Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Irish banks to stop procrastinating and recognize their losses

Bloomberg reports that Irish banks are going to stop waiting for the economy and real estate prices to improve and instead are going to move forward and recognize all of the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets over the next year.

Regular readers know that the Irish Central Bank under the leadership of Patrick Honohan has been a strong advocate of banks recognizing their losses as not doing so drags out the financial crisis.

Such rulings will become increasingly familiar in Ireland as one of the biggest property bubbles in European history unwinds, a crisis masked this year by falling bond yields as investors bet that the worst is over. Yet for Irish banks, whose losses forced the government to follow Greece in seeking a bailout, the true cost of the debacle is about to hit. 
“It’s the year when the world has to change, in the way we deal with this problem,” said Garry Stran, head of the arrears unit in Allied Irish Banks Plc (ALBK), the nation’s largest mortgage lender. “This time next year, when we’re looking back, we should have an absolute clear line of sight that we have restructured a significant number of people.”
As you re-read the highlighted text, keep in mind that Iceland required its banks to recognize their losses at the beginning of the financial crisis.  This protected Iceland's real economy and its social programs.

The losses that Iceland's banks recognized equaled what they could expect to lose if they went through the long process of default and foreclosure.  This level of loss recognition doesn't create equity for the debtor, but leaves the debtor in a position where they can actually service the debt.
Lenders that were bailed out by taxpayers and are owned by the state are looking at a previously unthinkable mix of repossessions and debt forgiveness as they confront the specter of loans that will never be repaid. 
Lenders in the EU, UK and US face the same problem.  Unlike Iceland's banks which have faced up to the problem and Irish banks that are going to confront the problem, EU, UK and US banks continue to kick the problem into the future.
They face the following conundrum: Move too quickly and aggressively in dealing with bad loans and risk cratering the banking system again and imperiling any recovery in real-estate prices, at least in Dublin. Move too slowly, and a debt-laden economy will struggle to grow as borrowers rein in spending.
Modern banking systems, like Ireland's, are designed to allow banks to continue to operate and support the real economy even if they have low or negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.
When banks have low or negative book capital levels, deposit insurance explicitly makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner.
Irish household debt had tripled to 214 billion euros ($279 billion) when the real estate market collapsed in 2008, from 75 billion euros in 2002, according to Dublin-based Goodbody Stockbrokers. As a share of household income, debt has risen to 210 percent from about 117 percent. That’s about twice the average in the euro area. 
Four years since the collapse, about 30 percent of Irish home loans by value, including so-called buy-to-let mortgages for rental properties, are in arrears or have been modified.

Banks have largely held off on repossessions or debt forgiveness after taxpayers were forced into a 64 billion-euro rescue of the financial industry. 
While they have set aside about 6.4 billion euros of provisions for expected bad loans, actual write-offs in the 30 months through June were 250 million euros, according to Goodbody Stockbrokers. 
“Banks have been playing a waiting game, hoping things improve,” Lars Frisell, chief economist at Ireland’s central bank, told reporters in Dublin on Nov. 28. “That’s not happened. It’s time to stop procrastinating, to find out where the losses are and crystalize them. Take the losses.”...
Previously, Mr. Frisell worked for the Swedish central bank, so he is very familiar with the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  He understands why the losses on the bad debt need to be recognized so that the burden of the excess debt is removed from the real economy.
Most borrowers will keep their properties, as banks roll out plans to avoid wide-scale repossessions and forgive vast quantities of debt. 
This is what was done in Iceland and should be done in the EU, UK and US.
“By any definition, the financial crisis in Ireland in general and the mortgage crisis as part of that is massive,” said Jeremy Masding, chief executive officer of Dublin-based Permanent TSB, the largest mortgage lender during the boom. He said the bank won’t talk about writing off debt before “we have exhausted all our efforts” on other solutions.

In some cases, borrowers will be encouraged to trade down to smaller homes, while the central bank is pushing the idea of split mortgages, where portions of loans will be put on hold until the person’s circumstances improve. 
For other debtors and banks, though, the future may lie in negotiating forgiveness....

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Italy rejects bad bank

After the Irish experience with a bad bank, I expected the Spanish government to reject setting up a bad bank as a bad bank doesn't restore confidence in the banking system and only consumes the government's access to credit (the Irish experience).

Clearly, the Spanish government did not reject setting up the bad bank and by doing so has committed itself to continue to place the burden of the excess debt in the Spanish financial system on a real economy that cannot afford this burden.  The result will be further shrinkage of the real Spanish economy.

Bloomberg reports that Italy is getting ahead of the curve and is rejecting setting up a bad bank.  The reason Italy is rejecting the bad bank is it produces only negative consequences for Italy.

Italian Treasury officials rejected proposals to create a so-called bad bank to take non-performing loans off the books of the nation’s lenders amid concern the plan would strengthen the link between sovereign and bank debt, said people with knowledge of the matter. 
At least three restructuring advisers held talks with government officials about a bad bank that Italy could fund without seeking external aid, said the people, who declined to be identified because the discussions were private. The bad bank could hold 30 billion euros ($39 billion) to 100 billion euros of assets and lenders would receive government bonds in return for their bad loans, according to one person....
I am shocked! Shocked I tell you to see that bankers are out there pushing for a solution that benefits them and nobody else.

Regular readers know that a bad bank does not work because of the issue of how to value the assets taken off of the bank balance sheets and the question of how does anyone know that all the bad exposures were transferred.  [These problems undermined the US Treasury's plan to buy opaque, toxic assets from the banks.]

To address these problems requires the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can independently value the exposures.

As a result, the market knows if the exposures are transferred at their market value or the bad bank pays too much (a boost to the banks at taxpayer expense).

If the exposures are transferred at market value, why bother with the bad bank in the first place as the banks have already written the loans down?
A bad bank is a tool the government could use to spur a turnaround in the country’s economy by easing funding needs among smaller banks that would allow them to boost lending, said the people.
This assumption is false.

It bears repeating that bank lending is independent of the bad debt on the bank balance sheet.  For proof, just look at how much lending the US Saving and Loans did during their crisis in the 1980s.

Bank lending is separate from how the loan is financed because the bank can sell the loan to other financial market participants like an insurer, pension fund, hedge fund...
Still, it could strengthen the link between government and bank debt, going against reforms including plans for a European banking union that seek to weaken that nexus that has exacerbated the region’s debt crisis. 
“The last thing Italy needs right now is a further strengthening of the links between the sovereign and the country’s banks,” said Nicholas Spiro, managing director of London-based Spiro Sovereign Strategy. “While Italian sovereign debt is a much safer asset class than a year ago, Italy is by no means out the woods and is seeking to differentiate itself favourably from Spain as much as possible.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Spiro's comment about not setting up a bad bank as a positive point of differentiation between Italy and Spain is telling.

If having a bad bank makes your sovereign debt a riskier asset class, then a government should simply not set up a bad bank.

It is worth repeating, given the design of a modern banking system, there is no need for setting up a government funded bad bank.  Between deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, banks are capable of absorbing the losses on their bad debt and continue supporting the real economy even if they have low or negative book capital levels.

The reason banks can continue to support the real economy is the deposit guarantee effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Friday, October 19, 2012

Does it matter when banks loaded with bad debts are recapitalized?

Does it matter when banks facing a solvency problem from over-exposure to bad debts are recapitalized?

Yes.

It is far easier to get banks to recognize their losses upfront on their bad debt before they are recapitalized.

After the banks are recapitalized, they will delay as long as possible recognition of their losses.

This is a very important point.  If policy makers and financial regulators want to clean up all the bad debt in their banking system and restart their national economy, the time to clean up all the bad debt is before the banks are recapitalized and not after the banks are recapitalized.

This can easily be shown with Iceland and Ireland.

Iceland required its banks to recognize upfront the losses that they would incur if all the bad debt in the financial system went through the long bankruptcy process.  This protected the real economy, kept families in their homes and allowed Iceland to expand social benefit programs.

Subsequently, Iceland's economy is growing, unemployment is falling and the banks are retaining their earnings to rebuild the level of book capital on their balance sheets.

Ireland injected equity into its banks and its policy makers and financial regulators are now wrestling with the banks to get them to recognize the losses on the bad debt and restructure the loans.

As a result, the real economy is still being burden by the debt service expense of the bad debt, families are losing their homes and social benefit programs are being cut back.

This experience is not unique to Ireland.  The same behavior has been exhibited by bankers where ever they have received a bailout.

As reported by the Irish Independent,
The Central Bank's director of bank supervision Fiona Muldoon said banks were in denial about the extent of the mortgage crisis, and were refusing to come up with realistic solutions....
"I see too much lip service to 'progress' and 'meaningful resolution' and not enough to 'reality'. I see too much 'give the Central Bank exactly, literally, what they asked for' and not enough true dialogue and meaningful engagement to find a solution," she said yesterday. 
"I see way too many 'extend and pretends' masking as solutions . . . yes, a lot has been done but the hard stuff is only getting started and it is taking too long, and too much of it is driven by the regulator." 
She said resolving the mortgage arrears crisis -- particularly with 167,000 residential mortgages in trouble -- was vital for the health of the economy... 
There had been talk of solutions for heavily indebted householders for four years now, Ms Muldoon told the conference.But nothing had happened, and instead banks had been hoping for an economic recovery that had not arrived. 
"This is the stuff of denial. Hope is not a strategy -- any more than anger."... 
In a related Irish Independent article,
THE banks must do deals with tens of thousands of homeowners struggling to pay their mortgages, the country's most powerful civil servant has demanded. 
Our economy will end up crippled for years unless banks grapple with the thorny issue of mortgage debt write-offs, Department of Finance secretary general John Moran said. 
Householders who are "hopelessly" in debt, with no chance of getting on top of the situation, need to have debt written off, Mr Moran warned. 
He told bankers at the annual conference of the Irish Banking Federation that households with "unsustainable debts" they simply could not repay were a drag on the economy.....
A bigger problem, he said, was the households that were not in arrears but were also not spending in the economy. 
This was a trend that was keeping the domestic economy from returning to growth. 
Mr Moran told the Irish Banking Federation conference that banks were nervous of lending but needed to help get those households back spending if the economy was to recover. 
Restoring the confidence of financially viable households would stimulate the wider economy, he said. This was a "very large prize" worth winning.
Finally, as reported by the Irish Times,
BANKS MUST face up to the issue of restructuring rather than just deferring problem SME loans, the deputy governor of the Central Bank said yesterday...
He said that, while banks have begun addressing the issue of restructuring mortgage arrears, an in-depth analysis commissioned by the Central Bank shows that, to date, they have failed to show a similar appetite for facing up to the issue of problem SME arrears. 
“It appeared that portfolios were largely subject to rescheduling and extended forbearance rather than a determined effort to restructure loans and deploy a wide range of workout options,” said Mr Elderfield who is head of financial regulation at the Central Bank.
The failure to clean up the 'zombie' loans acts as a drag on the real economy.
While the Central Bank would not be rolling out the same extensive regulatory framework it has done for mortgages, it would be pressing the banks to decisively tackle the recovery and, as necessary, restructuring problem SME loans, he said.

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Ireland's plan to fix housing and buoy economy: forgive mortgage debt

The New York Times Dealbook carried an article on how Ireland plans to fix its housing and buoy its economy by having its banks forgive mortgage debt.

While this sounds like Ireland is taken a page from the Swedish Model for addressing a bank solvency led financial crisis, it must be remembered that Ireland received money from the EU to recapitalize its banks.

When Ireland recapitalized its banks, it effectively nationalized the bad debt.  Now, Ireland is simply forcing the banks to own up to the losses that the Irish taxpayers are going to be paying for as the national debt is paid down.

Under the Swedish Model, the banks are not recapitalized by the government.  Either they have the capacity to generate earnings and rebuild their book capital levels through retained earnings or equity issuance or the don't have the capacity to generate earnings and need to be resolved.

With its economy still reeling from the housing crash, Ireland is making a bold move to help tens of thousands of struggling homeowners. 
The Irish government expects to pass a law this year that could encourage banks to substantially cut the amount that borrowers owe on their mortgages, a step that no major country has been willing to take on a broad scale.
Actually, there have been several major countries that have been willing to require their banks to substantially cut the amount that borrowers owe on their mortgages.  In prior financial crises, this was done by Sweden, Finland and Norway.  In the current crisis, this was done by Iceland.
The initiative, which would lower a borrower’s monthly payment, could prevent a tide of foreclosures, an uncertainty that has been hanging over the Irish housing market for years.
Preventing the tide of foreclosures protects the real economy.  This is one of the reasons that the Swedish Model works to end a bank solvency led financial crisis.
If it works, the plan could provide a road map for other troubled countries.... 
 A roadmap that your humble blogger has been talking about since the beginning of the financial crisis.
Most countries that have suffered housing busts, including the United States, have made limited use of so-called mortgage write-downs, the process of forgiving a portion of the principal on the loan. The worry has been that some borrowers who can afford their mortgages will stop making payments to take advantage of a bailout. Banks have also been reluctant since they could face unexpected losses.
The reason most countries have made limited use of mortgage write-downs is they decided to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.
Ireland is different from the United States and most countries. During the financial crisis, Ireland bailed out the banks, and the government still has large ownership stakes in some of the biggest mortgage lenders. So taxpayers are already responsible for mortgage losses.
Clearly, Ireland directly socialized the losses and its taxpayers are going to be paying for them for years.

What is less clear is that the US and most countries have also socialized the losses and their taxpayers are going to be paying for them for years.  These countries socialized the losses indirectly by shifting the burden of servicing the debt to the real economy.

One way to shift the debt service burden is regulators engaging in forbearance so that banks can use 'extend and pretend' to create 'zombie' loans out of the bad debt.  To facilitate this and reduce the banks' cost of pretending the loans are performing, central banks run zero interest rate policies.

I have documented extensively the negative consequences, like the Retirement Fund Death Spiral, triggered by zero interest rate policies and how these consequences reduce demand.  Demand that debt funded fiscal stimulus then is used to offset.  Debt that the taxpayers are going to be paying for years.
In other countries, the burden of principal forgiveness would largely fall on privately owned banks.
The burden of principal forgiveness falls on privately owned banks only if the government does not recapitalize them.
But the debate is the same: whether to push lenders to take losses now, in hopes that things will get better faster, or wait for the housing market to heal on its own, which could cloud the economy for years to come....
As shown in an earlier post, the Irish central bank economists think it could take 22 years for Irish house prices to recover to their pre-crisis peak.  This reflects the fact that the government chose to protect bank book capital levels.

For countries that don't protect bank book capital levels and require the banks to take their losses now (adopt the Swedish Model), house prices take anywhere from 7 to 13 years to recover to their pre-crisis peak.

Please note that we are 5 years into the crisis and the UK, US and most countries in the EU could still adopt the Swedish Model and speed up the time to recovery of their housing markets.

Irish house prices could take 22 years to recover says Irish central bank

Reporting on a study release by the Irish central bank, the Irish Independent's Charlie Weston highlighted that it could take 22 years for Irish house prices to return to their former peak.
IT COULD take up to 22 years for residential property prices to recover fully, a research paper produced by staff in the Central Bank indicates. 
The paper looks at 147 price collapses internationally and concludes that the Irish home price collapse is the most expensive of those....
The academic paper looked at crashes in three Nordic countries and Japan to estimate how much longer the Irish crisis will continue.  
Their research found that Ireland’s banking crisis is the most expensive of 147 crashes they examined. 
This means it could take between 11 and 22 years for prices to recover to their boom levels. The property crisis here is already five years old. 
The report confirms why adoption of the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis is preferable to the Japanese Model.

The Swedish Model which requires the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system was adopted by Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The Japanese Model which focuses on protecting bank book capital levels and only slowly recognizing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system was adopted by Japan and Ireland.

The following table from figures in the report shows how the Swedish Model outperforms the Japanese Model.
Country Total % Fall house prices peak to trough   No. of years to recovery of house priceIreland                     -46.92                                       ongoing (after 5 years)                      
Japan                       -45.12                                       ongoing (after 22 years)
Finland                    -45.79                                            13
Norway                   -36.13                                             7
Sweden                   -29.18                                             7
The outperformance of the Swedish Model over the Japanese Model is clear.  It is not to late for the Swedish model to be adopted by Ireland, across the EU, the UK and the US.

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Ireland is a case study in why not to accept money from the Troika to bailout your banks

Recently, finance ministers from Germany, the Netherlands and Finland took the position that the European Stability Mechanism could not be used for legacy assets and the cost of bank bailouts would be left to each country.

This was a very important statement as it cutoff Ireland from the possibility of having the ESM take over 20 billion euros of debt.  Debt that was incurred specifically to bailout the Irish banks so that they could repay unsecured debt owned by banks in countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Finland.

Given this example, Spain might want to ask itself why it would want to accept funds from the Troika to bailout its banks.

A bailout that helps banks from countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Finland avoid losses while saddling the Spanish taxpayer with more debt.

The Spanish banking system is designed so that banks do not need to be recapitalized even after the banks recognize all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

With deposit insurance and access to central bank funding, Spain's banks can continue to operate and support the real economy while they are rebuilding their book capital levels.

As discussed in the Irish Times,
The loot may be lost forever. All the media buzz last week surrounded the feisty Roisin's dramatic resignation in Dublin. Far more cataclysmic events in Helsinki were relegated to second place.
The three most powerful finance ministers in Europe had given the thumbs-down to Ireland's hopes of a Santa Claus-type bank rescue. 
The new European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds would not, after all, be allowed to be used to sort out those sins of bankers committed prior to the establishment of a new European banking supervisor. 
Or, as they put it so delicately, no "legacy" assets would be taken on by the new body. Thus historic problems would be left in the hands of "national authorities". 
Enda and Ireland are left holding their own banking babies. Contrary to previous hopes, Europe was not now going to charge in, a white knight on a chariot, to buy shares in AIB and Bank of Ireland at inflated prices. 
Europe doesn't do white knights. As far as the three powerful finance ministers were concerned, Ireland was done and dusted. 
There was going to be no relief for past sins. 
Ireland is a sinner from the past, doing its penance dutifully -- an example to other errant nations. Future sinners will qualify for forgiveness. The ESM will step in with funding to break the link between bank and sovereign debt for them, but not for us. 
Ireland was out on a limb, abandoned by its colleagues. The Government was exposed. It had grossly oversold the benefits of the earlier agreement in June. 
Irish ministers were ashen -faced in the Dail on Wednesday morning. The premature cries of triumph after the summit in June had vanished. 
No wonder they looked shell-shocked. Enda admitted to the Dail that he had been given no warning about the three ministers' bombshell. He was kept in the dark. 
He was reminded that he had announced a "seismic shift" in June. Now, Ireland had been humiliated. 
Kenny was careful to repeat ad nauseam the bald words of the June communique: the vicious cycle of the link between bank debt and sovereign debt would be broken. 
Equally, he reminded TDs of the June promise that Europe would "examine the situation of the Irish financial sector with the view of further improving the sustainability of the well-performing adjustment programme".
Gone was June's rhetoric of "seismic shifts" and "game changers". Stripped of the rhetoric, the June statement suddenly looked naked. 
The Taoiseach tried to claim that nothing had changed. He was in denial. 
So too was the Department of Finance who even told the Irish Times that it "welcomed the ideas put forward by [German finance minister] Schauble and his allies". The mandarins feebly mumbled that "these ideas will feed into our discussions over the coming months".
The Taoiseach was in denial. The mandarins of Merrion Street were in denial. And their own minister, Michael Noonan, was in denial....
Taoiseach Kenny spoke loftily of his own meetings with three PRIME MINISTERS, firmly putting the three upstart finance ministers in their place. Unfortunately the three prime ministers whom Enda had met came from Greece, Italy and Spain -- three basket-case countries. The three finance ministers issuing the statement came from the three strongest, triple-A rated nations in Europe: Germany, Holland and Finland. 
No contest. Enda's pals are the bearers of begging bowls. The three finance ministers hold the purse strings. His assertion that "all European finance ministers are equal when they sit around the table" is nonsense. 
The big powers in Europe are treating us shabbily. For a short while they even cruelly allowed us to indulge the fantasy that they would pay us €20bn for equity in our pillar banks when it was worth less than €8bn. 
We will hear no more of that. 
The Government needs someone with the bottle of Roisin Shortall to stand up to our European colleagues, someone who is neither captured, nor in denial.

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

Patrick Honohan: Some lessons from Irish experience on when and how to recapitalize banks

Irish central bank governor Patrick Honohan delivered an interesting speech at the 44th annual Trinity College Money, Macro and Finance conference on some lessons from the Irish experience on when and how to recapitalize banks.

He concludes
Prompt, transparent over-capitalisation in a systemic crisis should remain the preferred option for dealing with failing banks that it is deemed necessary to save.
Regular readers know that with the design of a modern banking system, it is not necessary to bailout and recapitalize any bank.  By design, banks can continue to operate for years and support the real economy while they have low or even negative book capital levels.

The reason they can do this is deposit insurance.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the bank's silent equity partner during periods when they are rebuilding their book capital levels.  There is no need to bailout the bank and make the taxpayer the explicit owner of the bank.
Losses should be shared by both junior and senior creditors where necessary (unless the amounts involved are small) in cases where the banks are put into resolution. 
This is call for implementing the Swedish model and requiring banks to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and not have these losses socialized.
Experience shows, however, that this may be a counsel of perfection not always achievable.... 
Why would this always not be achievable?
it proved hard to generate reliable and precise information quickly. Clearly it would have been better if comprehensive accurate estimates of future loan-losses had been available from the outset.  However, despite best efforts, accurate information emerged only slowly. 
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Professor Honohan has made the case for requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This disclosure provides the precise, reliable information needed.

With this disclosure, market participants have the information they need to analyze each bank and create an up to date estimate of future loan-losses.
Given the early decision to socialise the losses by guaranteeing all senior debt and some subordinated debt for two years, the scope for over-capitalisation was very limited in Ireland because the Government’s finances quickly became over-stressed. 
By removing the possibility of more extensive burden-sharing with private creditors, the initial guarantee narrowed the options available to Irish policymakers and pushed public debt levels to the limits of sustainability.  
Not only was over-capitalisation no longer a serious option and the chance of deeper burden-sharing with bank creditors shut-off, but in addition some resolution actions had to be deferred lest they trigger an immediate cash call on the guarantee...
And who offered the advice to guarantee all senior debt and some subordinated debt before getting the precise, reliable information to determine exactly how much in the way of future loan losses might be on the banks' balance sheets?

Why the bankers!

Bankers with an extraordinary conflict of interest who stood to gain substantially if the advice they provided was acted on as it would be the Irish economy and taxpayer who absorbed the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and not the banks.

I bet the bankers did not explain to the Irish government how their advice was likely to bankrupt Ireland while at the same time letting the bankers escape any losses for having made bad lending or investment decisions.

Friday, September 7, 2012

Ireland tells Spain not to copy Ireland

The Irish Times reports that Spanish officials called Mike Aynsley, the head of Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, to talk about setting up a bad bank.  Mr. Aynsley recommended that Spain not copy Ireland as there was always the perception that the banks had not been entirely cleaned up.

Regular readers know that there is only one way to prove that the banks have been cleaned up.  That is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and have them disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this information that market participants can independently confirm that all of the bad loans have been removed from the banking system and transferred to one or several bad banks.

The failure to require the banks to provide ultra transparency is the equivalent of the government waving a red flag and announcing that the banks still have something to hide.  If they didn't, then why aren't they providing ultra transparency?

As a practical matter, if the bad loans are going to be transferred at their current market value, it makes sense to have the banks provide ultra transparency first.  That way the market participants can help determine what is the current market value of the bad loans.

Spain would want to transfer the bad loans at current market value because this minimizes the taxpayers' exposure to losses.
In an interview with The Irish Times, Mr Aynsley said he has been in contact with senior officials within the Spanish authorities as Madrid attempts to deal with its deepening banking crisis and devise ways of purging soured loans from its struggling lenders. 
He advised them to be “broader minded” and consider setting up bad banks, not just one bad bank as Ireland did with the National Asset Management Agency. 
“What you are really looking at doing is a clean-up of the banking system, not a partial clean-up of the banking system,” he said. 
Cleaning up the banking system does not require setting up a bad bank.

It simply requires that the banks are required to provide ultra transparency.  Market discipline will force the banks to recognize all the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets.

While this will clearly lower the amount of book capital that the banks have, modern banks are designed to continue operating and supporting the real economy even if they have negative book capital levels.

Modern banks are able to do this because of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers are the silent equity partners when banks have negative book capital levels.
“Looking back for Ireland, yes it [Nama] was the right place to start but it wasn’t, in retrospect, a broad enough look at the extent of the problems that were emerging in the banking sector.” 
The failure to remove all the problem loans from the Irish banks froze new lending and created a perception the banks were still broken, said Mr Aynsley.
Of course the bad bank creates this perception if it is not accompanied with ultra transparency.  Without ultra transparency, how does anyone know that the banks have been cleaned up?
This led to a flight of bank deposits and a drain on the European Central Bank, which pressed the last government to apply for a EU-IMF bailout to reduce the ECB’s exposure to the Irish banks. 
“These are the series of unintended consequences not from negligence but from unawareness of the extent of the emerging problems and the breadth of the required response to the problems,” said Mr Aynsley. 
“In structuring its response, [Spain] can do that with a far better knowledge base than Ireland had at the time.”
A knowledge base gained by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency before setting up any bad banks.
The Australian banker said the power to stem the euro crisis lies with Germany. 
“Until the Germans come to the table and resolve this problem once and for all, we are going to lurch from one short-term fix to another. This is all about the long-term transfer of value from one part of the euro zone to another,” said Mr Aynsley.
This is a point that your humble blogger has been making since the beginning of the financial crisis.

By pursuing the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis, all that is happening is the transfer of value from the real economy to bankers who knew better than to extend credit beyond the capacity of the borrowers to repay.

As Iceland has shown, by requiring bankers to absorb the losses on the excess debt they should never have originated, the financial crisis can be quickly ended.

Thursday, September 6, 2012

Ireland moves towards adoption of Swedish model to deal with its financial crisis

In his column in the Irish Times, Simon Carswell reports on how the Irish central bank will draw on the Swedish central bank's institutional memory of the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Regular readers know that under the Swedish model banks are required to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system today.  They subsequently recapitalize themselves by retaining 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

Having the banks absorb the losses on the excess debt protects the real economy as it removes the burden on the real economy to repay this excess debt.  Instead of going to debt repayment, capital in the real economy can go to reinvestment and investment in growth in the real economy.
Lars Frisell, the Swedish economist who took over as director of economics and chief economist at the Central Bank in June .... has all the credentials to give the Central Bank the “institutional memory” he spoke of last week in his first public speech in Ireland, when he referred to the effect of Sweden’s financial crisis in the early 1990s on the country’s bankers. 
In his speech, Frisell gave his perspective on the “causes, culprits and cures” of the financial crisis in Ireland and drew interesting comparisons between Ireland’s current situation and how Sweden got into – and out of – its crisis. 
He told the Institute of Certified Public Accountants that the “institutional memory” of the Swedish crisis 20 years ago tempered the boom in lending by Sweden’s banks into the Baltic countries in the decade before the most recent crisis. While bankers did almost the same thing as in Sweden in the 1990s, it was on a smaller scale in the Baltics, he said. 
Frisell said that when the Burlington Hotel sold for €288 million in 2007, or €600,000 per hotel bedroom, someone should have said stop, but that even a small group of naysayers was not enough. 
“Even if there are a few people – maybe a few academics, a few journalists who would be the beacons of sanity – they are usually not enough to stop it,” he said. 
Frisell was also startled that nobody saw “something seriously wrong” in a country that was building almost 100,000 new homes at the peak of the boom when Sweden, which is twice the size of Ireland, was building 30,000 new homes a year. 
He blamed the Irish crisis on four areas – the corporate culture at the banks, the corporate governance at the banks, the role of “trusted third parties” and the failure of the authorities and politicians. 
The culture of the banks was affected by incentives such as bonuses based on loan volumes while the bank boards, who represented big shareholders, should have been aware of the risks being taken. 
Catering to his audience last week, Frisell said that accountants were among the trusted third parties who should have been protecting the interests of small shareholders and the banks’ creditors. 
Accountants play an important external role to protect outsiders, he said.... 
Frisell argued that the incentives for accountants – the payment of hundreds of thousands of euro in audit fees every year – was “clearly stacked in the wrong way”. 
Auditors will undoubtedly be wary of criticising the business models of a bank if there was a risk of losing the audit job. 
Frisell said that the Swedish regulator previously had financial accountants within the banks reporting back to them but they were later withdrawn in favour of a more hands-off model because they could be blamed if something went wrong. 
The regulator’s role was not to follow a bank’s business day-to-day but to ensure the rules of the game were being followed. 
This raises interesting questions for the more hands-on role that the Central Bank has adopted at the Irish banks since the crisis, with supervisors from the regulator sitting in on meetings of bank boards.... 
The banks won’t have liked it but Frisell did say that debt forgiveness had a role to play in the new personal insolvency law to alleviate the heavy burden of household debt but it involved a “tricky balance”. 
Sweden’s experience of debt forgiveness is different, however, given that the country’s over-indebtedness related mostly to commercial property, not residential or buy-to-let properties. 
Frisell told me later that the conditions for debt forgiveness were “pretty tough” – you had to live on a minimum salary for five years before debts were cleared.

Tuesday, September 4, 2012

Troika diktat looms large in reason for credit crunch

In his Irish Times column, John McManus describes how the current approach to handling a bank solvency led financial crisis has lead to a credit crunch.

Regular readers know that policymakers and financial regulators are pursuing the Japanese model under which bank book capital levels are protected at all costs.  It is the protection of these capital levels that leads directly to the credit crunch and damage to the real economy.

The alternative way to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis is to pursue the Swedish model under which banks recognize and absorb all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system today.  This model protects the real economy.

ANONYMOUS LETTERS are usually best ignored, but one which awaited me on my return from holidays was hard to ignore, not least because of the following opening line: “I am writing this letter in a state of extreme anger, this very week I have seen my brother go out of business or to be more clear he was put out of business by his bank.” 
The letter writer went on to encapsulate the chronic problem with credit for business and also the debate about the wider costs of the approach being adopted to fix the economy. 
It is intuitively obvious to everyone that protecting bank book capital is wrong.  What is important to protect is the real economy.

That is why a modern banking system is designed to support the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Specifically, banks have deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.  These allow a bank to absorb all the losses on the excess debt and continue operating for years supporting the real economy even if the result of absorbing the losses is negative book capital levels.
The brother in question had been in business for more than 20 years and had expanded before the recession at a time when credit was easily available from the banks. 
His business was struggling, but all 17 employees and creditors were being paid. The owner was not drawing a wage and had sold his home in 2010 to release some equity for his business. According to his sibling he had regular reviews with the bank and they had agreed to accept interest-only payments. 
“Up until now he was compliant with all their demands. Then all of sudden they re-called his loans which they knew well he would not be able to pay. He is a broken man. He always had such high regard for employees’ welfare, now we have 17 new people on the live register, 10 of whom have mortgages.” 
It is a far from unique story, but the writer did a good job of capturing the sense of unfairness and bafflement most people experience when confronted which such a story. 
“Will someone please tell me where is the sense of justice in this and how they are able to get away with it? Who the hell is sanctioning this behaviour? We bailed out the banks and this is how they are treating hard- working people. Of course my brother is not unique. He is the third business that I know for a fact this has happened to . . . ”
The letter-writer asks a lot of questions, but they all seem to boil down to one: why is the Government allowing this seemingly counterproductive and wrong-headed behaviour to continue?
Your humble blogger would say that it is the direct result of adopting the Japanese model and bailing out the banks when they are designed not to need a bailout.
It’s quite an easy question to answer. An economic crash as widespread and severe as the one that has engulfed Ireland does not lend itself to the sort of overarching solution or co-ordinated policies that would, as the writer seems to suggest, maximise the number of jobs retained in the economy.
Actually, Iceland showed that by adopting the Swedish model, precisely this outcome was easily obtainable.
It’s not that it’s not a good idea, it is just that it is beyond the capacity of our Government, or probably any government. 
It is only beyond the capacity of governments who are captured by or, and this is effectively the same thing, take advice from current or former bankers.

Everywhere that governments have listened to the bankers, there have been bailouts.  Everywhere that governments have listened to the bankers, there are ongoing problems in the financial system and the real economy is struggling (note:  it took some time, but the problems with the real economy have now hit Germany too).

Remarkably, the one country that did not listen to its bankers and bail them out was Iceland.  Iceland's economy is growing and the financial crisis is behind it.
The approach that has been adopted, at the behest of the EU-IMF-ECB troika, has been to focus on sorting out the Government finances by cutting spending and increasing taxes, even if this is counterproductive in the short term because it hits growth.
Japan has shown that this has been counterproductive for 2+ decades.  By most people's standards, this sorting out the government finances is counterproductive in both the short and long term.
Banking is another area and the focus here is to return the banks to solvency and profitability which will in theory allow them resume lending normally to business.
This is the argument that bankers use as justification for bailouts and to continue receiving their bonuses.

It is based on the assumption that lending and bank solvency are linked.  This assumption is false.

Lending and how the loans are financed are separate.  The reason they are separate is that the bank does not have to hold on its balance sheet the loans it originates.  There are any number of market participants who could hold the loan including other banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds and hedge funds.
Part of this process involves the banks biting the bullet on non-performing loans. The short-term consequences of this – such as the decision to pull the plug on the letter-writer’s brother’s business and the 17 jobs that will cost – are judged a price worth paying for solvent banks.
Part of banks biting the bullet on non-performing loans under the Swedish model is that the loans are modified to a level that is consistent with the borrower's capacity to repay.  The only limit on this is if someone else is willing to offer more for the collateral supporting the loan than the value of the borrower's repayment stream.

Please note, bank solvency is independent of whether the bank pulls the plug on non-performing loans. Bank solvency is determined by comparing the market value of the bank's assets to the book value of its liabilities.  If the market value of the assets is greater, then the bank is solvent.  If the market value of the assets is less, then the bank is insolvent.

Pulling the plug on this loan did not change the solvency of the bank.  All it did was hurt the Irish economy.
However, this doesn’t really go anywhere near answering what seems to me to be the deeper issue raised by the letter-writer which is why and how we have decided to go down this particular policy path with its calamitous social consequences. 
Or as he puts it: “This is achieving nothing but destruction. Are the government thick, blind or just don’t give a damn? People need to know what is happening. The bank are not paying for this, the taxpayer is.”
The writer is in good company when it comes to questioning the economic arguments for the current policy prescription.....
It is also common case that the approach adopted in Ireland has never been applied to a developed democratic economy. 
It is a mix of IMF policies forged in less developed countries overlaid by an unforgiving type of economic thinking typified by the ordoliberalism that has taken hold in Germany. 
But as long as Ireland remains in a bailout, we have little choice but to follow the path prescribed by the troika when it comes to the banks.
Ireland always has the choice of adopting the Swedish model and forcing its creditors to absorb losses.
So to try and answer the writer’s questions more fully: the Government probably does know what the banks are doing. But whether they approve or not is arguably irrelevant as long as Ireland remains in a bailout as we have little choice but to follow the path prescribed by the troika. 
Whether they have any better ideas or could implement them is a moot point. I am not sure this helps.
It is incredibly important that there is a better alternative and that this better alternative could be implemented.  It is not a moot point.

Every day that passes and the Irish government does not adopt the better alternative is another day that the Irish government has elected to put the interest of bankers ahead of the interest of the Irish citizens.

Will creditors be mad that they are made to absorb losses?  Yes.

Will creditors get over it?  As shown by Iceland, yes.

Monday, September 3, 2012

Is Danish housing slump ending as excesses squeezed out?

Bloomberg reports that S&P sees the Danish housing slump ending as the gap between what people can afford to pay for a house based on their earnings narrows with the actual cost of housing.

Regular readers know that based on the experience of Ireland, the decline in house prices does not stop simply because people can now afford to buy them again.  The decline in house prices stops when people think that the price of houses is not going to decline much further.

Denmark’s housing slump is nearing its end as the excesses of the nation’s property boom fade and the gap between what people earn and the price of a home narrows, Standard & Poor’s analyst Per Tornqvist said. 
“We think the bulk of the adjustment process, of needing to sort out what had obviously been excesses, that this will potentially be completed by the end of this year,” Tornqvist, who is based in Stockholm, said in an Aug. 31 phone interview. “So we are close to the end of the adjustment process.” 
Home prices have plunged about 25 percent since a 2007 peak and declines this year will average 3.5 percent, the government estimates. 
The housing crisis, combined with rising job losses, has suffocated demand and pushed the economy to the brink of its second recession in less than a year. Any recovery in Denmark’s housing market is likely to be gradual, S&P estimates. 
“There are some signs of improvement, though we do not expect a rapid turnaround,” Tornqvist said. “The problem with a high private debt burden is that it is a very long-term trend to change the leverage in society. You’re almost looking at a multi-decade process, certainly a process that can last a decade.”...
The only way to accelerate this process it to require the banks to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.
Danes bear the highest household debt burdens in the world, relative to income. 
Indebtedness reached 322 percent of disposable incomes in 2010, S&P estimates. 
“It’s come down very slightly since then but it’s obviously not a ratio that changes very fast,” Tornqvist said.
AAA rated Denmark has relied on its haven status, supported by a government debt level that’s less than half the euro-zone average and a current account surplus, to keep its borrowing costs low. The country pays less than Germany to borrow for 10 years and has charged investors to hold its two-year debt through most of July and August.

A capital influx into Denmark has also forced the central bank, which pegs the krone to the euro, to cut its benchmark rates to record lows and bring its deposit rate to an unprecedented minus 0.2 percent. 
Even rates on short-term Danish mortgage bonds may sink below zero, according to Rune Brinch Kristensen, chief analyst at Nykredit A/S, the country’s largest mortgage lender and Europe’s biggest issuer of covered bonds backed by home loans. 
While S&P’s main scenario is that monetary policy will “continue as it is in the medium term,” Danes are at risk of depending too much on record-low borrowing costs to sustain their debt loads, Tornqvist said. 
“It’s a key weakness in Denmark that the economy is reliant on low interest rates,” he said. “Should interest rates rise sharply, that is potentially the most painful economic shock to Denmark.”

EFSF head says Eurozone crisis over in two years

The Telegraph reports that the head of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), Klaus Regling, said the eurozone crisis could be over in "one to two years" if member states stick to their pledges.

Now there is a big 'if'.

How exactly can member states stick to their pledges given the negative economic feedback loop embedded in the pledges?

For example, Spain is already in a recession/depression.  Cutting government spending per the pledge demand by the EU as part of a bailout would reduce economic activity further.  With a more depressed economy, naturally Spain will generate less tax revenue.  With less tax revenue, how will Spain meet its pledge to balance its budget?
"If all countries in the currency zone strictly fulfil their budgetary consolidation targets and continue to improve their competitiveness then the crisis can be over in one or two years," he told German news weekly Der Spiegel in an interview to be published on Monday. 
Regling, who is German, described his European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) rescue fund as successful in heading off the worst potential consequences of the crisis, now in its third year. 
"If it weren't for us, Portugal and Ireland would probably no longer be in the eurozone."
Actually, Portugal and Ireland could still be in the eurozone if the EFSF didn't exist.

Rather than receive a bailout that is crushing their economies, they would have followed Iceland and adopted the Swedish model.  Under this model, the banks would have absorbed the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Like Iceland, by making the banks absorb the losses their real economy would have been protected.  Like Iceland, they would now have an investment grade rating on their debt and their economies would be growing.

Compare this to the tremendous burden placed on the real economies of Ireland and Portugal by the mountain of excess debt including the bailout.

Which countries position is better - Iceland's, Ireland's or Portugal's?
The EFSF, which was established with a total lending capacity of €440bn (£348bn), is due to be replaced by a permanent bailout fund called the European Stability Mechanism, with €500bn of firepower.

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

Spain's banks plan fire sale of toxic housing exposure

The Guardian reports that Spain's largest banks are planning a fire sale of their toxic housing exposure.

If the banks go through with it, Spain will discover what the real market value of housing is in a country with 24+% unemployment.  As the question is where will the buyers come from?

House prices continue to fall across the Iberian peninsula, with the ratings agency Fitch predicting a further 15% decline in Portugal and Spanish banks vowing to sell off unwanted stock at rock-bottom prices. 
Spain's second-biggest bank, the BBVA, said it would be accelerating its sales of toxic property assets, lowering prices as necessary. 
It has €8.7bn (£6.8bn) of real estate on its books including building land and thousands of built and half-built residential properties. 
Most of that property is connected to developers who have been unable to repay loans since the housing market crashed four years ago. "We will adjust prices month by month to speed up sales," BBVA's chief executive, Angel Cano, said on Tuesday. 
The Sabadell bank, which has absorbed the loss-making Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo (CAM) savings bank, recently said it would be selling off new properties at a 38% discount. 
Spain's largest bank, Santander, has reportedly dropped prices by 35% to 45%. Anecdotal evidence suggests discounts of up to 68% in some previously unsold promotions on the Costa del Sol. 
Spanish house prices have already fallen about 25% since their peak. But many analysts are expecting another 10% fall, which would make the overall decline similar to that seen in Ireland. 
Experts warned that further shrinkage of Spain's economy, which is in a double-dip recession and affected by strong austerity measures, could force prices still lower. 
Lower house prices seem like a safe bet as the Irish banks have still not taken the action that BBVA is talking about and lowering the price until it sells.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Like US and Irish financial regulators, Spain's missed or downplayed problems in banking sector

The NY Times carried a terrific article exploring yet another example of financial regulators publicly downplaying the risks in their banking systems.

This article confirmed a principal finding of the Nyberg report on the Irish financial crisis that the current structure of bank supervision causes financial instability because it suppresses expressing dissenting opinions on the riskiness of the financial system to the public.

While your humble blogger appreciates that regulators don't want to say anything that would cause market participants to question the safety and soundness of the banks or potentially trigger a bank run, this lack of criticism creates several problems.

First, it contributes to market participants mis-pricing the risk of the banks.  Since the regulators have an informational monopoly on the data needed to fully assess the risk of the banks, the regulators statements influence the perception of risk at the banks.

Second, it undermines the credibility of the government when it comes to dealing with a financial crisis.  Has anyone else noticed a cycle under which policymakers and financial regulators roll out a solution, sound the all clear and then repeat the exercise when the solution is shown as inadequate?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger proposed a new model for bank supervision that ends these problems.  The model is based on the idea of ending the financial regulators' information monopoly.

Specifically, it requires the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can assess the risk of each bank for themselves.

As a result, regulators do not have to offer up an opinion on the banks.  In fact, the regulators can easily piggyback off of the markets' analytical capability in their internal assessment of the banks.

It ends the cycle of inadequate solutions.  In particular, it ends the perception that governments and banks are hiding something.

As Spain edged closer to a real estate and banking crisis that led to its recent bank bailout, Spanish financial leaders in influential positions mostly played down concerns that something might go terribly wrong. 
The optimism of Spanish central bankers who went on to top jobs at the International Monetary Fund echoes the attitudes of officials in the United States who misjudged the force of a housing collapse several years ago that crippled banks and the economy. And it underscores the complications that can arise when government officials take watchdog roles at international agencies that pass judgment on the policies they once directed....
From their lofty perches, first at Spain’s central bank and then as the I.M.F.’s top executives assessing global banking risk, JosĂ© Viñals and Jaime Caruana were well positioned to sound alarms about the looming bank debacle. 
But at a news conference in Washington in April 2010, when analysts were raising red flags about failing Spanish real estate loans, Mr. Viñals — who a year earlier had succeeded Mr. Caruana — offered assurances. The Spanish system was “fundamentally sound,” he said, and its needs for cash “very small.” 
A year later, as the banking crisis showed little sign of improving, Mr. Viñals again called for calm, saying the market panic that had led to bailouts in Ireland and Portugal would not infect Spain. 
Now that the recent failure of Bankia, the big mortgage lender, has prompted a 100 billion euro (about $125 billion) European rescue, it is clear that Mr. Viñals’s forecasts were too sanguine. 
Mr. Caruana was no more prescient. Pressed at an I.M.F. news conference in July 2008 about falling house prices in Spain, he acknowledged there might be loan losses. But he said, “The financial system in Spain is able to cope with that and is properly capitalized.”...
The names have changed, but the same story could be told of senior bank regulators in Ireland and the US.
Certainly, Spanish officials were slow to acknowledge the depths of the problem. 
In early May, Rodrigo Rato, then the executive chairman of Bankia, told journalists that the bank was in a situation of “great robustness, both in terms of solvency and liquidity.” 
Even after the bank’s bailout a few days later, Spain’s economy minister predicted that no more than 15 billion euros of public funds would be required to clean up the banks....
Officials everywhere have been slow to acknowledge the depths of the problem.
Most prominent by far was Mr. Rato, now better known for his disastrous two-year run at the helm of Bankia. In 2004, he was picked to lead the I.M.F. after winning global recognition during an eight-year run supervising Spain’s growth burst as the country’s economy minister. 
Until he left the fund three years later, Mr. Rato was better known for praising Spain’s economic miracle — one that relied largely on revenue driven by real estate to drive growth and balance budgets — than questioning its sustainability. 
He considered himself the intellectual father of that miracle, as he made clear in a 2004 speech, citing his reforms as marking “a new era in economic policy” for Spain. Mr. Rato, too, declined to be interviewed for this article. 
There were many others, of course, who did not foresee the Spanish banking blowup. 
Topping the list is Europe’s main bank overseer, the European Banking Authority. 
In December 2011, the authority concluded that Spain’s two strongest institutions — Santander and BBVA — would need to raise more money than the 1.3 billion euros that was required of Bankia, which would need to be rescued just six months later.... 
In Spain, the increase in house prices between 2000 and 2007 was particularly extreme — so much so that as early as 2006, a team of inspectors within the Bank of Spain sent a cautionary report to the government. 
The study criticized the “passive attitude” of Mr. Caruana, who led the central bank from 2000 to 2006, and the extraordinary acceleration of loans to homebuyers and real estate developers. 
The inspectors also warned of Spanish banks engaging in unusually heavy short-term borrowing at levels far beyond their deposits. 
The 2006 report painted a much darker picture than Mr. Rato and the I.M.F. saw a short time later when the fund made its own assessment in 2007 of Spain’s economic and financial health — and the Bank of Spain’s ability to rein in excesses. 
The analysis praised the “dynamism of Spain’s financial system,” and said that “its strong, prudential supervision and regulation remain a forte of the economy.”...
In fact, up through the 2008 global financial crisis, Bank of Spain officials had become the toast of the international regulatory circuit for their innovations. Most notable of those was a so-called dynamic provisioning policy, a set of rules that forces banks to set aside extra cash during good economic times to protect against the inevitable rainy days.
For a time, Spanish financial institutions were hailed as paragons of responsible banking — having set aside over 110 billion euros in reserves. 
But JosĂ© Garcia Montalvo, a real estate specialist based in Barcelona, says that this figure could have been higher — and the banks better prepared for the housing collapse when it came. 
The reserves proved insufficient, he said, because the Spanish central bank in 2004, led then by Mr. Caruana, succumbed to bank lobbying and pressure from Europe by halving the amount that banks had to set aside to 15 percent of overall loans, from 30 percent. 
From that point, Spanish bank lending, already growing at 14 percent annually, went into overdrive — up 27 percent in 2005 and an additional 25 percent in 2006.
Yet another replay of the Irish experience.
Mr. Caruana’s career has since thrived. After just three years at the I.M.F., he left in 2009 for one of the plum global finance jobs: chief executive of the Bank for International Settlements, the Basel-based regulatory body that serves as a forum for the world’s central banks. 
Last weekend, in a speech that explored the roots of the financial crisis, Mr. Caruana highlighted the economic distortions caused by frantic real estate lending, and he called for banks to be quicker to recognize losses and raise capital — although he did not mention Spain by name

Friday, June 15, 2012

IMF urges EU to refinance Irish bank bailout so as to avoid another bailout next year

As reported in the Telegraph, the IMF has concluded that the Irish bank bailout needs to be redone as it does not leave the Irish government with the resources needed to avert an economic contraction by pursuing expansionary fiscal policies.

Regular readers know that one of the fatal flaws in the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis is that it uses up scarce government resources needlessly bailing out banks (and banker bonuses) and not on helping the real economy.

A second fatal flaw in the Japanese model is that it does not fix the underlying problem and require banks to recognize all their bad debts.  As a result, the Japanese model requires year after year of bailouts.

The IMF confirmed these flaws in its description of why the Irish bank bailout needs to be redone.

The International Monetary Fund on Friday urged Europe to help Ireland refinance its crippling bank bailout and consider taking equity in state-owned banks to help Dublin return to bond markets and avoid a second bailout next year..... 
The IMF repeated its call for more effort to stimulate growth, warning that significant additional fiscal adjustment in a low growth environment would risk a "pernicious cycle of rising unemployment, higher arrears and loan losses."...

However with weaker exports and a larger than expected decline in consumption weighing on Ireland's economy.

Friday, May 25, 2012

Without ultra transparency, 20 billion euros from Spanish government is not enough for Bankia

The Telegraph reports that Bankia's management is going to ask for more than 15 billion euros from the Spanish government (money that in a modern banking system is completely unnecessary for the government to give the bank).

Without Bania providing ultra transparency, even if management asks for 20 billion euros, there is no reason for market participants to believe that this is enough.

The lesson from Ireland is:  without ultra transparency, the losses at the banks are always significantly greater than the government or bank management acknowledges.

Spanish lender Bankia will reportedly ask the state for more than €15bn to bail it out when its new management team presents a restructuring plan on Friday.... 
Bankia, partially nationalised by the government earlier this month, is the weak spot in Spain's fragile banking system where loan losses stemming from a 2008 property crash threaten to push the country into seeking international assistance.
A second lesson from Ireland is that losses from a real estate bubble bursting hit every bank in the financial system, not just one.

 Again, in the absence of ultra transparency, there is no reason to believe that Bankia's real estate loan book is not a model for the performance of the real estate loan books of every other Spanish bank.

The logic behind this statement is that lending is competitive.  The borrowers ask several banks for loans and choose the one that is least expensive.  Bankia did not underwrite 100% of the real estate loans.  Therefore, there must be other banks who had similar underwriting standards...
"The help needed to clean up the bank will be more than €15bn," a source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Reuters. 
Neither Bankia, the country's fourth-largest bank with 10pc of Spaniards' deposits, nor the government would comment on the matter. 
The government said on Wednesday that it would provide any capital outlined in the new management's recapitalization plan through the state-backed restructuring fund, the FROB.
 I wonder if Bankia needs more capital than the FROB has?

Thursday, May 24, 2012

Spain 'can learn' from Ireland

The Wall Street Journal reports that the architect of the Irish bad bank thinks that Spain 'can learn' from the Irish experience.  Absolutely.  Anything Ireland did with regards to dealing with its banking system leading up to the Irish sovereign bailout Spain should make absolutely sure that it does not do it.
The failure of Spanish banks to recognize the extent of their bad loans is preventing them from escaping from their current troubles, according to the economist who set up Ireland's "bad bank" to stabilize the Irish banking sector after the property crash. 
Peter Bacon, an independent consultant specializing in Irish property markets, was hired by the Irish finance ministry in early 2009 to identify the scale of the country's banking crisis after its property market collapsed. Mr. Bacon's report led the authorities to establish the National Asset Management Agency, or NAMA, the "bad bank" that was designed to cleanse Irish banks of the commercial-property loans that had become toxic as a result of the market's collapse. 
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Bacon said other troubled euro-zone nations such as Spain could draw lessons from Ireland's banking experience because the lenders have been too slow to put a number on their property loan losses. 
"If you look at the drift in Spain, there is currently another attempt to stabilize the base of Spanish banks, and there is no confidence that the solution is at hand," he said. 
Mr. Bacon said an asset-management agency along the lines of NAMA still offers the best prospect of removing doubts surrounding Spanish banks.
Actually, an asset-management agency does not remove doubts surrounding the banks.  Ireland purchased assets from the banks twice.  Subsequently, it hired BlackRock Solutions in a failed attempt to remove doubt about the banks.

There is only one thing that removes doubts about the banks:  requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Without this disclosure, market participants will rightfully think that the government, financial regulators and the banks are hiding something.  If they weren't hiding something, then they should provide ultra transparency.
Analysts say Spain is now fighting a similar fight: trying to restore confidence in its banks and to avoid having to accept a bailout.... 
Mr. Bacon said Spain needs to waste no more time in identifying the losses in its banks....
"What has become apparent is that you cannot muddle through. And I think that is why Spain is back looking at the extent of its property losses," he said. 
"Spanish banks are certainly not likely realizing anything like the losses that are in fact sitting on their balance sheets in respect of their property losses. I am saying that from my experience of Irish banks," he said.
One of the primary reasons for requiring ultra transparency is that it brings market discipline to the banks and forces them to realize the losses sitting on and off their balance sheets.

Friday, May 18, 2012

Deutsche Bank: Ireland may need second bailout

The Telegraph reports that Deutsche Bank analysts think Ireland is going to require a second bailout as the first was not adequate to cover the losses in the banking system.

The analysis by Deutsche Bank highlights why the Japanese model and its focus on preserving bank book capital levels through policies like bailouts should never be pursued in the first place.  It leads to the worse of all possible outcomes.

If the Deutsche Bank analysts are right, not only will Ireland need a second bailout and all that entails, but its banks will still not be aggressively using the capital that was previously invested in them by the state to address their problem loans.

As households struggle to pay their mortgages, the country’s rescued banks may need €4bn (£3.2bn) more to cover losses on loans than was assumed in stress tests last year, said analysts at Deutsche Bank. 
That would hit the finances of the Irish government, which has already pumped about €63bn into its banking sector in the last three years. 
“A new, even modest, increase in [banks’] capital requirements could deter sovereign investor participation and tip the balance in favour of the sovereign requiring a second loan program,” said the Deutsche team. 
Ireland has been viewed as an example of how a country can stick to an austerity programme of tax rises and spending cuts. Fears that it will none the less need another rescue reinforce the challenges around a resolution of the eurozone debt crisis. 
Alan McQuaid, chief economist at Dublin broker Bloxham, said Ireland will want to return to the bond markets when its current bailout loans end next year, but can only do so if yields, or interest rates, come down from their current level of over 7pc on its 10-year government debt. 
“You are not going to go back if interest rates are very, very high and you can get a better deal from the EU/IMF,” he said. “It’s a question of wait and see.”

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Ireland's Patrick Honohan urges EU to take responsibility for regulating banks

The Irish Independent reports that Ireland's central bank Governor Patrick Honohan called for the EU to take responsibility for regulating banks.
EUROPE should take responsibility for regulating Ireland's banks and repaying bondholders of collapsed financial institutions, Central Bank Governor Patrick Honohan .... argued that a new pan-European regulator wouldn't be affected by national blind-spots like the Irish property bubble, and could therefore do a more effective job of supervising banks. 
If additional dispassionate eyes is the key to a more effective job of supervising banks, why stop with a new pan-European regulator?  Why not instead adopt ultra transparency and allow the market to assist in the supervision of the banks?
He also argued that paying off busted bank bondholders should be "the responsibility of a Europe-level resolution agency" and not of "stressed countries" and slammed the "irresistible" pressure for Ireland to preserve the European bond markets by paying off bank bondholders....
Regular readers know that in the absence of ultra transparency and the presence of regulators saying a bank is solvent there is a moral obligation to pay off busted bank bondholders.  The source of this repayment is the banks and not the host government.

This situation can be eliminated in the future by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this data, bondholders can assess the solvency of the bank.

As a result, bondholders become responsible for any gain or loss on their investment.
Failings in bank regulation were a major factor in Ireland's banking implosion, as supervisors failed to spot banks' ballooning credit risk, their dysfunctional funding bases and numerous other problems.
Since then, a new regulator and executive team has been appointed and a more robust regulatory approach established. 
The financial regulation functions have also been transferred back under the umbrella of the Central Bank.
The US had prior to the financial crisis and still has this regulatory approach.  It did nothing to prevent the crisis.
"In periods of collective national myopia such as that which generated the property bubble in Ireland, the chance of getting somebody whose judgment is not affected is greater, the more distant their base," he said.
"It's time to start the ball rolling in a direction going well beyond the current mandate of the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) and the ESAs (European Supervisory Authorities)."...
Please re-read the highlighted text as it makes the case for inviting the global market in to assist with bank supervision.  This is easily done by offering ultra transparency.
[There] would still be a role for nationals to be "involved in supervision" since "often it is they who pick up the vibes and the market talk". 
With ultra transparency, this market talk would be dramatically better informed.

Bailed out Irish bank CEO says bailout money 'used much better elsewhere'

The Irish Times reports that the new CEO, Jeremy Masding, of one of Ireland's bailed out banks has written an apology

saying that the bank’s €4 billion Government bailout “could have been used much better elsewhere”.“... 
As a result of some of the bank’s decisions and actions, the Irish taxpayer has had to invest substantial funds when those funds could have been used much better elsewhere,” he writes....
Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying that modern banking systems are designed so that banks do not need bailouts.  With deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, banks can continue to make loans to support the real economy and operate for years with negative book capital levels.

Bankers' bonuses need government bailouts, but not the banks themselves.

Here is confirmation of that fact.
The Government effectively nationalised Permanent TSB last year by injecting €2.7 billion following last year’s stress tests of the banks. A further €1.3 billion will be raised through the Government’s purchase of Irish Life. 
The troika and the Government approved a plan last month to carve a good bank out of Permanent TSB by moving about a third of its €34 billion in loans to an internal bad bank to be run down. 
Minister for Finance Michael Noonan has said that Permanent TSB has the potential to become a “third national bank” to compete with Bank of Ireland and AIB. 
One of the advantages of understanding that modern banks are designed not to require bailouts and requiring ultra transparency is that regulators can use the market to assess the long-term viability of the bank.

In the case of Permanent TSB, the market would probably have said it had the capacity to earn its way back to solvency and an appropriate book capital level.

As the CEO acknowledges, it would have been better for everyone if the bank had not received the bailout funds.