Showing posts with label Solvency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Solvency. Show all posts

Monday, January 7, 2013

Is the Fed doing enough, too much or not enough to aid recovery

The Wall Street Journal carried an article on the American Economic Association's annual meeting that in celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Fed's creation asked:  is the Fed doing enough, too much or not enough to aid recovery.

Regular readers know that under the guidelines for central banks established by the father of modern central banking, Walter Bagehot, the Fed is doing too much.

For example, Mr. Bagehot said that as a lender of last resort, the central bank is suppose to lend freely at high rates of interest against good collateral.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the Fed and the other central banks have lent freely at low rates of interest against collateral of marginal value.

For example, Mr. Bagehot said that interest rates should never be below 2% as rates below 2% change savers' behavior.  When making this comment about the change in behavior, he was well aware of Mark Twain's observation about being concerned about the return of his capital rather than the return on his capital.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the Fed and other central banks have pursued zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and an authority on the Great Depression, also argued that the Fed is doing too much because it does not understand that we are facing a bank solvency led financial crisis.

As she said,

"This was [his] claim to be worthy of running the Fed," she says. He was "familiar with history. He knew what had been done." But perhaps this is actually Mr. Bernanke's biggest problem. Today's crisis isn't a replay of the problem in the 1930s, but our central bankers have responded by using the tools they should have used then. They are fighting the last war. The result, she argues, has been failure. "I don't see that they've achieved what they should have been trying to achieve. So my verdict on this present Fed leadership is that they have not really done their job."
Bottom line:  the Fed is doing too much because it is pursuing policies for a liquidity crisis when we are faced with a bank solvency crisis.


From the WSJ,

On the 100th anniversary of the central bank's creation, economists remain divided over whether the Fed's decisions to slash interest rates to nearly zero and buy trillions of dollars in bonds will fuel inflation or fall short of reigniting growth.
Your humble blogger, who does not have an economics PhD, is already on record saying that we will continue to face a Japan-style economic slump until such time as the losses on the excess debt in the financial system are recognized.

I said this in early 2008 before the Fed engaged in zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

To date, economic performance has confirmed my prediction.
For much of its history, the Fed has acted too timidly when faced with difficult circumstances, University of California, Berkeley economists Christina Romer and David Romer argued in a paper presented at the conference. 
They argued that the Fed didn't do all that it could have done to foster growth until the fall of 2012. But they praised the Fed for its recent moves. 
During the Great Depression, officials doubted monetary policy's ability to overcome the forces that had wrecked the economy. Later, in the 1970s, officials thought high inflation could not be surmounted at a reasonable public cost. 
"An unduly pessimistic view of what monetary policy can accomplish has been a more important source of policy errors and poor outcomes over the history of the Federal Reserve" than overconfidence, the Romers said.
Having worked at the Fed, I would be the first to tell you that there are economic outcomes that monetary policy can accomplish.

Addressing bank solvency is not one of them.
For others, the Fed has already done too much. 
Carnegie Mellon economist Allan Meltzer warned that the Fed's bond-buying programs, often called quantitative easing, may be fueling a farmland price bubble. He worried that the actions also risk driving up inflation, and they have left the central bank as essentially the only significant player in the mortgage market. And when long-term rates eventually start to rise, the government will face an explosion in currently low borrowing costs that will further complicate efforts to rein in deficits, he warned. 
"It is impossible to minimize the size of the economic problem that faces us in the future," the chronicler of central-bank history said at a panel.
Maybe I missed something, but Fed policies also made it the only significant player in the market for US Treasuries.  Zero interest rate policies, quantitative easing and Operation Twist are designed to push rates on treasuries below where other investors will want to buy them.
Former Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn, now a Brookings Institution scholar, cautioned that ahead of the financial crisis, "not only didn't we see it coming," but once the trouble started, central bankers "had trouble" understanding what was happening, he said in a panel.
Your humble blogger was one of the handful of individuals who saw the financial crisis coming.  All modesty aside, I didn't have trouble understanding what was happening.

More importantly, I tried to explain to several Fed Governors, including Mr. Kohn, what was happening at the time it was happening.  This included predicting which policies would or wouldn't be effective (please see early posts on this blog for some examples).

What I discovered in these conversations were individuals who were captured by group think.  They had and still have a model for how the financial system and real economy is suppose to work and they dismiss any suggestion that their model is wrong.

In fact, the power of group think has them so wed to their models that they have repeatedly lashed out at consumers for not behaving in the way the economic models say they should behave.
The Fed has "only limited guidance" from history about how to navigate the economy with radically new tools of monetary policy.
Actually, history as represented by Walter Bagehot and Anna Schwartz provided plenty of guidance.  Fed policymakers chose to ignore this guidance to the detriment of the real economy and social programs.
More than five years after the onset of the financial crisis, scholars inside and outside government are struggling to rewrite textbook understandings of how the economy works and how unconventional monetary policies have affected markets and the economy. 
All modesty aside again, your humble blogger has rewritten the textbook understandings of how the economy works on this blog.  Please read the posts on the FDR Framework, the Queen's Question and how a modern banking system is designed to allow banks with low or negative book capital levels to continue operating because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.
"The whole policy evaluation inevitably is difficult," said Michael Joyce, an adviser at the Bank of England, "given the unknown counterfactuals, uncertain transmission mechanisms and [the fact that] we don't have many historical examples."
The historical examples we do have suggests that the whole policy would be evaluated negatively.

Mr. Bagehot set his guidelines for central banks as a result of his experience with the frequent financial crises that occurred in the 1800s.

Anna Schwartz made her observation that the Fed was pursuing the wrong policies based on her experience with the Great Depression.  She understood that we are dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis and not a liquidity crisis.

Sunday, January 6, 2013

Matt Taibbi: US government lied about health of large US banks

In a Rolling Stones article, Matt Taibbi discusses how the US government adopted the policy of lying about the health of the large US banks.  In doing so, he makes the case for why the only way to restore trust in the banks and end the moral hazard of Too Big to Fail is if the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Regular readers are familiar with Yves Smith's Geithner Doctrine:
Nothing must be done that will hurt the profits or reputation of any bank that is pretty big or well-connected.
Mr. Taibbi sums up the result of implementing this doctrine:
It built a banking system that discriminates against community banks, makes Too Big to Fail banks even Too Bigger to Failier, increases risk, discourages sound business lending and punishes savings by making it even easier and more profitable to chase high-yield investments than to compete for small depositors. 
The bailout has also made lying on behalf of our biggest and most corrupt banks the official policy of the United States government. 
And if any one of those banks fails, it will cause another financial crisis, meaning we're essentially wedded to that policy for the rest of eternity – or at least until the markets call our bluff, which could happen any minute now.
In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Taibbi looks at how the US government handled the issue of reporting the true condition of the largest US banks since the beginning of the financial crisis.

In doing this, Mr. Taibbi shows why the financial regulators' information monopoly must be ended and banks must be required to provide ultra transparency.
The main reason banks didn't lend out bailout funds is actually pretty simple: Many of them needed the money just to survive.
Please recall that starting on August 9, 2007, the question asked globally was which banks are solvent and which banks are not.  This question could not be answered because the banks' current disclosure practices leave them, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, resembling 'black boxes'.
Which leads to another of the bailout's broken promises – that taxpayer money would only be handed out to "viable" banks.
Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said that the central bank's role as lender of last resort was to lend at high interest rates against good collateral to solvent banks.

What was obvious to all from the beginning of the financial crisis is that the global central banks were lending at low interest rates against even the most worthless collateral whether the banks were solvent or not for fear of financial contagion.

Regular readers know that the only way to end financial contagion is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  With this information, market participants can assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure to the banks to what they can afford to lose.  As a result, the collapse of one bank does not bring down the entire financial system.

Please re-read the preceding as this is the necessary condition for ending our current financial crisis.

Your humble blogger is not alone in calling for this.  See the article "What's inside America's Banks' based on this blog written by Frank Portnoy and Jesse Eisinger as well as Nassim Taleb's call for an anti-fragile system.
Soon after TARP passed, Paulson and other officials announced the guidelines for their unilaterally changed bailout plan. Congress had approved $700 billion to buy up toxic mortgages, but $250 billion of the money was now shifted to direct capital injections for banks.... 
This new let's-just-fork-over-cash portion of the bailout was called the Capital Purchase Program. Under the CPP, nine of America's largest banks – including Citi, Wells Fargo, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, State Street and Bank of New York Mellon – received $125 billion, or half of the funds being doled out. Since those nine firms accounted for 75 percent of all assets held in America's banks – $11 trillion – it made sense they would get the lion's share of the money. 
But in announcing the CPP, Paulson and Co. promised that they would only be stuffing cash into "healthy and viable" banks. This, at the core, was the entire justification for the bailout: That the huge infusion of taxpayer cash would not be used to rescue individual banks, but to kick-start the economy as a whole by helping healthy banks start lending again. 
This announcement marked the beginning of the legend that certain Wall Street banks only took the bailout money because they were forced to – they didn't need all those billions, you understand, they just did it for the good of the country. 
"We did not, at that point, need TARP," Chase chief Jamie Dimon later claimed, insisting that he only took the money "because we were asked to by the secretary of Treasury." Goldman chief Lloyd Blankfein similarly claimed that his bank never needed the money, and that he wouldn't have taken it if he'd known it was "this pregnant with potential for backlash." 
A joint statement by Paulson, Bernanke and FDIC chief Sheila Bair praised the nine leading banks as "healthy institutions" that were taking the cash only to "enhance the overall performance of the U.S. economy." 
But right after the bailouts began, soon-to-be Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner admitted to Barofsky, the inspector general, that he and his cohorts had picked the first nine bailout recipients because of their size, without bothering to assess their health and viability.
Paulson, meanwhile, later admitted that he had serious concerns about at least one of the nine firms he had publicly pronounced healthy. 
And in November 2009, Bernanke gave a closed-door interview to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the body charged with investigating the causes of the economic meltdown, in which he admitted that 12 of the 13 most prominent financial companies in America were on the brink of failure during the time of the initial bailouts.
On the inside, at least, almost everyone connected with the bailout knew that the top banks were in deep trouble. "It became obvious pretty much as soon as I took the job that these companies weren't really healthy and viable," says Barofsky, who stepped down as TARP inspector in 2011.

Please re-read the highlighted text as it confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that the financial regulators chose not to communicate to the market their true assessment of the solvency of the banks.

This is very important as the financial regulators have a monopoly on the information that market participants need to assess the solvency of each bank.  If the financial regulators misrepresent the banks' financial condition, there is no way for market participants to properly adjust both the price and amount of capital they provide to the banks.

More importantly, once the government started lying about the condition of the banks, everyone knew it.

How?

Please notice that the interbank lending market froze at the beginning of the financial crisis because banks with deposits to lend could not determine which banks were solvent and could repay the loans and which were not.

The interbank lending market is still frozen.

This is the banks' way of telling the market that they are still concerned with the solvency of other banks because they know that they too are hiding losses on and off their balance sheets.

This early episode would prove to be a crucial moment in the history of the bailout. It set the precedent of the government allowing unhealthy banks to not only call themselves healthy, but to get the government to endorse their claims. 
Projecting an image of soundness was, to the government, more important than disclosing the truth. Officials like Geithner and Paulson seemed to genuinely believe that the market's fears about corruption in the banking system was a bigger problem than the corruption itself. 
Time and again, they justified TARP as a move needed to "bolster confidence" in the system – and a key to that effort was keeping the banks' insolvency a secret. In doing so, they created a bizarre new two-tiered financial market, divided between those who knew the truth about how bad things were and those who did not....
Please re-read the highlighted text because not only are the banks fighting to maintain opacity so they can continue to gamble and engage in bad behavior like manipulating Libor, but the government has committed itself to maintaining opacity.

As you can imagine, this effectively undermines the US financial system as it is based on the FDR Framework and its combination of the philosophy of disclosure and the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).
The sweeping impact of these crucial decisions has never been fully appreciated. 
In the years preceding the bailouts, banks like Citi had been perpetuating a kind of fraud upon the public by pretending to be far healthier than they really were. In some cases, the fraud was outright, as in the case of Lehman Brothers, which was using an arcane accounting trick to book tens of billions of loans as revenues each quarter, making it look like it had more cash than it really did. 
In other cases, the fraud was more indirect, as in the case of Citi, which in 2007 paid out the third-highest dividend in America – $10.7 billion – despite the fact that it had lost $9.8 billion in the fourth quarter of that year alone. 
The whole financial sector, in fact, had taken on Ponzi-like characteristics, as many banks were hugely dependent on a continual influx of new money from things like sales of subprime mortgages to cover up massive future liabilities from toxic investments that, sooner or later, were going to come to the surface. 
Now, instead of using the bailouts as a clear-the-air moment, the government decided to double down on such fraud, awarding healthy ratings to these failing banks and even twisting its numerical audits and assessments to fit the cooked-up narrative. 
A major component of the original TARP bailout was a promise to ensure "full and accurate accounting" by conducting regular­ "stress tests" of the bailout recipients. 
When Geithner announced his stress-test plan in February 2009, a reporter instantly blasted him with an obvious and damning question: Doesn't the fact that you have to conduct these tests prove that bank regulators, who should already know plenty about banks' solvency, actually have no idea who is solvent and who isn't?
The government did wind up conducting regular stress tests of all the major bailout recipients, but the methodology proved to be such an obvious joke that it was even lampooned on Saturday Night Live. (In the skit, Geithner abandons a planned numerical score system because it would unfairly penalize bankers who were "not good at banking.")  
In 2009, just after the first round of tests was released, it came out that the Fed had allowed banks to literally rejigger the numbers to make their bottom lines look better. When the Fed found Bank of America had a $50 billion capital hole, for instance, the bank persuaded examiners to cut that number by more than $15 billion because of what it said were "errors made by examiners in the analysis." Citigroup got its number slashed from $35 billion to $5.5 billion when the bank pleaded with the Fed to give it credit for "pending transactions." 
Such meaningless parodies of oversight continue to this day. Earlier this year, Regions Financial Corp. – a company that had failed to pay back $3.5 billion in TARP loans – passed its stress test. A subsequent analysis by Bloomberg View found that Regions was effectively $525 million in the red. Nonetheless, the bank's CEO proclaimed that the stress test "demonstrates the strength of our company." Shortly after the test was concluded, the bank issued $900 million in stock and said it planned on using the cash to pay back some of the money it had borrowed under TARP. 
This episode underscores a key feature of the bailout: the government's decision to use lies as a form of monetary aid. State hands over taxpayer money to functionally insolvent bank; state gives regulatory thumbs up to said bank; bank uses that thumbs up to sell stock; bank pays cash back to state. What's critical here is not that investors actually buy the Fed's bullshit accounting – all they have to do is believe the government will backstop Regions either way, healthy or not. "Clearly, the Fed wanted it to attract new investors," observed Bloomberg, "and those who put fresh capital into Regions this week believe the government won't let it die." 
Through behavior like this, the government has turned the entire financial system into a kind of vast confidence game – a Ponzi-like scam in which the value of just about everything in the system is inflated because of the widespread belief that the government will step in to prevent losses.... 
They're building an economy based not on real accounting and real numbers, but on belief. 
The time has come to stop doubling down and build an economy based on real accounting and real numbers.

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Quantitative easing isn't magic nor will it solve the economic problems

In his Guardian column, James K. Galbraith looks at what central banks can do and what central banks cannot do.

Regular readers know we are facing a bank led solvency crisis that central bank monetary policy tools cannot fix.
  • What central banks can do is keep banks with low or negative book capital levels alive.  They can do this by lending against "good" collateral.
  • What central banks cannot do is absorb all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system or make these losses go away.  Only banks can absorb these losses.  In a modern banking system, banks are designed to absorb these losses and to continue to support the real economy even when absorbing the losses causes them to have low to negative book capital levels.
  • What central banks cannot do is restart lending.  Lending requires a willing borrower, a source of repayment for the loan and collateral with a knowable value.  The problem today is valuing the collateral.  Collateral values are distorted as a result of not making the banks absorb the losses at the beginning of the financial crisis.  Instead regulatory forbearance was implemented which allows the banks to create 'zombie' loans by engaging in 'extend and pretend'.  This distorts collateral values by holding collateral off the market.
Problems and disappointment arise when there is confusion over what central banks can and cannot do.

Central banks can engage in policies like Quantitative Easing.
Quantitative easing, the third tranche of which was announced in the US last week (QE3), is just a fancy phrase for buying bonds, notably mortgage-backed-securities, in which operation the Federal Reserve takes assets from the banks and gives them cash. This raises the bond price and lowers the yield. It also tends to boost stock prices – very nice for people who own stock – and it can spur mortgage refinancing, improving the cashflow of solvent homeowners. 
And what should we expect from the policies that central banks can engage in?
And the effect on the economy of all this is? Mostly indirect and quite small. People don't generally spend capital gains as windfalls. Saving on mortgage debt helps to support spending but some of it goes to paying down other debts. People who are already underwater on their mortgages can't refinance anyway, and are not affected. Yes, there is some effect. But powerful stimulus, this is not....
 What can central banks not do?
Some people in high places – Tim Geithner, the US treasury secretary, for example – profess that restarting bank lending is the key to economic recovery, and increasing bank reserves will spur them to lend. (What else are banks really good for?) But if anyone believes that reserves are key to lending, they deeply misunderstand what banks do. 
As Hyman Minsky used to say: banks are not moneylenders! Banks don't lend reserves, and they don't need reserves in order to lend. Banks create money by lending. They need a client willing to borrow, a project worth lending to, and collateral to protect against risk. If these are lacking, no amount of reserves will turn the trick. And especially not when the government is willing to pay interest on their reserves: the truest form of welfare, income for doing nothing.  
In a debt-deflation, actually there's even worse news. When asset prices are falling, how do banks make money? Not by fighting the trend but by riding it. If they withhold loans, prices will fall even further, and the assets can be bought later for even less. You might call this shorting the entire economic system.
This is a very important point.  Banks have an ability to make money in both good and bad economic environments.
You can't blame the banks for this, it's how money makes money in hard times. But to expect them to act as the agents of economic growth in such conditions is foolish.... 
So in summary,
Yes, [central banks] can usually forestall panic. Yes, for better or worse they can keep zombie banks alive. 
No, they cannot bring on economic recovery or solve any of our deeper economic problems, from unemployment and foreclosures in America to unemployment and economic collapse in Greece and elsewhere. 
The sooner we stop thinking of central bankers as wizards and magicians, the better.

Friday, May 4, 2012

Like bankers everywhere else, Chinese bankers find way around regulations

Reuters reports that Chinese banks are providing local government bonds 'liquidity support' to get around a ban on guaranteeing these bonds.

This simply confirms that Chinese bankers are like bankers everywhere else.  They will create a financial innovation to get around any regulation that interferes with their ability to make money.

One of the reasons that your humble blogger has pushed for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is it captures the exposure regardless of how the bankers package it.

Chinese banks are providing de facto guarantees to bonds issued by local government financing platforms, official media reported on Friday, raising new concerns about the risk of local government debt threatening the health of China's banking system. 
Direct guarantees of corporate bonds by commercial banks was once common practice, but was banned from 2008 in an effort to avoid excessive concentration of risk in the banking system. 
Recently, however, fundraising prospectuses for bond issuances by city investment companies frequently boast of so-called "liquidity support" from commercial banks, the official Shanghai Securities News reported. 
Such support is effectively a guarantee by a different name designed to circumvent the ban, the paper quoted industry sources as saying, enabling local governments to pay lower interest rates on the debt.... 
Concerns have risen since 2010, however, that such investments may fail to yield the cash flows necessary to service the debt, leading to a potential rise in bad loans that could threaten the health of the banking system.

Saturday, January 21, 2012

With effectiveness of additional liquidity diminishing, central banks show they are not answer to solvency crisis

Mohamed el-Erian wrote an interesting column for Project Syndicate in which he observed that the financial system's credit pipes have remained clogged since the beginning of the crisis in 2008 despite central banks providing massive amounts of liquidity to unclog them.

He then makes several recommendations for how to unclog the credit pipes whose adoption and implementation are independent of the central banks and under the control of global policymakers and regulators.

Several of these recommendations appear in the blueprint for saving the financial system.

More than three years after the global financial crisis, the world still has a nasty plumbing problem. Credit pipes remain clogged, and only central banks are working to clear them. 
But their ability to do so is waning, posing yet another set of risks for western economies blocked by too little growth, too much unemployment, deepening inequality, and debt in all the wrong places. 
Fortunately, it is not too late to build broader pipes that complement and replace the damaged infrastructure.... 
Central banks providing liquidity only buys time for the underlying solvency problem to be addressed.  By itself, liquidity does not fix the problem.  Mr. el-Erian confirms this with his observation that the credit pipes are still clogged despite all the liquidity central banks are providing.
The current situation embodies two narratives that seem contradictory, but are not.
One speaks to the reality that most large companies with access to capital markets have no problem securing new funding. In fact, they have been remarkably successful in lengthening their debt maturities, accumulating cash, and lowering their future interest payments. In sum, they now have "fortress" balance sheets. 
The other narrative speaks to an opposing, but equally valid reality. Too many small companies and households still find it difficult to borrow at reasonable terms. This includes those reliant on bank credit, as well as many mortgage holders with very high legacy interest rates and balances that exceed their homes' market value. 
From every angle, the extremity of this state of affairs – in which those with access to credit do not need it, and those who do cannot get it – is highly problematic.... 
In the next round, as the system slowly implodes, even those with healthy balance sheets would be impacted, accelerating their disengagement from a deleveraging world economy.
All of this slows social mobility, tears already-stretched safety nets, worsens inequality, and accentuates genuine concerns about the functioning and sustainability of today's global economic system....

At the beginning of the financial crisis, your humble blogger observed that until opacity was eliminated in the financial system, we would continue in a downward spiral.  Mr. el-Erian confirms this and describes how he sees the mechanism behind the downward spiral working.

Central banks have recognised all of this for some time, prompting them to take enormous reputational and operational risks to slow the process. They have implemented a host of "unconventional policies" that previously would have been deemed unthinkable, even outrageous – and that can be seen in the enormous growth in their balance sheets. 
In the last four years, the United States Federal Reserve's balance sheet has more than tripled, from under $1 trillion (£645bn) to a mammoth $3tn. The growth relative to the size of the economy is even more stunning – from slightly more than 5% of GDP to 20%. The Bank of England's balance sheet is also at 20% of GDP. And both seem to be itching to do even more. 
The European Central Bank is often viewed as a laggard. No longer. Its balance sheet has now doubled, to a whopping 30% of GDP – and it, too, appears set to do even more. Mario Draghi, the ECB's new president, recently said that he expects heavy take-up on the next three-year long-term refinancing operation, a powerful tool to pump cheap liquidity into the banks. 
Unfortunately, the economic outcomes have come nowhere close to matching the intensity of these efforts. Effectively, the central banks have been unconventional bridges to nowhere, owing mainly to their imperfect tools and other government agencies' inability or unwillingness to act. At some point – and we are nearing it – bridges to nowhere become a standalone risk: they can topple over....
The financial system is facing a solvency problem as the result of its credit bubble bursting.  As Japan has shown after 2+ decades of unconventional central bank policies, liquidity does not fix a solvency problem.

With its blueprint for saving the financial system, this blog has laid out how the solvency problem could be fixed.  What follows is Mr. el-Erian's proposed cures.
It is high time to move on five fronts, simultaneously: 
• Countries such as Spain and the US need to be more forceful in unblocking the housing sector by making overdue decisions on burden sharing, refinancing, and conversion of idle and foreclosed housing stock.
• Countries with excessive debt, such as Greece and Portugal, need to impose sizeable "haircuts" on creditors to have a reasonable chance of restoring medium-term debt sustainability and growth.

Under this blog's blueprint, Wall Street rescues Main Street by stepping up and absorbing the losses on the financial excesses whether these excesses be mortgage-related or sovereign debt.

There are a number of reasons that Wall Street should absorb these losses including 1) it is the responsibility of a lender to be prudent in their credit judgments and not to extend more credit than the borrower can repay; and 2) banks are beneficiaries of both deposit insurance and access to central bank liquidity and therefore are in a position to recapitalize themselves through retention of future earnings.

• In several western countries, public-private partnerships should be formed to finance urgently needed infrastructure investment.
Under this blog's blueprint, banks recapitalize themselves through retention of future earnings.  This frees up governments to spend money on stimulating economic growth including making infrastructure investments.
• Regulators should stop bickering about the future configuration of key financial institutions, and instead set a clearer multi-year vision that is also consistent across borders.
Requiring banks to adopt ultra transparency is the only regulation that needs to be globally adopted.  There is no ambiguity in banks disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With ultra transparency, financial institutions become subject to global market discipline.  This discipline, through higher cost of funds based on the risk of the individual financial institutions, will force the financial institutions to reduce their complexity and risk profile.
• Finally, governments should inform their electorates explicitly and comprehensively that a few contracts written during the inadvisable "great age" of leverage, debt, and credit entitlements cannot be met, and must be rewritten in a transparent way that strikes a balance between generations, labour and capital, and recipients and taxpayers.
See Wall Street absorbing losses on financial excesses above.
Such policies would allow healthy balance sheets around the world, both public and private, to engage in a pro-growth and pro-jobs process. They require leadership, focus, and education. Absent that, plumbing problems will become more acute, and the repairs more complex and threatening to virtually everyone – including both the "one percenters" and those who worrisomely are struggling at the margins of society.

Monday, January 16, 2012

Are central banks safe? Yes.

ZeroHedge ran an interesting post looking at a UBS study of the question "Are central banks safe?".  The UBS conclusion is "yes" pretty much regardless of how large their balance sheets become.  This is the result of their "privileged position to print fiat money" and lack of mark-to-market accounting.

Regular readers have known since October 2010 that "yes" was the answer since this blog ran the Free Lunch series of posts (see here, here, here and here).

These posts not only looked at the issue of "are the central banks safe", but then carried the analysis forward to examine "how the characteristics that make central banks safe could be used to address the issue of solvency in the financial system".

It is nice to have Wall Street confirm my analysis on central bank safety.

I expect Wall Street will shortly turn to the logical next issue of how to use the characteristic that makes central banks safe to address solvency in the financial system.  When they do so, they will confirm another element of my blueprint to save the financial system - the element being that central banks can supply all the funding to support an insolvent bank not provided by the bank's depositors.

The Free Lunch posts ran over a year ago, but then regular readers expect me to be ahead of the curve given my December 2007 comments preceding the financial institution blow-up phase of the financial crisis.
Central banks have adopted ever-more unconventional policies since the financial crisis erupted in 2007. Chiefly, their extraordinary responses have taken the following forms.

First, the Fed and the Bank of England have purchased government securities, ‘quasi’ government securities (e.g., eligible mortgage-backed securities in the US) or credit instruments on a scale not seen (outside of Japan) during the post-war era. Even the ECB has dabbled in bond-buying via its securities market program. Second, all three central banks have acted as large-scale lenders of last resort to banks. Since 2008, that designation includes investment banks that have acquired banking licenses, at least in the US. Finally, in their capacity as liquidity providers to the financial sector several central banks— among them the ECB and some of the national central banks within the Eurozone—have significantly lowered eligible collateral standards for banks seeking funding.

All that activity makes some folks nervous. In particular, two questions arise. First, could a central bank go bust and precipitate a liquidity crisis? Second, if a central bank gets into trouble, who stands behind it?

Below, we explore both questions. We conclude that, for the most part, fears of central bank insolvency leading to a collapse of liquidity and failure of the payments system are wide of the mark. But it is possible to imagine a central bank suffering large losses, enough to wipe out its capital and hence warrant recapitalization.

That’s where matters get complicated and potentially problematic. Recapitalization by the fiscal authority—where it exists—may require legislation, which introduces politics and potential delays into the picture. So even in the US or the UK, where national governments backstop the central bank, the politics of ‘bailing out’ the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England could become messy, potentially leading to a period of elevated market uncertainty.

But the greater challenge resides in the Eurozone. No central fiscal authority exists to backstop the ECB. And some of the ECB shareholders—the 27 national central banks of the EU—might also themselves become financially stressed in a scenario where the ECB faces large losses.

In the end, investors might conclude that given the unimaginable alternatives, EU national governments would step in to recapitalize the ECB and, where necessary, their national central banks. But the history of the Eurozone crisis has not offered many reassuring examples about the speed and effectiveness of Eurozone political decision-making. In terms of crisis management, the lesson from Europe thus far has been that, indeed, crisis precedes management. Investors could be forgiven for wondering whether central bank recapitalization might not require a crisis first. 
Why disorderly central bank default is unlikely

Central banks can become insolvent. Infrequently they do. But it is unusual for their losses, per se, to impair the functioning of the financial system. Indeed, losses at central banks are not the same things as losses among ordinary banks.

For one, central banks aren’t forced to mark-to-market their holdings or to provision against changes in the probability of credit losses. Dodgy assets can be held at par until losses materialize or until maturity.

But the most crucial distinction is that central banks borrow with the money they (and they alone) print. That money is fiat—irredeemable in anything but itself.
To fund its Treasury or mortgage-backed securities purchases in recent years, for instance, the Fed merely credited banks’ accounts at the Fed with the dollars it printed (electronically, of course).

That makes the central bank unique. Its creditors cannot change the terms on which it borrows. As a result, the capital position of central banks is all-but irrelevant—it neither affects the central bank’s cost of funds, nor its ability to fund itself.

The privileged position of issuing fiat money enables central banks to operate with skinny capital. The Fed’s capital is $50bn—not much when compared to a balance sheet over $2.5 trillion. Were it a bank, on the other hand, the Fed’s capital ratio of less than 2% would have already landed it in bankruptcy court. Moreover, central banks can tolerate write-downs. In part, that is because they don’t require capital to borrow. But equally, it is because they are moneymaking machines in a different sense as well—they make fat profits (known as seigniorage). Central banks enjoy unparalleled net interest margin (borrowing at near-zero interest rates [Central banks will incur borrowing costs to the extent they pay interest on reserves, but those ‘borrowing rates’ are typically very low—much lower than the yield on the assets they hold and much lower than any private sector financial intermediary could hope to attain.], while investing in much higher yielding government or credit securities). Last year, for example, the Fed earned $76.9bn in profit, more than its total capital base.
Typically, central banks return all but a small fraction of their earnings to the government. In bad times, however, those earnings could be used to offset realized losses, bolstering the capital of the central bank.

But the key point is this one—even if the central bank incurred sufficiently large losses to create a negative equity position, that outcome would not change its ability to borrow via securities purchases. In short, even negative equity (technical insolvency) would not prevent a central bank from performing its customary open market operations nor its lender of last resort function.[Some observers have noted that the ECB’s low seigniorage revenues do not provide the same ‘earnings-based’ capital cushion available to other central banks. But the essential point is that capital does not determine the central bank’s ability to perform its mandated functions.] So when does a central bank actually go bust? The answer is when it cannot make payments, which would be the case if the central bank borrowed in foreign currency (i.e., money which it cannot ‘print’). That is not the case for the Fed, BoE or ECB—the liabilities of all three central banks are almost exclusively in their own currency.[In the event a country exits the Eurozone, its central bank would issue new national fiat currency, effectively re-denominating its liabilities.]

So if central bank capital is all but irrelevant, why have it? Alternatively, why worry if it is eroded by losses?

The answer may be, in part, optics.[The statutes of central banks may also require it.] No one, not even a central banker, wants negative net worth. But more subtly, it is also undesirable to incentivize central banks to maximize seigniorage (i.e., to earn their capital). After all, given a fixed net interest margin, maximizing seigniorage is about boosting assets ‘under management’. In turn, that requires creating excess money, which raises the risk of inflation. So the preferred public policy is to endow central banks with capital rather than to compel them, however infrequently, to earn it. Lastly, the source of central bank capital—the national government—acts a subtle yet powerful reminder that the central bank is not utterly independent, but ultimately is answerable to the taxpayer. 
The Eurozone is different

That’s why recapitalization is probable if a central bank suffers large enough losses to wipe out its capital.

So who recapitalizes the central bank? And why is the Eurozone different?

Insofar as central banks are a part of government [Technically and historically, this is not quite right. Central banks historically may have public-private roots. The Fed is a quasigovernmental organization and, as noted earlier, the ECB shareholders are the 27 national central banks of the EU. But insofar as they deliver public goods (a medium of exchange and, hopefully, price stability) and because they have (near) monopoly issuance of money, they are commonly assumed to be part of government.], the taxpayer ultimately stands behind them, at least where a central (federal) government exists. In the event necessary, it is widely assumed that the Treasury (or a European Finance Ministry) would recapitalize its national central bank.
Yet the act of doing so is a fiscal transfer, making it subject to legislative approval.It isn’t far-fetched, therefore, to imagine that if a central bank required a capital infusion, politics would intrude. To be sure, even if recapitalization were held up by politics, the central bank could perform its mandated duties, as previously noted. But political intervention could have other unsettling byproducts, such as de jure or de facto restrictions on the central bank’s operational independence (or even its revocation altogether).

The Eurozone is a special case because there is no central (or federal) government that stands ready to recapitalize the ECB. Moreover, some of the ECB shareholders (the national central banks) might find themselves in a pinch at the same time that the ECB needs a capital top-up. That’s because some Eurozone national central banks have similar or worse ‘risk asset’ exposures than the ECB. For example, via the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility, several national central banks have extended considerable collateralized lending to banks in their countries, reportedly accepting even weaker collateral than the ECB has in its own operations.Accordingly, it is possible that a series of Eurozone sovereign or banking defaults could simultaneously erode the capital position of the ECB and those of some of its shareholding national central banks. That outcome would imply that central bank recapitalization would have to be led by a subset of creditor countries (i.e., Germany). That’s potentially a problem—recent history reminds us that Europe’s creditors have a proclivity for prevarication where asymmetric bailouts are involved. 
Summary and conclusions
Central banks have taken on more risk in recent years. That’s been necessary and highly desirable during the most severe financial crisis since the 1930s, followed by the ‘great recession’. One shudders to think of the consequences of the alternative—‘Austrian’ central bankers running the show.

Yet the actions of central bankers in recent years may yet have undesired consequences. Central banks have claimed to have exercised prudence in demanding sufficient collateral and adjusting ‘haircuts’ to the value of collateral. But with central bank balance sheets swollen relative to their capital and a second recession underway in Europe, credit losses could mount. Stuff happens.

To emphasize, the risk is not that large central bank losses would impair the ability of the monetary authorities to provide liquidity, conduct open market operations, target policy rates, or safeguard the payments system. Rather, in the event that losses wipe out too much of their capital, the chief risk becomes the intrusion of politics into central banking. It might even bring about the end of independent central banks.

Monday, January 2, 2012

Germany looking at 75% writedown on Greek debts

A Bloomberg article reports that Germany is looking at making private sector investors in Greek sovereign debt take a 75% haircut.

Clearly, this will be the first of many forced haircuts as it will be impossible for politicians in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy to suggest to their voters that they should endure significant amounts of austerity rather than have the private sector (aka, banks) absorb the losses.

This is particularly true given that banks have a special role as the safety valve circuit breaker between the excesses of the financial markets and the real economy.  In a world where bank deposits are guaranteed, banks can absorb the losses from debt write-downs and still continue to operate despite massive amount of negative book equity.

Germany’s government declined to comment on a report that it may push for creditors to accept bigger losses on Greek debt than previously agreed upon, saying only that talks on lowering Greece’s debt level may end soon. 
Germany is studying a proposal to write down 75 percent of Greek government bonds held by private creditors as part of a planned debt swap to ensure greater debt sustainability, Greek news website Euro2day.gr reported today, without citing anyone. 
Under the terms of Greece’s 130 billion-euro ($168 billion) second bailout backed by European leaders in October, investors would take a 50 percent hit on the nominal value of 206 billion euros of privately owned debt. 
Talks are ongoing about the specifics of the role of the private sector and Germany assumes that the negotiations will end soon, the Finance Ministry in Berlin said in an e-mailed response to the Greek report, without elaborating.... 
Greece’s creditors are resisting pressure from the International Monetary Fund to accept bigger losses on holdings of the nation’s government bonds, three people with direct knowledge of the discussions said last month.
Of course the banks are resisting, because once everyone realizes that banks can in fact take write-downs and still keep operating, write-downs will become the solution du jour.
Greece’s debt will balloon to almost twice the size of its economy this year without a write-off accord with investors, the IMF said Dec. 13. 
At a Dec. 9 European summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel backed away from a prior demand that bondholders shoulder losses in any future euro-area rescue, saying that Greece was a “special case.”

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

The Euro crisis deepens

In his Guardian column, Aditya Chakrabortty lays out all the facts that support his observation that the Euro crisis is getting worse.

He then asks the question of why have the Eurozone policymakers and financial regulators been unable to end the crisis.

The answer is that the Eurozone and the rest of the global financial system are facing a solvency crisis that they have been treating as a liquidity crisis since 2008.  Treating the symptom is kicking the can down the road and not curing the cause.

Europe's leaders have spent most of the euro crisis denying there's a euro crisis....
The denialism ended this summer, as the financial bushfire moved to Italy and even began to menace Belgium and France.... If the rhetoric and the not-so-faint snobbery have vanished, to be replaced by panic about "a last wakeup call" and "a crucial crossroads", the actual policy-making is as clueless as ever.... 
The eurocrats can impose austerity, and bring in Goldman Sachs employees such as Mario Monti to run newly impoverished economies; but anything that might actually break the fire still eludes them. 
In the meantime, the crisis has just kept growing. 
Which is exactly what you would expect given that they are focused on treating the liquidity symptoms and not the underlying solvency cause of the crisis.
In February 2010, Greece needed to raise just €53bn for the entire year; now euro leaders are looking for a trillion euros and counting. Compare and contrast: in his memoirs, Alistair Darling recounts that it took ministers and officials 10 days and one curry-fuelled all-nighter in autumn 2008 to hammer out the complex and costly combination of ready cash, loans and guarantees that saved the British banking system....
Actually, they did not save the British banking system.  They kicked the can of solvency down the road.

Incidentally, these same policies were adopted by both the US and the Eurozone.

Does anyone really believe that the large British banks are solvent given the fact that their exposure to Eurozone governments and banks vastly exceeds their equity?
A good rule of thumb in this crisis is that when a European state pays more to borrow than an ordinary taxpayer shells out for a bank loan, the government eventually has to call in the rescue brigade. 
For much of November, Italy was borrowing at a rate of 7% – and probably the only thing that has kept interest rates from going higher still is that the European Central Bank (ECB) has been buying Rome's IOUs. 
In other words, the markets trust the Italian state – with its own tax-raising powers – less than it does a couple in Kettering who'd quite like a new kitchen. Which, given that Italy plans to roll over more than €360bn (£310bn) of debt next year, is hardly sustainable for the new prime minister Mario Monti. Indeed, on 1 February, Rome will have to either repay or renew €28bn of loans. Even now, no one has the faintest idea how it will do that.  
Over the next couple of months, Italy's crisis can go one of three ways: either the ECB keeps on buying its bonds, with the blessing of northern-European voters and markets; or ECB head Mario Draghi pledges to fund financially distressed eurozone governments; or Rome gives in and calls for a bail-out. If the last even looks likely, financiers will almost certainly panic that Italy is about to default on its debt. With about a third of the country's bonds held abroad, this could wreak chaos in world markets – including in Britain, which is by far the biggest foreign owner of BTPs. That's the sort of event Barack Obama has in mind when he remarks that Europe's crisis is "scaring the world". 
The idea that owners of Italy's debt might have to take a haircut is not what scares the world.  What scares the world is no-one knows who is holding onto the losses.  It is the possibility of contagion pulling down the global financial system that scares the world.

Regular readers know that the way to eliminate the fear of contagion pulling down the global financial system is not more expensive bailouts, but disclosure.  Specifically, every bank must be required to provide ultra transparency by disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this data, everyone knows who is holding the losses.  More importantly, market participants can take steps to adjust the amount and price of their exposure so that they do not lose more than they can afford to lose.

As for the banks in any country that sees its sovereign default, what is needed is a backstop to the sovereign's guarantee of the banks' deposits.  In Europe, this backstop could be provided by the EFSF or the ESM.  The backstop is needed to prevent a run on the banks.

It must be remembered that history has shown that banks with negative book equity can continue to operate and provide loans and payment services.
Rome's not the only government whose finances are in jeopardy; Madrid is in the same boat, while Brussels and Paris have also seen a surge in loan rates. 
Less often talked about is that many of Europe's banks, even well-known French names, are unable to borrow unless from the ECB. "You have European banks nowadays claiming they're not European at all because they're worried the very word will scare away investors," says Grant Lewis, head of research at Daiwa Europe. That credit crunch cannot carry on for much longer without causing either a full-scale banking crisis or throttling economic growth. 
Not that there's much growth to be had, because the prescription of austerity for sick economies simply makes them sicker. By the IMF's own projections, 2012 will be Greece's fifth straight year in recession, which by now should really be termed a depression...

Monday, December 26, 2011

UK Treasury working on plans for euro failure

The Telegraph reports that the UK Treasury is working on contingency plans in the event that the Eurozone breaks up.

My attention was drawn to what the UK would do in the event that depositors in the Eurozone elected to deposit their money in the UK.

Regular readers know that Eurozone depositors are already pulling their money out of banks in Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy.  The first place they transferred their deposits to was Switzerland, but Swiss authorities have been aggressive about stopping this inflow.  The second place they transferred their deposits to has been Germany; shown by the massive recirculation of euros through the German central bank.

While I only have anecdotal evidence, it appears that the way the Eurozone depositors are transferring their funds to the UK is through the purchase of high end real estate.  This is not surprising given that the rich would move their money first.

The Treasury is working on contingency plans for the disintegration of the single currency that include capital controls. 
The preparations are being made only for a worst-case scenario and would run alongside similar limited capital controls across Europe, imposed to reduce the economic fall-out of a break-up and to ease the transition to new currencies. 
Officials fear that if one member state left the euro, investors in both that country and other vulnerable eurozone nations would transfer their funds to safe havens abroad. 
Capital flight from weak euro nations to countries such as the UK would drive up sterling, dealing a devastating blow to the Government’s plans to rebalance the economy towards exports. 
Earlier this year, Switzerland was forced to peg its currency to the euro to protect the economy after a massive appreciation in the Swiss franc due to spiralling fears over Europe.... 
Britain’s response to the possible break up of the euro would reflect measures taken by Argentina when it dropped the dollar peg in 2002, according to sources. 
In addition to the risk of an appreciating currency, dealing with potential UK corporate exposures to the euro poses a considerable challenge for the Treasury. 
Britain’s top four banks have about £170bn of exposure to the troubled periphery of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain through loans to companies, households, rival banks and holdings of sovereign debt. For Barclays and Royal Bank of Scotland, the loans equate to more than their entire equity capital buffer. 
Under European Union rules, capital controls can only be used in an emergency to impose “quantitative restrictions” on inflows, which would require agreement of the majority of EU members. Controls can only be put in place for six months, at which point an application would have to be made to renew them. 
Capital controls form just one part of a broader response to a euro break-up, however. Borders are expected to be closed and the Foreign Office is preparing to evacuate thousands of British expatriates and holidaymakers from stricken countries....

A break up of the euro would have a devastating impact on the UK. HSBC economists have warned that it could trigger a global depression and forecasters at the Centre for Economic & Business Research reckon it would knock about a percentage point off UK growth – plunging the country into a full-blown recession in 2012. 
The scale of economic problems alongside the existing debt burden would leave the Government with little in its armoury to combat the collapse, making capital controls one of the few viable options.

Friday, December 23, 2011

Eurozone banks confirm interbank loan market frozen, ECB deposits reach new 2011 highs

One of the signs of a solvency crisis is when the interbank loan market is frozen.  Banks refuse to lend to each other because they cannot determine if the borrower is solvent or not and if not solvent, whether they will repay the loan or not.

The Wall Street Journal ran an article that showed the Eurozone interbank loan market is frozen and treating it with massive amounts of liquidity is ineffective as the issue is one of solvency.
Use of the European Central Bank's overnight deposit facility reached a new record high for the year Thursday, suggesting recent measures by central banks and policy makers still aren't enough to restore confidence in inter-bank lending markets. 
Banks deposited €346.99 billion ($453.38 billion) in the overnight deposit facility, up from €264.97 billion a day earlier and a previous high for the year of €346.36 billion, reached earlier this month. 
The high level reflects ongoing distrust in inter-bank lending markets, where banks prefer using the ECB facility as a safe haven for excess funds rather than lending them to other banks. 
The high deposit level also suggests markets aren't fully convinced that the ECB's massive long-term loan allotment is enough to fortify the currency bloc's banking sector. 
The central bank extended nearly half a trillion euros in long-term loans to euro-zone banks Wednesday, hoping to ease fears of a new credit crunch as banks struggle to borrow from markets. 
Separate actions in recent weeks by central banks and policy makers have also sought to make dollar loans cheaper for euro-zone banks and to boost fiscal integration in the bloc.... 
The ECB further said banks borrowed €6.34 billion from the ECB's overnight lending facility, compared with €7.55 billion borrowed a day earlier. When markets are functioning properly, banks only use the facility to the tune of a few hundred million euros overnight.

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

Have we reached the end for the ability of regulators and central banks to hide the losses in the financial system?

As regular readers know, since the beginning of the solvency crisis in 2007, I have been saying that the global economy is in a downward spiral with no logical stopping point until such time as transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system (for starters, this includes banks and structured finance securities).

This prediction was based on two simple observations.

  • First, everyone knows that as a result of the credit bubble bursting the banks have hidden losses on their balance sheets (no we were not fooled by the end of mark to market accounting or adoption of extend and pretend under regulatory forbearance).  


  • Second, Japan has shown with its 2+ lost decades what happens to an economy when policymakers and regulators develop a pathological obsession with helping the banks hide their losses.

For almost 4 years, I have watched policymakers and financial regulators in the US, UK and Europe chose policies that reflect this same pathological obsession with the same or even worse results.

During that time period, I have continued to say that requiring ultra transparency is the simple solution that saves the global economy.  It worked for FDR and his administration and there is no reason to think it would not work now!!!

As I look at the Eurozone banks signing up for funds from the ECB, it has become clear that we have reached the end for the ability of regulators and central bankers to hide the losses in the global financial system.

The reality is that we have a global solvency crisis that central bankers are attacking with the only weapon they have:  massive liquidity.

The Eurozone banks loaded up on central bank funds because investors recognize the banks are insolvent and won't give banks any new funds.  In countries where there is doubt about the solvency of the government, we have been seeing runs on the banks (please note that as long as depositors think they can always get their money back under a government guarantee, depositors don't care about the solvency of the bank).

The crisis of confidence is escalating as the pace of investor/depositor flight is increasing; particularly with the regulator inspired credit crunch and its related economic slowdown and further increase in bad debt impacting the Eurozone.

The question is will the ongoing loss of confidence and related plunge in the economy finally overwhelm the policymakers and regulators pathological obsession with helping the banks to hide their losses?
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A quick question: When is a bank no longer a bank?  Is this point reached when a bank receives more of its funding from the central bank than it does from depositors and investors?

Monday, December 12, 2011

The Fed continues to promote opacity in the financial system

Bloomberg ran an article that asked the question of who was the ultimate borrower from the Fed's central bank swap facilities.

As regular readers know and Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel prize winning economist, observed

the “fundamental problem” is that capital markets need information to work properly, yet the Fed is saying, “we believe in capital-market discipline without information.”
Please re-read Professor Stiglitz comment as it is one of the central themes that your humble blogger has been discussing since before the beginning of the solvency crisis on August 9, 2007.

This comment does not just apply to the Fed's central bank swap facilities.  It applies to every interaction between the Fed and the financial system including loans to the banks under all the various Fed programs as well as to regulatory oversight of the banks.

For all the transparency forced on the Federal Reserve by Congress and the courts, one of the central bank’s emergency-lending programs remains so secretive that names of borrowers may be hidden from the Fed itself. 
As part of a currency-swap plan active from 2007 to 2010 and revived to fight the European debt crisis, the Fed lends dollars to other central banks, which auction them to local commercial banks. Lending peaked at $586 billion in December 2008. 
While the transactions with other central banks are all disclosed, the Fed doesn’t track where the dollars ultimately end up, and European officials don’t share borrowers’ identities outside the continent. 
The lack of openness may leave the U.S. government and public in the dark on the beneficiaries and potential risks from one of the Fed’s largest crisis-loan programs. 
The European Central Bank’s three-month dollar lending through the swap lines surged last week to $50.7 billion from $400 million after the Nov. 30 announcement that the Fed, in concert with the ECB and four other central banks, lowered the interest rate by a half percentage point. 
“Increased transparency is warranted here,” given the size of the Fed’s aid and current pressures on European banks, said Representative Randy Neugebauer, a Texas Republican who heads the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 
Whether the U.S. should make disclosure of the recipients a condition of the swap lines is “probably a discussion we need to have,” possibly in a hearing that includes Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Neugebauer said.

The secrecy surrounding foreign central banks’ emergency lending contrasts with unprecedented transparency at the Fed, which was compelled by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and court-upheld Freedom of Information Act requests to release details on more than a dozen programs used to combat the U.S. financial crisis from 2007 through 2010. Bernanke this year began holding regular press conferences and has said he is considering ways to make the Fed’s objectives more clear to the public. 
Michelle Smith, a Fed spokeswoman, said there is “no formal reporting channel” for the identities of borrowers from other central banks, which are the Fed’s only counterparties on the swap lines and assume any credit risk. 
“U.S. taxpayers have never lost a penny” on the program, she said. “Decisions about disclosure by foreign central banks of their financial arrangements with financial institutions in their jurisdictions is an issue for the foreign central banks.”...
Foreign central banks borrowed dollars from the Fed for terms as long as three months in return for euros, pounds and yen. The ECB accounted for 80 percent of total swap-line loans during the mortgage-induced financial crisis, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the congressional auditor. The ECB won’t publicly disclose names of borrowers under any circumstances and doesn’t share the identities outside the 17 euro-area central banks, a spokesman wrote in an e-mail. 
“These banks have a right to enjoy the standard confidentiality attached to banking transactions,” the spokesman wrote. 
In Europe, bank may have the right not to provide ultra transparency.  In the US, banks and regulators lost this right, if they actually ever had it, when taxpayers had to be tapped to deal with the solvency crisis of 2007.
European officials may be concerned that future lending might be inhibited by a “stigma phenomenon” if past borrowers are made public, said Ralph Bryant, former director of the Fed’s international-finance division and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. The concept is “usually overplayed by people, but it’s not something that’s trivial.”
Actually, the stigma phenomenon was made up by the Fed to justify secrecy over its discount window loans.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency by disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants would know exactly how much they were borrowing from the Fed.

When banks are providing ultra transparency, it is fundamentally naive to believe that market participants cannot tell the difference between a solvent and an insolvent bank.  As a result, market participants know exactly how to interpret any Fed lending, whether discount or through some other program, to a bank.

There is no stigma for the bank that receives this money as market participants already know why it is needed.
The Bank of Japan, which tapped 3.9 percent of the aggregate swap dollars according to the GAO, has no plans to publicize borrowers’ identities and declined to comment on whether it shares the names with the Fed, a spokesman said. The Swiss National Bank, which accounted for 4.6 percent, “as a matter of principle” doesn’t publish counterparties, said Walter Meier, a spokesman. 
The Bank of England doesn’t publish details of individual financial institutions’ use of its facilities. Confidence in banks “can best be sustained” if support is disclosed “only when conditions giving rise to potentially systemic disturbance have improved,” it said in its annual report....
There is not a single shred of evidence to support the BoE's claim.  There is nothing.

As this blog and the NY Fed documented, there is considerable evidence that confidence in banks is best sustained through disclosure.  It was disclosure of all the useful, relevant information for depositors, namely an implied 100% guarantee of deposits, that broke the back of the Great Depression and ended bank runs by retail depositors.
Bernanke didn’t know which financial institutions got dollar loans, he said during a July 2009 House Financial Services Committee hearing. 
Not having the identities would restrict the Fed’s ability to understand the “overall risk exposure of the institutions it’s supervising,” said Robert Eisenbeis, a former research director at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta who’s now chief monetary economist for Sarasota, Florida-based Cumberland Advisors Inc. 
It just doesn't restrict the Fed's ability to understand overall risk, it also restricts market participants ability to assess each bank's risk.