losses in the Spanish financial system and providing the data to prove the point. As shown by Iceland several years ago, this solution protects the real economy and Spanish society and sets the stage for growth.

Mr. Tucker includes many recommendations for what banks could do to make themselves less likely to need a bailout including living wills (which won't work in a financial crisis) and breaking up into smaller banks (which bankers won't do because it would cut their pay).

Completely absent from the list was the one solution that would work:  require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, banks and other market participants could  independently evaluate the risk of each bank and adjust the amount of their exposures to each bank to what they can afford to lose given the risk of the bank.

This ends the risk of contagion and with it any justification for bailing out the banks.

Mr Tucker ... said it was in the industry’s own interests to set up so-called “living wills” that would help regulators manage a “speeded-up Chapter 11 [bankruptcy] and recapitalisation” programme that would protect taxpayers from another round of multi-billion pound bail-outs. 
He also made a veiled attack on the concentration of power in Britain’s big four banks, saying that more operators and more competition would be better for financial stability and the economy. 
The UK taxpayer is still propping up the banking system with £228bn of loans and guarantees, according the National Audit Office, and the rescue drained £2.4bn of cash from the public purse last year....
A number that is similar in size to what UK bankers paid themselves in bonuses. 
 “The objective is to get to a position where public money is never used to provide solvency support for a bank failure. This is hugely in the interests of the industry because the effect is to politicise banking. 
If the objective is to never use public money, the only way to achieve that is by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It is only by ending the risk of contagion that bankers are stripped of their ability to 'scare' policymakers into bailouts.
“If there is to be another episode of massive taxpayer solvency support to sort out a crisis once we’ve eventually got through this one I think the backlash would be almost uncontainable.”
Clearly, Greece is showing what happens when policymakers go to the bailout trough once to much.

Spain is on the verge of providing further confirmation that we have reached the end of the line bailing out the banks.

Your humble blogger has said repeatedly that bailouts are the wrong solution.  Apparently what is needed to get policymakers attention so they stop listening to the banks is literally massive protests and social upheaval.
Bank resolution plans are also vital to lowering the levels of capital that they must hold, he added. Without such a safety net, “the capital surcharge would be considerably bigger than it is going to be”.
This is a classic example of using complicated rules and regulatory oversight in place of transparency.

Outside of the regulators, no one believes that resolutions plans will prove effective in a time of crisis.  Resolution plans suffer from the simple problem of in times of crisis, there are very few buyers and the price they are willing to pay for assets drops precipitously.  This suggests that capital needs to be even higher to absorb the losses, not lower as Mr. Tucker indicates.

Frankly, bank resolution plans are not preventative.  The crisis has to hit first.

Transparency is preventative.  Market participants adjust their exposure to what they can afford to lose before the crisis hits.  This makes it very simple to close a bank as everyone knows what its exposures are worth.
Central to resolution regimes will be new forms of bail-in debt that would convert into equity and recapitalise banks in place of taxpayer money. “This is for real. This is going to happen,” he said....
Another example of substitution of complex rules and regulatory oversight for transparency.

In the absence of ultra transparency, who is going to buy bail in debt?  No independent third party would buy bail in debt without the ability to independently assess the risk of the bank.

We know that the independent assessment cannot take place by the simple fact that the interbank lending market is frozen.  Banks with deposits to lend do not have the information they need to assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.

This is no surprise as the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane calls the banks 'black boxes'.

Having bankers buy bail in debt is no solution.  Bankers are smart enough to make it an addition to their current compensation packages and not a replacement for 95% of their compensation.

Monday, October 8, 2012

UK college graduates starting salaries down 13 percent since last year

Another consequence of zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies has been a reduction in the average starting salaries for recent college graduates.

According to a Pimco Viewpoint, a reason their salaries are down is that older workers are staying in the workforce longer in order to offset the decline in earnings on their retirement savings.  Potential retirees see the need to work longer to ensure they have adequate savings to retire on.

The result of postponing retirement is that companies need to hire fewer new employees.

As reported by the Telegraph,
Graduates who started new jobs this summer received an average salary of £22,800 - a “marked” 13.2pc less than last year, an analysis of graduate salaries at more than 60 recruiters found. 

Sunday, October 7, 2012

Liam Halligan: QE is 'oxygen-mask' for banks and 'counter-productive' for savers

In his Telegraph column, Liam Halligan nicely summarizes what is wrong with zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies and why we have these policies.
My long-held view, as regular readers will know, is that QE is deeply counter-productive. 
A "backdoor bail-out" for politically connected banks, this ridiculous and historically unprecedented policy will ultimately bring only higher inflation and much steeper future borrowing costs. Reducing what you owe your creditors via a combination of deliberately-created inflation and currency debasement seriously harms any sovereign borrowers' long-term reputation. 
Yet we are continually told that QE is "positive" and "growth-boosting", all of which is total nonsense. 
Yes, money-printing pumps up asset prices for a while and fuels another round of banker bonuses.
But for savers, non-financial businesses and the economy as a whole, it can only end in tears.  
Preservation of banker bonuses appears to be a goal of policymakers in the EU, UK and US regardless of the harm done to the real economy and society.
The reason we are implementing QE, despite its massive drawbacks, is that insolvent banks are using it as an oxygen mask. 
As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane pointed out, zero interest rates and quantitative easing make it a lot cheaper for the banks to engage in forbearance and not recognize the losses on their bad debt exposures.
Politicians, meanwhile, want QE to continue to suppress gilt yields, so allowing them to keep talking tough about "austerity" while avoiding the really difficult fiscal decisions. 
So, despite the massive damage it is doing to pensioner incomes and this country's future reputation, QE has friends in high places. 
Part of what makes the Blob (aka politicians, financial regulators, bankers and their lobbyists) so effective is that it operates globally.
Many leading lights of the UK's economics profession have also given the Bank of England's "extraordinary measures" the thumbs-up. 
Then again, sucking up to the powerful, and providing intellectual alibis for expedient policies that were going to happen anyway, is what most economists do. In addition, the wages of many leading pro-QE dismal scientists are paid, directly or indirectly, by the banks that are using this grotesque policy as a form of life support.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Halligan has described how the Blob (aka the Financial, Regulatory and Academic Complex; FRAC) manages to use the names of prominent academic institutions as a halo around destructive policies.

Which policy sounds more trustworthy:  policy A supported by an economist at Harvard or policy B supported by an economist at a community college?  Without even knowing what the policy is policy A has a more favorable impression because of the association with Harvard.

So the question is "are there any Harvard economists who earn fees from the Blob?"  For starters, we have Larry Summers...
QE-supporters on the MPC and elsewhere who claim inflation is "subdued" should take a close look at these latest PMI numbers. In the manufacturing sector, the input price index rocketed in September from 48.8 to 57.5 – an almost unprecedented rate. Food prices, meanwhile, are elevated and commodity costs are stubbornly high. This month we'll also see utility price rises and the impact of large increases in university tuition fees. 
The UK is in the midst of the longest double-dip recession in history and inflation remains significantly above the Bank's 2pc target – as it has been for no less than 52 of the last 58 months. And that's while sterling remains firm and before fireworks in the Middle East cause an oil price spike. 
So don't let anyone tell you that UK inflation is "subdued", certainly no one who works for an insolvent bank or with the power to implement more QE.

Monday, October 1, 2012

UK government scheme fails to boost lending in first month

The Telegraph reports that the latest UK government scheme failed to boost lending in its first month.  In fact, lending contracted as borrowers repaid their existing debts.

Regular readers are not surprise that the UK government is having trouble boosting lending.  It is fighting against zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

One unintended consequence of zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies is that it changes the definition of the risk free rate.

Clearly, if the rates on government debt are being artificially lowered, these rates are not risk free.  As a result, there is a search for an interest rate that is risk free.

For anyone with a loan outstanding, the risk free rate becomes the rate they pay to borrow.  Any money they use to pay down the outstanding loan generates a return equal to the rate on the loan.

If you borrow at 5% and can only invest excess cash at 0.10%, it makes sense to 'invest' the excess cash in paying down the loan as it 'saves' the borrower 4.9% (the difference between the borrowing rate of 5% and the investment rate of 0.10%).

Attempts by the authorities to boost the supply of credit have failed in the first month of trying, economists said, after official data showed that borrowers repaid their debts last month and rates continued to rise. 
In the first full month that the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) was operating, households repaid £276m of mortgage debt and cleared another £134m of personal loans. Lending to businesses dropped by £2.2bn, the largest monthly decline since February. 
The figures, from the Bank of England, also showed that the average fixed mortgage rate rose by 0.03 percentage points in August and is now 0.52 percentage points higher than at the start of the year. 
Michael Saunders, UK economist at Citi, said: “The data suggest that the introduction of the FLS has not produced significant immediate results in improving the growth or price of credit to households and businesses.” 
The Bank and the Treasury launched FLS, which provides banks state-backed low-cost funding, on August 1 in an attempt reduce borrowing costs for households and businesses and increase lending. ... 
However, the Bank’s data suggest that there is little demand for credit currently, which would limit the impact the scheme would have on restoring economic growth....
“The Bank of England data indicate that consumers appetite for new taking on new borrowing is limited while there is also an ongoing strong desire of many consumers to reduce their debt,” Howard Archer, IHS Global Insight UK economist, said.

Monday, September 24, 2012

Portugal caves on hiking workers social security taxes

Portugal highlights just how pervasive the Pension Fund Death Spiral is in the global economy.  In the case of Portugal, the pension fund spiraling down is social security.

The reason that social security is spiraling down is a combination of lack of investment return in an artificially low interest rate environment and money that could be used to support social security is instead being used to support excess debt in the financial system.

Please recall that in the private sector, the lack of earnings on pension fund assets causes the private sector to deprive the real economy of growth by diverting money that could be used by firms for investment in growth into covering the shortfall in pension earnings.

Since the firms aren't investing, they are not hiring.

Without hiring, payments into social security are less than they would be if the economy was growing.

This problem is exacerbated by the simple fact that the Portuguese government is using its limited access to funds to support excess debt in the financial system.  Since the money is being used to support excess debt, it is not available to cover the shortfall in social security taxes.

I know it sounds simplistic, but there really is an easy way out of this problem.  The solution, also known as the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis, is to require the banks to recognize all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

As shown by Iceland, making the banks recognize losses today equivalent to what they will recognize if they go through the long process of default, bankruptcy, and foreclosure saves the real economy.  In the case of Iceland, not only is their economy growing, but they were able to expand social benefits.

Please note, with the losses out of the financial system, there is no need for the artificially low interest rates.  This ends the Pension Fund Death Spiral.

As reported by the Guardian,

It's official, Portugal has caved in on its plans to hit workers with a hike in their social security payments. 
As expected (see 8.23am), the Lisbon government has pulled a U-turn on the austerity measures. 
Speaking a little while ago, the prime minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, said new tax measures would be proposed. The original plan to raise employee social security payments from 11% of their salary to 18% is abandoned. 
The decision is a victory for the hundreds of thousands of people who took to the streets nine days ago in massive protests against the plan. 
Passos Coelho warned that Portugal needs to find the money from another source, otherwise its €78bn bailout could be at risk. 
He added that he will continue negotiating with unions and business confederations over news ways to raise the funds, which could include separate income tax rises or changes to "capital tax measures".
This raises the question of why is Portugal taking the bailout.

Its banking system is designed not to need to be bailed out and to be able to function even after absorbing all of the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.