Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts

Monday, December 24, 2012

France moving forward to separate investment and commercial banking

The Wall Street Journal reports that French bank reform is focusing on separating investment from retail and commercial banking.

France's banks are lobbying against this saying the separation will hurt economic growth.

I can clearly see how it will hurt banker bonuses, but I fail to see the direct connection between separating the two businesses and hurting economic growth.  The reason I don't see a direct connection is that the two businesses still exist after they have been separated.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger sees reform efforts focused on separating investment from retail and commercial banking as a best a distraction and at worst a barrier to real reform of the financial system.

The starting point for real reform of the financial system is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Not only does ultra transparency address the issue of reducing the riskiness of the investment and retail/commercial banks, but it also ushers in cultural change as sunlight is the best disinfectant for bad behavior.

The French government-planned reform of the banking industry, which seeks to separate speculative and highly risky activities from retail and commercial operations, is ill-timed, the head of the French Banking Federation said Saturday. 
Implementing the reform, which was an electoral pledge of socialist president Francois Hollande while the country is facing strong economic headwinds could further limit banks' profitability and ability to help foster growth, Jean-Paul Chifflet said in an interview with France Inter radio. 
In the U.S., banking reforms have been put on the back-burner because of the economic slowdown, Mr. Chifflet said.
Actually, in the US, bank reform was put on the back-burner by the Obama administration and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The administration didn't want to reform the banks and Dodd-Frank was written by and for the banks by their lobbyists.
The French government last week presented a bill forcing French banks to create specific units to house risky speculative operations, in a bid to address one of the causes of the financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 and to protect retail activities and customers' savings. 
The project, however, has been watered down from Mr. Hollande's original plan to split the banks into two and end the combined model of commercial and investment bank.

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

French banks embrace securitization

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, French banks are trying to shrink their balance sheets by offering opaque, possibly toxic, asset-backed securities.
In a shift, French banks are embracing a practice popular in the U.S. What is raising eyebrows is that it involves the creation of financial instruments that led to huge losses not so long ago. 
The practice is the packaging of loans into securities to be sold to investors—also known as securitization. It is unusual in French banking. 
French banks traditionally keep most of the loans they make on their balance sheets, unlike their U.S. counterparts, which have long put them into securities and sold them to investors. During the financial crisis, scores of those securities went sour as the housing market crashed, leaving investors and banks nursing huge losses. 
But French banking executives say stringent new rules on capital and liquidity, passed in the wake of the 2007-2008 meltdown, are crimping profits. That, in turn, has prompted them to ramp up other means of increasing revenue, they say.
Regular readers know that in the absence of observable event based reporting buyers of these structured finance securities are not investing, but rather 'blindly betting'.

Under observable event based reporting, all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral are disclose before the beginning of the next business day.  It is only with this reporting that market participants have current information and investors know what they own.
BNP Paribas SA, France's largest publicly traded bank, recently issued, packaged and sold billions of euros in real estate, aircraft financing and corporate loans. Other recent deals include Société Générale SA, Crédit Agricole SA and Natixis SA selling securitized loans to French insurer AXA SAand Belgian-Dutch insurer Ageas NV. 
French mortgage lender Crédit Foncier said in October it plans to start issuing residential mortgage-backed securities, reviving a market that has been dormant in France since the financial crisis.The lender wants to securitize around €1 billion ($1.3 billion) this year and is targeting issuance of around €2 billion of RMBS per year starting in 2016. 
"If you can't adapt, you won't survive," says Fabrice Susini, global head of securitization at BNP Paribas.....
The adaptation being to provide observable event based reporting.  This information is easily made available because this is how the information systems used by the entities that originate, bill and collect the underlying assets track the underlying collateral.
New regulations have forced banks to increase their reserves to cushion against unexpected shocks. In addition, new rules intended to ensure that European banks aren't caught out if short-term funding from financial markets dries up mean lenders can no longer rely on this borrowing to fund long-term loans. Deposits, another key source of funding, aren't sufficient to cover loan demand. 
"The new regulatory constraints are significant," says Xavier Fessart, head of counterparty risk at Crédit Agricole's investment bank. "To continue to lend to our customers we had to find new financing solutions." 
Done right, securitization is an attractive way of financing loans.
Securitization has two attractions for the banks. It moves assets off their balance sheets, reducing the amount of capital and liquid assets they have to set aside against loans. At the same time, it enables them to earn commissions for creating and selling the securities. The question for banks is whether the commissions will be enough to offset the loss of interest revenue on loans they once held on their books. 
"We need to adapt our business model in order to be able to distribute the loans that we issue," said Didier Valet, head of Société Générale's corporate and investment bank, in an interview earlier this year. "Loans will become a raw material to feed this new business model."
The originate to distribute business model is a very attractive model for banks.  The key to making the model work for the financial system is observable event based reporting.
The lenders say they won't make the same mistakes many of their US peers did before the crisis. Back then, some of the packaged loans were the product of lax lending standards and the banks issuing the loans didn't necessarily end up holding the bonds. 
Big French lenders haven't been shy about pointing the finger across the Atlantic. "I am not saying that one model is better than the other," said Frédéric Oudéa, Société Générale's SA chief executive, comparing U.S. and French banking practices at a conference in Paris in March. "But no major bank in Europe went under during the financial crisis." 
Analysts say a move into securitization could fuel financial instability instead of taming it. 
"If banks don't carry the risk of the loans they issue, there's always a risk they may lower lending standards," says Kepler Capital Markets analyst Benoît Pétrarque.
Observable event based reporting is the antidote to the risk that banks will lower their lending standards.  Under observable event based reporting, market participants have the information they need to independently assess the risk of the underlying assets.

Market participants can use this risk assessment to make sure they are always being adequately compensated for the risk they take on.
While new rules were drawn up to rein in lax lending practices in the U.S., banking and insurance regulators in Europe haven't really addressed this risk, he said. 
The French bank and insurance regulator "is very closely watching" the new deals, said a spokeswoman for the Autorité de Controle Prudentiel, an agency affiliated with the Banque de France. "We can make sure that insurance companies buying these packaged loans from banks understand the risks that these loans carry." 
Regular readers now that the US National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) white paper on the Future of Mortgage Finance set the global standard for disclosure by structured finance securities ranging from covered bonds to securitizations.  This standard relates the quality of disclosure to the amount of capital needed to support a position.

Specifically, deals that provide observable event based reporting are rewarded with low capital requirements.  Everything else is seen as a 'blind bet' and as a result must carry significantly more capital.
AXA, for example, said it won't invest in a securitized loan portfolio unless the bank that has issued it retains 20%-30% on its books. "We do not want to finance the loans that banks won't finance themselves," said Odette Cesari, AXA's chief investment officer.
The reason AXA needs such a big retained interest by the seller is that these deals do not provide observable event based reporting.  As a result, AXA needs the lender to be absorbing a substantial portion of the credit risk.
But some banks aren't committed to doing that. Société Générale, for one, won't "systematically" hold a part of the loans it issues, said Vincent Tricon, head of Mid Caps Investment Banking at the bank. 
Mr. Tricon was responsible for arranging for AXA to buy its securitized debt. The bank plans to rely largely on securitization to fund lending to midcap companies.
One of the reasons that the European insurance and bank regulators will adopt the NAIC's global standard is that it assures the regulators that the investors know what they are buying.

Sunday, September 2, 2012

France nationalizes major mortgage lender

In a continuation of putting banker bonuses before society, France's elected officials have nationalized one of its major mortgage lenders.

Regular readers know that modern banks are designed not to require state bailouts.  Their access to deposit guarantees and central bank funding assures that they can operate and support the real economy for years with negative book capital level.

The deposit guarantee effectively makes the taxpayer the 'silent' equity partner for the bank.  Without the need for a bailout, the state is effectively putting up the capital so the bank can continue to operate.

Naturally, for taking on this risk, the state is going to require more from the bank than would be the case if the bank's management had not wiped out the bank's book capital.

Regular readers also know that so long as French banks are not required to provide ultra transparency the French government will always choose to bailout the banks to avoid panic in the financial markets.

Had the French government required all of its banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants would be well aware of exactly what was happening with each bank.

More importantly, with this information, market participants could adjust the amount and price of their exposure to reflect what they could afford to lose given the risk of each of France's banks.  This exposure adjustment eliminates both the possibility of contagion and the fear of panic bailout justification.

As reported by the Guardian,

France's government has stepped in to rescue the floundering banking group Crédit Immobilier de France after the search for a buyer failed. 
The move came after the credit-rating agency Moody's downgraded CIF, which has been up for sale since May after what it described as a "liquidity crisis". 
Pierre Moscovici, the French finance minister, said the bailout was subject to the approval of the European commission. He said the financial institution's business model had been "weakened by the [economic] crisis". 
"To allow CIF to respect all of its engagements, the state has decided to respond favourably to its request to grant it a guarantee. This guarantee will be put in place on the condition that the European commission and parliament agrees," Moscovici said. 
It is the latest financial headache to hit the French president, François Hollande, whose Socialist administration has been forced to deal with ... the winding-down of the Franco-Belgian financial group Dexia. 
CIF, which specialised in mortgage lending to less privileged families, encountered problems when previously cheap funding from credit markets, on which it depends to finance its operations, dried up. A €1.7bn (£1.34bn) covered bond is due to expire in October. 
CIF showed that finding funds for risky mortgages is impossible without transparency.  A lesson learned from the financial crisis was not to blindly bet on risky mortgages, but rather to require observable event based reporting so that the mortgages could be monitored and assessed on an ongoing basis.
The government has not said whether it will continue to seek a buyer for CIF or try to wind down the group. However, Le Figaro said a winding down of the group, which has about 300 branches and more than €30bn-worth (£23.76bn) of loans, was the most likely outcome. 
The paper added that Moscovici acted in spite of opposition from the government-owned Banque Postale to a CIF rescue in the hope of avoiding panic in the financial markets. 

Sunday, November 20, 2011

Former UK deputy prime minister says euro going under catastrophic for UK

According to a Guardian article, former UK deputy prime minister, Lord Heseltine, observed that the euro going under would be catastrophic for the UK as it would damage both the banks and the government's financing.

Regular readers know that there is no reason to link the government's financial condition to the banks'.  The banks can continue to operate with negative book equity for years.

As shown by the US Savings & Loan crisis, so long as the government does not shut down a financial institution, it can continue to operate while being insolvent (the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities).

Furthermore, the S&L crisis showed that because of deposit insurance, depositors will not stage a run, but will continue to do business with the insolvent institutions.

Finally and most importantly, the S&L crisis showed that the insolvent institutions will continue to make loans.  In fact, there is an incentive for management to gamble on redemption and book high risk, high return loans.  Disclosure of each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure is needed to prevent gambling on redemption.  Market participants will look for banks that are gambling and increase the cost of and reduce the amount of their exposure to these banks.

Britain will join the euro, Conservative peer Lord Heseltine has claimed. The former deputy prime minister, a long-time supporter of the single currency, said the public had "no idea" of the potential impact its collapse would have on the UK....
"I think the chances are the euro will survive because the determination, particularly of the French and the Germans, is to maintain the coherence that they have created in Europe. 
"Now they have got a hell of a problem, let's be frank about it, but my guess is that they will find a way through. I hope they will because the downside for the British economy of the euro going under is catastrophic. 
"People have no idea of the scale of money British banks are owed by European banks. If the European banks start going it will be our banks that are on the line, our government on the line."
Doesn't it make sense that all market participants should know the scale of money British banks are owed by European banks?

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Germany's Merkel backs plans to recapitalize banks, but how much capital do they need? (updated)

A Telegraph article reports that Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel backs plans to recapitalize the Eurozone banks.

The key questions are:  how much capital do the banks need and will there be disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data so that market participants can confirm the adequacy of this additional capital injection?

Confirmation of the adequacy of the capital injection is critically important to restore market confidence because the mere discussion of another round of capital injections in the Eurozone banks clearly shows that the first round of capital injections was inadequate.

As previously discussed on this blog, potential recapitalization amounts range from the single digit billion euros (based on the EU financial regulators stress tests) to 200 - 300 million euros (based on the IMF's analysis) to maybe as much as 2 trillion euros (based on BlackRock Larry Fink's comment).

Regardless of what number is selected for recapitalizing the banks, market participants and Germany's Merkel are going to want to be able to verify that this recapitalization is sufficient to restore and maintain bank solvency.  The only way to do this is if each bank discloses its current asset and liability-level data.

If regulators do not require banks to make this disclosure, market participants and Germany's Merkel could easily conclude that the regulators are hiding something and that the banks are in fact not adequately capitalized.  After all, there is no reason not to disclose this data unless the banks are hiding something.
The German Chancellor's intervention on Wednesday rallied European markets after fears that EU's determination to prop up banks was wavering after a meeting of finance ministers on Monday failed to take a decision. 
"I think it is important, if there is a general view that the banks are not sufficiently capitalised for the current market situation, that one does it," she said following talks in Brussels.  Chancellor Merkel said that she was ready to support and to decide on a eurozone bank capitalisation plan as early as October 17, at an EU summit. 
"Germany is prepared to move to recapitalise. We need criteria. We are under pressure of time and we need to take a decision quickly," she said. 
Actually, as your humble blogger has repeatedly pointed out, Eurozone policymakers are not under time pressure to inject capital into the Eurozone banks.

Eurozone policymakers are under time pressure to put in place a mechanism for determining how much capital each bank needs.

Only after the size of the capital shortfall has been determined is it appropriate to talk about how and if each bank will be recapitalize - which banks will recapitalize themselves through retained earnings, which banks will be recapitalized by raising equity from the capital markets, which banks will be recapitalized by their host governments, and which banks are so far underwater that they will be closed.

The "how to" roadmap for doing this involves the following steps:

  1. Each bank discloses its current asset and liability-level data to all market participants;
  2. Market participants analyze this data and determine how much capital each bank needs;
  3. Working with market participants, the regulators determine appropriate strategy for recapitalizing each bank; and 
  4. Banks recapitalized.
Please note, these steps will not be completed in 5 weeks.  However, that is not what is needed to restore confidence in the market.

What is needed is that the market sees the Eurozone governments committed to a path that will address and end the solvency crisis.

... Germany is said to support a move by the European Banking Authority to raise minimum capitalisation levels, a change that would lead to a need for financial support for banks with exposure to Greek or other sovereign debt risk.... 
Germany's intervention soothed markets but will intensify pressure on France. 
France, with banks that are among the most exposed, including its stake in Dexia, is opposed to recapitalisation. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, is concerned that the huge sums he might have to pay out could threaten the French AAA sovereign debt rating ahead of elections next year.
Using my approach, it is not clear that governments will have to inject huge sums of money in their banking systems.  Private investors are likely to put up the money when they can assess the risk of each bank.
"I think it will be a very important signal to the international financial markets," she said.
The key is to send the right message.  My modest proposal is the message that needs to be sent.
"There's just news of discussions about a possible bank recapitalisations, there's no details yet," said Kasper Kirkegaard, currency strategist at Danske in Copenhagen. "There's a high risk of a further sell-off if we don't get details on this soon."
The details that need to be laid out is a credible plan for addressing the need to recapitalize the banks.

Update


A Wall Street Journal article discusses a 'plan' to restore investor confidence in Eurozone banks.  Under the plan, each EU nation and its financial regulators are now suppose to tell how much capital each bank actually needs.

Currently, the plan lacks verifiability by market participants.  Instead, market participants are suppose to simply believe these numbers.

This plan is highly unlikely to restore confidence.  At a minimum, it excludes two key ingredients to restoring confidence.  These ingredients are current asset and liability-level disclosure and investor participation in the determination of how much capital each bank needs.

Germany is putting pressure on other euro-zone governments to declare how they would recapitalize their banks if the need arose, as part of a concerted effort to repair investors' battered confidence in European banks....

German officials hope that a coordinated demonstration by euro-zone governments that they have contingency plans for their banks in place would calm financial-market fears of a banking crisis in the region....
As well as alleviating such funding strains, German officials hope that a system of backstops for banks would give the euro zone more freedom to deal with Greece's teetering debts—including the option of restructuring Greek bonds. 
Investors fear that some European banks would struggle to digest the losses that would follow from a major Greek debt restructuring, unless the banks receive capital injections from national or European authorities....

Banks should seek to raise capital first from private investors, and from national authorities if they can't tap the market, she said. If national authorities don't have the necessary resources, banks should turn to currency bloc's main bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, she said....

Germany has said in recent days that it stands ready, if necessary, to reactivate its national banking bailout fund, which was set up in 2008 but is now closed to new aid requests from banks. Reopening the fund would require approval from Germany's parliament, but Berlin officials believe they could get that authorization quickly.

Germany professes confidence that its own banks, which have so far avoided the worst of the recent funding strains, don't need more capital. But Europe's biggest economy wants the single-currency bloc to send a united, reassuring signal to financial markets about its banks.

German officials have complained that some other governments haven't put in place national contingency plans to support their banks. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was frustrated at the lack of progress in some countries when European finance ministers discussed the issue in Luxembourg early this week, according to people familiar with the matter....

France's government, however, is reluctant to reactivate its banking bailout measures dating from 2008, according to people familiar with the matter. Paris is deeply worried about losing its triple-A credit rating if the rating agencies decide the country can't afford any costly new bank-support measures, these people say....

French banks are also against announcing a new national banking backstop, for fear that it could spook financial markets already worried about French lenders' exposure to indebted Southern European countries.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

BNP Paribas Chairman Michel Pebereau reaches time for 'utter transparency'

In a great irony, BNP Paribas which fired the Guns of August on August 9, 2007 and signaled the beginning of the financial crisis when it announced that it could no longer value sub-prime structured finance securities now finds the market is unable to value BNP Paribas.

The WSJ ran an article by Nicolas Lecaussin citing an anonymous executive on the condition of BNP Paribas.  Naturally, BNP Paribas issued a statement claiming the executive was wrong.

Why should market participants believe BNP Paribas?  If 'utter transparency', disclosing its current asset and liability-level data would show that it is right, it ought to disclose this information.

The failure to provide 'utter transparency' and disclose its current asset and liability-level data is a public admission BNP Paribas has something to hide and its anonymous executive is right.

If BNP Paribas would like help with the mechanics of offer 'utter transparency', your humber blogger is ready to assist them.
"We can no longer borrow dollars. U.S. money-market funds are not lending to us anymore," a bank executive for BNP Paribas, who declines to be named, told me last week. "Since we don't have access to dollars anymore, we're creating a market in euros. This is a first. . . . we hope it will work, otherwise the downward spiral will be hell. We will no longer be trusted at all and no one will lend to us anymore." 
He's not the only one worried. Société Générale has lost 22.5% of its value since the beginning of the summer. In early September, BNP released a statement—in English, which is highly unusual—explaining that it has abundant dollar liquidity and that BNP has nothing to worry about, unlike other banks. France's three biggest banks have been the subject of whisper campaigns about their solvency throughout the summer. 
On the surface at least, the concerns are hardly groundless. BNP, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole together hold nearly $57 billion in Greek sovereign and private debt, versus $34 billion held by the largest German banks and $14 billion at British banks. And then there is Spain and Italy. French banks held more than €140 billion in total Spanish debt and almost €400 billion in Italian debt as of December, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements. If either of these governments were to default on their debts, their banking systems could collapse and take the French system along with them. BNP, Société Générale and Credit Agricole all say that their finances are in order and the market worries are unfounded. 
But it's difficult for the BNP executive to hide his concern. "Look at the French banks' debt holdings versus those of U.S. banks," he continues. "The total debt of the three big U.S. banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan and Citigroup) is $5.86 trillion, or 39% of GDP, while the debts of BNP, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale come to €4.7 trillion, or 250% of French GDP."... 
Whether the market's worst fears are realized or not, French banks certainly maintain an all too close relationship to the state. This opaque system doesn't offer outsiders much visibility, save for the knowledge that indebted banks and an indebted French state intend to continue to cover each other, no matter the cost and on taxpayers' backs if they must.  If U.S. money-market managers no longer trust the French system, this is a glaring reason why. The fastest way to regain their trust would be to end this system.
This is true of the relationship between the banks, governments and regulators in the US, UK and the rest of Europe too (See the Nyberg Report on Irish Financial Crisis for confirmation of this fact).

The way to end this system would be to provide utter transparency as recommended under the FDR Framework.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

BNP Paribas Chairman Michel Pebereau sees need for "utter transparency"

The Wall Street Journal carried an article on BNP Paribas Chairman Michel Pebereau discussing the adequacy of European bank capitalization.

After trying to defend capital adequacy citing the recent stress tests, the Chairman then acknowledge that "utter transparency" is needed.

Here is a leading banker confirming the importance of the current asset and liability-level disclosure (it does not get more 'utter transparent' than that) your humble blogger has been calling for.


Recent stress tests carried out in Europe show most European banks have enough capital and don't need more to get through the current crisis, BNP Paribas Chairman Michel Pebereau said Monday. 
Stress tests carried out at the European level at the end of July "don't obviously show that the European banking system as a whole needs more capital," Pebereau told a conference organized by Paris-based think-tank Institut Montaigne. 
Most of the banks scrutinized by the new European banking regulator passed these tests, with only eight out of a total of 90 failing. 
Like the stress tests conducted a year earlier, these tests have been subject to an intense amount of criticism by the investment community.  Clearly, based on their actions of reducing their funding to European banks, US money market mutual funds do not find the tests and their results compelling.
Pebereau's comments follow a call from International Monetary Fund chief and former French finance minister Christine Lagarde for banks to bolster their capital buffers in the face of the sovereign-debt crisis in the euro zone. 
Her comments raised eyebrows among European banking officials, who pointed out Lagarde also said most global banks have already undergone a round of recapitalization after the 2008 crisis....
An insolvent bank can raise capital and still not be solvent.
Europe-wide stress tests have been criticized for not factoring in the possibility of default of a euro-zone member. But Pebereau countered that stress tests give a comprehensive picture of European banks' exposure to sovereign-debt risk and how that risk is provisioned. 
Even as he recognized that "utter transparency" and more oversight on banks is needed, Pebereau repeated his opposition to measures he says could hinder bank lending to the economy, such as the capital surcharge on systemic banks proposed by the Financial Stability Board, the body advising the Group of 20 industrialized and emerging nations on financial reform. 
Instead, Pebereau said, systemic banks should be subjected to tighter supervision.
Ultimately, with "utter transparency" banks receive much tighter supervision because they become subject to market discipline.

Monday, August 15, 2011

Buy-side confirms that disclosure is solution to alleviate solvency fears

In a Bloomberg article, the buy-side confirmed that disclosure of current asset and liability-level data is the solution to alleviate their solvency fears.
“There is a great cloud of uncertainty that’s hanging over the U.S. banks about the full extent of the exposures they have to French and other European banks,” said Andrew Karolyi, a finance professor at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. “The market is clearly not reacting well to what they’re seeing.” 
Citigroup and Goldman Sachs, both based in New York, were the only large U.S. banks to quantify their exposures to French banks in their quarterly filings, known as 10-Q reports. Cross- border outstandings include cash deposits, receivables, loans and securities. They also include short-term collateralized loans of securities or cash known as repurchase agreements or reverse repurchase agreements. 
The disclosures, which didn’t identify the French companies involved in the two banks’ dealings, don’t provide a full picture of the risks because investors can’t see any offsetting collateral or hedges, said David Hilder, an analyst at Susquehanna Financial Group in New York. 
“Unfortunately, I think the numbers in the 10-Qs are really not economically meaningful,” said Hilder, who has a “positive” recommendation on Goldman Sachs and “neutral” on Citigroup. “The gross amount is very likely to be misleading in terms of true economic exposure.” ...
The 2008 financial crisis showed how the interconnections between financial institutions worldwide can cause risks in one company to spread around the globe. Three years later, investors remain unaware of U.S. banks’ Europe-linked risks, Karolyi said. 
“As investors in these banks, we crave greater clarity about the full extent to which they’re laying off their exposures and how and in what form,” Karolyi said. “A little bit more transparency would go a long way to alleviating a lot of investors’ concerns about the extent of these exposures.” 
...“The French are particularly exposed to funding concerns because of their funding structure,” the RBS analysts wrote. “It is quite likely in our view that funding will not become a serious issue for the large French banks, that anxieties subside and that the shares rebound. But there is a non-trivial risk that confidence deteriorates further.”

Sunday, August 14, 2011

Independent confirmation that disclosure is the solution to French banking crisis

In a Telegraph article, the disclosure solution recommended under the FDR Framework for the French banking crisis was independently confirmed as the solution for ending an opacity fueled, fear driven crisis.

Regular readers know that under the FDR Framework, banks would be required to disclose all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  For banks, this means they would have to disclose their current asset and liability level data.

It is only with this data that market participants can do their own independent analysis on a bank's solvency.

It is only with disclosure of this data that market fears of the worst can be replaced with knowledge of the facts.

Lord Myners, the former fund manager [and City minister]... called for European banks, which have been at the centre of the storm, to be more honest to investors and increase levels of disclosure of the sovereign debt they are holding. 
A call for disclosure of current asset-level data.
His calls on disclosure were echoed by Georges Pauget, an adviser to the French government, who said banks must be more open with investors if they are to end the market fears that have led their share prices to collapse in recent weeks. The comments from the two men come after a wild week in global stock markets. 
The nadir came last Wednesday, when investors moved strongly against Societe Generale, France's largest bank, forcing its shares down as much as 20pc. As a result, European regulators chose to ban shorting on banks in France and three other countries.... 
Lord Myners' calls for wider disclosure were echoed by Mr Pauget, the former chief executive of Credit Agricole, who said banks should move quickly to give better disclosure of their funding positions to reassure the markets they are well-financed. 
A call for disclosure of current liability-level data.
"They have to provide more information. Banks have to give more information on liquidity," said Mr Pauget. He went on to say there was a growing need for all banks to give more details of their net stable funding ratios, which show the proportion of a bank's assets that are financed with longer-maturity debt. 
His comments come amid concern that the UK's largest banks are on a collision course with the FSA over the need for more detailed disclosure of the amount and type of sovereign debt each is holding.

Thursday, August 11, 2011

How can France's banks restore confidence?

A Telegraph article asked the question of how can Soc Gen [and all of France's banks] restore confidence. Regular readers know the answer is not to ban short selling, but rather for the banks to disclose to all market participants their current asset and liability-level data.

By announcing that they are going to disclose this information, the French banks are sending a message to the market that they have nothing to hide and any problems that they have are manageable.

By actually providing the information, the French banks would be providing market participants with the ability to confirm or deny this message (trust, but verify).  Confirmation of the message would fully restore confidence.

In addition, the French banks would be setting the global standard for disclosure.
"I mean, why would I as a corporate treasurer want to take the risk?" asked one investor of analysts at Nomura on a conference call yesterday to discuss fears over the funding of European banks. 
John Peace, head of banks research at Nomura, took up the question and gave a lengthy explanation of why he thought the bank was safe, but it was his colleague Alison Miller, head of European credit strategy, who gave a more pithy response. 
"I think the answer is simple, it's about confidence. If something doesn't transpire, that could restore some confidence." 
Confidence in Société Générale, one of France's largest banks, has been lacking this week. 
The bank's shares lost more than 20pc of their value at times and at yesterday's close the lender had seen its market value reduced by about a quarter as rumours swirled the market that it could be in trouble. 
Even a statement from the bank written in bold capitals saying that rumours over its financial health were "COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED" did little to ease fears that something might not be quite right at the bank. 
What is striking is that the suspicions come despite investors having access to far more information on the exposures of European Union banks than they have had before. 
Stress test data published last month by the European Banking Authority provided the market with a detailed breakdown of the exposures of the region's 90 largest banks. 
Analysts at independent research firm CreditSights have even created their own "Stressometer" allowing clients to play around with the numbers and work out the writedowns and losses they think banks could face. 
This is exactly as predicted under the FDR Framework.  Market participants who know how to turn the disclosed data into information do so in a way that makes it easy for other market participants to benefit.
For example, take the fear of the French banking sector's exposure to French government debt, a major source of the collateral used by the banks to fund their day-to-day operations. 
Using CreditSights' database, in just two minutes you can work out that this amounted to €118.73bn (£105bn) at the end of last year. 
Break the figure down and you discover that Société Générale's net exposure to the French government is €16.1bn, about €10bn less than the larger BNP Paribas and about half that of Crédit Agricole. 
Notes sent to clients by Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and Nomura, all expressed themselves comfortable with the exposures of France's banks and their funding. 
The question, then, is why are the share prices of European banks being hit so hard? 
Current sector valuations show European banks trade at just 0.8 times their tangible book value and a price earnings multiple of less than six times 2012 forecast earnings. 
"I think there is a really worrying trend here," said one senior London-based credit analyst. 
"What you could be seeing is counter-parties to the French banks asking them to replace French government debt with other assets. What this means is that the market does not want any more exposure to France because of its own worries over its economic outlook." 
Since the eurozone crisis began, there has been the constant fear of contagion to the currency union's larger members and the concurrent worry that it could also lead to a new bank crisis.... 
Unlike in 2008, the banks have a lot more capital and larger liquidity reserves. Dollar funding, one of the main issues in the last crisis, is less of an issue and the banks have about $900bn (£554bn) of funds on deposit with the Federal Reserve, against $50bn in 2008. 
Their funding is also more diversified and banks have made efforts to tap every available investor base, from the Australian bond market to exchange traded funds. 
This is not to say there are not serious problems. European Central Bank lending figures for May showed that more than half of eurozone deposits were being lent out to the region's weaker banks to keep them afloat, a higher proportion than in the previous crisis. 
For all the unknowns made known by the July stress tests, investors still think their are more unknown unknowns out there. 
Actually, the investors know that there are more unknown unknowns out there.  What investors have been clearly communicating since the beginning of the credit crisis is that they do not want facts that are readily knowable included in the unknown unknown category because of a lack of disclosure.

Raghuram Rajan calls for European banks to "come clean" on financial holdings

In a Bloomberg article, Raghuram Rajan summarizes why the global financial system should fully implement the FDR Framework.  He urges the Europeans banks to adopt current asset disclosure so that market participants can analyze this data and understand what it implies for the banks.
European banks haven’t “come clean” about their holdings, said Raghuram Rajan, a professor at the University of Chicago and a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. 
“There is a need for some concern because the Europeans haven’t yet come clean on what their banks hold,” Rajan, 48, said in an interview on Bloomberg Television’s “In Business” with Margaret Brennan. “We need to have a better sense of what it means if these sovereigns take a hit and what it means to the banks.” 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel plan to meet next week as concerns over the spread of the euro-area debt crisis rattled French markets. Societe General SA, France’s second largest bank, plunged 15 percent yesterday amid speculation that a downgrade in the nation’s credit rating would damage the company’s stability. The stock rebounded today, closing up 3.7 percent in Paris trading at 23 euros ($32.68).... 
“We are some distance away from having to worry about France defaulting and we are some distance away from worrying about the consequences for French banks,” Rajan said today. “It is quite possible the market’s come to terms with this and settled down, but it is something that people do worry about...."
Investors “can start thinking what if Greece goes? What if Portugal goes, France goes and eventually perhaps what if Germany goes?” Rajan said. “When you focus on those tail risks the only answer is sell.”

Europe's banks in free fall while regulators protect their information monopoly

The Independent ran an article describing how once again market participants are asking who is solvent and who is insolvent among Europe's banks.

Regular readers know that the reason that market participants have to ask these questions is the unwillingness of regulators to give up their information monopoly.

European regulators have effectively been gambling with financial stability by maintaining their monopoly and trying to substitute regulatory credibility and stress tests.  One year ago, the regulators ran stress tests and announced that virtually every bank tested had passed.  This included Irish banks that within two months had to be nationalized.

This year, the regulators ran stress tests and again announced that virtually every bank tested had passed.  Unlike last year, the regulators provided disclosure into the individual bank's exposures.  The idea being to let market participants to run their own stress tests.

Less than two months later, even with the benefit of some disclosure, the combination of regulatory credibility and stress tests has come up short.  Without full current asset and liability-level detail, market participants are still do not know who is solvent and who is insolvent.  As a result, inter-bank lending markets are freezing and stock investors are reacting to rumors.
Fear gripped Europe's banks yesterday as shares in French and Italian lenders dived on concerns they would be crippled by the eurozone crisis. 
Société Générale led French banks down as market rumours about its financial position sent its shares tumbling more than 20 per cent during the trading session. SocGen, France's second-biggest bank, was forced to issue a statement denying speculation that it was in trouble. 
Shares in Unicredit and Intesa, two of Italy's biggest banks, were suspended because of volatile trading. Fears about Italy's sovereign debt burden sent the banks down 9.4 per cent and 13.7 per cent respectively. 
French banks were hit by rumours that France was about to follow the US and lose its top AAA credit rating. SocGen shares closed down almost 15 per cent and have nearly halved in the last four weeks. BNP Paribas, France's biggest bank, fell 9.5 per cent. 
SocGen also suffered after a typographical error in a Reuters chart sparked concerns that the bank, a big bullion trader, was trying to raise cash by selling gold futures cheaper for 12 months than for one month. 
Later, rumours swept the market that an unlisted French insurer was in financial difficulty and had sold its big holding of SocGen shares. 
SocGen last week revealed a slump in second-quarter profit as the bank was hit by its big exposure to Greece. The bank also admitted it was unlikely to meet its 2012 profit forecast.
A SocGen spokesman said there had been no change since the profit warning, adding: "SocGen categorically denies all the market rumours." 
The eurozone crisis is in danger of spreading from peripheral countries such as Greece and Portugal to major economies such as Italy, Spain or even France. Fears about which banks might be hit by holdings of bonds issued by troubled countries have caused inter-bank lending costs to rocket. Simon Maughan, an analyst at MF Global, said: "Basically, the banks have stopped lending to each other again because of stories that one or another of them has gone under and that has created a liquidity problem." 
The situation is reminiscent of market turmoil following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, when plunging share prices and soaring costs of funding and debt sent the sector into meltdown. 
Last week the European Central Bank started to buy Italian and Spanish government bonds to stem the crisis but markets doubt its willingness or ability to do enough to stop the rot. 
Mr Maughan said central banks' attempts to ease fears were in fact "red flags" to the market. "All they have done is say, 'We are extremely concerned about the situation', and that has given an excuse for people to start selling." 
British banks were also casualties of the sell-off. Barclays dropped 8.7 per cent, followed by Standard Chartered and Royal Bank of Scotland, which both shed more than 7 per cent. Santander, Spain's biggest bank, fell 8.3 per cent. The US banking sector saw similar falls in early trading.

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

With solvency in doubt, broad decline in European banks [update]

A Bloomberg article reported on how the decline in European bank stock prices is related to questions about solvency - both of the host countries and the individual banks.
European stocks fell to a two-year low amid speculation the region’s debt crisis is spreading... 
Societe Generale (GLE) SA, France’s second-biggest lender, plunged 15 percent as a measure of banks tumbled the most in two years.... 
The benchmark Stoxx Europe 600 Index slid 3.7 percent to 223.71 at 4:34 p.m. in London, erasing an earlier advance of 2.2 percent. The measure entered a bear market on Aug. 8 and has declined 23 percent from this year’s high on Feb. 17 on concern that Europe will fail to contain its sovereign-debt crisis and that the U.S. economic recovery is faltering....
France’s top credit grade was affirmed by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings as yields on the nation’s debt climbed on concern that Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is intensifying. 
Banks retreated 6.6 percent, the most since March 2009. Societe Generale lost 15 percent to 22.13 euros, the biggest drop since October 2008. BNP Paribas (BNP) SA, France’s largest lender, sank 9.7 percent to 35.53 euros and Credit Agricole SA (ACA) plummeted 13 percent to 5.97 euros, a two-year low. 
“Societe Generale issued a warning recently, which makes it very vulnerable to market rumors and that’s why the stock is getting hit today,” said ETX Capital’s Huber. The French bank said on Aug. 3 that it may miss its 2012 earnings target after second-quarter profit fell 31 percent because of a writedown on Greek government debt. 
Societe Generale “categorically denies all market rumors,” Emmanuelle Renaudat, a spokeswoman for the bank said. 
Banco Santander SA (SAN), Spain’s largest lender, declined 6.3 percent to 5.95 euros. UniCredit SpA (UCG), Italy’s biggest bank, fell 7.5 percent to 98.65 cents, while Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (ISP), the second-largest, slumped 11 percent to 1.17 euros.
Update

A Telegraph article provided a lot more on the French bank solvency crisis. 

The political drama came as swirling rumours set off a collapse of French bank shares.
Société Générale fell 21pc before recovering partially, plagued by fears that it may be heavily exposed to tumbling global stockmarkets through its role in the equity derivatives market. Credit Agricole closed down 13pc, and BNP Paribas fell 10pc. 
French banks have €410bn (£360bn) of exposure to Italy alone according to the Bank for International Settlements. The twin crises in France and Italy are now intimately linked and appear to be feeding on each other. 
The MIB index on the Milan bourse fell 6.7pc as the euphoria following the European Central Bank's intervention in the Italian bond markets gave way to angst that the EU bailout machinery may not be large enough to back stop the whole of southern Europe. 
France's CAC 40 closed down 5.5pc. 
Morgan Stanley said the flight from French bank equities was "overdone". 
BNP Paribas does not need to tap the capital markets this year, while SocGen is 93pc funded. The European Central Bank has kept its lending window open and offered a 6-month tender. 
Julian Callow from Barclays Capital said the credibility of the €440bn rescue fund (EFSF) depends on France retaining its AAA rating. 
That is now highly questionable despite assurances from all three rating agencies on Wednesday that nothing had changed. 
"The debt ratios of the US and France are very similar. France also suffers from economic rigidities and now has this extra burden of the EFSF. People are asking themselves whether S&P can downgrade US without downgrading France," he said. 
Mr Callow said France has a current account deficit of 3pc of GDP, unlike other members of the eurozone core. This is a sign of slipping competitiveness and a warning that France may struggle to carry the burden of escalating bail-outs. 
French industrial output fell by 1.6pc in June and economic growth ground to a halt in the second quarter, further eroding budget finances. 
The fiscal deficit was running at 7pc of GDP in the first half. It will take draconian cuts at this point to meet the 5.7pc target agreed with the EU. 
With Spain, Britain, and even Italy now forcing the pace on austerity, France cannot appear nonchalant. Italy's premier Silvio Berlusconi met union leaders on Wednesay to forge a deal on €20bn of anti-deficit measures and labour reforms demanded by the ECB. 
He has recalled parliament to vote on a balanced budget amendment to the constitution. 
The ratings agencies are under intense pressure in Europe and may no longer be able to carry out their work effectively. Italian prosecutors have raided the offices of S&P and Moody's in Milan, accusing them of issuing "false and unfounded judgements" on the Italian financial system. 
S&P said the accusations are "without any merit" 
The Procura di Trani said the agencies had jumped the gun by issuing a report in early July on draft budget proposals. 
Three analysts from S&P are accused of "market manipulation" and "abuse of privileged information" by issuing "inaccurate" reports over a period of several months. 
This sort of judicial action against rating agencies is highly unusual. If it is shown in any way that the charges are politically motivated, the episode may inflict damage to Italy's reputation as a safe place to conduct business. 
Marchel Alexandrivich from Jefferies Fixed Income said investors are worried that the latest contagion to France could bring the eurozone's bubbling problems to a head in a dramatic fashion. 
"If France is dragged into the problem, then we will hit crisis point. They will either have to move to a full-blown eurobond -- and German politicians are set against that -- or face a break-up. There is a significant chance that the euro will no longer exist in its current form within twelve months," he said.