Showing posts with label The Queen's Question. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Queen's Question. Show all posts

Monday, January 21, 2013

Joseph Stiglitz: Why Macro economics failed to see financial crisis coming and cannot provide solution

In his lecture at the University of Hyderabad (hat tip The Big Picture and Zero Hedge), Professor Joseph Stiglitz explains why macro economics was unable to predict the financial crisis and much, much worse, why it does not have any basis for the advice it offers on how to fix the problem.

The lecture is well worth listening to as Professor Stiglitz explains some of the assumptions that go into the standard model used by central banks and macro economists.  These assumptions included no financial sector as well as perfect operation of the invisible hand (the model excluded the possibility of either information asymmetry or "lemons").

As previously discussed by your humble blogger, the Fed is diligently working to adjust its model to include the financial sector.

However, nobody has adjusted their model to deal with opacity in all the different corners of the financial system (information asymmetry and lemons are examples of opacity).

The fact that the macro economists' standard model is fundamentally flawed is directly linked to the simple reality that the solutions they have championed to recover from the financial crisis have not worked.

This is not surprising as macro economists were guessing as opposed to offering advice based on their expertise.

Unlike the macro economists, your humble blogger has not been guessing about what policies it will take to end the financial crisis.

The fact that I haven't been guessing shows in the numerous predictions on this blog about what policies will or will not work and the subsequent performance of the policies.

My track record of predicting the financial crisis and the efficacy of the different policy responses should not be a surprise because I am simply applying the FDR Framework on which most of the global financial system is based.

If you know what the problem is, it is easy to see what does or does not address it.

One question that Professor Stiglitz did not answer was why economists open up their mouths and offer policy recommendations that they will vociferously defend when, by training and practice, they have never studied the cause of the financial crisis.


Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Paul Krugman desperately tries to suggest that economists have the answers

Despite amble evidence to the contrary, in his NY Times column, Paul Krugman made yet another attempt at arguing that economists have the answers when it comes to dealing with our current financial crisis.

I admire the man for his efforts, but the economics profession has never been able to answer the Queen's question of 'why if everything was going so well did no-one see the crisis coming'.

When there are hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals with a PhD in Economics and Finance, trotting out a handful of individuals like Bill White and saying that they saw the crisis coming does not rescue the economics profession for its failure to see the crisis coming.

What would have rescued the economics profession from this failure is its membership pointing to the fundamental principles underlying economic theory and warning about the coming crisis.

In defending the economics profession, Professor Krugman inadvertently drives home this point by highlighting how its membership cannot even agree on the fundamental principles underlying economic theory that unite its response to the financial crisis.

Your humble blogger has a confession to make.  I don't have a PhD in Economics or Finance and I am on record for having warned about the financial crisis.

Furthermore, my warning was based on the observation that the necessary condition for the invisible hand to operate properly is that the buyers have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so the buyer can assess and make a fully informed decision.

If transparency is the necessary condition, then by definition 'opacity', 'lemons' and 'information asymmetry' are simply examples of market imperfections that need government involvement to address.

What results from recognizing that transparency is the necessary condition is a simple model of our financial system:  the FDR Framework.  The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

The principle of caveat emptor is needed to ensure that investors recognize they are responsible for all gains and losses on their investments and, as such, they have an incentive to use the disclosed information.

The FDR Framework easily explains our financial crisis.  All the opaque corners of the financial system froze as investors realized they could not assess what they were buying.

Examples of the opaque corners of the financial system include banks (the inter-bank lending markets froze because banks are 'black boxes' and nobody could tell which banks were solvent and which were not) and structured finance securities (these opaque, toxic securities are 'brown paper bags' where the value of the contents can only be guessed at).

Since transparency is the necessary condition for the invisible hand to operate properly and vast swathes of the financial system are cloaked in opacity, the natural suggestion is that transparency be brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

I would think that the need for transparency is something that everyone in the economics profession could agree on (after all, the relevance of economics is greatly reduced without the invisible hand) .  My observation is if the economics profession agrees on the need for transparency, it certainly isn't telling anyone outside the profession.

That said, back to Professor Krugman's attempt to say that the economics profession has something to say about how to respond to the financial crisis.

It’s that time again: the annual meeting of the American Economic Association and affiliates... And this year, as in past meetings, there is one theme dominating discussion: the economic crisis. 
This isn’t how things were supposed to be.
True.  Had global policymakers followed your humble blogger's suggestion to restore transparency to the financial system, the financial crisis would be over.
If you had polled the economists attending this meeting three years ago, most of them would have predicted that by now we’d be talking about how the great slump ended, not why it still continues.
These same economists didn't see the financial crisis coming so why would anyone expect them to be accurate in their prediction of its coming to an end?
So what went wrong? The answer, mainly, is the triumph of bad ideas.
Yes, yes, yes.  Leading the bad idea parade was the notion of protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.  This placed the burden on the real economy of servicing the excess debt in the financial system.  Doing so diverted funds needed for reinvestment and growth.  The result is a global Japan-style economic slump.
It’s tempting to argue that the economic failures of recent years prove that economists don’t have the answers. But the truth is actually worse: standard economics offered good answers but political leaders – and all too many economists – chose to forget or ignore what they should have known....
So Professor Krugman, when are you going to start arguing for bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system?
So what can be done? A smaller financial shock, like the dot-com bust at the end of the 1990s, can be met by cutting interest rates. But the crisis of 2008 was far bigger, and even cutting rates to zero wasn’t nearly enough.
Professor Krugman, the problem we have is a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Cutting interest rates does not solve this type of crisis.
At that point governments needed to step in, spending to support their economies while the private sector regained its balance. And to some extent that did happen. Revenue dropped sharply in the slump, but spending actually rose as programmes like unemployment insurance expanded and temporary economic stimulus went into effect. Budget deficits rose, but this was actually a good thing, probably the most important reason we didn’t have a full replay of the Great Depression.
I happen to agree with Professor Krugman that there is a role for government spending when dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis.  The role is to kickstart the economy after the banks have absorb all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Government spending before the losses on the excess debt have been realized is far less effective as it has to overcome the burden of the excess debt (this is what Japan has shown for over 2+ decades).
But it all went wrong in 2010.
Actually, it all went wrong in 2008/2009 with the decision to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses.

In 2010, the policymakers doubled down on their bad decisions by adopting austerity.
The crisis in Greece was taken, wrongly, as a sign that all governments had better slash spending and deficits right away. 
Austerity became the order of the day, and supposed experts who should have known better cheered the process on, while the warnings of some (but not enough) economists that austerity would derail recovery were ignored. 
For example, the president of the European Central Bank confidently asserted that “the idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect”. 
Well, someone was incorrect all right.
And that someone wasn't Professor Krugman or myself.
Of the papers presented at this meeting, probably the biggest flash came from one by Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh of the International Monetary Fund. Formally, the paper only represents the views of the authors, but Blanchard, the IMF’s chief economist, isn’t an ordinary researcher...
For what the paper concludes is not just that austerity has a depressing effect on weak economies, but that the adverse effect is much stronger than previously believed. The premature turn to austerity, it turns out, was a terrible mistake. 
I’ve seen some reporting describing the paper as an admission from the IMF that it doesn’t know what it’s doing. 
That misses the point; the fund was actually less enthusiastic about austerity than other major players. To the extent that it says it was wrong, it’s also saying that everyone else (except those sceptical economists) was even more wrong....
Your humble blogger wasn't wrong nor was I skeptical that austerity would end badly.  In fact, I argued on this blog that the only entities that should experience austerity were the banks and banker bonuses.  I argued for protecting the real economy, the social contract and society.
[I]t deserves credit for being willing to rethink its position in the light of evidence. 
The really bad news is how few other players are doing the same.
This applies across the economics profession and the global policymakers.
European leaders, having created Depression-level suffering in debtor countries without restoring financial confidence, still insist that the answer is even more pain. 
The current British government, which killed a promising recovery by turning to austerity, completely refuses to consider the possibility that it made a mistake. 
And here in America Republicans insist they’ll use a confrontation over the debt ceiling – a deeply illegitimate action in itself – to demand spending cuts that would drive us back into recession. 
The truth is that we’ve just experienced a colossal failure of economic policy – and far too many of those responsible for that failure both retain power and refuse to learn from experience.
Austerity, like bailouts, is simply a policy that flows from the choice of protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses.

If we are to end this colossal failure of economic policy, it is important that leading economists learn from their mistakes and highlight that there is another policy choice that has been proven successfully for ending bank solvency related financial crises:  bring transparency back to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

When transparency is brought to banks by requiring them to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it will trigger recognition of all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  Banks will respond to market discipline by ending the use of 'extend and pretend' to create 'zombie' loans.

Fortunately, as the banks are absorbing these losses, they can rely on the design of a modern banking system to continue operating and supporting the real economy.  By design, banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, taxpayers become the banks' silent equity partners when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Monday, January 7, 2013

Is the Fed doing enough, too much or not enough to aid recovery

The Wall Street Journal carried an article on the American Economic Association's annual meeting that in celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Fed's creation asked:  is the Fed doing enough, too much or not enough to aid recovery.

Regular readers know that under the guidelines for central banks established by the father of modern central banking, Walter Bagehot, the Fed is doing too much.

For example, Mr. Bagehot said that as a lender of last resort, the central bank is suppose to lend freely at high rates of interest against good collateral.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the Fed and the other central banks have lent freely at low rates of interest against collateral of marginal value.

For example, Mr. Bagehot said that interest rates should never be below 2% as rates below 2% change savers' behavior.  When making this comment about the change in behavior, he was well aware of Mark Twain's observation about being concerned about the return of his capital rather than the return on his capital.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the Fed and other central banks have pursued zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and an authority on the Great Depression, also argued that the Fed is doing too much because it does not understand that we are facing a bank solvency led financial crisis.

As she said,

"This was [his] claim to be worthy of running the Fed," she says. He was "familiar with history. He knew what had been done." But perhaps this is actually Mr. Bernanke's biggest problem. Today's crisis isn't a replay of the problem in the 1930s, but our central bankers have responded by using the tools they should have used then. They are fighting the last war. The result, she argues, has been failure. "I don't see that they've achieved what they should have been trying to achieve. So my verdict on this present Fed leadership is that they have not really done their job."
Bottom line:  the Fed is doing too much because it is pursuing policies for a liquidity crisis when we are faced with a bank solvency crisis.


From the WSJ,

On the 100th anniversary of the central bank's creation, economists remain divided over whether the Fed's decisions to slash interest rates to nearly zero and buy trillions of dollars in bonds will fuel inflation or fall short of reigniting growth.
Your humble blogger, who does not have an economics PhD, is already on record saying that we will continue to face a Japan-style economic slump until such time as the losses on the excess debt in the financial system are recognized.

I said this in early 2008 before the Fed engaged in zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

To date, economic performance has confirmed my prediction.
For much of its history, the Fed has acted too timidly when faced with difficult circumstances, University of California, Berkeley economists Christina Romer and David Romer argued in a paper presented at the conference. 
They argued that the Fed didn't do all that it could have done to foster growth until the fall of 2012. But they praised the Fed for its recent moves. 
During the Great Depression, officials doubted monetary policy's ability to overcome the forces that had wrecked the economy. Later, in the 1970s, officials thought high inflation could not be surmounted at a reasonable public cost. 
"An unduly pessimistic view of what monetary policy can accomplish has been a more important source of policy errors and poor outcomes over the history of the Federal Reserve" than overconfidence, the Romers said.
Having worked at the Fed, I would be the first to tell you that there are economic outcomes that monetary policy can accomplish.

Addressing bank solvency is not one of them.
For others, the Fed has already done too much. 
Carnegie Mellon economist Allan Meltzer warned that the Fed's bond-buying programs, often called quantitative easing, may be fueling a farmland price bubble. He worried that the actions also risk driving up inflation, and they have left the central bank as essentially the only significant player in the mortgage market. And when long-term rates eventually start to rise, the government will face an explosion in currently low borrowing costs that will further complicate efforts to rein in deficits, he warned. 
"It is impossible to minimize the size of the economic problem that faces us in the future," the chronicler of central-bank history said at a panel.
Maybe I missed something, but Fed policies also made it the only significant player in the market for US Treasuries.  Zero interest rate policies, quantitative easing and Operation Twist are designed to push rates on treasuries below where other investors will want to buy them.
Former Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn, now a Brookings Institution scholar, cautioned that ahead of the financial crisis, "not only didn't we see it coming," but once the trouble started, central bankers "had trouble" understanding what was happening, he said in a panel.
Your humble blogger was one of the handful of individuals who saw the financial crisis coming.  All modesty aside, I didn't have trouble understanding what was happening.

More importantly, I tried to explain to several Fed Governors, including Mr. Kohn, what was happening at the time it was happening.  This included predicting which policies would or wouldn't be effective (please see early posts on this blog for some examples).

What I discovered in these conversations were individuals who were captured by group think.  They had and still have a model for how the financial system and real economy is suppose to work and they dismiss any suggestion that their model is wrong.

In fact, the power of group think has them so wed to their models that they have repeatedly lashed out at consumers for not behaving in the way the economic models say they should behave.
The Fed has "only limited guidance" from history about how to navigate the economy with radically new tools of monetary policy.
Actually, history as represented by Walter Bagehot and Anna Schwartz provided plenty of guidance.  Fed policymakers chose to ignore this guidance to the detriment of the real economy and social programs.
More than five years after the onset of the financial crisis, scholars inside and outside government are struggling to rewrite textbook understandings of how the economy works and how unconventional monetary policies have affected markets and the economy. 
All modesty aside again, your humble blogger has rewritten the textbook understandings of how the economy works on this blog.  Please read the posts on the FDR Framework, the Queen's Question and how a modern banking system is designed to allow banks with low or negative book capital levels to continue operating because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.
"The whole policy evaluation inevitably is difficult," said Michael Joyce, an adviser at the Bank of England, "given the unknown counterfactuals, uncertain transmission mechanisms and [the fact that] we don't have many historical examples."
The historical examples we do have suggests that the whole policy would be evaluated negatively.

Mr. Bagehot set his guidelines for central banks as a result of his experience with the frequent financial crises that occurred in the 1800s.

Anna Schwartz made her observation that the Fed was pursuing the wrong policies based on her experience with the Great Depression.  She understood that we are dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis and not a liquidity crisis.

Monday, October 8, 2012

What have the economists ever done for us?

In an article by this title on Vox EU, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane actually answers the Queen's Question of 'why if everything was going so well, economists didn't see the financial crisis coming'.

Mr. Haldane asserts that the reason why economists didn't see the financial crisis coming is that the conventional economic models they use failed because financial factors like asset prices and credit had little or no role in the model.

His conclusion is that these models need to be rethought and rewritten to reflect the fact that the system is more complex.

What caught my attention in the article, was his discussion of the importance of financial history in economics and how it was neglected pre-financial crisis in favor of economic models.  It was neglected because the path to tenure for economists lays in developing and extending the conventional models.

Conventional models that were unable to predict the financial crisis (your humble blogger did) and are unable to generate a policy response that will successfully end the financial crisis (history shows that the Swedish Model is the appropriate policy response).
There is a long list of culprits when it comes to assigning blame for the financial crisis. At least in this instance, failure has just as many parents as success. But among the guilty parties, economists played a special role in contributing to the problem. 
We are duty bound to be part of the solution (see Coyle 2012).
Why are economists duty bound to be part of the solution?  If they didn't predict the financial crisis in the first place, why on earth do they have the hubris to think that they have anything to contribute to its solution?

Honestly, no one is asking them to open up their mouths and provide a solution like higher bank book capital levels, zero interest rates and quantitative easing that make the problem worse.
Our role in the crisis was, in a nutshell, the result of succumbing to an intellectual virus which took hold of the body financial from the 1990s onwards.
Excuse me, but the intellectual virus took hold a long time before that.  If it had not, economists would have been shouting from the rooftops that a financial crisis was coming.

This did not happen.

There were a handful of economists who saw subprime mortgage-backed bonds as a problem.  I might be wrong, but I don't think these few economists were in their mid- to late 70s.
One strain of this virus is an old one. Cycles in money and bank credit are familiar from centuries past. And yet, for perhaps a generation, the symptoms of this old virus were left untreated. That neglect allowed the infection to spread from the financial system to the real economy, with near-fatal consequences for both. 
In many ways, this was an odd disease to have contracted. The symptoms should have been all too obvious from history. The interplay of bank money and credit and the wider economy has been pivotal to the mandate of central banks for centuries. For at least a century, that was recognised in the design of public policy frameworks. The management of bank money and credit was a clear public policy prerequisite for maintaining broader macroeconomic and social stability. 
Two developments – one academic, one policy-related – appear to have been responsible for this surprising memory loss. 
The first was the emergence of micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DGSE) models in economics. Because these models were built on real-business-cycle foundations, financial factors (asset prices, money and credit) played distinctly second fiddle, if they played a role at all. 
The second was an accompaying neglect for aggregate money and credit conditions in the construction of public policy frameworks. Inflation targeting assumed primacy as a monetary policy framework, with little role for commercial banks' balance sheets as either an end or an intermediate objective. And regulation of financial firms was in many cases taken out of the hands of central banks and delegated to separate supervisory agencies with an institution-specific, non-monetary focus.
I realize this is an excuse for the Bank of England, but it is certainly not the case for the Federal Reserve.

Regular readers know that the reason monetary policy and regulation of financial firms don't mix is that to be good at one precludes being good at the other.  Monetary policy involves a comfort with theory.  Regulation of financial firms involves a comfort with minutia.  These are mutually exclusive.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 confirms that they are mutually exclusive as the Federal Reserve did not prevent the US from participating in the financial crisis even though it houses both monetary policy and regulation of financial firms.
Coincidentally or not, what happened next was extraordinary. Commercial banks' balance sheets grew by the largest amount in human history....
This balance sheet explosion was, in one sense, no one’s fault and no one’s responsibility. Not monetary policy authorities, whose focus was now inflation and whose models scarcely permitted bank balance sheets a walk-on role. And not financial regulators, whose focus was on the strength of individual financial institutions. 
Yet this policy neglect has since shown itself to be far from benign.
Actually, this policy neglect as it occurred at the Federal Reserve is confirmation that monetary policy and regulation of financial firms don't mix.
The lessons of financial history have been painfully re-taught since 2008. They need not be forgotten again. This has important implications for the economics profession and for the teaching of economics. 
Regular readers know that transparency so the buyer has access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess what they are buying is the necessary condition for the invisible hand to work properly.

All other market imperfections, like the existence of a monopoly or accounting control fraud or information asymmetry, are examples of where the invisible hand does not work properly.

In theory, this should be taught in Economics 101.  In practice, it isn't.
For one, it underscores the importance of sub-disciplines such as economic and financial history. 
As Galbraith said,"There can be few fields of human endeavour in which history counts for so little as in the world of finance." Economics can ill afford to re-commit that crime....
This is a very important point.

In financial history, we learned that the Swedish Model successfully ends a bank solvency led financial crisis and the Japanese Model does not.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize the all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and society and the real economy are protected.  Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital and banker bonuses are protected at all costs and society and the real economy are severely damaged.
The second strain of intellectual virus is a new, more virulent one. This has been made dangerous by increased integration of markets of all types, economic, but especially financial and social. In a tightly woven financial and social web, the contagious consequences of a single event can thus bring the world to its knees. That was the Lehman Brothers story....
Regular readers know that applying the lessons of financial history inoculates against contagion.

When each market participants has access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner, they are likely to use this information when they are held responsible under the principle of caveat emptor for any benefit or loss on their exposures.

What results from caveat emptor is that all participants adjust their exposures to what they can afford to lose.

As a result, even though the failure of one institution might cause losses throughout the global financial system, it does not result in a domino effect where other institutions also fail.
These dynamics do not emerge from most mainstream models of the financial system or real economy. The reason is simple. The majority of these models use the framework of a single representative agent (or a small number of them). That effectively neuters the possibility of complex actions and interactions between agents shaping system dynamics. 
The financial system is an archetypical complex, adaptive socioeconomic system – and has become more so over time....
Conventional models, based on the representative agent and with expectations mimicking fundamentals, had no hope of capturing these system dynamics. They are fundamentally ill-suited to capturing today’s networked world, in which social media shape expectations, shape behaviour and thus shape outcomes. 
This calls for an intellectual reinvestment in models of heterogeneous, interacting agents, an investment likely to be every bit as great as the one that economists have made in DGSE models over the past 20 years. Agent-based modelling is one, but only one, such avenue. The construction and simulation of highly non-linear dynamics in systems of multiple equilibria represents unfamiliar territory for most economists.

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

William White: Ultra easy monetary policy and the law of unintended consequences

In a must read article, economist William White evaluates
the desirability of ultra easy monetary policy by weighing up the balance of the desirable short run effects and the undesirable longer run effects – the unintended consequences.... 
He finds
There are limits to what central banks can do. 
One reason for believing this is that monetary stimulus, operating through traditional (“flow”) channels, might now be less effective in stimulating aggregate demand than previously. 
Further, cumulative (“stock”) effects provide negative feedback mechanisms that over time also weaken both supply and demand. 
It is also the case that ultra easy monetary policies can eventually threaten the health of financial institutions and the functioning of financial markets, threaten the “independence” of central banks, and can encourage imprudent behavior on the part of governments. 
None of these unintended consequences is desirable. 
Mr. White's article is the economist's version of why central banks must observe Walter Bagehot's rule that interest rates must not be lowered below 2%.

For those who do not know:  Mr. White is one of the handful of economists that the economic profession hauls out to say there were some economists who predicted the financial crisis (without Mr. White and his colleagues at the Bank for International Settlements, the number of economists that predicted the financial crisis would have been countable on one or two fingers);  and Mr. Bagehot was the individual who in the 1870s wrote the book, Lombard Street, on modern central banking.

Mr. White makes one observation in particular that I would like to draw regular readers' attention to.
The unexpected beginning of the financial and economic crisis, and its unexpected resistance to policy measures taken to date, leads to a simple conclusion. The variety of economic models used by modern academics and by policymakers give few insights as to how the economy really works.
Please re-read the highlighted text again and then a third time as it is a highly respected economist answering the Queen's Question by saying although economists claim to have some insight into how the economy really works, in reality they have no clue.


The clear conclusion from Mr. White's observation that the economic models currently in use give few insights as to how the economy really works is that there is no reason to believe that any solution based on these models is likely to fix the problem with the financial system.

Saturday, August 25, 2012

Professional rot in economics as some 500 economists line up as political hacks

In a must read Bloomberg editorial, Professor Laurence Kotlikoff discusses how the professional rot in economics has transformed the profession into political hacks.

Regular readers know that the Queen of England called into doubt the competence of the profession by asking how if everything was going so well, the economics profession did not see the financial crisis coming.

Professor Kotlikoff provides a possible answer to why the economics profession did not see it coming.  Simply, none are so blind as those whose job depends on their not seeing.

Some 500 of my colleagues in economics, almost all academics, have signed a statement applauding former Governor Mitt Romney’s economic plan and condemning President Barack Obama’s handling of the economy. 
The statement amounts to an endorsement of Romney’s presidential candidacy. As such, it represents a disservice to the economics profession as well as to the statement’s signatories, five of whom are Nobel laureates. 
The 500 signatures including 5 Nobel laureates just shows the scope of intellectual capture that the Financial-Academic-Regulatory Complex (FARC) has managed to achieve in the academic space.
Economics holds itself out as a science, yet here we have supposedly impartial scientists declaring that all of Romney’s proposed economic policies are good and that everything the president has done on the economics front has been misguided and flawed. 
No impartial economist would make such blanket assertions. By their very nature, such statements represent political, not scientific, opinion.  
Yet the signatories not only identified themselves as professional economists; they also specified their university or other institutional affiliations, thereby implicating places such as the University of Chicago in their political pronouncements.... 
Economists on both sides of the political spectrum have long used the credibility of their institutional affiliations as an 'endorsement' of their opinion.
The decision of the 500 U.S. economists, many from the leading ranks of the profession, to trade in their credentials as economists for that of campaign workers is just the latest sign that something’s rotten in economics. 
The documentary “Inside Job,” demonstrated how prominent economists failed to disclose, as standard ethics require, when they are being paid for their professional opinions. 
Please re-read the highlighted text and recall that none are so blind as those whose jobs depend on their not seeing.
Then there is the increasingly nasty op-ed war pursued by political economists, such as Paul Krugman and Glenn Hubbard, who have so closely aligned themselves with one of the two parties that it’s impossible to know where their politics stop and their economic analyses begin. 
The worst part of all this is that the new political economics routinely diverges so far from economic theory and fact....

Economic theory isn’t up for grabs. Economic facts aren’t a matter of choice. And the integrity of the economics profession isn’t free for disposal. The 500 economists owe our profession a sincere apology.

Sunday, August 12, 2012

Paul Krugman shocked to find 'culture of fraud' in economics profession

On his NY Times blog, Nobel prize winning Princeton economics Professor Paul Krugman expresses his shock to find a 'culture of fraud' in the economics profession.

Regular readers know there is nothing shocking about this.

The Queen of England made the point that there is something wrong with the economics profession when she asked how if everything was going so well nobody [in particular, economists] saw the financial crisis coming.  She asked this question at the London School of Economics to economists who claim to understand or at a minimum know something about how the financial system and the economy actually work.

There are two reasons that the economics profession might not have seen the financial crisis coming.

First, maybe economists truly know nothing about how the financial system and the economy actually works.  As a result, economists could not be expected to have seen the financial crisis coming.  However, if this is true, then they also could not be expected to have anything useful to say about how to deal with the financial crisis.

Support for the idea that economists truly know nothing about how the financial system and the economy actually works can be seen in the so-called peer reviewed academic journals in finance and accounting that have approximately zero standards when it comes to publishing articles.  I say this based on the simple fact that articles on informationally insensitive debt have been published.

By definition, all debt is informationally sensitive.  Some debt just requires less effort to assess.

The authors of the papers on informationally insensitive debt argue that demand deposits are an example of informationally insensitive debt.  Every six year old who opens a bank account with their parents knows that demand deposits are informationally sensitive.  Before the six year old hands over their money to the bank they make sure that the government guarantees to get it back.

The fact that a finance or economics peer reviewed journal would not apply something known to a six year old to disqualify an article highlights the lack of academic standards in these journals and supports the notion that economists truly know nothing about how the financial system or economy works.

Second, maybe economics has some useful insights, but maybe many of its current practitioners have become financially and intellectually captured.  It would not be too tough for industry to do this as industry has both the data economists might want to study and money to pay for research.

As explained by Yves Smith in her post on NakedCapitalism,
As much as it’s good to see Krugman call this sort of thing out, it nevertheless raises a basic question: where has he been? He was soft on his colleagues when the movie Inside Job came out, which discussed corruption in academic economics, focusing on Frederic Mishkin, Larry Summers, Laura Tyson, and….Glenn Hubbard:: 
"OK, about the economist-bashing: I thought it was basically fair. There aren’t, I think, all that many cases when economists are literally paid to offer a specific opinion — although Greenspan’s defense of Keating qualifies. But the movie didn’t say there are. What it suggested, instead, was a kind of soft corruption: you get paid a lot of money by the financial industry, you get put on boards, but only if you don’t rock the boat too much. Besides, you hang out with these people, and get assimilated by the financial Borg. I think all of that is very true." 
In other words, the problem is cognitive capture.
Professor Krugman sees this in the scramble by several economists to court the Republican presidential nominee.
The big story of the week among the dismal science set is the Romney campaign’s white paper on economic policy, which represents a concerted effort by three economists — Glenn Hubbard, Greg Mankiw, and John Taylor — to destroy their own reputations. (Yes, there was a fourth author, Kevin Hassett. But the co-author of “Dow 36,000″ doesn’t exactly have a reputation to destroy). 
And when I talk about destroying reputations, I don’t just mean saying things I disagree with. I mean flat-out, undeniable professional malpractice. It’s one thing to make shaky or even demonstrably wrong arguments. It’s something else to cite the work of other economists, claiming that it supports your position, when it does no such thing — and don’t take my word for it, listen to the protests of the cited economists....
Can Hubbard, Mankiw, and Taylor really be that out of it? I don’t think so. They just believe that they can pull one over on the rubes, and pay no professional price. Let’s hope they’re wrong.
I suspect they are not the only economists who have tried this gambit.
Simon Wren-Lewis wonders what could have possessed Mankiw and Taylor to sell their souls this way. I won’t pretend to have a full answer. But surely part of it is simply that they have been caught up in the vortex of the broader Romney campaign .... 
Is it really surprising, then, that the economists who have decided to lend their names to the campaign have been caught up in this culture of fraud?
The actions by these economists are no surprise.  Their upside is a role or voice in policymaking by the Romney administration.  Their downside is they continue in their current roles.



Saturday, August 4, 2012

Are central banks' monetary policies a source of systemic risk?

Earlier this week, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane said that economists share in the blame for the financial crisis and the ongoing recession.

Mr. Haldane is the executive director of financial stability at the BoE and a member of the BoE's Financial Policy Committee.  The FPC is suppose to focus on sources of financial instability and systemic risk.

As a result, my question is:  based on Mr. Haldane's comments are central banks' monetary policies a source of financial instability and systemic risk?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger's answer is yes.

As this blog has documented on numerous occasions, the economic headwinds created by zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing appear to far outweigh the benefits.  Not only that, but the policies have never be shown to promote economic growth (Japan is in its third lost decade when it comes to economic growth).

So why do central bankers pursue these policies that crush the real economy with what appears to be messianic zeal?

Mr. Haldane provided the answer in his observation that economists have come to believe in the assumptions underlying economics as if they were a "theological doctrine".  As a result, economists are on a crusade to prove they are right.

As this blog has documented, many of the assumptions that economists make are wrong.

For example, they assume that zero interest rates will force investors to reach for yield.  This is not true.  Investors see that pricing in the financial markets is distorted by the central bank policies.  As a result investors are now focused on return of their capital over return on their capital.  This deprives the real economy of capital it needs for growth.

This raises another interesting question:  given economists' religious belief in the assumptions underlying their models of the economy, are they fit to be central bankers?

The Telegraph's Jeremy Warner offered
Wanted: applicants for the post of Britain’s most powerful technocrat. 
Required qualifications include unmatched knowledge of macro and micro economics, in-depth experience of banking and the complexities of modern finance, natural authority, exceptional communication and media skills, outstanding administrative abilities, proven leadership qualities and a deity-like ability to transcend the political divide. 
It is small wonder that George Osborne is struggling to find a suitable candidate for the post of governor of the Bank of England, which falls vacant when Sir Mervyn King retires next June. 
By consolidating responsibility for banking supervision and financial stability under the same roof as the Bank of England’s existing monetary functions, the Chancellor has created a huge job and an almost impossible ask....
Imagine how much easier it would be to find qualified individuals if the requirement for 'unmatched knowledge of macro and micro economics' is dropped.

Whoever the Chancellor chooses will have to answer some profound questions about the future of central banking and the economy. 
Money is only a means of trade and exchange, yet over the last decade or two, it has been catastrophically mismanaged at almost every level. As custodians of the monetary system, central bankers have been a large part of this mischief. 
Nor, having messed up so spectacularly in the years before the crisis, is it clear they’ve got their response to it entirely correct either.
Which is exactly what Mr. Haldane observed.  More importantly, his observation in their belief in their assumptions suggests that economists are singularly incapable of correcting the response of monetary authority.  Doing so would require that they stop believing.  Hence the question:  are economists fit for central banking?

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

Bank of England's Andy Haldane admits economists share blame for financial crisis and recession

In a must read Telegraph article, Andy Haldane, the Bank of England's executive director for financial stability, admits that economist in both academia and the government share in the blame for both the financial crisis and the ongoing recession.

Regular readers know that the Queen of England pointed out this simple fact with her question of how if everything was going so well did the economics profession not see the financial crisis coming.

Mr. Haldane's statement confirmed what your humble blogger has said (see the Queen's question) about why the economics profession failed to see the crisis coming and in fact contributed to the crisis and the ongoing recession.
Andy Haldane ... said economists misled policymakers in the years before the crisis by promoting a “blinkered” view of the world based on the assumption their theories were unfailingly correct. 
The academic establishment, including central bankers, needs to own up to its mistakes, he added....
Please note that in the case of central banks, the economists were the policymakers.  Therefore the economists dominated and still dominate monetary, fiscal and regulatory policy.
In an interview with OurKingdom, the UK arm of openDemocracy, Mr Haldane said: “It’s right that it should shoulder some of the blame [for the financial crisis]. In part, this is because thinking within the wider academic economic community did start to shape and influence public policy in important ways.” 
He added: “I think looking ahead, central banks – this isn’t remotely just about the Bank of England – are going to need ... to say when they’ve got it wrong, to admit to mistakes when they’ve been made.” 
The profession’s mistake was to allow “a rather restricted and blinkered view of the dynamics of social and economic systems [to be] carried across into how public policy was thought about and executed”. 
He said the error was not driven by economists seeking financial gain but “the quest for certainty”. But their error was to think of the assumptions used to build economic models as cast-iron laws. 
“A concept gets formalised and then gets socialised and then believed as an almost theological doctrine,” he said. "The notion of not knowing, of imperfect information, of uncertainty, got lost from economics and finance for the better part of 20 or 30 years.
Please re-read Mr. Haldane's comment on imperfect information.  Your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that it was the result of imperfect information.  Imperfect information that was brought about by Wall Street as it capitalized on building opacity into the financial system.
“I think one of the great errors we as economists made was that we started believing the assumptions of economics, and saying things that made no intellectual sense. 
We started to believe that what were assumptions were actually a description of reality, and therefore that the models were a description of reality, and therefore were dependable for policy analysis. 
“With hindsight, that was a pretty significant error.”
The major assumption being that there was transparency in the financial system when in fact Wall Street was creating vast opaque areas (think banks and structured finance securities).

Update
I thought that readers might find the following NY Times' Economix column interesting as it expands on the idea of economists believing that their assumptions are facts.
An economist's mea culpa

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Economists, like Mervyn King, are as unrepentant as ever

One of the unfortunate discoveries from the financial crisis is that the economics profession is hopelessly out of touch with how the financial system operates and is in denial about the fact that it failed to predict the financial crisis (the ability to predict an event implies some understanding of what is going to cause the event to occur).

The economics profession clings to the belief that it was saved by a couple of economists at the Bank for International Settlements who 'predicted' the crisis.  This belief conveniently ignores that these economists were dismissed by the economics profession because their analysis was not backed by economic theory (these economists understood that making loans to individuals with no means for repayment is going to end up badly).

The economics profession clings to the belief that it was ambushed by the Queen of England when she asked why did the economics profession not see the crisis coming.  No, it is a perfectly reasonable question to ask a profession that claims to have some insight into financial markets and the economy.

The economics profession clings to the belief that it has something to offer to solve the financial crisis it was not able to predict.  We have tried the economic profession's voodoo remedies of zero interest rates, quantitative easing, austerity and fiscal stimulus policies as well as bailing out banks and increasing their book capital and none of these remedies has ended the financial crisis.  It is quite apparent that the solution is not in economic textbooks or any economist's academic papers.

Speaking of academic papers written by economists, in defending the Bank of England's failure to understand that the Libor interest rate was being fiddled with, Mervyn King said

We had no evidence of wrongdoing (in that respect), none was supplied to us and the evidence that you cite here, there were plenty of academic articles that looked into it and said we cannot see in the data any evidence of manipulation.
These papers should be a source of embarrassment to the economics profession.

Regular readers know that the way Libor interest rates were calculated using self-certified submissions created the veil behind which Libor could be manipulated.  Without disclosure of actual trades, how could anyone know if the submissions were fiddled with or not?

These papers may not be a source of embarrassment given how low the standard is for getting finance and economic papers published in the top journals.

For example, there are a number of papers that talk about informationally insensitive debt and claim that demand deposits are an example.  Everyone, except the finance professors and economists who reviewed the articles apparently, knows that demand deposits up to $250,000 are guaranteed by the government.  The last time anyone checked, a government guarantee was information.

My guess is that if the finance professors and economists who reviewed and accepted these papers understood that a government guarantee was information, they would have rejected the papers as the author confuses sensitivity with the ease of assessing all the useful, relevant information on an investment.

As Jeremy Warner observed about the testimony given by the Bank of England's Mervyn King,

King's persistent stubborness in refusing to accept any degree of responsibility for what went wrong in the banking crisis. 

Denial of culpability in the libor scandal – basically on the grounds that the Bank of England was not the responsible regulator – mirrors a similar more general refusal to accept the Bank did anything wrong either in the lead up to or during the banking crisis.
Why is it that economists have so little ability to say 'we screwed up and we are not going to offer any advice or take any extreme actions until we understand why we screwed up and missed predicting the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s?'

Friday, July 6, 2012

A review of the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee performance after one year

Regular readers know that your humble blogger was not optimistic about the contribution that the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee would make to promoting financial stability and, as a result, set the bar for success at "do no damage".

The reason for this low standard is the composition of the membership of the FPC.  It is long individuals with a PhD in Economics.

In addition, there is no one on the FPC who publicly predicted our current financial crisis.  I felt this might be a problem because in the absence of anyone who understood why the financial crisis occurred it was highly unlikely the FPC had the expertise to do anything to moderate the current crisis or prevent the next crisis.

Recall that the Queen also predicted that this was a problem when she asked the economic profession why it hadn't seen the current crisis coming.  The very question suggests that perhaps by training economists are very poorly suited for understanding the financial system and what might cause a crisis.

At its one year anniversary, I am sadden to report that the FPC could not get over the 'do no harm' standard.

Here is the performance of the FPC as described by external board member Robert Jenkins in a Telegraph column.
The financial policy committee of the Bank of England is now one year old. Its purpose is to identify and, where possible, mitigate threats to the British financial system. Financial stability is the goal.
Over the past 12 months, systemic fragility and troubles in the eurozone have been the key threats. 
Restoring confidence in the British banking system has been the priority.
Given this priority, has the FPC done the only thing that restores confidence in a financial system and called for banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details?  No.

Regular readers know that transparency restores confidence as it allows market participants to independently assess each bank.  Confidence is restored because market participants trust their own analysis (whether they do it themselves or they hire a third party to do it for them).
That banks should build balance sheet strength has been the primary recommendation and today the country's banking system is among the better capitalised and funded.
However, as everyone except the economists and other members of the FPC knows, bank capital is meaningless.  This is not just your humble blogger's opinion, but an opinion expressed by the OECD.

The reasons why bank capital is meaningless are extremely well known.

First, we have suspended mark-to-market accounting.  As a result, all those opaque, toxic securities and government bonds that still reside on and off the bank balance sheets have not been properly marked-to-market.  This results in an overstatement of bank book capital levels.

Second, bank regulators have engaged in regulatory forbearance that has allowed the banks to keep zombie borrowers alive using 'extend and pretend'.  Again, the banks have not taken losses and this too results in an overstatement of bank book capital levels.

So the primary recommendation for restoring confidence was to focus on a meaningless number as oppose to requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and actually restore confidence.

Unfortunately, the primary recommendation to boost bank book capital also carried with it a well known and fully predictable  toxic side effect for the real economy:  a financial regulator induced credit crunch.

Since no investor is dumb enough to buy newly issued capital in a bank with large, undisclosed losses, to reach the higher capital ratios the FPC endorsed, banks had to shrink their balance sheets.  The number one place to shrink a bank balance sheet and get the most bang for the activity is by reducing loans.

The toxic side effect of the FPC's primary recommendation was to support a financial regulator induced credit crunch.  The FPC managed to take a situation where it was difficult for credit worthy borrowers to access bank credit and make it virtually impossible.  As a result, the real economy has been starved for credit to support it.  A clear violation of the "do no harm" standard.
Financial stability requires a healthy economy and a healthy economy requires financial stability.....
Is this true?

Couldn't we have financial stability in a recession (I would think a recession qualifies as a 'sick' economy)?
committee members have questioned whether there might be a trade-off between the strengthening of bank balance sheets on the one hand, and ensuring sufficient credit availability on the other.
In other words, was there a choice to be made between safer banks and a stronger economy? 
The discussion continues. To date, the following facts have informed the committee's recommendations: 
• Confidence must be maintained in our banks without which the banking system will cease to function. Loss of confidence in the banking system is the single biggest threat to lending. The strengthening of bank capital and liquidity has been critical to restoring confidence. 
Every part of the highlighted text is not a fact, but is rather something that only economists believe! (Of course. they are encouraged in this belief by bankers who tell them it is true as the bankers are looking to be paid their bonuses.)


It is a belief that results in the incredibly destructive policies adopted under the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.


Regular readers know that under the Japanese model, bank book capital levels are protected at all costs.  This involves deception by the regulators and the adoption of policies like suspension of mark-to-market accounting and regulatory forbearance.


The result of these policies is that an accounting construct is held constant and the damage from excess debt in the financial system is forced onto the real economy.  This burden is more than the real economy can support and results in contraction of the real economy.


As your humble blogger has said many, many, many times, the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding forever ended depositors' concerns about the book capital level or liquidity of a bank.  


(Let me give you two leading indicators of this simple fact.  First, to date, no economist I have asked what is the capital or liquidity level of the bank they have their checking account at as of the end of last quarter has known the answer to the question. Second, every economist I have asked that has helped a child open a banking account has answer the child's question of how do they know they will get their money back from the bank by saying the government guarantees the child will get their money back.)


Deposit insurance shifts the concern to the issue of can the government make good on its deposit guarantee.  If you live in Japan, the UK or the US, by definition the answer is yes because the government can always 'sell' bonds to the banks who can use these bonds as 'collateral' at their central banks to access funds that can be given to the depositor.


In the EU, until the politicians threatened to kick countries out and force them onto a new currency, depositors continued to believe that their governments would make good on their deposit guarantees.  By introducing re-denomination risk, the EU politicians have lowered the value of the deposit guarantee (you still get your 'money', it is just paid back in a currency worth significantly less than the euro).


What everyone, except the economics profession, learned during the Savings and Loan Crisis in the late 1980s is that bankers will continue to lend even when there is little confidence in the solvency of their institution.  Based on the commercial real estate boom that resulted from this lending, the link between 'solvency' and lending has been shown not to exist in the real world.


Our current crisis shows that bankers will also continue to gamble in the securities casino even when there is little confidence in the solvency of their institution.  In short, since bankers are compensated for gambling and lending they will continue these activities regardless of the solvency of their institution unless the financial regulators intervene with policies like higher capital ratios.
• The balance sheets of Britain's major banks total some £6 trillion. The aggregate of British lending to small and medium sized enterprises is below £200bn. The committee is concerned about that portion of SME lending which seeks and merits credit. It is also concerned about the loss-absorbing buffers needed to support the other £5.8 trillion. 
Leading up the financial crisis, the structured finance market was a significant source of funds for the SMEs.  The structured finance market is a fraction of its former size. This is a direct result of current disclosure practices that do not provide investors with the timely performance information on the underlying collateral that they need to know what they own.

Investors prefer not to blindly bet and instead are investing in asset classes that provide transparency.

To attract investors back to structured finance and reinvigorate SME lending will require that each security provide observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, every activity, like a payment or default, that occurs with the underlying collateral is reported to all market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

With current information, investors can know what they own and prospective buyers can independently assess the value of the security.
• There is a difference between capital levels and capital ratios. Higher capital levels absorb loss, inspire confidence and support lending. By contrast capital ratios can be "improved" by reducing lending without increasing capital. 
There is a difference between bank capital that is used to protect the real economy from the excesses in the financial system and bank book capital levels that are meaningless.

Bank book capital levels that are used to protect the real economy vary over time.  In times when there are excesses in the financial system, bank book capital levels decline dramatically as the losses on the excesses are absorb today.  If the losses are large enough, bank book capital levels can become negative.

Bank book capital levels that are meaningless tend to increase during a financial crisis.  This increase is a sure sign that the losses on the excesses in the financial system are being shifted onto the real economy and that there is a financial regulator induced credit crunch.
• Capital is not something locked away in the vault. An incremental pound of capital can fund an incremental pound of loans. And given current bank leverage, each £1 of additional capital can support £20 of additional small business lending – provided, of course, that the liquidity funding is available. Alternatively, some portion of incremental equity could support new lending with the remainder used to build buffers and reduce leverage. 
Of course, once again this focus on capital is irrelevant as it implies a link between lending and capital that does not exist.

What is well known to everyone except perhaps the FPC is that banks make loans when the opportunity arises and then look for how to fund the loans.

While many people think that structured finance was the original originate to distribute banking model, it wasn't.

For decades before structured finance became significant in size, banks would sell participations in their loans or the whole loans themselves to other banks, insurance companies and pension funds.  This was a classic way for smaller banks to diversify their loan portfolio by geography and industry.  It also resulted in matching loans to deposit funding already in the system.
• Allowing capital ratios to fall might lead to new real economy lending – but it might not. It might merely fuel intra-financial risk-taking with little positive impact on small business requests. 
• And even if lower ratios did lead to new business lending, to which businesses would the loans go: to a manufacturer in Manchester or a shoe factory in Shenzen?....
Of all the financial regulators, the FPC should know that it is not the job of regulators to approve or disapprove of individual positions taken by banks.  Doing so explicitly substitutes the regulators for the market in the allocation of capital.
Recently the Chancellor announced that the committee would add an economic growth objective to that of stability. 
How disappointing as it would have been far better for the UK and global financial stability if the Chancellor had put the FPC out of existence so that it could do no further harm to the real economy.

Sunday, June 3, 2012

Paul Krugman: "I'm sick of being Cassandra. I'd like to win for once."

In an interesting Guardian column, Decca Aitkenhead interviews Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Krugman to discuss his new book, End this Depression Now!.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, Professor Krugman has been advocating that governments should be adopting aggressive economic stimulus policies.  The idea being that with a big increase in economic growth, the economy can afford to repay the current excess debt in the financial system.

Professor Krugman has made a number of very public statement that support his claim to being a Cassandra with regards to our ongoing financial crisis.  These include his statements that Obama's stimulus was not going to be successful because it was not big enough.

Unfortunately, these statements do not make him a Cassandra.  Like all but a small handful of his peers in the economic profession, Professor Krugman was absent when it came to predicting the financial crisis and offering a solution beforehand to mitigate the impact of the crisis.

Yes, his predictions about the policies failing were accurate.  However, the reasons that he gives as to why the policies failed are limited and do not really explain the totality of why the global economy has failed to revive.

There is an alternative explanation that also predicts these policies, both stimulus and austerity, would fail.  This explanation also suggests policies which if implemented, unlike Professor Krugman's, would end the financial crisis.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger used this alternative explanation to predict the financial crisis.  I also offered a solution, the Swedish model with ultra transparency, to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis.  Equally importantly, I have continued to make predictions about the success or rather the lack of success of the various policy responses, like stimulus, austerity and zero interest rate policies, and these predictions have also come to pass.

For example, I predicted that the economy would  remain in a downward spiral until such time as opacity was eliminated in all the corners of the financial markets (including structured finance securities and bank balance sheets).  Even with Obama's fiscal stimulus, this trend continues (Professor Krugman might choose to argue this, however, the fact that every time fiscal or monetary stimulus is stopped, the economy stalls and heads towards recession confirms the underlying trend).

Professor Krugman has been pounding the table to call attention to his solution.  However, by itself, his solution will not address what is undermining the real economy.  The real economy is in a downward spiral as a result of the excess debt in the financial system and all the related distortions in pricing caused by the regulatory and monetary policy responses to the financial crisis.

Until such time as it is easier for a creditworthy borrower to get a loan than a zombie borrower, no amount of fiscal stimulus is going to end the financial crisis.

The only thing that will end the financial crisis is forcing the banks to recognize the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details to confirm this.

Now I happen to believe that combining Professor Krugman's call for fiscal stimulus with the Swedish model and ultra transparency is a good idea.  That is why it is in the blueprint for saving the financial system.

What Professor Krugman has achieved with his table pounding is to make it harder to focus attention on the blueprint and end this financial crisis.
Deregulation of financial services was supposed to have made us all better off, so why did most of us have to live off credit to keep up? Now that it has all gone wrong, and everyone agrees we're in the worst crisis since the Great Depression, why aren't we following the lessons we learned in the 1930s?
Excellent question as the number one lesson from the 1930s was the introduction of transparency into the financial system.  Specifically, the FDR Administration rebuilt the financial system based on the philosophy of disclosure and ensuring that market participants had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they could make a fully informed investment decision.
President Obama is the only world leader who has attempted a Keynesian stimulus programme. Why has it been only minimally effective?
Doesn't address the losses hidden on and off the banks' balance sheets.
Why do most other western leaders still insist the only way out is to tighten our belts and pay off our debts, when that clearly isn't working either?
Because most western leaders have adopted the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and are trying to protect the bank's book capital levels.  If we stop paying our debts, the capital levels take a big hit.
And how come the bankers, credit agencies and bond traders are still treated with cowed reverence – don't frighten the markets! – when they got us into this mess?
When you spend as much money as they do on lobbyists, academics and jobs for former regulators and policymakers, you tend to get what you want.
An authority on John Maynard Keynes, Krugman wrote a book in 1999 called The Return of Depression Economics, largely about the Japanese slump, which drew ominous parallels between Japan's economic strategy and the pre-New Deal policies of the early 30s that turned a recession into catastrophic depression. At the time, unsurprisingly, most western economists weren't bowled over; in thrall to the seemingly endless boom, the Great Depression looked to them to be more or less irrelevant. Krugman's latest book will be much harder to ignore.
He is right that the Japanese model should never be adopted as the only beneficiaries are the bankers.
He doesn't expect it will be an easy message to sell, though. "As far as I can make out, the serious opposition to the coalition's policy is basically a half-dozen economists, and it looks as if I'm one of them – which is really weird," he laughs, "since I'm not even here." 
Visiting London last week, he met lots of what he calls Very Serious People: "And there are lots of things these people say that sound very wise and sensible. But it's all upside-down; it's all wrong. Yet the power of their orthodoxy – even when it's failing – is quite awesome." 
These Very Serious People present economics as a morality play, in which debt is a sin, and we have all sinned, so now we must all pay the price by tightening our belts together. They tell us the crisis will take a long time to resolve, and must inevitably be painful. 
All of this, according to Krugman, is the opposite of the truth. Austerity is a self-imposed collective punishment that is not just unnecessary, but won't work. We know what would work – but for complex political and historical reasons that his book explores, we have chosen to forget. "Ending this depression," he writes, "should be, could be, almost incredibly easy. So why aren't we doing it?"...
Because we have economists who didn't predict the crisis (see the Queen's Question) pro-offering their solution without understanding what is really driving the crisis.
Thus far, Krugman has essentially restated the case for Keynesianism. "And these are not hard concepts, actually. It's not hard to get it across to an audience. But it doesn't seem to play in the political sphere." What's fascinating is his historical analysis of why policy-makers, who once understood these principles, collectively decided to forget them. 
In the years following the Great Depression, governments imposed regulatory rules upon the banking system to ensure that we could never again become indebted enough to make us vulnerable to a crisis. "But if it's been a long time since the last major economic crisis, people get careless about debt; they forget the risks. Bankers go to politicians and say: 'We don't need these pesky regulations,' and the politicians say: 'You're right – nothing bad has happened for a while.'" 
That process began in earnest in 1980, under President Reagan. One by one the regulations on banking were lifted, until "we lost the safeguards, and it meant there was an increasingly wild and woolly financial system willing to lend lots of money". Politicians were in part persuaded to deregulate by the argument that it would make us all richer. And to this day, "there's this very widespread belief that there was, in fact, a great acceleration in growth. But this really isn't hard. You sit down for a minute with the national account statistics, and you see it ain't so." 
If we divide the period between the second world war and 2008 into two halves, "the first half is a really dramatic improvement to living standards, and the second half is not."... 
Why would economists claim ordinary people were getting much richer if they weren't? "The answer, I think, has to be that you need to ask: 'Well who are the people who say these things hanging out with? What is their social circle?' And if you're a finance professor at the University of Chicago, the people that you're likely to meet from the alleged real world are going to be people from Wall Street – for whom the past 30 years have, in fact, been wonderful. If you're a mover and shaker in the UK, you're probably hanging out with people from the City. I think that is the story of the disconnect."...
Or perhaps economists were being hired as consultants by Wall Street and as any good consultant knows, you give the client what they ask for.
There were early warning signs, such as the savings and loans crisis of the late 80s, that should have alerted politicians to the dangers of financial deregulation, moral hazard and subsequent spiralling debt. But by then Wall Street's influence over policy-makers had rendered them deaf to alarm bells – in part because bankers were financing so many politicians' campaigns. 
Krugman quotes Upton Sinclair's famous observation: "It's difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it" – but more than that, he suspects the sheer glamour of wealthy bankers had a powerful influence over politicians. 
"My impression is that old style captains of industry can be rather boring. I'm not sure how much thrill there is in hanging out with someone like that. But Wall Street people are in fact very smart; they're funny, they're not company men who work their way up the chain. They're impressive."
This is why it is virtually impossible to get policy-makers to consider the Swedish model with ultra transparency.
Since the crash Krugman has become the undisputed Cassandra of academia, but he jokes: "I'm kind of sick of being Cassandra. I'd like to actually win for once, instead of being vindicated by the disaster coming – as predicted. I'd like to see my arguments about preventing the disaster taken into account instead."
That makes two of us.  Any time you would like to actually end this financial crisis, I look forward to hearing from you Professor Krugman.

Friday, May 4, 2012

An insight into why economic models missed the financial crisis and don't explain the recovery

In his Washington Post blog, Ezra Klein examines the assumptions underlying macro-econometric models.  He discovers that the models essentially ignore the financial sector and as a result are incapable of distinguishing between the impact on the economy from the loss of wealth from the dot-com bubble bursting and a housing meltdown.

“The macroeconometric models used by the Fed -- like those used by the Congressional Budget Office, the White House and others -- had at best a very rudimentary financial sector built into them.” So “they treated the housing collapse as if it were merely dot-com bust 2.0.” And that’s still the case today, [Peter Orszag] says... 
”You’re probably wondering why economists would leave leverage out of our models,” adds Jared Bernstein. “Good question. It’s because we’ve historically viewed financial markets as basically an intermediate input in the economic process, distributing savings to their most productive sources. [Alan] Greenspan added the assumption the hyper-rationality would lead market participants to self-regulate.”...
Actually, I wonder why economists don't highlight that a major assumption in their models is the virtual exclusion of the financial sector.

If they did, it might raise some doubts as to whether to trust the results of these models after the financial sector crashes.
Bernstein also brings up another difference between a housing crisis and an stock-market bubble:

When a dot.com bubble bursts, it mops up more quickly because of the difference between “mark-to-market” in an equity bubble and “extend-and-pretend” in a debt-financed housing bubble. The fact that your pet rock shares go from valuations of $1,000 on Friday to $1 on Monday rips the bandaid off in a way you don’t get when banks can inflate for months on end their balance-sheet value of non-performing loans.
Please re-read the highlighted text on the difference between a bubble bursting in an area of the financial market where there is transparency (the stock market) and an area of the financial market where there is opacity (banks).