Showing posts with label Too big to fail. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Too big to fail. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Paul Volcker explains how to fix big banks and financial system

In David Brodwin's must read US News column, he looks at Paul Volcker's explanation of how to fix big banks and the financial system.

Mr. Volcker observed:

The erosion of confidence and trust in the financial world, in the financial authorities that oversee it, and in government generally is palpable. That can't be healthy for markets or for the regulatory community....
Regular readers know that transparency is the foundation for confidence and trust in the financial world.

The global financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).  Confidence and trust is one the end results of implementing this framework.

This end result occurs because market participants have confidence and trust in their decisions when they have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to independently assess the risk of and value an investment so they can make a fully informed decision.

Confidence and trust are shattered when there is opacity in large corners of the financial system and financial authorities insist on substituting their judgement for each market participant's independent analysis.
Volcker sees two main threats to our banking system: first, our ongoing failure to regulate it adequately in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, and second, the development of unrealistic and dangerous expectations for the role of the Fed. 
Volcker begins by affirming that modern financial markets have lost the ability to self-regulate, and that "market discipline alone" fails to "restrain episodes of unsustainable exuberance before the point of crisis." 
Your humble blogger disagrees with Mr. Volcker that modern financial markets have lost the ability to either self-regulate or exert market discipline.

For either of these to occur, there must be transparency because without transparency it is impossible to assess risk.

How can markets exert discipline and restrain bank risk taking when they do not have access to a bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details?

How can markets exert discipline and restrain bank risk taking when the regulators, who have an information monopoly on the current exposure details, say banks are low risk?

No one should expect markets to exert discipline and restrain bank risk taking when bank disclosure regulations allowed them to be "black boxes" and regulators out of concern for the safety and soundness of the financial system misrepresent the riskiness of the banks.

It is not surprising that confidence and trust in the financial system and financial authorities are eroding.  Market participants have reason to believe they are being lied to.

If the banks are in the great financial condition that the financial authorities claim, then the authorities should insist that the banks provide transparency so market participants can independently confirm this fact.

By not requiring the banks to provide transparency 6 years after the financial crisis began, the financial authorities are effectively waving a large red warning flag.
Yet, the so called Dodd-Frank Act does not solve the problem, he says. It provides both too much regulation and too little.... 
Despite the extensive regulation in Dodd-Frank, the bill is badly compromised by loopholes that prevent it from being fully and effectively implemented. Volcker writes: 
"The present overlaps and loopholes in Dodd-Frank and other regulations provide a wonderful obstacle course that plays into the hands of lobbyists resisting change. The end result is to undercut the market need for clarity and the broader interest of citizens and taxpayers."...
The Dodd-Frank Act uses complex regulations and regulatory oversight as a substitute for transparency and market discipline.

Unfortunately, we are in our current financial crisis because complex regulations and regulatory oversight does not prevent a financial crisis like transparency and market discipline does.

Your humble blogger likes to cite in support of this statement the simple fact that the financial crisis occurred in all the opaque corners of the financial system (think banks and structured finance securities).  In these opaque corners the financial system froze (think unsecured interbank lending).

By contrast, the transparent parts of the financial system continued to operate (think stock and corporate markets excluding banks).  For every seller, there was a willing buyer.  The price might not have been what the seller really wanted, but there was a private buyer.

Your humble blogger has frequently said that most of the Dodd-Frank Act should be repealed (with the exception of the Volcker Rule and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).  It should be replaced with a requirement that the SEC implement the Securities Acts of the 1930s and require banks to disclose their current exposure details.

As JP Morgan showed with the London Whale trade, when a bank's exposure details are known, it quickly exits any risky position.

It is remarkable what transparency and the resulting clarity it brings can do.
We can't simply return to the rules of the past, says Volcker. 
The world has changed too much. Financial markets and institutions are larger, more complex, more interconnected and "more fragile." Hedge funds and other non-banks play a much larger role in the system and regulated commercial banks play a proportionally smaller role. 
The old regulatory structures will not give us the stability we need in the system and its major institutional components.
Actually, we can return to the rules of the past when the rules concern ensuring transparency in the financial markets.

Please recall that under the FDR Framework's principle of caveat emptor market participants are responsible for all losses on their exposures.  It is this responsibility that ends financial contagion and fears of interconnectedness.

Quite simply, since they are responsible for losses on their exposures, market participants have an incentive to limit their exposures to what they can afford to lose.  This goes for investors and for banks too.

When all market participants are responsible for their losses, there is financial stability.  A bank can fail without any worries about financial contagion because market participants have limited their exposure to what they can afford to lose.

However, this doesn't work when banks are opaque black boxes that financial authorities say have a low risk profile.  In this case, market participants over invest as they did in the run-up to our current financial crisis.

Fixing the big banks and the financial system is simple: bring back transparency.

Saturday, July 20, 2013

The Volcker Legacy: Too Big to Fail

Most people associate Paul Volcker with his role as the chairman of the Federal Reserve when inflation was defeated in the early 1980s.  For that, he deserves all the kudos he receives.

Few people associate Paul Volcker with his role as the chairman of the Federal Reserve and through his leadership of bank supervision and regulation creating the concept of Too Big to Fail banks.

However, it is the creation of Too Big to Fail banks that our current financial crisis has shown is his most important, lasting legacy.

In a very interesting American Banker article, Francine McKenna discusses how Continental Illinois was the first Too Big to Fail bank.  The collapse of Continental Illinois was the result of opacity that hid from the market what a combination of irresponsible lending, self-interest, hot money and lack of restraint by the Fed was allowing to be done to a bank that faced no market discipline.

In a related article, Ms. McKenna lays out the lack of regulatory restraint on banks and the adoption of the Too Big to Fail policy.

“The Congressional testimony of the OCC’s Conover in September 1984 also mentioned that the OCC had considered earlier whether it should have taken action much sooner to stop Continental from growing so quickly and, in hindsight, so recklessly.  
Conover testified that he believed such action would have been inappropriate but that the OCC could have placed “more emphasis on . . . evaluation and criticism of Continental’s overall management processes.” 
Federal Reserve Board Governor Charles Partee is quoted in William Grieder’s 1987 book “Secrets of The Temple” saying: “To impose prudential restraints is meddlesome and it restricts profits. If the banking system is expanding rapidly, if they can show they’re making good money by the new business, for us to try to be too tough with them, to hold them back, is just not going to be acceptable.” 
If that’s not enough foreshadowing of the policy prescription the Federal Reserve would deliver during the 2008 financial crisis, here’s Conover again during his testimony explaining to Congress why everyone but shareholders was made whole in the Continental Bank bailout: 
“…had Continental failed and been treated in a way in which depositors and creditors were not made whole, we could very well have seen a national, if not an international, financial crisis, the dimensions of which were difficult to imagine. None of us wanted to find out…” 
The day after Conover’s testimony, the Wall Street Journal published an article by Tim Carrington, “U.S. Won’t Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation Fail—Testimony by Comptroller at House Hearing Is First Policy Acknowledgement”.
By the mid-1980s, Too Big to Fail had become the policy of the Federal Reserve and other bank regulators.


Regular readers know that I have written extensively about the Loans to Less Developed Countries crisis as it was the next step on the evolution of the concept of Too Big to Fail banks.  This crisis was very important for two reasons:

  1. It cemented into the regulatory culture the notion that if the regulators and the Too Big to Fail banks "hid" the true extent of the losses at these banks, the market would go on as if the losses did not exist.
  2. It drove monetary policy as the Fed, after informing the banks, chose to cut interest rates in an effort to generate earnings that could be used to recapitalize these institutions.
A little background is necessary to understand these conclusions.

Walter Wriston, a former chairman and CEO of Citicorp, said that "people go bankrupt, but countries don't".  Based on this observation, the large US banks plunged into lending to Less Developed Countries.

Of course, Mr. Wriston was wrong.  Countries do go bankrupt and this point had become obvious by the mid-1980s.  

Unfortunately, by the time this point was obvious, the exposure of the large US banks to the Less Developed Countries was multiples of their book capital levels.  A fact that was well known to market participants as banks disclosed the level of their exposures to the Less Developed Countries.

In fact, the general magnitude of the losses on these loans was also known to the market as predecessors to Bloomberg reported the prices at which the Loans to Less Developed Countries traded. When a Less Developed Country's loans trade at fifty cents on the dollar, it was a pretty safe bet that the value of the loans held by the banks reflected this pricing.

So the question that the Fed as the lead regulator for the Too Big to Fail banks faced was do we require the banks to write down their loans to Less Developed Countries upfront to reflect current market valuations or do we engage in regulatory forbearance and let the banks engage in extend and pretend and bring the losses slowly through their income statement as they generate earnings?

The Fed chose regulatory forbearance and the idea of "hiding" the actual magnitude of the losses from the market.

Please note, the market had a very good idea of the size of the losses, it just did not know the exact amount of the losses.


When John Reed at Citicorp eventually recognized the losses on the Less Developed Country loans, the market responded by bidding up Citicorp's price.  The write-off confirmed the market's conclusion about the size of the losses.

The Fed mistakenly believed that the fact the market had not collapsed when it became obvious the banks were insolvent and the subsequent positive reaction by the market was an endorsement of its policy choice.

The market didn't collapse because there was sufficient transparency into each of the Too Big to Fail banks to determine a) the general magnitude of loss and b) whether the bank's net interest income was greater than its ongoing operating expense after adjusting for the income actually generated by the loans to Less Developed Countries.

The Fed's policy response set another precedent.

Tuesday, July 9, 2013

Simon Johnson discovers that he and everyone else is "fumbling through the fog surrounding Too Big to Fail"

In a very telling Bloomberg column titled Fumbling through the fog surrounding Too Big to Fail, MIT Professor Simon Johnson admits that there is imperfect information about TBTF banks.

This imperfect information leads to very predictable outcomes.
As Tom Hoenig, the current FDIC vice chairman, put it at the hearing: “Short-term depositors and creditors continue to look to governments to assure repayment rather than to the strength of the firms’ balance sheets and capital.”
Regular readers know that the reason no-one looks at the strength of the TBTF banks' balance sheets and capital is that these banks are "black boxes".

The information disclosed by the TBTF banks is inadequate for even these banks to determine which of the other TBTF banks is solvent and which is insolvent (the finding of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission).

As your humble blogger has been saying since the very beginning of the financial crisis, the only way any bank can be assessed by the market is if it discloses its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Without this information, there is no way to assess the risk of a bank.

By the way, it is not just your humble blogger who believes this, but also bank regulators.  It is the reason that bank regulators have access to what is happening at every bank 24/7/365.

If there is no way for the market to assess the risk of a bank, then it is only natural that short-term depositors and creditors should rely on governments, who have access to the necessary information, to assure repayment.

Let me repeat this very important point: so long as financial regulators have a monopoly on the information needed to assess each bank's risk, market participants are dependent on them and will rely on the government to guarantee the market participant will be repaid.

The starting point for ending market participants' reliance on the government guarantee is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current exposures.

Requiring this disclosure can be done under the 1930s Securities Acts.

Until banks are required to provide ultra transparency, all the talk about ending the threat to the financial system from the Too Big to Fail is just that: talk.

Thursday, May 2, 2013

Too Big to Fail needs to be sorted out

The Dodd-Frank Act was suppose to eliminate the problem of Too Big to Fail.  It was suppose to achieve this wonderful result through the combination of complex regulations, regulatory oversight and Congress promising not to authorize a bailout should there ever be another systemic financial crisis.

Clearly, market participants, like investors, realize that this combination is not up to the task of eliminating the TBTF problem.

Now, Brown-Vitter is suppose to eliminate the problem of Too Big to Fail.  It is suppose to do this by making banks over $500 billion hold equity capital equal to 15% of their total on balance sheet assets plus off balance sheet exposures.

There are two ways that B-V is suppose to convince market participants, like investors, that the problem of TBTF has been eliminated.

First, the high equity level is suppose to act as an incentive so that the TBTF banks split themselves into smaller banks (21 if all the TBTF divide themselves up) that presumably can fail and be resolved by the FDIC.

Second, if a TBTF doesn't break itself up, the higher equity level presumably can absorb the losses when the FDIC steps in to resolve it.

While your humble blogger believes that B-V is a step in the right direction, it is not clear that it eliminates the problem of TBTF as it does not address the issue of interconnectedness in the financial system.

Is Congress really not going to step in with a bailout if 3 of the smaller banks fail and threaten to trigger a systemic financial collapse?

Regular readers know there is a far simpler and more direct approach to ending the TBTF problem.  Simply require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

History shows that when banks provide this level of transparency, they tend to maintain the B-V 15% equity ratio.

History also shows that when investors have the information they need to independently assess the risk of an investment, they tend to limit their exposures to what they can afford to lose.  Banks are no different and this would end the issue of interconnectedness.

Finally, history shows that when banks have to disclose their exposure details, they stop taking proprietary bets (see Jamie Dimon's efforts to withhold information on London Whale trade for fear market trade against JPM).

Friday, April 26, 2013

Brown-Vitter highlights failure of Dodd-Frank Act

Whether you approve or disapprove of the proposal by Senators Brown and Vitter to require big banks to hold more capital, this proposal offers confirmation that the Dodd-Frank Act has failed.

Dodd-Frank has failed because it is not seen outside of Washington DC and the financial regulatory community as actually making the US financial system safer.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying since Day 1 that there are only two elements of Dodd-Frank worth saving, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.  The rest should be repealed.

Dodd-Frank is based on the fundamentally flawed premise of "we should give the financial regulators who failed to prevent the current financial crisis another chance to prevent a future financial crisis".

Why?  Especially since the financial regulators have already shown themselves by not preventing the current crisis to be up to the task.

The upside of giving the financial regulators another chance is that they succeed in preventing the next financial crisis.

The downside of giving the financial regulators another chance is that they fail.

If they fail, who pays for their failure?

Are the Senators and Congressmen who drafted and voted for Dodd-Frank first in line with all of their net worth to pay?  Is the President who signed Dodd-Frank into law first in line with all of his net worth to pay?  Are the financial regulators who are suppose to have prevented the financial crisis first in line with all of their net worth to pay?

No.  It is the taxpayers who pay when the financial regulators fail.  I say "when" because the financial regulators have already shown they are prone to failure.  It is only a question of time.

And it is the knowledge that the financial regulators will fail that drives individuals like Senators Brown and Vitter to propose legislation that attempts to protect the taxpayers from the failure of the financial regulators.

The Senators hope by putting more capital into the financial system this capital rather than the taxpayers' money will be used to pay for the losses incurred during the next financial crisis.

Of course, this won't work as financial regulators have already shown they will not use the banking system as it is designed and require banks to recognize upfront their losses on private and public debt that cannot be repaid.

Financial regulators don't require the banks to recognize losses upfront as the regulators perceive that any reduction in the reported level of capital signals a problem that threatens the safety and soundness of the financial system.

As regular readers know, this assumption is false as market participants already know the banks have experienced massive losses and undoubtedly have negative book capital levels if all their losses are realized.  What market participants don't know is just how negative book capital levels really should be.

While I think that the goal of Senators Brown and Vitter to try to protect the taxpayer from the failure of the financial regulators is correct, their effort to put more capital into the financial system won't achieve this outcome.

Taxpayers would be much better off if Senators Brown and Vitter championed enforcement of the Securities Act of 1933 and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Under the Act, the government is suppose to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

The current financial crisis has shown that the banks are "black boxes".  It is only when the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants have the information that they need to make a fully informed investment decision.

Thursday, April 25, 2013

Simon Johnson debunks notion TBTF can fail and refocuses debate on how do we prevent need for resolution

In a Project Syndicate column, Professor Simon Johnson debunks the notion that a Too Big to Fail bank can actually fail by cutting through all of the meaningless assurances by politicians and financial regulators and pointing out that a TBTF could not be resolved (bankruptcy for banks).

So the question becomes, "how do we prevent these banks from failing in the first place?"

The Obama administration's answer to this question was to double down and put the responsibility on the same financial regulators who failed to prevent our current financial crisis.

In case this wasn't a bad enough idea, the Administration and Congress turned over writing the new financial laws that these regulators are suppose to enforce to the bank lobbyists.  The result was the bank lobbyist full employment act, otherwise known as the Dodd-Frank Act.

Regular readers know that I think the Dodd-Frank Act should be repealed with the exception of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.  Its sheer complexity reflects the absurdity of trying to replace market discipline with regulations.

Others have answered the question of how to prevent banks from failing by suggesting that the solution is to have them hold more capital. The logic behind this answer is if banks hold more capital it is harder for them to fail as they have more capital to lose.

This logic assumes that banks will not change their risk profile as a result of having to maintain a higher capital level.  But how will anyone know if they take on greater risk until ....

Which brings me to my preferred solution: transparency.

By making the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, transparency subjects the banks to market discipline.

For example, transparency achieves what the Volcker Rule tries to accomplish in ending banks taking proprietary bets.  As demonstrated by Jamie Dimon and JP Morgan's London Whale trade, banks fear that if their bets are known the market will trade against them.  Transparency makes this nightmare an everyday reality if they engage in proprietary bets.

For example, transparency restrains risk taking.  Market participants adjust the price of their exposures to a bank to reflect how risky it is.  This gives banks an incentive to reduce their risk.

But a great myth lurks at the heart of the financial industry’s argument that all is well. 
The FDIC’s resolution powers will not work for large, complex cross-border financial enterprises.  
The reason is simple: US law can create a resolution authority that works only within national boundaries. 
Addressing potential failure at a firm like Citigroup would require a cross-border agreement between governments and all responsible agencies.
On the fringes of the International Monetary Fund’s just-completed spring meetings in Washington, DC, I had the opportunity to talk with senior officials and their advisers from various countries, including from Europe. I asked all of them the same question: When will we have a binding framework for cross-border resolution?
The answers typically ranged from “not in our lifetimes” to “never.” 
Again, the reason is simple: countries do not want to compromise their sovereignty or tie their hands in any way. Governments want the ability to decide how best to protect their countries’ perceived national interests when a crisis strikes. No one is willing to sign a treaty or otherwise pre-commit in a binding way (least of all a majority of the US Senate, which must ratify such a treaty).
As Bill Dudley, the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, put it recently, using the delicate language of central bankers, “The impediments to an orderly cross-border resolution still need to be fully identified and dismantled. This is necessary to eliminate the so-called ‘too big to fail’ problem.”
Translation: Orderly resolution of global megabanks is an illusion. As long as we allow cross-border banks at or close to their current scale, our political leaders will be unable to tolerate their failure.

Friday, April 19, 2013

Rallying to defense of TBTF, Treasury questions existence of big bank subsidy

Confirming its commitment to implementing the Geithner Doctrine (Yves Smith:  don't do anything that will hurt the profits or reputation of a big and/or politically connected bank), the US Treasury questioned the existence of any big bank funding subsidy based on the idea these banks will be bailed out by the government.

By questioning the existence of this funding subsidy for Too Big to Fail banks, the US Treasury is casting doubt on the core argument used to support breaking these banks up.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger sees the argument for breaking up the Too Big to Fail and the argument for banks holding more capital as distractions that crowd out discussion of the most important reform:  transparency.

I say that transparency under which the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is the most important reform because with this level of transparency we get a number of benefits including the TBTF breaking themselves up and banks holding more capital.

This is a bold statement.

Fortunately, it is supported by the facts.

First, transparency has already been shown to shrink a TBTF institution.  All we have to do is look at Jamie Dimon and the JP Morgan London Whale trade.

His first response was to hide the trade so that the market wouldn't find out about it and trade against JPM.  Senator Levin's committee documents cutting off information to regulators for fear of leaks.  His second response was to exit trade as soon as possible.

Please note, simply ending proprietary betting is a step in breaking up the TBTF.

What else might be ended and be a step in breaking up the TBTF as a result of transparency?

How will the market react when it gets to see what is really happening with all of those subsidiaries that are designed to arbitrage regulations and taxes?  Will the market pressure the TBTF to close these subsidiaries?

Second, transparency has already been shown to exert discipline on a bank so it holds more capital.  For confirmation, all we have to do is look at the level of capital that banks held back in the early 1900s when providing exposure detail disclosure was the norm and seen as a sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.

As reported by Reuters,

 A Treasury Department official on Thursday rebuffed recent arguments that giant banks enjoy cheaper borrowing because markets think the government would bail them out in a crisis. 
Mary Miller, Treasury's undersecretary for domestic finance, said in prepared remarks for a speech at an economic conference in New York that it is not necessarily true that the biggest banks borrow more cheaply than smaller competitors can. 
And even if they do enjoy such a subsidy, she said, it may not be because markets believe they are "too big to fail." 
"In the wake of the financial crisis, the largest banks' borrowing costs have not only increased more than those of some regional bank competitors, but have also increased to higher absolute levels," Miller said.... 
Many politicians and some regulators argue some banks are still so big that the government would support them, as was done during the 2007-2009 crisis, rather than let their failure threaten the stability of the financial system. 
Because markets also believe the government would step in, these critics say, the biggest banks have the unfair advantage that they can issue debt more cheaply than smaller banks can.... 
Even if big banks do have lower funding costs, that could be explained by other factors, she said. For example, financial giants may have greater liquidity and a bigger pool of potential investors than smaller competitors. 
"Research shows that large non-financial corporations enjoy a similar funding advantage over their smaller and less-diversified peers," Miller said.

Saturday, March 30, 2013

Perhaps the Department of Justice knew something when it didn't prosecute the banks; judge dismisses Libor case

For those of us who are not lawyers, it certainly appeared after the Too Big to Fail banks confessed to and paid fines for manipulating the benchmark interest rates, Libor in particular, that investors who suffered losses as a result of the manipulation would be able to recoup their losses.

Turns out that we were wrong.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the judge presiding over the case decided that because the banks agreed to cooperate in manipulating the rate the investors shouldn't be reimbursed.

With this ruling, the judge single-handedly validated the US Department of Justice's decision not to pursue any of the bankers for their misbehavior.

It turns out that the DoJ understood that no matter how strong the fact set, and the banks saying they are guilty of manipulating the benchmark interest rates for their benefit and paying a fine is a pretty strong fact set, judges would let the banks off.

This ruling appears to confirm that the Too Big to Fail truly are Too Big to Jail and they are in a position to engage in any illegal conduct that they would like.
A federal-court judge on Friday agreed to dismiss claims that the 16 banks targeted by the suits broke federal antitrust laws through alleged suppression of the London interbank offered rate, or Libor. 
In a 161-page ruling on the banks' motions to dismiss the leading suits seeking class-action status, U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald allowed some of the claims to proceed, including allegations the banks breached commodities laws. 
But if her ruling stands, it would take out a central plank of the litigation. The federal antitrust claims that the judge threw out can pay up to triple damages.... 
Judge Buchwald said her ruling was based on the conflicting legal arguments affecting the suits, rather than whether the underlying allegations of rate-rigging were true.... 
Judge Buchwald ruled that the banks' alleged conduct didn't breach federal antitrust laws, partly because the Libor-setting process was a "cooperative endeavor" and "never intended to be competitive."
That means even if the banks did subvert the Libor process by putting in fake estimates, any losses suffered by investors and other plaintiffs would have resulted from the banks' "misrepresentation, not from harm to competition," the judge wrote.
Just wondering, but could any bank have become a participant in the Libor-setting process or was there a restriction, say based on size, on who could participate?

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Dean Baker: in reality, it's the failure of financial reform

In his Guardian column, Dean Baker observes in his usual understated tones that financial regulators are simply not up to the task of overseeing the large, global financial institutions and that financial reform since the beginning of the financial crisis is inadequate.

He suggests that what is needed to fix this situation is for citizens to pressure their policy makers so that the policy makers adopt legislation that breaks up these Too Big to Fail institutions.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger prefers a much simpler solution that doesn't require policy makers to adopt new legislation over the objections of the banking industry.  I would like to see our policy makers pressure financial regulators to simply use the laws on the books.

During the 1930s, Congress adopted the securities laws that require that market participants be provided with access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they could independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision [note: similar laws have been adopted in Europe and Japan].

For banks, all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner is defined by ultra transparency under which the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This definition of what constitutes all the useful, relevant information is an appropriate, timely manner is not just mine.  At the time the securities laws were passed, it was also the definition used by the banking industry.  

The banking industry use to see a bank disclosing all its exposure details as a bank that could stand on its own two feet as it had nothing to hide.  I realize that the current banking industry doesn't believe this and will push back against the regulators because they prefer to hide their true risk.

So let me offer a compromise:  only banks that have government insured deposits need to provide ultra transparency.

There is no legitimate business reason why a bank that benefits from having the taxpayers guarantee their deposits should be allowed to hide the risks that it is taking.

My compromise gives all banks a choice:  keep their insured deposits and provide ultra transparency or get rid of their insured deposits and continue to hide behind the veil of opacity of current disclosure requirements.

JP Morgan is a huge bank and can swallow $6bn in losses, but the incident showed as clearly as possible that the Dodd-Frank reforms are not working. The London Whale's losing trades were all done in the Dodd-Frank era. The bill's provisions did not prevent JP Morgan from making massive bets and misleading regulators about their nature and the risks involved. 
If the regulators were not able to catch the London Whale's huge gambles before they went bad, why would we think that they will catch the next crapshoot from the Wall Street gang? 
It's time that we looked at this seriously: the regulators lack either the will or the competence to rein in the big banks. 
The big banks are going to get away with everything they want, regardless of the provisions of Dodd-Frank. 
If the big banks are too big to regulate and, according to Attorney General Holder, too big to prosecute, then the only sensible course is to break them up.... 
Or simply require them to provide ultra transparency if they are to have access to deposit insurance.
At the top of the list is Elizabeth Warren's election to the senate. Senator Warren has already made it clear that she will use her seat on the Senate banking committee to try to hold the banks and bank regulators accountable. The other important development is that Warren seems to have an ally in Louisiana Senator David Vitter. 
At first glance, this might seem an unlikely alliance. Warren is clearly on the left side of the Democratic party and Vitter is to the right of center of a very conservative Republican party. But Vitter, apparently, takes his belief in the market seriously enough ...
Disclosure is not a Democrat or Republican issue.  Disclosure is the necessary condition for the invisible hand of the market to operate properly.
The point is straightforward: if a bank's creditors know that the government will cover its losses, the bank is gambling with the taxpayers' money, not its own.... 
Hence my compromise: if the government will cover a bank's losses, then the bank must provide ultra transparency.  Transparency ends the bank's gambling with the taxpayer's money.
As it stands, the leadership of both parties is too closely tied to the financial sector to take any steps that fundamentally threaten their interests. 
This has nothing to do with political philosophy: the leadership of both parties is owned by the financial industry. 
However, if the outsiders in both parties can build up enough popular outrage over Wall Street's shenanigans, the party leadership will follow.
All that is required is that enough pressure be applied so that regulators use the laws on the books.

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

EU's Rehn asks for suggestion on how to get credit flowing in EU again

In defending the EU's austerity policies, the EU's top economic official, Olli Rehn, asked for a suggestion on how to get credit flowing again in Europe that was both financially and politically feasible.

If EU policymakers actually saw themselves as being responsible to the citizens of the EU, this is easy:  require the banks to absorb upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

This would immediately restore growth in the EU and set the stage for credit to flow again.

Why?

Three primary reasons:

  1. It ends the diversion of capital the real economy needs for growth, reinvestment and social programs from servicing the excess debt.  With growth and reinvestment in the real economy resuming, demand for credit would naturally pick up.
  2. It ends the need for policies like zero interest rates, quantitative easing and austerity that create headwinds to economic growth.  With economic growth, demand for credit naturally picks up.
  3. It ends pricing distortions caused by 'zombie' loans.  One of the toxic side effects of the regulators engaging in forbearance and letting the banks use 'extend and pretend' to turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans is that it distorts the valuation of the collateral backing the 'zombie' loans.  As secured lenders, this valuation distortion acts as a barrier to new loans as bankers have a hard time valuing new collateral knowing how much collateral is in the hands of 'zombie' borrowers.  Eliminating the collateral valuation distortion eliminates a barrier to new lending.

If EU policymakers see themselves as being responsible only to bankers, 100% of the policies adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis support this notion, then getting credit flowing again in the EU is not only far more difficult, but virtually impossible.

Bankers will immediately realize that if the banks absorb the losses on the excess debt as they are designed to do this would be very bad for banker cash bonuses.  As a result, they will try to block this solution.

Bankers will propose and support any alternative to the banks recognizing upfront the losses and their cash bonuses being reduced.

For example, bankers proposed and endorsed the notion that bank losses should be paid for by taxpayers by having the sovereigns recapitalize the banks.  Never mind that this undermined the creditworthiness of the sovereigns and was completely unnecessary as banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

For example, bankers endorsed the notion that bank losses should be paid for by savers.  One way of getting the savers (actually all the taxpayers) to pay for the bank losses would be to tax their deposits at the banks.

Never mind that this tax violates the spirit of deposit insurance.  Never mind that this tax reintroduces bank runs that deposit insurance ended by making depositors not responsible for the losses that the bankers run up.

So long as the EU policymakers see themselves as being responsible to the bankers and not the citizens of the EU, EU policymakers will adopt a series of policies that will not get credit flowing again.

However, should EU policymakers ever decide that they represent the citizens of the EU, then it will be easy for them to adopt the necessary policies to get credit flowing again (Iceland did this at the beginning of the financial crisis and it worked).

Friday, March 15, 2013

Barry Ritholtz: Bankistan vanquishes America (and the EU, Japan and UK too)

From Barry Ritholtz blog, the Big Picture comes a terrific summary of exactly where the global financial system is currently:
Is there a single doubt left in your mind? 
Are you still a believer in Rufus T. Firefly Jamie Dimon as the world’s smartest banker? 
Is there a scintilla of wonder left in your mind that the giant banks are legitimate? 
Have you come around to understanding — finally — what some of us have long understood about banks? 
Are you willing to accept the truth about these corporate behemoths — that they are a horrific combination of economically dangerous, criminally inept, led by pathologically lying CEOs? 
Do you harbor any doubts that the giant banks are anything less than ruthlessly efficient criminal enterprises? 
Can you — finally — admit that our bank-created financial crisis of 2008-09 has led us to where we are today? 
Do you understand the only options presented as a result of that — either corporate bankruptcy and nationalization or a completely artificial Fed driven recovery? (The third option was a Japan-like multi decade recession). 
Do you realize that the feeble recovery, the slow, deleveraging-driven process of gradual economic healing was the result of how our policy makers chose?
Our policy makers chose the Japan-like multi decade recession in which bank bonuses are protected at all costs and society, particularly through cuts in social programs like Medicare and Social Security, pays the cost.
Do you recognize that the world of banking is divided into two camps? 
On one side, there are those who understand that the giant banks must be broken up. They are dismayed at the large banks  under-capitalization, over-leverage and opacity.  
These folks have figured out that these banks are not only too big to fail, but are so large that they are too big to succeed, and that the best route is to let insolvent banks fail. They are unhappy that our finance sector is a trillion dollar black box. 
Insert call for banks to provide ultra transparency here.
They know that the majority of giant banks’ profits come from bailouts, and subsidies. This group is dismayed at the corruption of our political system by financiers.
Insert Jeff Connaughton and the Blob (aka, politicians, regulators, lobbyists and Wall Street) here.
They understands huge banks are anti-competitive, a blaspheme against capitalism.
Insert that we need to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize the losses on the excess debt upfront here.
They are shocked about  corruption of even the most fundamental measures of interest rates such as LIBOR.
Insert bankers behaving badly behind a veil of opacity and the need for ultra transparency as sunlight is the best disinfectant and the source of confidence in the financial system.
They are stunned that bankers have overturned a bedrock, fundamental principle of our society — the rule of law rule — with the threat of disrupting the world’s economy if prosecuted for their crimes.
Insert need for requiring ultra transparency as it is only the market that can discipline the banks as they are too big for individual nations to control.
On the other side lay the bank apologists, corrupted politicians, and crony capitalists.  
They advocate the Big Lie of the financial crisis. They choose to ignore the facts and data that disprove their narrative. 
They continue to push the lies that the bailouts were a good investment. (They weren’t). 
They work against the Bipartisan consensus that the giant banks should be broken up.
Insert if banks provided ultra transparency, market discipline in the form of higher cost of funds would force them to reduce their risk and complexity (closing those thousands of subsidiaries that only exist to arbitrage regulations and taxes).

A likely outcome of reducing risk and complexity is that the banks would shrink significantly in size.
They ignore the many former bank CEOs who call for thebreak up of “Too Big to Fail” banks. 
They mandated that GSEs were banned from Lobbying, but they made sure that the big banks retained their influence peddling and hold on Washington DC. 
They no longer represent the voters of their districts, but instead are the elected representatives of Bankistan. 
And unless we do something — and soon — they will vanquish America.
This is also true of the EU and UK.

In the EU, we had the appointment of technocrats to carryout austerity in countries that should have had the banks take losses on their sovereign debt holdings. 

In the UK, we had the chancellor pleading with the EU not to limit bankers' bonuses.

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Joshua Rosner: JP Morgan has taken a page out of Fannie Mae handbook

As reported by Bloomberg, Graham Fisher's Joshua Rosner is out with an analysis of JP Morgan in which he observes:
“JPM appears to have taken a page out of the Fannie Mae playbook,” Rosner wrote, referring to the New York-based company by its stock ticker. 
Fannie Mae “perfected the art of cozying up to elected officials, dominating trade associations, employing political heavyweights and their former staffers and creating the image of American flag-waving, apple-pie-eating, good corporate citizen.”...
Mr. Rosner has used slightly different imagery to capture what Jeff Connaughton call the Blob (aka, politicians, regulators and Wall Street's lobbyists).
JPMorgan has spent at least $8.5 billion, or about 12 percent of net income, to settle regulatory and legal disputes from 2009 through 2012, Rosner estimated. 
“We could not find another ‘systemically important’ domestic bank that has recently been subject to as many public, non-mortgage-related regulatory actions or consent orders,” Rosner wrote. 
“The firm’s pride in a disputable ‘fortress balance sheet’ -- which underestimates their off-balance sheet risks -- appears to have given investors false comfort.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Rosner has just called into question whether JP Morgan's, or any bank's financial statements, fairly represents their current financial condition.

From Barry Ritholtz's blog, the Big Picture, we learn that Mr. Rosner had more to say on this issue in the executive summary to his report.
JPM’s ability to retain its reputation, its political power and support of investors in the face of financials that lack the details necessary for a proper analysis are reminiscent of another too-big-to-fail institution: Fannie Mae.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Rosner confirms the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane's observation that banks are 'black boxes' when Mr. Rosner says JP Morgan's financials lack the details necessary for a proper analysis.

Regular readers know what those necessary details are for a proper analysis.  Those details are the bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that it would disclose if it provided ultra transparency.

A bank that could stand on its own two feet and truly had a fortress balance sheet would make it a point to provide ultra transparency.  After all, it has nothing to hide.

A bank that doesn't provide ultra transparency is a bank that is waving a huge red flag and announcing to the world that it has something to hide.  Mr. Rosner's report is an attempt to figure out what JP Morgan is hiding besides its engagement in bad banker behavior.

Monday, March 11, 2013

Dallas Fed's Fisher and Rosenblum examine how to shrink Too Big to Fail and find transparency

In their Wall Street Journal column, the Dallas Fed's Richard Fisher and Harvey Rosenblum examine why the Dodd-Frank Act does not end Too Big to Fail and they offer a proposal they think will succeed in ending TBTF.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger prefers to end the TBTF banks by requiring them to provide ultra transparency rather than rely on a solution that assumes policymakers and regulators will not bail these banks out in the future.

Ultra transparency ends TBTF because it makes the unsecured bank bond and equity investors responsible for the losses on their investment.  Investors become responsible for the losses because they have access to the information they need to independently assess the risk of an investment in the banks.

Currently, investors are protected from losses on their investment in the banks for two reasons.

First, they do not have access to the information they need to make a fully informed investment decision.  Banks are 'black boxes'.

Second, in the absence of the needed information, investors are relying on the government' investment recommendation.  This recommendation creates a moral obligation to bailout the banks and protect the investors from solvency related losses.  This investment recommendation is renewed every year through the stress tests and the subsequent statements about bank solvency.
[T]he mere 0.2% of banks deemed "too big to fail" are treated differently from the other 99.8%, and differently from other businesses. Implicit government policy has made these institutions exempt from the normal processes of bankruptcy and creative destruction. 
Without fear of failure, these banks and their counterparties can take excessive risks. 
It also emboldens a sense of immunity from the law. As Attorney General Eric Holder admitted to the Senate on March 6, when banks are considered too big to fail it is "difficult to prosecute them . . . if we do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative impact on the national economy."... 
This is patently unfair. It makes for an uneven playing field, tilted to the advantage of Wall Street against Main Street, and it places the financial system and the economy in constant jeopardy. It also undermines citizens' faith in the rule of law and representative democracy.
This uneven playing field is the result of the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine.

Under this policy, the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis was adopted and bank book capital levels and banker bonuses were protected at all costs.

These costs include undermining citizens' faith in the rule of law and representative democracy (please note that this is not restricted to the US, but also applies in the EU).
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was a well-intentioned response to the problem. Its stated promise—to end "too big to fail"—rings hollow. 
With a law that runs 849 pages and more than 9,000 pages of regulations written so far to implement it, Dodd-Frank is long on process and complexity but short on results. 
Regulators cannot enforce rules that aren't easily understood.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Fisher and Mr. Rosenblum have nicely summarized why the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight fails and why the financial system should not be dependent on this combination working for ongoing financial stability.
Further, market discipline is still lacking for the largest dozen or so institutions, as it was during the last financial crisis. 
Why should a prospective purchaser of bank debt practice due diligence if in the end, regardless of new layers of regulation and oversight, the issuing institution won't be allowed to fail? 
The return of marketplace discipline and effective due diligence of banking behemoths is long overdue....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Fisher and Mr. Rosenblum make the case for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Without this data, a prospective purchaser of bank debt cannot perform due diligence.

Without due diligence, there is no market discipline on the banks.

The only way to bring about the long overdue return of marketplace discipline and effective due diligence of banking behemoths is to require ultra transparency.

Your humble blogger liked how Mr. Fisher and Mr. Rosenblum described the benefits of addressing TBTF.  As a result, I have taken the liberty to replace their expression "this plan" with ultra transparency.
Had ultra transparency been in place a decade ago, it would have altered the insidious behaviors that contributed to the crisis, avoiding the bailouts and their aftermath, the cost of which our nation's citizens will bear for years to come. 
The Government Accountability Office and others estimate the cost of the financial crisis, measured in lost output and jobs, to be between $10 trillion and $20 trillion, roughly one year of U.S. output down the drain.
It is simply stunning to look at ultra transparency from a cost/benefit analysis perspective.

The cost of the banks providing ultra transparency is less than $10 billion globally per year.  The benefit is saving $10 - $20 trillion.  This is at least a 100 fold return on investment.
Most of all, adoption of ultra transparency would have avoided a crisis that undermined Americans' belief in the fairness and justice of the economic system. 
The United States was founded on the principle of economic freedom, underpinned by secure property rights and by a strong aversion to special favors and subsidies to the few. 
Those fundamental virtues were undermined by the recent financial crisis and government's response to it. 
Rescuing too-big-to-fail banks from their bad investment decisions imposed an enormous economic burden on the American people. It also perpetuated a sense that powerful banking mandarins operate above the law and prosper at the expense of the thrifty and hardworking citizenry. 
Congress should rewrite Dodd-Frank so that it actually ends the problem of banks that are too big to fail. Our proposal [ultra transparency] won't lead to bigger government. It will lead to smaller banks governed by the market discipline of creditors who are at real risk of losses, and by laws that apply equally to all.

Sunday, March 10, 2013

Another problem with Too Big to Fail: Eric Holder says Too Big to Jail

In a very interesting Fiscal Times column, Suzanne McGee examines the choices of what to do with the Too Big to Fail financial institutions that US Attorney General Eric Holder said are Too Big to Jail.

Regular readers know that the solution is to require these banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their global asset, liability and off-blance sheet exposure details.

Why ultra transparency?

Sunlight is the best disinfectant and most of the problems posed by these banks can be cured by sunlight.

Here are some of the problems sunlight solves.

Problem 1:  Financial contagion.

With access as a result of ultra transparency to all the information needed to independently assess these banks, unsecured bank debt and equity investors become responsible for the losses on their investments.

Being responsible for losses on their investments gives investors an incentive to not having a greater exposure to an investment that the investor can afford to lose.

As a result, each bank limits its exposure to the other banks to an amount where any bank can fail without dragging down the other banks with it.

Problem 2:  Too much risk.

With ultra transparency and the responsibility for absorbing losses, investors subject the banks to market discipline for the first time since the 1930s.  Investors subject the banks to market discipline by linking the return they require on their investment in the bank to the risk being taken by the bank.

This market discipline provides an incentive for management to reduce business complexity (1,000s of subsidiaries involved in arbitraging regulations and taxes are subject to closure) and reduce the risk of their exposures (proprietary trading is out as it has an unfavorable risk/return profile when all market participants can see what bank is doing and trade against it).

Problem 3:  Governments are obligated to bailout TBTF

Ultra transparency ends the bailouts that result from the moral hazard of governments recommending investment (see: stress tests that purport to show banks are solvent under extreme economic circumstances) in the banks.  Investors can now do their own stress tests.

Problem 4:  Excessive banker pay

Subjecting the banks to market discipline results in banks becoming much more like utilities that exist to provide the real economy with access to credit and payment processing that it needs.

While the banks will still make money, it will be done with a much more conservative risk profile and banker pay will reflect this.

While your humble blogger could go on about the problems that ultra transparency solves, US Attorney General Eric Holder's admission that some banks are Too Big to Jail creates a new problem.

While ultra transparency eliminates a bank's ability to manipulate a benchmark interest rate like Libor (the rate can be based off of actual transactions), it does not address a bank that wants to engage in money laundering for the drug cartels or terrorists.

What ultra transparency does do to help make banks prosecutable for these crimes is make it so the banks can fail as a result of being prosecuted for these crimes without bringing down the financial system or the economy.
Too big to fail.” .... it’s also the question that is proving hardest to resolve, as post-crisis efforts to prevent the financial system from another near-catastrophe continue. 
Eric Holder, the country’s Attorney General, raised eyebrows nationwide as well as the blood pressure on Wall Street when he testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee Wednesday that he believes the size of the biggest global banks “made it difficult” to prosecute them for any misdeeds. 
What happens, he asked, if levying criminal charges means jeopardizing the national or even the global economy? 
Ultra transparency ends this issue (see discussion of financial contagion above).
Even more alarming, perhaps, is his suggestion that the size – and thus the influence – of the big banks is so immense that Wall Street can ensure investigations never bear any fruit. 
Too-big-to-fail banks, he said, may have “an inhibiting impact on our ability to bring resolutions” to situations that the government has investigated....
Regular readers know that Jeff Connaughton wrote a terrific book on how Wall Street uses this influence to always win when it comes to legislation and regulation.

Ultra transparency works to counter-balance Wall Street's influence when it comes to bringing resolution for criminal matters.

Recall that under ultra transparency, investors are responsible for all losses on their exposures to the banks.  This gives prosecutors tremendous leverage over Wall Street.  Wall Street has to toe the line because investors know that they can be wiped out by criminal conduct.
Comments like Holder’s may add to the pressure to break up the big banks, but the authors of a new report published by the Milken Institute, a think tank, come down against such a move, in large part because there is no evidence that it would make the system safer or more manageable. There is, on the other hand, a risk that it would be a destabilizing process, they write in the report, entitled Breaking (Banks) Up Is Hard to Do. 
Who decides what is too big? Or how a bank should be broken up?...
That is one of the reasons that I like requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It is no longer a debate over questions like what is too big or how a bank should be broken up.

What limits the size and complexity of these banks is the risk that investors are willing to accept knowing that they are going to lose their investment if the bank fails.  It is this limitation on risk that investors convey through how much they require to be compensated for taking on the risk of loss.

It is up to bank management to figure out how what is the best combination of size and complexity within the risk restraints applied by investors.
Of course, as the Milken Institute report points out, there is no way to determine in advance which kind of Wall Street institution will become a systemic threat. 
The most serious threats to the financial markets previously had come from fraudulent accounting, or from flawed risk management at hedge funds such as Long-Term Capital Management. 
The size of the institutions themselves was no determinant of how serious the threat became to the stability of the financial markets. Even in the case of Long-Term Capital, the fund itself was tiny compared to the banks. 
What mattered was the leverage and counterparties involved.
This is why transparency is the solution.  Transparency forces each bank counter-party to limit its exposure to what it can afford to lose.

If it doesn't limit its exposure to what it can afford to lose, a bank can expect to be perceived as very risky and as a result have to pay a very high return to attract investors.
To the extent that a Wall Street institution is not only big but involved in every kind of financial transaction, the odds increase that it will be caught up in whatever kind of crisis erupts next....
Again, ultra transparency puts a premium on banks limiting their exposures to what they can afford to lose.  And it puts in place market discipline to enforce this.
It is the behavior of banks, not their size, that we should be focused on, and to that extent Holder hit the nail on his head in his testimony. 
If the size of banks gives them the ability to fend off regulators or investigators, that’s far more of a threat to the system than anything else. Just look at the way that banks influenced policymaking in the years that led up to the financial crisis.
The goal here shouldn’t be for Washington’s policymakers to declare that any bank whose deposits top a certain percentage of the country’s GDP should be broken up. 
Rather, they should be looking at whether the regulation is capable of reining in excesses and bad behavior, and holding bankers and other Wall Street participants – regardless of the size of their institution – responsible for their misdeeds. The purpose must be to ensure the stability of the system, not enshrine some hypothetical perfect size.
This is exactly what ultra transparency does.  It ensures the stability of the system while reining in excesses and bad behavior.

Friday, March 8, 2013

Anat Admati: "The Bankers' New Clothes", right fairy tale, wrong conclusion

In an American Banker column, Professor Anat Admati makes a very important observation about the gutting of financial regulation.  It tends to be good for bankers and bad for society.

The column is an excerpt from a book she co-authored with Martin Hellwig, "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It."

Regular readers know that your humble blogger differs with Professor Admati on both the diagnosis of what is wrong with banking and what to do about it.

I see the problem with banking being opacity.

Opacity that let's bankers engage in bad behavior knowing that they are Too Big to Jail.

Opacity that makes the financial system unstable because market participants are dependent on financial regulators both correctly assessing and communicating the risk of each bank (something the regulators cannot do because of concerns about the safety and soundness of the financial system).

Opacity that prevents the market from exerting discipline on the banks and restraining their risk taking.

Opacity that creates moral hazards like bailouts because investors relied on the Fed's stress tests when making an investment decision.

Opacity that makes the banks such "black boxes" that banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk and solvency of the banks looking to borrow.

Opacity that has been made even worse by the response of policymakers and financial regulators.  They have decide we need more of what failed to prevent the financial crisis in the first place.  Namely, the combination complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Professor Admati has championed the notion that banks were holding too little capital going into the financial crisis and by simply upping capital standards all will be well.

This is knowably untrue.

The OECD has written extensively how due to the suspension of mark-to-market accounting and creation of 'zombie' loans under regulatory forbearance bank financial reporting and bank book capital is meaningless.

Opacity hides the true condition of the banks.  Who knows just how distorted each bank's financial statement is from reflecting its true financial condition?  After all, Dexia reported very high capital levels shortly before it needed to be nationalized.

Until there is ultra transparency and banks have to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, bank financial reporting and book capital will remain meaningless.

Ultra transparency is the necessary condition for Professor Admati's capital standards to be relevant.
Do we have to resign ourselves to having a fragile and dangerous banking system, one that harms the economy and requires government support when the risks turn out badly?
No.
As we have seen, there is not much prospect of dealing with failures of large and interconnected banks, particularly those that are active internationally, without imposing large costs on the economy.
Actually, there is a simple solution for dealing with these banks without imposing large costs on the economy.  Require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Like all market participants, banks know that when they have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner they become responsible for all losses on their exposures.

In practical terms what this means is that the banks will independently assess each of the other banks that they have dealings with and they will adjust their exposure to what they can afford to lose should the other bank fail.

With ultra transparency, the cost of failure of a bank is absorbed by investors (including other banks) and not the real economy or society.

Ultra transparency is very important as it also ends the mechanism of financial contagion.  Each bank manages its exposures so that it can survive the failure of the other banks.
The economy is also harmed when many banks are distressed at the same time and do not make sufficient loans because of their overhanging debts.
There is a common misconception that a distressed bank stops making loans.  This is untrue.  I must be too old, but I distinctly remember that in the US Savings & Loan crisis, the management of these institutions gambled on redemption by making large real estate development loans.

As a practical matter, bank lending and the funding of these loans has been separate for at least 40 years.  The reason that they are separate is that holding a loan on a bank balance sheet is not the only option for the bank.  It can sell the loan to a bank syndicate, a hedge fund, an insurance company or a pension fund for example.
It is therefore important to focus on preventing banks and other financial institutions from running into distress or insolvency....
Please re-read the highlight text as Professor Admati has nicely summarized a point that your humble blogger has been making since the beginning of the financial crisis.  We need to take actions that prevent a financial institution from running into distress or insolvency in the first place.

This is why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency.

Investors know that with access to the information they need to independently assess the risk of each bank comes the responsibility for absorbing the losses on their investment exposures.  As a result, investors have an incentive to exert discipline on management so that management does not let the bank become distressed or insolvent.
For this purpose, we need better regulation and supervision.
True, but better regulation does not necessarily mean more regulation and better supervision does not necessarily mean more regulatory oversight.
If the banks' own incentives with respect to the risks they take and the extent of their reliance on borrowing were aligned with those of society, banking regulation would be less important. 
As it turns out, however, the incentives of banks with respect to the risks they take and to their borrowing are perversely conflicted with those of society.
This is only true because of the opacity of the banks.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency, there would be much more alignment with the incentives of society.  This alignment would occur because investors would no longer be in a position where gains are privatized and losses are socialized.

With ultra transparency, investors know they will get hit for losses should a bank fail.  As a result, investors have an incentive to restrain the risk taking of the banks.  Restraining the risk taking results in banks focusing on supplying the credit the real economy needs and not on taking proprietary bets.
In the last few years, many proposals have been made to address the risks that the banking system imposes on society. Very few, however, have been implemented. 
Most proposals have been rejected, diluted, or delayed, some of them endlessly it appears, because the banks have convinced policymakers, regulators, and sometimes the courts that the regulations might be too expensive.... 
Please re-read the highlight text again as Professor Admati makes a very important point.

Regular readers might recall that before the financial crisis the SEC ran a cost/benefit analysis on bringing observable event based reporting to structured finance securities and concluded that the cost of transparency could not be justified.

Today, a cost/benefit analysis easily justifies bringing observable event based reporting to structured finance securities and ensuring that they are transparent.

Better Markets would argue that our financial system is based on the philosophy of disclosure and therefore transparency should never be subjected to a cost/benefit analysis.
From the bankers' perspective, any regulation that constrains their activities or might reduce their profits is expensive. 
What is expensive for the banks, however, need not be expensive for the economy. 
The costs to the banks are important, but other costs must be considered as well, particularly the costs to everyone else resulting from financial crises or bank bailouts....
When bankers complain that banking regulation is expensive, they typically do not take into account the costs of their harming the rest of the financial system and the overall economy with the risks that they take. 
Public policy, however, must consider all the costs and not simply those to the bankers. 
The point of public intervention is precisely to induce banks, or dye producers, to take account of costs they impose on others. 
For society, such intervention can be very beneficial. 
Appropriate banking regulation is available that would reduce the potential for harm to the financial system without imposing any costs on banks other than the loss of subsidies from taxpayers....
Actually, ultra transparency would cost the banks much more than the loss of their subsidies from taxpayers.

It would end their ability to profit from engaging in illegal activities like manipulating benchmark interest rates like Libor.

It would significantly reduce the profitability of their proprietary trading as market participants could trade against them to minimize their gains while maximizing their downside.

It would reduce their ability to profit from the mismatch between what regulators lead investors to think is the risk profile of the bank and what is actually the true risk profile of the bank.

It would reduce their ability to profit from engaging in regulatory or tax arbitrage.
The fact that this is beneficial and not costly for society is all too often obscured by flawed and misleading claims, what we refer to as the bankers' new clothes.
The bankers' new clothes are simply opacity.

Like the fairy tale Emperor, banks should not be hiding anything.

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Sheila Bair is not a substitute for market supervision

In his NY Times Economix column, Professor Simon Johnson argues that it is important to appoint Sheila Bair to the vacant post of Fed Vice Chairwoman for Supervision because without filling this vacancy the Fed faces a potential crisis of legitimacy for its handling of the Too Big to Fail banks.

While there is much to recommend his column, Professor Johnson misses two critical facts.

First, a major reason for the financial crisis was the failure of regulatory supervision.  There is little that has happened since the beginning of our current financial crisis to indicated that the reasons that regulatory supervision is not a viable substitute for market discipline, including regulatory capture, have been fixed.


Second, the Fed has a long running policy of financial failure containment and its corollary the Geithner Doctrine (from Yves Smith, nothing should be done that hurts the profits or reputation of a big or politically connected bank).


As regular readers know, banks are not subject to market discipline because they are, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, "black boxes".  When market participants do not have the information they need to independently assess the risk of the banks, they cannot exert discipline on the banks by adjusting both the amount and price of their exposure based on each bank's risk.

Leading up to the crisis and even now market participants rely on the regulators' representation about the riskiness of the banks.  This reliance is the result of the simple fact that the regulators have access to all the useful, relevant information on each bank in an appropriate, timely manner and investors don't.

Unfortunately, this reliance is misplaced as the regulators have to both correctly assess this information and accurately communicate the results of this assessment to the market.  By definition, regulators cannot accurately communicate the results because of concerns over the safety and soundness of the financial system (the regulators won't say anything bad about the banks).

This problem is compounded by the moral hazard creating Dodd-Frank Act mandated stress tests.  Each year, the Fed performs a stress tests on the banks and pronounces them solvent under extreme economic conditions.  This announcement effectively makes the taxpayer obligated for bailing out the investors for any solvency related losses.

Why?  Where is there the investor who is going to argue with the Fed given that the Fed has better access to information than the investor?

That the government making investment recommendations creates moral hazard has been well known since the 1930s.  FDR warned about it and specifically said that the government should stay out of the business of making investment recommendations as this create a moral hazard to bailout investors who relied on the government's recommendation.  The Fed's stress tests are nothing less than the government making an investment recommendation.

More troubling is that former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner pledged the full faith and credit of the US to provide the banks with all the capital they need as a guarantee to investors that they would not suffer any losses from investing based on the stress test findings.

The policy of financial failure containment was in place back when I worked for the Fed and can be seen in the handling of Continental Illinois and the Savings & Loan crisis.

This policy has already destroyed the Fed's legitimacy when it comes to dealing with the Too Big to Fail banks.  Everyone knows the Fed will not do anything to control them and prevent them from taking outsized risks.

Rather, the Fed will come along and try to "mop up" after one of these banks blows up again.

If the Fed were truly interested in having the Too Big to Fail banks subjected to appropriate levels of supervision, the new Vice Chairwoman for Supervision would be leading the charge to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With ultra transparency, the banks would be subjected to both market supervision and market discipline.  Supervision that would be far superior in terms of both manpower and resources than anything that our regulators can offer.

The Dodd-Frank Act created the position of the Vice Chairwoman for Supervision at the Fed precisely because Wall Street knows that the Fed will never support ultra transparency.  Supporting ultra transparency means giving up its information monopoly.

It also means that the market could exert discipline on the Fed in its performance of is supervisory duties.  The last thing the Fed and its economists would ever be willing to do would be to put themselves in a position where they could be held accountable for their actions or lack thereof.

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Eric Holder admits that TBTF is Too Big to Jail, only way to fix situation is transparency

As reported by Bloomberg, the US Attorney General, Eric Holder, admitted to Congress that the Too Big to Fail banks are Too Big to Jail because they are so large and interconnected that prosecuting them risks creating an economic crisis.

This as a restatement of the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine (do not doing anything that will hurt the profits or reputation of big or politically connected banks).

Implementing this policy has freed the banks and the bankers from regulatory or judicial restraint on their activities.

At the same time, the banks are also free from market discipline because current disclosure practices leave them resembling 'black boxes'.

Regular readers know that the first step to restoring restraint on the banks is to require them to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, the banks become subject to market discipline.  Sunshine that acts as the best disinfectant of bad banker behavior.

Market discipline that links the cost of a bank's funding to the risk the bank is taking.  With funding no longer subsidized by opacity and investors' inability to accurately assess the risks the banks are taking, pressure will be exerted on the banks to shrink and reduce their risk.

As the banks shrink, they become less interconnected.  This makes them more susceptible to being subjected to the rule of law.
The size of the largest financial institutions has made it difficult for the U.S. Justice Department to bring criminal charges when there’s wrongdoing, Attorney General Eric Holder said. 
Criminal charges against a bank -- something that could threaten its existence -- may also endanger the national or global economies in the case of the largest ones, because of their size and interconnectedness. That has “made it difficult for us to prosecute” some of those institutions, Holder said today at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. 
“That is a function of the fact that some of these institutions have become too large,” Holder told lawmakers. “It has an inhibiting impact on our ability to bring resolutions that I think would be more appropriate.”

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage

In his Guardian column, Joris Luyendijk does a wonderful job of outlining the issues with the Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage global financial institutions.

The Lloyds and RBS press conferences were strikingly similar and, as they wore on it became hard not to think of them as dull, rather sophisticated but above all extremely effective rituals.
Given that these banks do not provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, earnings releases are simply elaborate rituals.

With the information provide by ultra transparency, there is no way to know if anything represented about a bank's financial condition is true.

As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says, banks are "black boxes".

Other than the financial regulators, nobody knows what is lurking on and off their balance sheets.
On one side of the table were men (Lloyds had one woman, who said nothing) in suits projecting an image of control. 
Yes, they were presiding over banks with tens of thousands of employees engaged in very different and often wildly complex activities across the globe. Yes, they had been caught out by scandal after scandal somewhere in their vast empires and yes, in the past their books had given a wildly inaccurate picture of the risks they were running. 
Without ultra transparency, there is no way of knowing what risks they are currently running.  So the critical issue is why trust what the bankers have to say?
But all of this was now in the past and firmly under control, they implied, as they fired off endless numbers and percentages and ratios, and said things like "We remain very confident of our capital position," or "Our strategy remains centred on taking into account the interests of all of our stakeholders", or some other cardboard PR phrase CEOs learn to use when they want to deflect a question they know can't be followed up.
Here is one of the dangers of the easily manipulated Basel III capital ratios, because the financial regulators are blessing them it is easy for banks to hide their true condition.
Their vocabulary had been sanitised to a startling degree, with PPI and other schemes that cheated tens of thousands of trusting Britons out of their money becoming "legacy issues" requiring "customer redress". (HSBC referred to its huge fines in the US for massive drug money-laundering as "regulatory and law enforcement matters".)...
The PPI scandal continues to grow.  Last year, the UK's Financial Ombudsman saw its case load of PPI claims grow by almost 300,000.

The ability of the banks to use vocabulary to sanitize their past actions is directly related to how the financial regulators are reaching settlements with the banks.

As regular readers know, financial regulators have adopted the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary the Geithner Doctrine (do nothing that hurts the profitability or reputation of big or politically connected banks).

The pursuit of these policies results in settlements where the banks do not have to admit quilt for their actions.

It is not surprising when banks reach an agreement where they don't have to admit guilt to ripping off their customers that they would choose to try to sanitize and gloss over their activities.


What if bonuses and privatisation are diversions and the real issue is "too big to fail" in combination with too big to manage? 
If you believe that CEOs knew nothing about the scandals taking place under their watch, what reason is there to believe that this time they are on top of things? 
Over the past 18 months I have interviewed more than 150 people working in finance in London, most of them in junior functions. Many of them believe that the top of their organisation has no idea what's really going on. 
They are equally scathing about the regulators.
This is the debate Britain [and the rest of the world] refuses to have.  
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Luyendijk captures the problem presented by Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage who operate behind a veil of opacity.

Opacity prevents market participants from knowing what is going on inside these banks.  As a result, the banks are subject to regulatory and not market discipline.

Regulatory discipline that is lacking for a number of reasons.  This includes the ability of the regulators to actually assess what is going on.  The bigger problem with regulators is that even if they do properly assess what is going on, they are designed to make it virtually impossible to communicate this to other market participants or to get the regulator to take action.

The top of the shop for financial regulators are political appointees.  This means they are susceptible to lobbying efforts by the banks.

The upper levels of the financial regulators tend to experience the revolving door between regulator and industry.  As a result, there is a tendency to give the banks the benefit of the doubt.

Your humble blogger has repeatedly said that the only way to truly address the problem presented by Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage is to require them to provide ultra transparency.

With this information, market participants can exert discipline on these global financial institutions.  This discipline takes several forms including linking each bank's cost of funds to the risk they are taking.

Naturally, banks that are more complex because of thousands of subsidiaries will be perceived as riskier.

Naturally, banks that engage in proprietary bets will be perceived as riskier.

It is these banks that will face a higher cost of funds and pressure to simplify their organizations and reduce their risk exposure.
The timing and conditions of the privatisation of Lloyds and RBS are vital to the British government's financial health, and it makes for powerful and simple-to-produce stories, especially if these banks continue to pay high salaries and bonuses. 
But Lloyds' and RBS's return to private ownership is ultimately a question of secondary importance when both banks continue to be too big to fail – and so effectively remain a public liability.
Today, the banks are a public liability because they are opaque.  As a result, market participants are dependent on the regulators who have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for properly assessing this information and accurately communicating the risk to the market.

When regulators fail to do this and they will whenever there is concern over the safety and soundness of the financial system, there is a moral obligation to bailout the investors.  After all, the investors relied on the regulators who had better information.

One of the benefits of ultra transparency is that it ends the banks being a public liability and the moral hazard caused by reliance on the financial regulators.

With ultra transparency, investors know they are responsible for all losses on their exposures to these banks as they have the information they need to independently assess the risk and solvency of each bank.

It is this responsibility for losses that will drive investors to exert market discipline.
While this idea persists, Britain remains hostage to the health of banks over which it has only very limited influence. Knowing that your vital interests are affected by factors beyond your control is a recipe for stress. It's not what democracies should be about. 
But it has become the new normal. The big issue today is not whether British taxpayers get their money back. It's whether British citizens get their sovereignty back.
Getting their sovereignty back simply requires the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Any bank that is unwilling to disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is not a bank that the British citizens would want to support in any fashion.

After all, an unwillingness to provide ultra transparency is the equivalent of waving a giant red flag and announcing to the world that the bank has something to hide.

British citizens would be better off asking banks that are unwilling to provide ultra transparency to leave and become some other country's headache.  Why should British citizens be responsible for the losses of a bank that refuses to disclose the risks it is taking?