Showing posts with label Sovereign Debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sovereign Debt. Show all posts

Saturday, October 27, 2012

Banks looking to strengthen hand and avoid sovereign debt restructuring

Knowing that it is a matter of time before they are forced to restructure all of their sovereign debt holdings, banks are trying to take steps to protect themselves.

According to an article in the International Financing Review, the Institute of International Finance, a leading bank lobbying group, is trying to change the terms on which sovereign debt is renegotiated.

For example, the banks would like official institutions that hold the debt, like the ECB, to also be required to incur losses.

The biggest change is the banks would like the governments to provide what would be the equivalent of ultra transparency for a government ('enhance data and policy transparency') so that the banks were not left in the dark about what is going on.

Your humble blogger is thrilled to see that banks are such big fans of ultra transparency.  Naturally, given that banks recognize the benefits of ultra transparency, banks should be leading the charge to provide ultra transparency about themselves.

I expect all 450 banks that are members of the IIF as part of their push to change the terms on which sovereign debt is renegotiated to voluntarily provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The world’s biggest banks are drawing up tactics to strengthen their hand in future sovereign debt restructurings, as they seek to avoid another situation similar to the Greek debt talks, when government pushed them into accepting to tens of billions of euros in writedowns. 
The Institute of International Finance, which represents 450 banks around the world that collectively represent the biggest buyers of government debt, has proposed changing the documentation of future bond sales after finding many aspects of the Greek restructuring flawed.
No doubt the banks found that the restructuring was flawed.  The restructuring resulted in the banks taking losses that were not directly paid for by the taxpayers.

If banks were forced to take additional losses on sovereign debt that were not paid for by the taxpayers, this could put the bankers' cash bonuses in jeopardy.

Clearly, something has to be done to retain the sanctity of and bankers' entitlement to their bonuses.
It called for the restoration of the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring” established by the IIF following sovereign debt crises in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. 
Moreover, it argued that the absence of open dialogue, transparent and good-faith negotiations, plus fair treatment of all investors, endangers the normalisation of market access and financial stability.
The most important principle underlying stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring is that the banks recognize upfront the losses that they will ultimately incur should they go through the long process of default and foreclosure on the bad debt.

In the case of Greece, the banks would write off 100% of the sovereign debt.  We are talking about a country that is in a depression with its society and economy falling apart.
The most practical measure the IIF proposes is adding aggregation clauses to documents, which would prevent minority investors – such as hedge funds – from blocking future agreements. 
“Fair treatment of all creditors is in the interest of both issuers and creditors,” the IIF said in a report. “It lessens the burden on all creditors and, by avoiding discrimination, encourages creditors to participate voluntarily in debt resolution.”
As I recall, this is not a problem for sovereign debt that is issued under the sovereign's laws (Greek debt subject to Greek laws).  It is a problem for sovereign debt that is issued under UK laws.

No matter how much the banks would like it, there is absolutely no reason that a sovereign should give up its right to change the terms on the debt issued under its own laws.
The report, written by the IIF’s Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Resolution, examined the Greek debt restructuring from the vantage point of private creditors. 
In particular, the report criticised the retroactive adoption of legislation that introduced a collective action mechanisms into Greek-law government bonds. The manoeuvre raised concerns about the sanctity of financial contracts, the report said. 
“The retroactive change in the legal framework governing sovereign debt instruments is worrisome and sets a bad precedent,” the report said....
Actually, any investor who buys a Greek-law or similar sovereign-law bond knows that the law can and will be changed to benefit the sovereign should it experience financial distress.  This was one of the risks of investing in these bonds that bankers were fully informed about prior to making an investment decision.
The group also demanded that sovereigns make a good-faith effort to negotiate with private creditors at an early stage, including providing enhanced data and policy transparency.
During the Greek PSI negotiations, private investors often felt like they were left in the dark, which limited an open, informed and productive dialogue between private creditors and the Greek authorities, the report said.
I am sure that it was not lost on regular readers that the banks would like enhanced data and policy transparency so that they did not feel like they were left in the dark.

This is the equivalent of asking the governments for ultra transparency.

Given that banks think ultra transparency is good for them, it must be equally good for every other market participants to have when it comes to assessing a bank.

As a result, the banks should take the lead and provide ultra transparency.

Wednesday, October 3, 2012

With good reason, Spain fears terms from AAA EU nations

The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard points out that Spain's prime minister is reluctant to ask for a bailout for fear of the terms that the AAA EU nations will impose.

In case Mr. Rajoy has any doubt about the cost his country will have to bear to preserve the bonuses of the German and other AAA EU nations' bankers, he just has to look north at Ireland (or west at Greece).

In return for a bailout that was used to repay the unsecured debt to German and other AAA EU nation banks, the Irish government effectively yielded a substantial portion of its sovereignty.  For no benefit to the Irish citizens, the Irish government agreed to make them debt slaves.

I would hope that Spain's government takes a different approach and follows Iceland's lead.

Iceland made its banks absorb upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system that the banks would have realized had they gone through the long bankruptcy procedure.  Having the banks take a loss meant that the unsecured creditors of the banks also had to take a loss.

Did the world come to an end?  No!

What did happen is that Iceland saved its real economy and society from the damages that would have been inflicted upon them had Iceland bailed out the banks and socialized the losses.

The same would happen for Spain if it followed Iceland's lead.

Mr. Rajoy and his government face a clear choice:  preserving Spain's real economy and Spanish society or turn Spain into a debt slave.

Fear of escalating demands by Germany, Finland and Holland is a key reason why Spanish premier Mariano Rajoy continues to drag his feet on a full sovereign bail-out. 
Spain's refusal to act has frozen the eurozone rescue machinery and begun to rattle markets. The European Central Bank will not buy Spanish bonds until the country requests aid from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and signs a "Memorandum" giving up fiscal sovereignty. 
Finance minister Luis de Guindos told Spain's parliament Wednesday that there will be no bail-out until the terms are clear. "The government will take the best decision for Spain and its European allies when it knows all the details," he said. 
Finland has become the greatest worry. "Rajoy is terrified that the Finns will say `No' after he has requested a rescue," said a Spanish economist with close ties to the Rajoy team. 
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, head of the Grand Committee on Europe in Finland's parliament, said Finnish lawmakers must vote on any deal and would make their own decision. 
"Our national law on the ESM is very tight. If the budgetary risks for Finland increase, or if there is any change to the ESM's preferred creditor status, we will have to evaluate it," she told The Daily Telegraph. 
True Finn leader Timo Soini said the parliament would demand high-quality collateral from Spain, complicating any deal.
By requiring high-quality collateral, Finland is not exposed to Spain's credit risk.  It gets to claim it was helpful without doing anything (Spain could have gotten the same funds by selling the collateral).
"Don't underestimate the fury of Finnish taxpayers. Almost everybody here thinks the bail-out policies have failed and that we are paying to rescue French and German banks," he said.
Mr. Soini is right.  A bailout is nothing more than a needless rescue of the French and German banks.  These banks are fully capable of absorbing losses on the excess debt in the global financial system and continuing to support the real economy.

There is no reason for the Spanish taxpayer to bail them out, particularly when Spain needs every euro it gets from its taxpayers to support its real economy and social programs. 

Tuesday, June 5, 2012

Spain losing access to capital markets as capital markets signal don't bailout banks

The Wall Street Journal reports that according to Spain's budget minister the country is losing access to the capital markets and needs the EU to bailout its banks.

Regular readers know that this interpretation of why Spain is losing access to the capital markets solely reflects bankers' worries over whether or not they will be paid their bonuses.

The capital markets know that bailing out the banks is unnecessary.

Under a modern banking system with deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, banks are designed to absorb all of the losses on the excesses in the financial system today.  Subsequently, banks can continue to operate and make loans to support the real economy while they rebuild their book capital levels through retention of future earnings.

The IIF published a report that indicated it will take less than 4 years for Spain's banks to generate sufficient earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.  Four years suggests that recapitalizing the banks today is much ado about nothing.

The capital markets are worried that the Spanish government will undermine the perceived strength of its deposit guarantee by recapitalizing its banks and as a result, trigger a bank run.  This occurred in both Ireland and Greece.
Spain's Budget Minister Cristobal Montoro on Tuesday urged euro-zone partners to act faster to help support its enfeebled banks, saying that the government has effectively lost access to capital markets because of steep risk premiums demanded by sovereign bond investors.
In making this dramatic admission, Mr. Montoro joined recent calls by the Spanish government for direct aid from European Union institutions for Spanish banks as the government hopes to avoid a full-blown bailout package... 
As discussed above, Spain's banks do not need the bailout.

What we are talking about here is that bankers in other EU countries would like Spain and its banks bailed out.  If Spain and its banks are not bailed out, there is some chance that the banks in other EU countries will have to recognize a loss on their Spanish exposure.  This loss might prevent the bankers from being paid their bonuses.
"What this premium tells us is that the state, and Spain as a whole, has a problem when it comes to accessing markets, when we need to refinance our debt," Mr. Montoro said in a radio interview. "What that premium says is that Spain doesn't have the market's door open, as such, the challenge is to open that door and regain the confidence of those markets, our creditors."
Regaining confidence is a function of requiring ultra transparency from the Spanish banks and not getting an EU bailout.
The warning from Madrid was reminiscent of similar alarms over prohibitive borrowing costs sounded by Greece, Portugal and Ireland before entering into bailout talks with such international lenders as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.
History shows that those bailouts did not work out for the countries involved.  They did work out well for the bankers in the countries that lent money.  They were effectively bailed out of their bad decisions.  As a result, they not only got a bonus for making a bad lending decision, they also get a bonus for the bailout.

Heads the bankers win, tails everyone else in the EU loses.

Saturday, June 2, 2012

Regulatory failure: banks offered incentive to buy government debt

CNBC carried an interesting article on how financial regulators are offering an incentive banks to buy government securities.  Regulators do this by waiving the need for banks to hold capital against these securities.

Of course, government debt is not risk free.  Not only is there interest rate risk, but as Iceland, Ireland and Greece have shown, there is also default risk.

Requiring banks to hold zero capital against assets with this type of risk profile is a fairly clear example of regulatory failure.

US and European regulators are essentially forcing banks to buy up their own government's debt—a move that could end up making the debt crisis even worse, a Citigroup analysis says. 
Regulators are allowing banks to escape counting their country's debt against capital requirements and loosening other rules to create a steady market for government bonds, the study says. 
While that helps governments issue more and more debt, the strategy could ultimately explode if the governments are unable to make the bond payments, leaving the banks with billions of toxic debt, says Citigroup strategist Hans Lorenzen. 
"Captive bank demand can buy time and can help keep domestic yields low," Lorenzen wrote in an analysis for clients. "However, the distortions that build up over time can sow the seeds of an even bigger crisis, if the time bought isn't used very prudently." 
"Specifically," Lorenzen adds, "having banks loaded up with domestic sovereign debt will only increase the domestic fallout if the sovereign ultimately reneges on its obligations." 
The banks, though, are caught in a "great repression" trap from which they cannot escape.
"When subjected to the mix of carrot and stick by policymakers...then everything else equal, we believe banks will keep buying," Lorenzen said....
"Ask the simple question: Why are banks buying sovereign debt when yields are either near record lows, or perhaps more interestingly, when foreign investors are pulling out?" Lorenzen wrote. 
He thinks he has the answer. 
For one, the European Central Bank's Long-Term Refinance Operations provided guarantees for the debt, which Lorenzen deems a "heavily sweetened form of financial repression given the pressure banks were under" to buy. 
"Banks have ended up buying bonds at yields where they would happily have sold them only a few months prior," he said. 
Moreover, banks are allowed to not count the sovereign debt against their Basel capital requirements. Also, Lorenzen argued, European banks have escaped the onus of stress tests this year, a less-than-subtle hint that authorities are willing to tolerate a bit of looseness in banks so long as they are helping to stave off a full-blown debt crisis. 
"One doesn’t have to be too cynical to hypothesize that all the disclosures on sovereign exposure have become a bit of a political liability at a point in time where the only buyers in size of periphery sovereign debt are periphery banks funded by the ECB," he said. 
"As long as funding for sovereigns in markets remains in jeopardy, and as long as there is no clear move towards proper fiscal solidarity in Europe, we reckon there will be a strong political incentive to make banks captive buyers. That implies a move away from marking sovereign debt to market, away from raising risk weights, away from capital ratios that don't risk weight assets and away from stress tests incorporating government bonds."

Monday, January 16, 2012

Sovereign debt write-downs and what makes central banks safe

ZeroHedge has been running a number of excellent posts discussing the Greek sovereign debt situation.

As Tyler Durden predicted, banks have been selling their Greek sovereign debt exposure to activist hedge funds.  In turn, these funds are trying to use their holdings to block a write-down and extract better terms.

Tyler raised the issue of what happens to the ECB's 40+ billion holdings of Greek sovereign debt.  Are these holdings going to be subject to a write-down or do they become senior to all other debt holders.  If the latter, naturally, this will depress demand for sovereign debt of other troubled countries.

However, and this is a big, however, does the ECB actually need to have its holdings made senior to other countries?

In an earlier post, UBS discussed how the ECB has a couple of items going for it that make it different than any other investor.  First, it has no cost of carry.  Second, it does not need to write-down its investments to market value.

What does this mean for Greek sovereign debt?

Imagine that Greek sovereign debt is written down to 20 - 30% of par value.  Now assume that the average yield on the Greek debt to the ECB is 5% and the average discount from par is 10%.

If the debt is written down to 20, the ECB would have an 'unreported loss' of 70 - (100 par - 10 discount - 20 new value) since the ECB does not market its investments to market value.

On the remaining 20, the ECB would continue to earn interest with no offsetting interest expense.

Assuming the ECB can rollover this debt at 5% at maturity into new Greek debt, in 70 years, the ECB will have recouped its investment and suffered no loss!

Obviously, the time it takes to recoup its investment drops if the initial haircut is not as large.

The fundamental point I am making here is that there is no reason that the ECB needs to become senior to other debt holders.  In fact, if the ECB were to really get involved in a sovereign debt restructuring, it might push for a larger write-down and far longer maturity than the other debt holders might prefer!

If the ECB did become involve, it is possible that the headline would read "ECB leads cram-down on hedge funds".

Friday, December 23, 2011

Debt crisis is causing a dangerous dependence on central banks

In a Bloomberg article, the Bank of England's Mervyn King effectively points out that the solution to a solvency crisis is not massive amount of central bank liquidity.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying this since the beginning of the credit crisis.

The solution to a solvency crisis, and it was proven by the FDR Administration in 1933, is based on ultra transparency.  It involves three simultaneous steps:

  • Make the banks recognize the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets (this ends the mis-pricing of assets in the real economy caused by 'extend and pretend' activities);
  • Have the governments guarantee each bank's deposits and unsecured liabilities (this lets the banks continue in operation providing credit to the economy even with negative book equity); and
  • Require the banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details (this restores confidence in the market as participants know that all losses have been recognized and they can exert discipline to keep the banks from gambling on redemption).
What Mr. King identified in the article is the ongoing collapse of confidence by investors is leading to a dangerous over-reliance by banks on funding from the central banks.
Mervyn King, vice chairman of the European Systemic Risk Board, said Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is threatening to hurt the real economy and the outlook for financial stability has worsened. 
The damage to the real economy is caused by requiring the real economy to absorb losses from the financial excesses that have occurred rather than the banks.

It is a primary role of the banking system to act as a safety valve and absorb losses on financial excesses so that the real economy is not hurt.
Growth prospects “have deteriorated” since September, King, who is also governor of the Bank of England, said at a briefing hosted by theEuropean Central Bank in Frankfurt yesterday. “Investors lack confidence to continue to provide normal levels of funding. Dependence on central banks has risen.”
Why should investors have confidence in the banking system?  Because banks are not required to provide ultra transparency, there is no way for any market participant, including banking competitors, to know who is solvent and who is insolvent.

The solvency crisis began on August 9, 2007 and since that time the global financial regulators and policymakers have done absolutely nothing to address it.  The losses that existed in the global banking system are still there.  It is the cover-up of these losses by the regulators and bankers that is eroding confidence.

The only time when banks provide more transparency is when they are undergoing a bank run.  This blog has demonstrated this with French banks (BNP Paribas and Societe Generale) and US investment banks (Jefferies).
The ECB loaned banks a record 489 billion euros ($636 billion) for three years on Dec. 21 to avert a credit crunch from the sovereign debt crisis. The central bank said earlier this week that the turmoil has taken on systemic proportions not seen since the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
King said the outlook for financial stability has “worsened” since the last ESRB meeting in September, and while intervention by the ECB is expected to “assuage funding problems in the near term, in the longer term private funding markets must be revitalized.”
The only way to bring back the private funding market is for all sectors of the financial system that are currently opaque to have the sunlight of ultra transparency shown on them.

Banks are at the top of the list because they are opaque or in the words of the Bank of England's Andy Haldane 'black boxes'.  To revitalize the private funding market for banks requires the banks disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is this data that all the private funding market participants need to assess the risk of each bank and adjust both the amount and price of their exposure to each bank.

Without ultra transparency, all the useful, relevant information that market participants need in an appropriate, timely manner is not available.  It is no surprise that the private funding markets are not functioning as transparency is required for the invisibile hand to operate.
Bank shares have suffered this year as borrowing costs surged in the euro region.... 
King also appealed to banks not to “reduce lending to the real economy” as they increase their capital levels to meet new standards set by regulators. 
The best way to have avoided this regulator induced credit crunch is not to have set the meaningless 9% Tier I capital ratio targets in the first place.

Until banks provide ultra transparency, nobody believes that any reported Tier I capital ratio is anything other than an easily and highly manipulated, meaningless number.  
“We are very conscious there is extreme risk aversion in private financial markets,” he said. 
“We want a more robust banking system so that whatever risks crystallize, whatever their source, the banking system is in a better position than 2008.”...
The only way to have a more robust banking system is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  Until this is done, there is no way for the private market participants to know if the banking system really is in a better position than 2008.

Friday, December 16, 2011

Run on the Greek banks hits the accelerator

A Guardian article reports on the continuing run on the Greek banking system.  With the collapse in confidence in the government deposit guarantee and the solvency of the banks, deposits are leaving the Greek banking system at a record setting pace.

An unprecedented exodus of capital from Greece – peaking in a record number of withdrawals from banks in recent months – has exacerbated the liquidity crisis now wracking the recession-hit country. 
The latest figures released by the Bank of Greece reveal that in September and October alone investors pulled €12.3bn (£10.3bn) from domestic banks, spurred by fears of political uncertainty and economic collapse. 
Overall, outflows have reached a record 25% since September 2009 – when household and corporate deposits stood at a peak of €237.5bn, the data showed. 
So 5% of peak deposits just left in one month.
Theodore Pelagidis, an economics professor at the University of Piraeus, said: "This is part of the death spiral of the recession as a result of austerity measures. People realise that contagion has come to banks and they are very afraid of losing their deposits. On average around €4bn-€5bn in capital flees the banking system every month." 
The extraordinary figures back up anecdotal evidence that it is not just the super-rich behind the flight of funds. 
Over the past year, as the eurozone debt crisis has intensified in the nation where it largely began, there have been countless cases of ordinary depositors hauling suitcases stuffed with cash to the safer destinations of Cyprus, London and Switzerland. 
The weekly Proto Thema publication reckons that some 500,000 Greeks have moved money abroad, with a record 1.2m bank transfers being made over the last 18 months. 
An estimated €40bn, amounting to 17% of the country's gross domestic product, is believed to have been withdrawn from the banking system over the past year. 
Foreign banks with branches in Athens were facilitating the cash flight, the newspaper claimed, by encouraging Greek depositors to set up bank accounts abroad. The Swiss banking groups UBS and Credit Suisse had made it much easier for investors to open accounts in Geneva and Zurich by simplifying procedures.

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

WSJ: Regulators create systemic risk

In an editorial on the Basel capital requirements, the Wall Street Journal observed that through these requirements regulators are creating systemic risk.

Regular readers know that the global financial regulators are a source of systemic risk because of their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information for assess the risk of a bank.

The WSJ identifies yet another way that the global financial regulators create instability.

In this case, the regulators do it by the risk weightings they put on different asset types that banks hold.  These risk weightings encourage banks to have similar portfolios.  As a result, a problem with one asset type is likely to permeate the entire banking system.

The Basel capital requirements themselves are the product of banking regulators in the 1980s attempting to help banks generate a higher Return on Equity so that the banks could attract capital. [I know as I worked on Basel I.]

The idea of risk weights was developed to allow banks to take on more leverage.

The idea of a risk-free asset that would have a zero risk weight has always been fundamentally flawed.  The only asset that a bank holds that fits this criteria is cash in its vaults.  All the other assets have a component of risk:  including credit, interest rate and liquidity.

It is well known that zero risk weight sovereign debt is definitely not risk free.  For example, a large bank in the US managed to lose over half of its book value from a position in long term US Treasuries.

Standard & Poor's Monday night put nearly every country in the euro zone on notice for a possible credit downgrade ... European officials denounced the announcement as counterproductive and somehow politically motivated, but the rating agencies are merely catching up to the reality that sovereign debt isn't a risk-free asset.  
This same realization may even be dawning at last on the international banking regulators in Basel, Switzerland. Business Week reports that the authors of the Basel standards, which set capital and liquidity requirements for large international banks, are reconsidering rules that all but require banks to hold large amounts of sovereign debt. 
Unfortunately, the rules under review concern only the new liquidity buffers that banks will need to hold under the forthcoming Basel III standards. Under this new requirement, banks are supposed to have a 30-day supply of funds available in case lending markets seize up as they did in the fall of 2008, and 60% of that supply is supposed to be in high-quality, highly liquid assets, such as, believe it or not, government bonds....
Under Basel's risk-weightings, government debt of your home country is assigned a zero risk under both the old rules and the new. 
The rationale is that a government can always tax more or print more money to pay off its debts, at least nominally. So a country that issues debt in its own currency should in theory never be forced into actual default, even if it has to resort to inflationary money printing to avoid it. 
On this, the Basel gnomes have a point, even if it's taken everyone too long to realize that this option wasn't open to the likes of Greece and Italy. 
But even when correctly applied, those rules create systemic risk by nudging large banks toward holding similar assets. This reduces diversity in the system, increasing the odds that if one bank is in trouble, all or most of them will also be in trouble. 
A normal market has a balance of buyers and sellers, longs and shorts, bulls and bears. But risk-weightings put a thumb on the scale. 
Recall that the Basel rules also assigned a very low risk-weighting to triple-A-rated mortgage-backed securities, which helps explain why sleepy banks in Dusseldorf loaded up on the stuff during the housing bubble and lost billions during the panic. 
And now here we are doing it again with sovereign debt. 
In a paper commissioned by the European Parliament in 2010, former Commerzbank Chairman Achim Kassow notes dryly that "The regulatory incentive which results from the 0% risk weight is apparent: banks in Member States are effectively encouraged to place their most liquid assets into the worst possible government debt, maximizing the yield with a regulatory capital requirement of zero." 
It's encouraging that the Basel rule makers are considering even a limited climb-down from pushing banks into government bonds, but the whole policy needs revision.

Monday, November 28, 2011

European Banking Authority warns on bank funding...ultra transparency emerges as only solution

A Reuter's article reports on how the European Banking Authority (EBA) is growing increasingly concerned over the fact that the inter-bank funding market is frozen and Eurozone banks need to rollover almost $1 trillion in debt.

The EBA is looking at all the solutions tried in 2008-09 to unfreeze the market -- for example, state guarantees, stress tests, higher capital ratios -- and has concluded that these are not working.

The solutions are not working because banks simply do not trust each other or the sovereigns that stand behind them (this is not confined to the Eurozone as a collapse of the Eurozone banks will wreak havoc in the UK and US too).

Why don't banks trust each other?

Because banks are unable to evaluate the solvency of other banks.  As the Bank of England's Andy Haldane would say because each bank is a 'black box'.

Four years ago, I said predicted a solvency crisis driven by opacity in the financial marketplace.  One area of opacity is bank balance sheets.

Regular readers know that in order to assess the risk of a bank, market participants, including the bank's competitors, need access to the bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details on an on-going basis.

It is the ability to independently analyze this data that restores and maintains trust in the banks.

Until this data is made available, as I predicted, the financial system and the real economy will continue on a downward spiral.
Europe's finance chiefs try again next week to end a deadlock over bank funding, after the industry regulator warned time is running out to revive confidence across the troubled euro zone. 
Over breakfast on Wednesday, European Union finance ministers will seek agreement over state-backed guarantees in a bid to unblock wholesale funding markets. With 700 billion euros ($933 billion) of bank debt needing to roll over next year, the need is pressing. 
One solution touted, a pooling of state-backed guarantees, has effectively been abandoned, while another, individual national guarantees, is seen as unlikely to help banks in euro zone countries whose government bonds are being given a wide berth. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) may end up having to step in with a band-aid solution of two-to-three year liquidity lines to banks. 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) has drafted a three-pronged package to shore up confidence in banks: a 106 billion euro recapitalisation by mid-2012, writedowns on exposures to stressed sovereign debt and the funding guarantees. 
But EBA Chairman Andrea Enria signalled this week his increasing frustration with the deadlocked political process, including how to leverage the EU's new bailout fund, the EFSF. 
"The fact that so far only the EBA's measures to strengthen bank capital have been publicly put forward is for us a source of real concern," Enria said in a speech. "We believe that further delays to having all the elements in place are severely affecting the effectiveness of the whole package."... 
But the EBA package is already in danger of being left behind by the deepening euro zone crisis, making it harder for banks to find enough quality collateral to back loans and which is often in the form of government bonds. 
"With the sovereign debt crisis moving to the bigger euro zone countries, there is no longer any confidence in collateral, and the only way to get banks lending to each other again is to restore trust and confidence in sovereign debt used for collateral," said Godfried de Vidts, director of European Affairs at brokerage ICAP. 
So far the EBA is sticking with its timetable to publish by the end of November how much capital each bank must raise, but it and bankers now worry more about funding than capital. 
"We are in a bad spot," Stefano Marsaglia, chairman of Barclays Capital's financial institutions group, said at a Thomson Reuters IFR Bank Capital conference on Thursday. "The problem for banks is very much a funding problem, it's not so much a capital problem." 
The EBA has told banks they need to raise about 106 billion euros to repair their balance sheets, but that amount could rise as the watchdog may take a tougher line on what qualifies as capital and losses on sovereign bonds.... 
Banks are expected to mostly meet shortfalls by selling assets and loans, retaining earnings and cutting dividends or pay, and the amount of capital needing to be raised could be less than 30 billion euros, analysts have estimated.  
Regulators and national governments ... have become increasingly concerned that aggressive "deleveraging" to lift capital ratios will squeeze credit and hurt economic growth. 
Of course they are worried, as it appears that their policies have triggered a mini-credit crisis in the Eurozone.

To try to alleviate this de-leveraging, regulators are proposing a new way for banks to raise capital.
Banks will be given details of how they can plug their capital with debt that converts into equity, or "contingent capital" instruments dubbed CoCos. 
Contingent capital will be accepted if it meets "strict and harmonised" criteria, the EBA has said. It plans to issue a common European "term sheet" to make that clear. 
That is desperately needed, as uncertainty about how regulators view key aspects such as the point where bonds have to convert into equity -- probably when core Tier 1 capital drops to about 7 percent -- have held back issuance. 
But with some investors steering clear of investing in bank shares and most types of debt, market confidence will need to improve first.
Who would invest in contingent capital that converts to equity if they cannot assess the risk of the underlying bank?

Without ultra transparency, there is no real market for contingent capital.

The only way to improve market confidence is by providing ultra transparency.
UK investor M&G said where it has exposure to financials it is "very conservative" and senior in the capital structure. "That is unlikely to change soon. It is difficult to quantify banks' exposure to the periphery but the sector needs better disclosure, more liquidity and less reliance on interbank funding," said M&G fund manager Stefan Isaacs.
Investors, including banks making loans to each other, are on a buyers' strike until ultra transparency is provided.

Thursday, November 24, 2011

Why not pull the trigger on Greek credit default swaps? Authorities fear contagion.

A NY Times Dealbook article asks the question of why not pull the trigger on Greek credit default swaps.  The simple answer is fear of the unknown in the form of contagion.

Since financial regulators have not required that banks disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details on an on-going basis, they have no idea who would win or who would lose if the credit default swaps payout.

This lack of disclosure creates the potential for surprises and the financial regulators are trying to avoid this.

Far better that the financial regulators should have required ultra transparency so everyone could see what the impact would be.

The really important issue here centers on why the European Union cares so much about not setting off credit-default swap triggers in this exchange offer. The absurd lengths European leaders are going to in order to make this “voluntary” does raise a few eyebrows. And I have no really compelling explanations. 
Still, would it be so hard to imagine that the Eurpean Union wants to avoid setting off the swaps because of aggregate exposure among European banks to Greek and other European sovereign debt? For example, what if European banks have all been hedging their sovereign credit-default swaps with each other. If that proves to be the case, a German bank with seemingly modest net exposure to sovereign debts, for example, could really be heavily exposed because the hedge is with a French bank? 
And let us stop with the “Greek C.D.S. market is small” argument. Yes, the publicly acknowledged market is small. What about the bespoke market? 
Moreover, what would the collateral posting requirements be for European banks if non-Greek sovereign debt was downgraded after the triggering of Greek credit-default swaps? What if we also add collateral posting requirements that result from European banks being downgraded?

Wednesday, November 23, 2011

Run on Eurozone banks continues

The NY Times carried an article updating the ongoing run on the Eurozone sovereigns and banks.

Banks clamored for emergency funds from the European Central Bank on Tuesday, borrowing the most since early 2009 in a clear sign that the euro region’s financial institutions are having trouble obtaining credit at reasonable rates on the open market. 
Indebted governments among the 17 members of the European Union that use the euro are also finding it harder to borrow at affordable rates as investors lose confidence in their creditworthiness....
Together, the commercial banks’ heavy reliance on the central bank to finance their everyday business needs, along with the growing borrowing burden for Spain and Italy, raise the risk of failure for some banks within the countries that use the euro and the danger that nations much larger than Greece could eventually seek a bailout or be forced to leave the euro currency union.... 
The European debt crisis has crimped the flow of funds to banks by raising doubts about the solvency of institutions with a large exposure to European government debt. In particular, American money market funds have severely cut back their lending to European banks in recent months, leading many institutions to turn to Europe’s central bank. 
Compounding the problem, many banks using the euro have also had trouble selling bonds to raise money that they can lend to customers. That raises the specter of a credit squeeze that could amplify an impending economic slowdown. In addition, some banks may fail if they are unable to raise short-term cash. 
The central bank said Tuesday that commercial banks had taken out 247 billion euros, ($333 billion), in one-week loans, the largest amount since April 2009. And the 178 banks borrowing from the central bank on Tuesday compared with the 161 banks that borrowed 230 billion euros ($310 billion) last week. 
Since 2008, the central bank has been allowing lenders to borrow as much as they want at the benchmark interest rate, which is now 1.25 percent. Banks must provide collateral. But the central bank is not supposed to prop up banks that are insolvent, only those that have a temporary liquidity problem. 

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

UK financial institutions grow fearful of 'high impact event' on financial system

As the run from Eurozone sovereign debt and banks continues, a Guardian article reports a decline in confidence at UK financial institutions.

Specifically, these institutions see a much higher probability of a 'high impact event' in the UK financial system.

Leading the way is sovereign risk -- which would explain another source of selling pressure on Eurozone sovereign debt.


It is perhaps not surprising that big City firms surveyed by the Bank of England are worried about the impact of the eurozone crisis and a sudden economic downturn might have on the financial system. 
But when set out in black and white in the Bank's latest systemic risk survey, the findings might seen slightly alarming. 
Asked about their confidence in the UK financial system over the next three years, and how their confidence levels had changed over the past six months, the responses show that confidence has fallen sharply. 
A net balance of 59% respondents reported decreased confidence, which was conducted between 20 September and 21 October 2011 of 68 major firms, such as banks, building societies, hedge funds and insurers. 
The perceived probability of a "future high-impact event" in the UK financial system increased sharply in the second half of 2011, compared with the first half of the year, and was reported to be at the highest level since the survey began in July 2008. 
The five risks reported most frequently by respondents to have the greatest impact on the UK financial system if they were to materialise were: 
• sovereign risk (cited by 76% of respondents)
• the risk of an economic downturn (76%)
• funding risk (57%)
• risks around regulation/taxes (38%)
• the risk of financial institution failure/distress (26%).

Sunday, November 20, 2011

Henry Blodget on bank runs in Europe and the 'absurd opacity of bank balance sheets'

Henry Blodget has an interesting article on Business Insider about the run on European sovereigns and banks that this blog has been systematically documenting.

Regular readers know that the only way to stop the bank runs is for the banks to required to provide on an ongoing basis ultra transparency.  Ultra transparency is current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As Mr. Blodget observes,
The world's lenders are increasingly deciding that it's better to be safe than sorry, and they're pulling their money out of Europe. 
As a result, the borrowing costs of many European countries are rising fast. And so are inter-bank lending rates, because the second huge problem with the Euro-train-wreck is that Europe's banks have Euro debts coming out of their ears. 
(When bond yields rise, the market value of existing bonds drops, so any bank that owns the debt of any European country is suffering huge embedded losses. The banks don't mark these losses to market, so you can't see them on the balance sheet, but they're there.) 
Last week, Italian borrowing costs soared over 7%, which has been viewed as a sort of Rubicon level. Spanish yields hit nearly 7%. And French "spreads" over German bonds expanded sharply. 
Nelson Schwartz in the New York Times has some other details: 

  • The Royal Bank of Scotland and pension funds in the Netherlands have been heavy sellers of European sovereign debts in recent days.

  • Kokusai Asset Management in Japan unloaded nearly $1 billion in Italian debt this month.

  • Vanguard let a $300 million CD with Rabobank expire earlier this month and pulled the money out of Europe

  • European banks like SocGen and BNP Paribas cut exposure to Italy by 26 billion euros in Q3

  • American money-market funds have cut their exposure to European bank paper by 54% ($261 billion) since May

  • And so on. 
    The interbank-lending problems, by the way, are exactly what happened in the United States in 2007 and 2008. 
    If the run continues, for banks and countries and companies that live on borrowed money, the effect will be similar to the oxygen being sucked out of the room. 
    And because of the absurd opacity of bank balance sheets, there's no way to tell when or if some critical threshold will be breached and banks and insurance companies (think AIG) will suddenly have to start handing over tens of billions of dollars of "collateral" to counter-parties, blowing huge holes in their balance sheets. 
    Importantly, once runs like this get started, they can accelerate fast. Recall how quickly Bear Stearns an dLehman Brothers went from angry denials and "exploring options" to bust. Recall how quickly, a month ago, MF Global went from confident to flailing to broke.

    Greek debt restructuring, credit default swaps and conflicts of interest

    In her NY Times column, Gretchen Morgenson discusses the conflicts of interest concerning credit default swaps and the Greek debt restructuring.

    Specifically, she looks at the role of BNP Paribas and one of its employees.  The employee sits on the committee that decides if the Greek debt restructuring is a 'default' that triggers payments to the buyers of credit default swaps.

    She identifies several conflicts of interest including:

    • BNP Paribas known exposure to Greece;
    • BNP Paribas unknown exposure in terms of credit default swaps; and
    • BNP Paribas compensation for maximizing the amount of the outstanding bonds that are restructured.
    One of the reasons for regulators to require banks to provide on-going disclosure of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail is it eliminates the unknowns.

    In the case of the Greek debt restructuring, investors could see exactly how conflicted BNP Paribas is.

    Perhaps more importantly, by looking across all of the major banks that will be involved in determining if the Greek debt restructuring triggers a payout on the credit default swaps an investor could assess the probability that it won't happen.

    If all the banks involved in deciding to make a payout would be making the payout, the chances are very high that there will be no payout.  

    Clearly, this is a major risk for any investor using credit default swaps to hedge their Greek debt position that they would like the ability to assess.  Hence, the need for current detailed disclosure.
    AS the debt mess in Europe deepens, bankers are pressing Greece’s bond holders to swallow big losses. 
    Leading the charge is BNP Paribas, the big French bank, which has been hired by the Greek government to help persuade investors to accept a deal that would cut the value of their investments in half. 
    On paper, this restructuring would be voluntary. Bond holders would exchange their old Greek bonds, at a 50 percent loss, for new ones that would mature in 30 years. Painful, yes. But in theory, such a move would help Greece get a handle on its debt, and that would be good for everyone. 
    Behind the scenes, however, BNP officials seem to be twisting some arms. A big point of contention is — surprise! — derivatives. 
    Investors who own Greek debt and have bought insurance on it, in the form of credit default swaps, wonder why they should accept the offer that’s on the table. If Greece stops paying after the restructuring, those swaps are supposed to cover their losses, much the way homeowners’ insurance would cover a fire... 
    BNP and its client, Greece, want to corral as many investors as they can. The more bond holders they persuade, the more that Greece would benefit — and the more the bank would collect in fees. 
    So it is perhaps unsurprising that some recent meetings have taken on a forceful tone, according to three portfolio managers who attended three different sessions with BNP Paribas. The investors spoke on condition of anonymity because they feared retaliation by the bank. 
    Contrary to what the I.S.D.A. says, the BNP Paribas bankers have been telling bond holders that their credit insurance may not pay off down the road, because after the restructuring is completed, the terms of the old debt might be changed, these money managers said.... 
    But the warnings from BNP Paribas carried weight, the money managers said, because of one of the officials who was making them. She is Belle Yang, a BNP specialist who also happens to serve on a powerful I.S.D.A. committee. The panel, the “determinations committee” for Europe, decides what constitutes a “credit event” in Greece or elsewhere on the Continent. 
    This is the committee that will likely rule that the Greek deal would not constitute a default. That is because the restructuring would be “voluntary.” Some investors who were counting on their credit insurance would be out of luck. 
    In the meetings, the investors said, Ms. Yang identified herself as a member of the committee. That itself was unusual, because the names of I.S.D.A. committee members are normally kept confidential. The association doesn’t disclose them, and lists only panel members’ employers — 15 large global banks and financial services firms. Those institutions include Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs, BlackRock and Pimco. 
    One of the money managers who attended the meetings said Ms. Yang’s presence seemed to raise a conflict. Ms. Yang works for BNP, which stands to profit from the restructuring. She is also on the I.S.D.A. panel, which will determine if credit default swaps pay off. 
    One of the money managers said he pointed out Ms. Yang’s dual role at a meeting.
    “You’re on the determinations committee, your firm is earning a big fee and trying to scare me into tendering my bonds,” he said he told her. He said Ms. Yang replied: “No, I’m just trying to help tell you what could go wrong.”... 
    The money managers with whom I spoke said BNP Paribas seemed to be motivated either by its desire to generate fees from the exchange or, perhaps, by worries about its own exposure to Greece. They wondered, for instance, if BNP Paribas has written a lot of insurance on Greek debt. If so, getting people to unwind such swaps now would be less costly for BNP than having the insurance pay off. 
    If investors think debt terms can be changed by fiat, they will flee the market. Ditto if they find that their insurance can be made worthless. Indeed, some of the volatility in European debt recently may be attributed to investor fears about these issues. 
    The discussions with BNP Paribas confirm the view of some investors that credit default swaps are not insurance at all, but rather instruments that big banks use to benefit themselves. The secrecy of who serves on I.S.D.A. committees feeds this fear, as does the fact that these panels are both judge and jury. 
    “Market forces like to think of market pricing as having symmetry,” said David Kotok, founder of Cumberland Advisors, a money management firm in Sarasota, Fla. “But a system which requires decisions by parties who have vested interests on one side is asymmetric. A surprise rule change or an interpretation which was understood by some and misunderstood by others also defeats symmetry. In the case of credit default swaps, both elements apply.”

    Saturday, November 12, 2011

    Eurozone bailout fund has to buy own debt is a sign a different approach is needed

    In the category of you cannot make this stuff up, the Telegraph reports that the Eurozone bailout fund had to buy its own debt because investment bankers could not find enough willing buyers.

    If ever there was a clear signal that a different approach is called for this is it.

    Regular readers know that I have proposed a different approach based on disclosure, deposit guarantees and the fact that banks can continue to operate while having significant negative book capital.
    The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) last week announced it had successfully sold a €3bn 10-year bond in support of Ireland. 
    However, The Sunday Telegraph can reveal that target was only met after the EFSF resorted to buying up several hundred million euros worth of the bonds. 
    Sources said the EFSF had spent more than € 100m buying up its own bonds to help it achieve its funding target after the banks leading the deal were only able to find about €2.7bn of outside demand for the debt. 
    The revelation will be seen as a major failure and a worrying sign of future buyers strike after EFSF officials and their bankers had spent recent weeks travelling the world attempting to persuade key investors, including China's national wealth fund and Japanese government funds, to buy its bonds....
    Chinese and Japanese money was crucial to last year's first bond sales by the EFSF, but they have since been dismayed by the eurozone's failure to resolve the worsening debt crisis and alarmed at how fund has morphed from being a rescue facility for European banks into a potentially €1 trillion leveraged first-loss insurer for eurozone governments. 
    Other European Union funds are also understood to have supported the EFSF's bond sale....
    At a private breakfast organised by PI Capital last week, Mark Hoban, the Treasury minister, said: "What it doesn't do is provide the next stage of the solution, which is how do you stop this from happening again?" he said. 
    The move, by the European Investment Bank, will cause more disquiet among non-eurozone EU members who have become concerned about their growing exposure to the cost of rescuing the currency bloc.

    Wednesday, November 9, 2011

    European finance ministers focus on shoring up sagging bank capital blocks opportunity to save Eurozone

    According to a Reuter's article, European finance ministers failed to find a united front for shoring up Eurozone banks.

    Thank goodness.

    Now, rather than worrying about the meaningless bank capital numbers and socializing the banks' losses, the finance ministers can worry about requiring the banks to perform their role as the safety valve between financial market excesses and the real economy.

    The bank safety valve function is their ability to absorb unlimited amounts of losses.  They can absorb the losses necessary to restructure the debt to a level where the borrowers can afford to service their debt.

    By reducing debt payments to what the borrowers can afford, banks re-establish the conditions for economic growth.
    European Union finance ministers failed to agree on Tuesday how to shore up sagging banks and avert a credit squeeze, as rising borrowing costs for Italy threaten to unleash a new and more dangerous phase of the euro zone debt crisis. 
    Against the worsening economic backdrop, European banks are finding it hard to borrow and are increasingly reluctant to lend to one another. 
    The solution to this problem is to require each bank to provide disclosure of its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This would unfreeze the interbank lending market as lenders would know exactly what was happening at the borrowers.
    In an attempt to arrest this creeping credit freeze, ministers examined offering state guarantees to borrower banks on Tuesday but became bogged down in deciding whether to pool such guarantees in Europe or ask countries to go it alone. 
    "The point is to what extent you pool together guarantees for banks," said one official. "There are differences of views on that point." 
    Austria's finance minister and others said two schemes were now being considered -- one a common "harmonized" model of guarantees for banks that need to borrow and another a "consortium" where state guarantees for banks are gathered.... 
    Rather than guarantee interbank loans, the guarantee should be saved for deposits.  So long as the depositors feel that their funds are not at risk, they are willing to stay with a bank which is insolvent.

    It is the deposit guarantee plus current detailed disclosure that makes it possible for the banks to absorb the losses related to credit excesses.
    Michel Barnier, the EU official in charge of financial regulation, said he would write a law to empower supervisors to push banks that need to beef up their capital by curbing their dividend or bonus payouts....
    This law should be applied after the banks have absorbed the losses and restructured the debt.
    Amid indecision, the EU's attempts to support its lenders may be overtaken by events. 
    Recapitalizing banks was in part intended to cope with a default by Greece. But if debt-ridden Italy -- the euro zone's third biggest economy -- were also to need financial assistance, the scale of the problem would change entirely. 
    It is only the bank balance sheets that are large enough to absorb the losses.
     

    Monday, November 7, 2011

    Is Barclays the firm that will actually provide detailed disclosure?

    A ZeroHedge post asks if Barclays is going to have to follow Jefferies and provide daily detailed disclosure.
    Courtesy of Bloomberg we may now know who the market will focus its attention on next: 
    "Barclays has $12.5 billion sovereign risk, $20.1 billion of risk to corporations and another $10.2 billion to financial institutions. It also has $66.6 billion of exposure in its retail business, 86% of which is to Spain and Italy. Group and corporate-level risk mitigation (sovereign CDS, total return swaps) may reduce these exposures." 
    Or, as the Jefferies case study demonstrated so vividly, it may not, and the only option will now be for Barclays to post daily releases with CUSIP breakdowns...
    Since CUSIP breakdowns were not adequate for market analysis to actually assess the risk of Jefferies, Barclays needs to go much further and provide all the useful, relevant information.

    Fortunately, this type of disclosure would be in keeping with Barclays CEO Bob Diamond's banks behaving as good citizens.

    Saturday, October 22, 2011

    IMF threat to not lend Greece more money is opportunity for Europe

    According to an article in the Telegraph, the IMF is telling the European financial ministers that it will not continue to lend to Greece.

    If this is true, it is extraordinarily good news as it presents the EU with the opportunity to truly address the sovereign debt and bank solvency issues.

    In 2008-2009, like the US and UK, the EU elected to bailout its banking system.  The result was to change a bank solvency issue into a sovereign debt crisis.

    Now, in 2011, the EU has the chance to lead the way and break from the failed policies of 2008-2009.

    The time has come to force banks to recognize their losses.

    Policymakers have to understand that banks recognizing losses is the safety valve in the financial system.  It is not recognizing the losses that is a primary driver of the sovereign debt crisis.  

    Recognizing accounting losses will not cause the financial system to collapse.

    Depositors will not run - they are covered by deposit insurance.  This deposit insurance can be enhanced by using the European Financial Stability Fund as an additional guarantor.  There is the European Central Bank to insure liquidity.

    Banks can continue to originate loans that can be funded either through securities like covered bonds or by selling the loans to investors like pension funds, insurance companies and hedge funds.

    Access to credit will actually be enhanced for small businesses.  Policymakers under appreciate the role that real estate plays in these loans.  Banks are senior secured lenders.  For most small businesses, the security they have to pledge is real estate.

    When a real estate bubble bursts, the problem for bankers is to estimate the value of the real estate.  Not requiring the banks to write down the real estate related loans on their balance sheets prolongs the period of time in which bankers are uncertain as to the value of the real estate and thus the collateral being pledged.  It is this uncertainty that limits small businesses access to credit.

    The EU should recognize the opportunity the IMF threat represents and fully utilize the safety valve that banks recognizing losses represents.

    Thursday, October 20, 2011

    Walter Bagehot provides answer to European financial crisis: "a well-run bank needs no capital"

    Perhaps I am missing something, but I think that the global policymakers and financial regulators have reached the end of the road in their ability to "kick" the solvency problem into the future.

    What concerns me is that they do not recognize this fact.

    Instead, European policymakers and financial regulators, under pressure from the US, UK and IMF are focusing on solutions that involve kicking the solvency problem into the future.  For Europe, kicking the solvency problem into the future involves solving three simultaneous problems:
    • Restructuring Greece's debts;
    • Restoring confidence in the Eurozone banks through a re-capitalization; and
    • Increasing the firepower in the European Financial Stability Fund to protect the ability of Spain, Italy and other EU nations to access the capital markets for low cost funds. 
    A recently proposed solution involved writing down Greece's debt by 50%, recapitalizing systemically important Eurozone banks with approximately 100 billion euros and using the European Financial Stability Fund to insure against restructuring losses of up to 20% on newly issued EU sovereign bonds.

    According to a column by the Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the problem with this and similar proposed solutions is the markets already know they will not work.

    A chorus of analysts on Wednesday said the EFSF proposals are unworkable. "It is unlikely financial markets will be fooled by this for long," said Commerzbank. 
    "I have no confidence in this plan whatsoever," said Hans Redeker, currency chief at Morgan Stanley. "It creates a two-tier capital market, which is dangerous. How can you insure Italian debt but not Belgian, or French debt?" 
    Mr Redeker said the proposals risk setting off a chain reaction in which France loses its AAA rating, followed by Germany and the creditor core as ever greater liabilities engulf them, too. 
    Morgan Stanley said European and UK banks may have to slash their loan books by €2 trillion over the next two years to boost capital and cut dependence on short-term funding. 
    Lenders have already identified €775bn in cuts. The credit squeeze risks trapping Europe in near-slump next year, exacerbating the debt dynamics of Italy and Spain. 
    Jacques Cailloux from RBS said the attempt to turn EFSF into a bond insurer is misguided. "In our view it will ultimately fail to restore confidence. It is very risky for euro area policy-makers to rush out some quick deal on leverage," he said, adding that the plan concentrates risk. Its "Achilles Heel" is that financial stress in Club Med states would inevitably ricochet back into Northern banks, he said. 
    Mr Cailloux said coverage of just 20pc of damage is no longer enough to lure back shell-shocked investors. "It's like insurance that covers the cost of a front door rather than the full house," he said.

    It is entirely possible that the EU's adopting a solution that the market has no confidence in will realize Sir Mervyn King's fears that 'we will face the worst financial crisis since the 1930s maybe ever'.


    Fortunately, this is avoidable if Europe instead decides to address its solvency problems.  

    There is only one way to address solvency that also is proven to restore market confidence.  This is what I previously presented as the FDR Framework's blueprint for solving the EU's sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis.

    This post expands on that blueprint to include using the European Financial Stability Fund to guarantee Eurozone bank deposits and minimize the potential for a run on the Eurozone banks.

    Regular readers will recall that the blueprint was based on providing disclosure to market participants.  By providing disclosure, the European policymakers and financial regulators gain two indispensable commodities.
    • They gain access to the market's analytical capabilities.  Market participants would use the disclosed information to determine who was solvent and the path back to solvency for the insolvent banks.
    • They gain restoration of confidence in the banking system and the sovereign debt market.  The involvement of the market participants in analyzing the information and the various options brings with it confidence in the solution implemented to end the solvency crisis.
    Unstated, but underlying the blueprint is the fact that banks are special.  As Walter Bagehot said, "a well-run bank needs no capital."  

    Please re-read Mr. Bagehot observation as it is a critical element underlying the blueprint and the solution to the European solvency crisis.

    The implications of his observation are that a bank can continue to operate without being nationalized if it has a negative book equity and all of its assets are valued at levels that the bank could realistically expect to realize in an arms length negotiation with an independent third party.

    This is why disclosure is of paramount importance and the key to ending the solvency crisis.

    Market participants need to be in a position where they can monitor the current detailed assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures of a bank to confirm that the bank is well-run going forward!

    If market participants can do this, they can assess the risk of the bank and adjust the amount and price of their exposure accordingly.

    Furthermore, until a bank is closed by the regulator in their host country, it can continue to make loans.

    How will a bank fund these loans? Eurozone banks should also be able to tap the capital markets to fund these loans.  For example, when investors can monitor the loans backing a covered bond (they will be able to do so as part of the detailed disclosure by the bank), there should be much more of an appetite for these bonds.  Alternatively, they can sell the loans to investors (pensions, insurers, hedge funds to mention a few).

    The bottom-line is that a long period of negative book capital does not mean that banks cannot support the lending needs of the economy. 

    Finally, in Europe there is the issue of the European Central Bank's exposures to assets that are going to be repriced.  The Eurozone banks should make the ECB whole for any losses on securities that they pledged to the bank.  

    As for losses on any sovereign debt the ECB purchased, it needs to be realized that central banks are unique because they have no cost for carrying the sovereign debt nor do they pay taxes.  As a result, they only experience a loss if the interest paid on the debt plus the principal repaid on the debt is less than their purchase price for the debt.  This loss should be covered by the European Financial Stability Fund.

    "How to implement" the blueprint:
    • European regulators should disclose what they know about each bank so that market participants can assess the solvency of each bank and the path back to solvency for the insolvent banks.  
    • Europe should require that its banks disclose their current detailed asset/liability data going forward through a conflict of interest free data warehouse so that market discipline can be brought to bear and keep the banks' risk level in check.
    • Europe should use the EFSF to guarantee the deposits at all of the EU banks - this is done to prevent a run on the EU banks.  It is also the most efficient way to leverage up the EFSF funds.
    • Europe should implement the great credit restructuring.  This includes writing down both the sovereign debt and any other bad debts (like residential real estate) that the banks hold to a price they could realistically expect to receive from an independent third party.  These write-downs are necessary to clean up the banks' balance sheets. 
    • The banks should be required over time to recapitalize their balance sheets.  This can be done through retained earnings and the sale of equity in the capital markets.  It is important to reiterate that these banks will be an attractive investment as investors will be able to assess what they are buying.  In fact, with disclosure, banks will not be able to take the level of risks that they took leading up to the financial crisis and they will once again be viewed as long-term, stable, conservative investments.
    Please note that the intent of the blueprint is to restore solvency to the Eurozone financial system.  The intent is not to resolve the economic imbalances that exist between countries in the Eurozone.  If the blueprint is adopted, it will provide the time and financial market stability necessary for those discussions to take place.

    Considering the alternative solutions that are out there, the blueprint moves the Eurozone as close to an economically optimal outcome as possible while staying within the constraints of the politically possible.

    Finally, I expect that the banking industry's Opacity Protection Team will vigorously object to the blueprint as the blueprint is based on detailed disclosure.  

    They will make unsubstantiated claims like the banks won't be able to make loans (the issue is not origination of the loans, but where the loans are held), depositors require banks to have positive book capital (depositors care that their accounts are insured so they can get their money back), and equity and debt investors require banks to have positive book capital (with detailed disclosure, investors, like other banks, will be able to do a better job of assessing the risk of a bank and low risk banks can expect to have greater access at lower cost to investor funds).

    Tuesday, October 18, 2011

    Mervyn King: Four years into the crisis it is surely time to accept the underlying problem is solvency, not liquidity

    Bank of England Governor Mervyn King confirms we are dealing with a solvency crisis and embraces the recommendation under the FDR Framework for disclosure by banks that your humble blogger has been making.

    According to an article in the Telegraph, he observed
    All of the emergency stimulus measures employed to support European banks and the eurozone had simply “bought time” for world leaders to address that fundamental imbalance, Sir Mervyn said in a speech in Liverpool last night. 
    “So far, that time has not been used to deal with the underlying imbalances, or the weaknesses in bank and sovereign balance sheets,” he said. “Time is running out [to prevent the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s or of all time].”
    According to another article in the Telegraph,
    [F]ar more urgent is how we deal with the crisis of confidence in some banks and sovereigns. 
    Here the Bank of England Governor had a clear message for the eurozone. "A transparent recognition of losses and a substantial injection of additional capital are necessary to restore market confidence." 
    Four years into the crisis, said Sir Mervyn, it was "surely time to accept that the underlying problem is one of solvency, not liquidity". This goes for banks and countries, added Sir Mervyn. 
    A round of recapitalisations in October 2008 was inadequate, he believes, especially on the Continent. And he's right.
    As this blog has repeatedly said, the only way to know if a capital injection is adequate is if there is disclosure by each bank of its current asset and liability-level data, including off-balance sheet exposures.  With this data, market participants can verify that all the bank losses have been recognized.  With this data, market participants can assess how much, if any, capital a bank needs.

    Where this blog differs from Mr. King is over the timing of recapitalizing the banks.

    Your humble blogger believes that so long as banks continue to disclose their current asset and liability-level data, they do not have to recapitalize immediately.  Instead, they can recapitalize over time through retained earnings and stock issuance.  While the banks are recapitalizing, either market discipline or regulatory persuasion will act as a restraint on the banks increasing their risk profile.

    Not recapitalizing immediately should have no impact on the ability of banks to make all the loans necessary to support a growing economy.  While it will impact their ability to hold the loans they generate, this is not a problem.  There are plenty of buyers of these loans in the capital markets (insurers, pension funds, hedge funds to mention a few).

    Update


    From an article in the Guardian,
    Four years into the financial crisis, King said it was time to accept that the underlying problem was solvency of banks and countries. "Of course, the provision of additional liquidity support to countries or institutions in trouble can buy time. But that time will prove valuable only if it is used to tackle the underlying problem."
    King said that the recapitalisation of banks in continental Europe in October 2008 had been inadequate, noting that the underlying problems of excessive debt had not gone away. "As a result, markets are now posing new questions about the solvency of banks, and indeed of governments themselves."