Showing posts with label Buyer's Strike. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Buyer's Strike. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 23, 2012

EU structured finance market worried as JP Morgan trading loss could effect biggest buyer

According to the International Financing Review, JP Morgan was the primary buyer of newly issued opaque European RMBS securities since 2009.

The question is will the structured finance market go back into a deep freeze if the losses in other parts of the chief investment office's portfolio cause JP Morgan to cut back on its purchases of these securities.
While many in the market were last week revelling in the discomfort caused to JP Morgan by the losses at its chief investment office, those working in European structured finance found it difficult to enjoy what has become known as “Dimonfreude”. 
Rather, they were wondering anxiously whether the losses might alter the unit’s buying strategy when it comes to European structured paper. 
The CIO is the biggest buyer of European structured product and any pull-back from the market, caused either by a new strategy or by a series of sales to offset the losses, might prove disastrous for European securitisation. 
Indeed, the CIO almost single-handedly resuscitated the European RMBS market in 2009, buying huge chunks of new issues and providing repo agreements on others. 
Any change to this strategy could undermine the sector’s ability to absorb large primary market deals. 
One trader said it could have a “pronounced effect” on the market, which “doesn’t have too many others to take up the slack”. 
As one fixed-income head said, when selling European structured finance, the JP Morgan CIO “is your first call, your second call, your third call and your fourth call.” “There are real questions about the strength of the market if they’re not there,” he added.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it confirms the continuation of the buyers' strike.

Regular readers know that the buyers are on strike until structured finance securities provide current disclosure on an observable event basis so they can know what they own.
The CIO became a cornerstone investor of the European structured finance market in 2009, starting with Permanent 2009-1 from Lloyds. A number of other large investments followed in the UK and Dutch markets, as well as a number of repo agreements to finance retained tranches such as those in Italy. 
A pull-back could have ramifications for certain issuers bringing new issues. One structured finance specialist, for example, cited the example of Dutch RMBS where the investor community had a clear preference for the shorter bonds last year. These originators “had trouble placing longer tranches. Without that [CIO involvement] they wouldn’t have got deals away,” he said. 
In its 10-Q quarterly SEC filing, JP Morgan said its US$74.902bn of fair value “available for sale” non-US RMBS “primarily represent mortgage exposures in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands”. 
Since JP Morgan is the largest buyer of these securities, I wonder who would pay JP Morgan $74.9 billion for the securities?

Monday, May 7, 2012

Refusing to end buyers' strike by giving up its informational advantage, the sell-side continues to block return of ABS

As predicted (see here and here) by your humble blogger, the refusal by the sell-side to give up its informational advantage is preventing the securitization industry from restarting.  Having lost trillions, the buy-side is on strike until it has access to the information on each structured finance security it needs to know what it owns.

A Financial News article looks at the current sell-side efforts to restart securitization in the EU while protecting their information monopoly.
Some might prefer to let ABS rest in peace, were it not for the fact that the market is considered crucial to the funding capabilities and survival of banks. It is even being hailed as the solution to the problem of reduced mortgage lending.... 
[The] European Central Bank announced its ABS loan-level initiative in December 2010 in a bid to kickstart the market. 
The aim is to improve transparency and investor confidence in the European ABS markets by compelling issuers to provide data on the underlying loans that are backing securities.  It is not compulsory. But any institution that wants to borrow from the ECB and post ABS as collateral will need to reveal the relevant data....
The key here is that the data is relevant for purposes of valuing the structured finance securities and knowing what you own.

Under the current data warehouse proposal, the data is not relevant.  It will be both out of date (it is being updated once per quarter) and incomplete (it includes data fields carefully selected by the sell-side and the industry trade group it controls).
Investors, by and large, are only confident buying the most senior tranche of a securitisation, leaving the bank with the junior tranche, against which they still have to hold capital....
A direct reflection of the opacity of the product and the inability to access all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate timely manner for use in valuing the lower tranches.
[The] market may be tentatively welcoming the idea of a data warehouse but there is still the thorny issue of who will pay for it. 
It is a well established principle that the issuer pays.  Payment for transparency should be built into each deal.

The fact that the current ECB endorsed data warehouse has adopted a business model that abandons this principale and makes the buy-side pay for data confirms the data warehouse is a sell-side initiative.

A source close to the project said that the data warehouse was keen to attract investment and was preparing to float but admitted it was not a “money-making machine” and was relying on banks to provide the investment. 

The source said: “The plan is to issue shares that will be bought by rating agencies, vendors and those that have a stake in the ABS market, namely banks. The incentive to create such a platform comes from banks because they have to sell securities and need to provide investors with transparency.” 
Why exactly would the buy-side end its strike when the proposed ABS data warehouse is designed to protect existing sell-side business models and would be controlled by investors with significant conflicts of interest with the buy-side?

For example, the reason for a rating agency to buy a stake is to protect its access to proprietary data (say data that is updated more frequently than quarterly).  After all, what value does a rating agency offer if investors and the rating agencies have access to the same data?

For example, why would anyone on the buy-side think that they had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner when the data warehouse is owned and controlled by the banks.  The same banks that exploited their informational advantages prior to the financial crisis.

In short, the current data warehouse proposal doesn't work even with the ECB's prominent endorsement.

On the other hand, I proposed a viable data warehouse alternative prior to the beginning of the financial crisis.

It features current and complete information on the underlying loans backing the securities.  It complies with borrower privacy laws.  It doesn't have any conflicts of interest with the buy-side.  It has a business model that works.

It is time for the ECB to stop endorsing a sell-side initiative that will not end the buyers' strike and endorse my solution so that ABS can be restarted and the buyers' strike ended.

Tuesday, March 13, 2012

Quality labels on asset-backed securities is like a skunk with a new name, it still stinks

A Reuters' article discusses how the Eurozone asset-backed security sell-side is trying to roll out a new, rebranded with quality labels asset-backed security.  This new security has all of the fatal flaws that sunk the pre-financial crisis asset-backed securities.

This is like calling a skunk a different name and hoping that it changes the smell of the odor a skunk puts out.
Asset-backed securities, blamed for triggering the financial market chaos that has toppled banks and sucked in countries, are undergoing a brand makeover but they may find it hard to shake off their old image. 
Financial lobby groups are working on a new 'quality label' for bonds secured against bundles of assets including credit card debt and car loans, with the aim of rekindling demand. 
In future, they hope top-notch ABS will be known as PCS, or Prime Collateralised Securities. 
The new brand is designed to polish the image of assets that could be used by the European Central Bank as security - a stamp of approval that would reassure investors who still associate them with the subprime U.S. mortgage loans that sent shockwaves through banks in Europe and beyond after the last five years.
The ECB is willing to use the old, asset backed securities as collateral. Hence, this is not much of a stamp of approval.

Furthermore, the ECB endorsed the creation of a data warehouse so that loan-level data could be made available for each deal.  The ECB did this to revive investor interest in asset-backed securities so that private investors would buy these securities and become the source of funding rather than the ECB.

Unfortunately, in endorsing the data warehouse, the ECB also endorsed the same disclosure practices that made subprime mortgage backed securities toxic in the first place.  These disclosure practices are designed so that investors do not know what they own.

The lesson from the financial crisis is that buying securities where you do not know what you own will result in the loss of most of your investment.
Its architects are optimistic the brand will be seen as low-risk, and have identified almost 1 trillion euros of securitised loans that might qualify for the PCS label. 
That includes more than 750 billion euros of debt backed by mortgages, while some 100 billion euros of small business loan securitisations and a similar volume of securities backed by consumer debt and credit card loans could also qualify. 
"There is a strong commitment to make this happen, including public comments of support from the ECB, European Commission ... and other authorities," said Sebastian Fairhurst, Secretary-General of the European Financial Services Round Table, one of two lobby groups organising the programme. 
"The initiative is expected to bring added quality, transparency and standardisation to the market, with a goal of improving overall liquidity."
Your humble blogger can assure the buy-side that the sell-side has no interest in providing transparency that is useful for independently valuing these securities.
The project inspires both enthusiasm and nervousness among observers. One banker, speaking anonymously, expressed concerns that it could be abused by banks to disguise toxic assets.
No kidding!
With interbank lending still fragile in Europe despite the ECB's recent 1 trillion euro liquidity injection, rejuvenating demand for securitised debt would throw a lifeline to banks. 
The blessing of the ECB, which has already lowered standards for the collateral it accepts in return for providing lenders with funds, is important for the new brand, and its officials are following developments.... 
The central bank considers factors including credit ratings when deciding whether ABS can be used as collateral. It currently accepts those backed by home loans and small-company credit, having lowered the minimum acceptable rating for such securities to single-A from triple-A in December.... 
The PCS project is being organised by a Brussels-based lobby group chaired by Swiss Re chairman Walter Kielholz, the European Financial Services Round Table, and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, representing investment banks including Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs.
The PCS project is being organized by the sell-side.
Banks are also hoping to persuade European regulators to include high-quality securitised debt among the assets they can use in their liquidity buffers. European Union countries are negotiating a framework for bank capital to be finalised in coming months.... 
"There has been a lot of lobbying saying that ABS, particularly European ABS, is not that bad and those lobbyists are finding some favour now among regulators and the ECB," said Dipesh Mehta, an analyst with Barclays Capital. 
"The ECB is showing willingness to accept more ABS as collateral. The PCS initiative might satisfy regulators more and may make it easier to repo (repurchase agreement) bonds at the ECB."...
Of course the regulators controlled by the sell-side will bless PCS.

The problem the sell-side, the ECB and the regulators have is the buy-side is on strike.  It is not returning for a skunk relabeled a black cat.

The buy-side has been explicit that it is not returning until it knows exactly what it is buying and it has disclosure practices that 24/7/365 support their knowing what they own.

Adopting the same disclosure practices as opaque, toxic mortgage backed securities will not end the strike.

Update
Since before the financial crisis, your humble blogger has written a series of white papers on what structured finance 2.0 needs to look like.

To date, the sell-side and the Opacity Protection Team have lobbied successfully against my proposed reforms.

However, for the efforts, they have been rewarded with a number of regulations that make structured finance less attractive.  These include the issuer having skin in the game, the exclusion of structured finance securities from bank liquidity measures and the higher capital requirements.

Now, we have reached a point in time where having a functioning structured finance market would be very useful in the US and Europe.  The key to doing so is for the regulators and the ECB to adopt my ultra transparency based solution.

Many of the regulatory restrictions are no longer required when there is ultra transparency.

For example, with access to current collateral level performance data, market participants will always be able to value these securities (as oppose to the opaque, toxic securities which are impossible to value).  The ability to value is directly related to increased liquidity in the market and hence allowing structured finance 2.0 securities to qualify as a liquid asset for banks.

Thursday, February 16, 2012

Gambling on toxic subprime securities temporarily increases

In what has become an annual rite in the toxic subprime securities market, in the hopes of creating interest from buyers Wall Street is attempting to mark up the price of these securities.

Both the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg published lengthy articles (see here and here) on how hedge fund investors, including some who made a lot of money shorting these securities prior to the credit crisis, are thinking of investing.

Regular readers know that investing in these bonds poses a number of challenges.

The biggest challenge is that these bonds do not provide adequate disclosure so that an investor can actually know how the underlying collateral is currently performing and use this in an independent valuation of the bonds.  As a result, investors are basically blindly betting.

This challenge is magnified because the Wall Street firms that are selling the bonds have better access to current performance information through their investments in mortgage servicers and can use this information to value the securities.  As a general rule of thumb, if Wall Street has an informational advantage (say tomorrow's news today), Wall Street makes money on it.

Further compounding the challenge as the Wall Street Journal said is

Market prices for individual subprime bonds are difficult to track, because there are thousands of securities with varying characteristics, and most don't trade often. 
That is because there is a buyers' strike and the market is illiquid.

The buyers are on strike because they do not have the current information on the performance of the underlying collateral they need to independently assess the risk and value the securities and eliminate Wall Street's informational advantage.

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

Europe wishes now more than ever that it could restart structured finance

Europe wishes now more than ever that it could restart structured finance.  Unfortunately, that is not going to happen until structured finance securities provide on-going disclosure of the current performance of the underlying assets.  So long as this disclosure is not available, there will be a buyers' strike.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis on August 9, 2007 when BNP Paribas said it could not value sub-prime mortgage backed securities, the City and its lobbyists have run circles around the financial regulators on everything related to structured finance.

For example, the European Parliament adopted Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive, otherwise known as the 'know what you own' requirement.  The Committee of European Bank Supervisors, now called the European Banking Authority, was given responsibility for translating this requirement into a regulation.

By the time the City and its lobbyists were done with the individuals at CEBS who were writing this regulation, these individuals had agreed that the disclosure provided by sub-prime mortgage backed securities was adequate to know what you own.

What is adequate for regulators to know what they own is not adequate for private investors to be able to value the securities.

Naturally, having been burned by the securities they bought prior to the start of the solvency crisis, the private investors are staying on strike.

Replacing the private investors are the European Central Bank and the Bank of England.  Both of these central banks allow structured finance securities to be pledged as collateral.  Collateral that apparently violates Bagehot's rule that central banks should only lend against good collateral.

Since the start of the crisis, your humble blogger has been offerring to help ECB, BoE and other European policymakers get the structured finance market restarted with on-going disclosure of the current performance of the underlying assets.

A Reuter's article provides more on the European actions to restart structured finance.

After nearly four years in the doghouse, regulatory bias against securitisation could finally be easing, if recent progress in market-led initiatives and policy statements continues. 
The ECB has relaxed ABS repo rules, progress is being made with the Prime Collateralised Securities (PCS) initiative and in the UK the FSA has more closely aligned covered bond reporting and disclosure rules with RMBS. 
By lowering the requirement on the second-best rating to Single A from Triple A, the ECB is making it easier for Portuguese banks to repo bonds, confirms Italian issuers' eligibility (a downgrade to A minus of the sovereign, for instance, will cost all Italian ABS their Triple A rating due to the rating caps) and also assist Irish originators. 
Nevertheless, the ECB's shift is unlikely to stimulate public market activity, because the countries that stand to gain the most (the peripherals) are the least likely to be able to bring publicly-marketed deals. 
But the decision should help ease the stress on liquidity-starved banks - many of which have faced progressively higher haircuts on ABS repo and more stringent rating rules. Furthermore, banks can now also pledge raw mortgage or SME loan portfolios. 
And the UK's FSA has introduced new rules that will equalize the pressures on covered bonds and RMBS, such as through loan-level requirements. 
JP Morgan analysts said the changes are "in line with those already adopted by the BoE relating to ABS, and leverage the work of the ECB ABS loan level data technical working groups." 
They hope that these initiatives are indeed "the start of the process of leveling the regulatory playing field for Europe's secured debt market."

The Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) and the European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR) have been pushing the PCS. This market-led initiative aims to produce a high quality label for European securitisation, with the hope that regulators will agree, and ease what ABS practitioners view as unfavourable treatment of the product. 
Covered bonds, for instance, are eligible for liquidity buffers under the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) but securitisation is not. This dissuades some investors from buying the assets, while Solvency II rules also make it expensive for insurance companies to buy ABS because of the capital they have to hold against it....
But there are doubters. At Global ABS conference in June various market contacts questioned whether this project could succeed due to variations in underlying markets across Europe, for example between high LTVs. But AFME and EFR are confident PCS will work. 
"One thing unique about Europe is that assets are different across countries, but we still feel that a consistent labelling process is do-able. Investors who have invested in this product in the past do understand that even though the underlying products are different the securities that come out the other end have a lot of similarities to them," said Watson. 
To do this, it has to be tagged clearly. The pool will be verified by the PCS Secretariat, which checks for basic agreed eligibility criteria. 
"Those would be consistent across European countries, for example certain types of underwriting criteria and documentation requirements. They wouldn't have to be the same, we're not saying the underwriting is exactly the same across different countries, but there would be agreed underwriting criteria which are achievable," explained Watson. 
But simply giving deals a new moniker will not solve all problems. 
"Generally investors as well as issuers concluded that a label by itself doesn't achieve all that much because the investors can always create their own internal labels if they want to, however they do recognise that if the label is combined with some type of regulatory changes over time, it could be a potentially significant benefit to the entire market," said Watson...
Pricing differentiation is one side-effect of PCS/non-PCS structures that could be felt sooner than regulatory changes with "high quality" eligible deals printing tighter than non-qualifying issues. And market players do appear to be willing to take the risk. 
"The decision to do something with the label does involve a risk that it does split into a PCS and non-PCS market but investors do recognise there will non-label deals that are also still good securitisations but may not have the label for various reasons," added Watson. 
The PCS strategy is also an attempt to focus the minds of policy-makers, as well as boards of investors who have not seen the same level of support for securitisation as other assets. 
If ratified by the regulators, the PCS' allure could spread beyond typical investor types such as banks and funds, with Bank of America Merrill Lynch analysts suggesting in their 2012 outlook that retail clients could also feature. 
"The aim is to create a pan-European market. It will help investors in the future to make decisions, to look at investor reporting and documentation in a more consistent way - that is one of the potential benefits of PCS," summarised Sebastian Fairhurst, secretary general of the EFR.

Monday, October 3, 2011

UK Chancellor looking to by-pass the banks to get credit to small businesses

According to a Telegraph article, George Osborne, the UK's Chancellor, has directed the UK's Treasury to look into how the government could directly lend money to small businesses and then package these loans so they could be sold in the capital markets.

The UK government would not need to do this if the securitization markets were functioning.  If they were, there would be private firms that would make the loans and sell them into the capital markets.

Regular readers know that the securitization market is not functioning because the buyers are on strike.  They went on strike at the beginning of the credit crisis and are not coming back until they have access to current performance information on the underlying assets.

The UK government could restart loans flowing to small business simply by requiring current performance disclosure on the underlying assets.

Of course, the UK government could also elect to retain the credit risk of the loans as an enticement to attract buyers.  But by doing so, it is no longer really "selling" the loans.  Instead, it is setting up the equivalent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US - an agency where private investors do well and taxpayers are stuck with the losses.
George Osborne used his speech at the Conservative Party Conference to announce plans for "credit easing" - which is a form of quantitative easing for businesses. 
The Chancellor said: "I have set the Treasury to work on ways to inject money directly into parts of the economy that need it such as small business. It is known as credit easing. It is another form of monetary activism," he said. "It is similar to the national loan guarantee scheme we talked about in opposition." ...
However the Government could deploy public to buy corporate bonds either directly through the Treasury or via the Bank of England's asset purchase facility. This facility was set up in 2009 during the apex of the financial crisis but has hardly been used since. 
The Treasury wants to create packages of small business loans that could then be traded. 
In this way the Government support would not add to the national debt for accounting purposes because they would be a tradable asset. 
The plans also include setting up a Small Business Bank that could handle the new policy. At the Liberal Democrat Conference two weeks ago, Vince Cable used his speech to back plans for a new state-backed bank as a way of tackling the failure of banks to lend to small firms.... 
The chancellor also repeated that he would give the Bank of England the green light to engage in further quantitative easing if it decided to go for more asset purchases. 
John walker, National Chairman, Federation of Small Businesses, said: We also welcome steps to help inject money into small firms, but need to see more detail so look forward to working with the Government on this."

Thursday, August 18, 2011

Yields on 10 year US Treasury bonds trade fall below 2% further confirming solvency crisis

As investors flee European banks and soon, through the obvious channel of contagion, UK and US banks, yields on 10 year US Treasury bonds fell to an all time record low today.

For four years, we have had a solvency crisis and not a liquidity crisis.

Unfortunately, for four years, policy makers have chosen to act as if we have a liquidity crisis.

For four years, central banks have pumped massive amounts of liquidity into the global financial system. For four years, fiscal authorities have run stimulus programs.  For those four expensively purchased years, bank regulators engaged in extend and pretend rather than adopt current asset and liability-level disclosure and end the risk of the solvency crisis re-emerging.

Now, the solvency crisis has re-emerged.


Investors are once again asking the question of banks who is solvent and who is insolvent.  With the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus, investors are once again asking the question of where is economic growth going to come from.

As stated in an earlier post, when investors start asking these questions, they become like Mark Twain - more concerned with the return OF their capital than the return ON their capital.


For confirmation of this, a Bloomberg article on the on-going stock market meltdown and US treasury market melt-up.
U.S. stocks tumbled amid growing concern the economy is slowing and speculation that European banks lack enough capital, while hopes for more stimulus from the Federal Reserve receded. 
Bank of America Corp. (BAC) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) dropped more than 4.6 percent as Sweden’s financial regulator said his country’s lenders must do more to prepare for a worsening in Europe’s debt crisis that could cut off funding.  
The bank solvency crisis morphing back into frozen funding markets.
Caterpillar Inc. (CAT) sank 5.6 percent, pacing losses in companies most-tied to economic growth, as jobless claims rose, consumer inflation accelerated more than forecast and the Philadelphia-area manufacturing index fell to the lowest level since March 2009. 
The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index slumped 4.1 percent to 1,145.07 at 10:29 a.m. in New York. All 10 groups in the S&P 500 dropped at least 1.8 percent. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 438.62 points, or 3.8 percent, to 10,971.59. Treasuries rallied, pushing 10-year yields to a record low. 
“It’s almost like a worldwide buyers strike,” Michael Mullaney, who helps manage $9.5 billion at Fiduciary Trust in Boston, said in a telephone interview. “There’s a continued general malaise on global economic activity. People continue to downgrade their expectations on growth on a worldwide basis. There’s concern about funding problems. That’s making us very nervous here and as such we want to take risk out of portfolios at least for the immediate future."

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

Fed seeks to end buyers' strike

With its announcement that it was going to pursue zero interest rate policies for a minimum of two more years, the Fed upped the stakes in its effort to end the buyers' strike.  The buyers' strike applies to all forms of investment.  This includes everything from risky assets like stocks and long term bonds to business expansion.

The question is will the knowledge that interest rates will be artificially held at zero forever change buyers' behavior?

If the experience of Japan for the last two decades is any indication, the answer is a resounding NO!

Why should the Fed or any other central bank pursuing similar policies expect zero interest rates to end the buyers' strike?

Investors are acting according to Mark Twains' observation that he was more interested in the return of his capital than the return on his capital.  Given what has happened since the start of the Great Contraction this makes sense.

What has happened since the start of the Great Contraction?

Investors learned two lessons from blindly chasing yield.

First, they learned the difference between investing and blindly betting.  Investing requires access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner and evaluating this information so that the risk and return can be assessed.  Blindly betting is buying opaque financial innovations like CDOs cubed.

Second, they learned that return of their principal is more important than capturing a 1 - 3% higher return on their principal.  When the focus is on return, significant losses of capital result.

What has not happened since the start of the Great Contraction?

Policymakers and economists have not followed the advice that they freely gave to Japan when its bubble burst.  Their advice was that the most important thing Japanese policymakers could do to restart their markets and economy was to publicly recognize the size of the losses related to the bubble and who was holding them.

Why did they give this advice?

They knew that until the losses are recognized buyers will stay on strike.   Buyers know that the losses exist, but without the disclosure of how big the losses are and who holds them, they do not know how the losses will impact them.  So, rather than take a risk - which is what investing is - buyers go on strike and "invest" where they can get their principal back.

By not recognizing the losses, policymakers are perpetuating uncertainty in the economy that undermines buyers' willingness to invest.  In essence, until the losses are recognized, the losses are the elephant in the room that crowds out everything else.

I am not going to speculate about why western policymakers and economists did not act on their own advice since the start of the Great Contraction.  I will just note that they have not acted and the resulting economic malaise and related buyers' strike has been extremely predictable.

Friday, July 1, 2011

Faced with lack of disclosure, investors migrate to government guaranteed debt

To nobody's surprise, government guaranteed debt is emerging as the biggest source of debt in the capital markets.  This is completely expected when regulators fail to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner on non-government guaranteed debt.

It is one thing for market participants to buy a non-government guaranteed debt security when they know what is in it, but quite another to buy a non-government guaranteed debt security when they do not know what may or may not be in it.

This blog has held up structured finance securities and financial institutions as examples of where inadequate disclosure leaves investors guessing at what may or may not be standing behind the debt repayment.

When market participants cannot analyze the risk, they do not know if they are being compensated for it.  As a result, market participants have an incentive to purchase securities where they can analyze the risk and see if they are being compensated for it.  Today, those securities tend to be government guaranteed.

According to a column in the Financial Times,
By the time you read this column today, a fascinating shift will almost certainly have occurred in the nature of US finance: for the first time the government will be the biggest source of outstanding home mortgage and consumer credit loans in the US, eclipsing private sector banks or investors. 
Or that, at least, is the forecast recently made by Investor Business Daily, a US publication. 
... What should investors make of this? There are at least three lessons to ponder. 
First, the data provide a powerful sign of just how distorted the US financial system remains in the aftermath of the great credit crunch. This might not seem obvious to investors or voters; after all, in recent months the large banks have repaid their troubled asset relief programme funds, stock markets have rallied and credit spreads have shrunk. 
But behind this veneer of normality, banks are still deleveraging, and the private sector mortgage securitisation world remains almost dead. Indeed, were it not for the activity of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant state institutions, mortgage finance would, in effect, have seized up in the past three years. 
Actually, what the data shows is that there is a buyer's strike going on until market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information on private sector mortgage securitizations in an appropriate, timely manner.

As predicted under the FDR Framework, zero interest rate policies were not going to lead to blindly chasing after yield in the structured finance market.  Market participants learned their lesson with the credit crisis that these securities do not have adequate disclosure. Notice how the lack of buyers in this $2 trillion market expressed itself with prices for non-government guaranteed mortgage-backed securities slumping almost 20% when the Fed tried to sell its $30 billion AIG portfolio.
The second fascinating point, though, is the cognitive dissonance surrounding this pattern. Six years ago, when I first started writing about the credit markets, I often heard US financiers praise America’s capital markets as the most developed system of free market finance in the world. Indeed, techniques such as securitisation were presented as a natural outcome of American enthusiasm for free market ideals. 
One of the major themes of this blog has been that "free markets" have a role for both government and market participants.

The US version of free markets under the FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the practice of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

  • government is responsible for ensuring that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
  • market participants are responsible for the outcome of any investment decision and as a result they have an incentive to adjust both the price and amount of their exposure based on the results of their analysis of this information.
The US version of free markets ceases to function when the government does not ensure access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner, but instead claims that it is the investors' responsibility to require disclosure. [See Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's speeches and the Presidential Working Group on structured finance.]

Investors have limited ability to require disclosure.  Instead, they go on a buyer's strike covering the types of securities with inadequate disclosure.  While waiting for the government and issuers to provide adequate disclosure, investors turn to alternative investments that do provide adequate disclosure.  It is only when the issuers provide all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner that the buyer's strike will end.
But the dirty secret behind this rhetoric was that government-backed institutions such as Fannie and Freddie were playing an important role in the modern financial system, even before the credit crisis erupted. And what is remarkable now, given that the role of Fannie and Freddie has swelled, is just how little debate this patter continues to generate. 
After all, with the US remaining wedded to free market ideals, it is uncomfortable to admit that “capital markets in the US have become reliant on government guarantees”, says Viral Acharya, an economist and co-author of a thought-provoking book.* 
Capital markets in the US are not "reliant" on government guarantees.  They use these guarantees as a substitute for access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

If the US wanted to reduce the total amount of government guaranteed debt, it could simply provide access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner instead. This would allow the guaranteed debt to runoff and be replaced by non-guaranteed debt.