Showing posts with label Liquidity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Liquidity. Show all posts

Monday, January 7, 2013

Banks' win on liquidity coverage ratio calls into question central bank role as lender of last resort

Across both the mainstream media and the blogosphere it has been unanimously concluded that the banks "won" when the Basel Committee dramatically loosened both the definition of securities that qualify for inclusion in the liquidity coverage ratio and delayed when LCR becomes effective.

Only Bloomberg reported the far more interesting implication for central banks in their lender of last resort role.
The LCR would force banks to hold enough easy-to-sell assets to survive a 30-day credit squeeze. It’s a key component of a package of capital and liquidity measures, known as Basel III, drawn up to avoid a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis.... 
“The committee and the regulatory community more generally felt it was appropriate to broaden the class of liquid assets,” King said. “That doesn’t mean to say it’s a loosening of the whole regime.” 
The additional securities will get bigger writedowns to their value than those that would have been eligible under the 2010 LCR. They also won’t be allowed to count for more than 15 percent of a bank’s LCR buffer. 
Supervisors will have discretion to decide whether the reserves lenders keep with central banks will count towards the LCR. Regulators will also continue to assess how the LCR will interact with liquidity support measures provided by national central banks, the GHOS said. 
“It became clear during the process of discussing all this that it didn’t make sense really to think about an LCR without having a clear view about what to make of access to central bank facilities,” King said.
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Mr. King has just pointed out the simple fact that banks have infinite liquidity due to their ability to borrow from their central banks.

Plus, borrowing from central banks has long been part of implementing monetary policy.  Thirty plus years ago when Paul Volcker led the Fed in its fight to break the back of inflation, banks would routinely borrow at the discount window if they did not have enough reserves.

The entire discussion of LCR exists because of central bank's lender of last resort role.

As a lender of last resort, central banks are suppose to lend at high interest rates against good collateral. The problem is how does a central bank know what is good collateral.

LCR is a method for the central banks to ensure themselves that the banks are carrying a certain amount of good collateral.

Everyone knows that the liquidity held under LCR is inadequate to address a run on the bank.  LCR is discussed in terms of what happens if a bank cannot role over its funding from the capital market.  It doesn't address the issue of what happens if depositors line up around the block.

As I said, LCR is about nothing more than assuring the central banks that banks are holding some good collateral.

The alternative to LCR is to simply require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market participants will value all of the assets on each bank's balance sheet.  This directly answers the question of how good is the bank's collateral.

Bottom-line:  the banks 'won' because LCR is nothing more than the substitution of a complex regulation for transparency.

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Bank of England's Robert Jenkins: Prepare for Lehmans re-run

According to a Telegraph article, the Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins told the Global Alternative Investment Management conference in Monaco
Banks and traders must prepare for a devastating market seizure as governments grapple with the escalating economic crisis in Europe... 
Cheap and ready access to the liquid assets that oil the financial markets are under threat from both state-imposed capital controls and flagging confidence in the euro... 
Without easy access to liquidity, markets could seize in a re-run of the credit crunch after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.... 
“Those of you who traded asset backed securities in 2008 can testify to the speed with which liquidity can disappear,” .... “Yet despite these examples, many continue to assume that ... ‘liquidity’ is free and will be freely available.
Thanks Mr. Jenkins for confirming what your humble blogger has been talking about since the beginning of the financial crisis.  Specifically, that for all the sound and fury coming from the policymakers and the financial regulators, none of it actually addressed the fundamental issue of restoring investor confidence.

At the beginning of the financial crisis, the policymakers and financial regulators chose the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  This model is based on maintaining the deception that banks have positive book capital levels.

To support this deception, governments adopt a host of policies like bailouts, regulatory forbearance and stress tests.

The result of all this deception has been a dangled web of policies that further undermine investor confidence.

Investor confidence is not something that governments can provide directly.  Rather, it is the result of providing investors with all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that investors can independently assess this information.

Confidence flows because investors trust their own analysis.

This point is critically important.

For example, investors don't trust the repeated statements by financial regulators that the banks passed a stringent stress test.  In the absence of ultra transparency where the banks disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details and investors can independently confirm this fact, why should they?

In fact, the lack of ultra transparency is a sign to investors that both financial regulators and the banks have something to hide.  This fact has been confirmed with the nationalization of several banks subsequent to their passing a stress test.

Since implementation of the Japanese model does not promote confidence, Mr. Jenkins correctly observes that liquidity will not always be available.  Confirmation of this is easy to see in the ongoing freeze in the interbank lending and the unsecured bank debt markets.

I am already on record for saying the financial markets are prone to freezing because of the lack of ultra transparency.  When investors cannot assess the risk of an investment, most of the time, they don't make the investment.

The question is when will policymakers and financial regulators stop engaging in deception and instead  bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system and end the financial crisis?

Saturday, June 16, 2012

Regulators prepare to back down on bank liquidity requirements

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, under intense industry lobbying, banking regulators are preparing to back down and soften their recently adopted policy requiring banks to hold a minimum percentage of their assets in liquid investments.

This is another glaring example of why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Unlike liquidity requirements that are unnecessary and capital requirements which are meaningless, ultra transparency allows market discipline to act on the banking sector and force the banks to recognize all the bad debt on and off their balance sheets.

Liquidity requirements are unnecessary because in a modern financial system banks have access to central bank funding.  The limit to a bank's liquidity is approximately the market value of its assets.  That liquidity requirements are unnecessary was confirmed by the Bank of England's Mervyn King.
"In current exceptional conditions, where central banks stand ready to provide extraordinary amounts of liquidity against a wide range of collateral, the need for banks to hold large liquid asset buffers is much diminished," .... "I hope regulators around the world will take note."
Capital requirements have been meaningless since the adoption at the beginning of the financial crisis of regulatory forbearance which allowed banks to keep zombie borrowers alive with 'extend and pretend' techniques and rendered bank book capital meaningless.  This comes from the OECD.

Ultimately, the only requirement that matters is ultra transparency.  Without it, banks are 'black boxes' holding an unknown amount of risk and bad debt that is dragging down the real economy.

With ultra transparency, the risk of each bank is known, the financial system has been cleansed of bad debts as they have been recognized and the real economy is growing again as it is relieved of the burden of carrying excess debt.

Friday, January 27, 2012

Eurozone banks face question of what to do with ECB provided liquidity

The Wall Street Journal published an article discussing what Eurozone banks are going to do with the ECB provided liquidity.

The article confirms what your humble blogger has said previously.  Specifically, that the money is not going to be used to fund new loans because of the pursuit of the 9% Tier I capital ratio, but rather hoarded.
After receiving nearly half a trillion euros in cheap loans from the European Central Bank last month, the Continent's banks face a dilemma: to invest the money in lucrative but potentially risky government bonds or hoard the cash at a loss. 
The choice reflects the uncertainty surrounding Europe's financial system at a time when dark clouds continue to hover over the euro-zone economy and its common currency. Regardless of whether banks use the money to buy bonds or simply stash it at the central bank for safekeeping, consumers and businesses are unlikely to see much of the funds pumped back into the economy in the form of loans. 
The ECB in December extended about €489 billion ($640.88 billion) in three-year loans to hundreds of banks that operate in the euro zone. The loan program was primarily designed to fend off a potential cash crunch. European banks face hundreds of billions of euros of debt coming due this year and, with funding markets shut to all but the strongest institutions, some banks faced the prospect of serious liquidity problems.
Bankers and government officials gathered in Davos, Switzerland, this week for the World Economic Forum are virtually unanimous that the ECB's loans have eliminated such fears, at least for now. And the ECB is poised at the end of February to offer banks another chance to take out the loans. Bankers and analysts expect them to borrow hundreds of billions more. 
The ECB loan program provides "a very significant degree of breathing space to banks," said Adair Turner, chairman of the U.K.'s Financial Services Authority, in an interview here. 
But bank executives say lenders are taking radically different views on how to use the money.
Some are squirreling it away. In at least some cases, that means parking the funds back at the ECB in a facility that houses bank deposits overnight.
 
Thanks to the ECB loans, the banking industry is "awash with liquidity, although I have to admit that most of that liquidity goes back to the ECB overnight," said Francisco Gonzalez, chairman of Spanish lender Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA. 
That sentiment, echoed privately by other senior European bank executives in Davos this week, also is apparent in the amounts housed in the ECB's overnight deposit facility....
The downside is that leaving the money in the deposit facility is a money-losing proposition. The ECB pays a paltry 0.25% interest rate—less than the 1% that banks were charged to borrow from the ECB in the first place. 
But it offers banks the comfort of knowing their funds are safe. Industry experts said this week that such safety is more valuable in the current environment, especially for lenders in troubled countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. "'Survival first' will have to be the mantra for most banks in peripheral European countries," analysts at RBC Capital Markets wrote. 
"Those [banks] with liquidity are parking it with central banks. Those without liquidity are borrowing from central banks," said Peter Sands, chief executive of U.K. bank Standard Chartered PLC, which didn't borrow funds from the ECB. "So instead of being the lender of last resort in times of crisis, central banks have become the central actor."
This way the ECB takes on the credit risk of the borrowing bank which the lending bank is not able to determine because of opacity.
Other bankers and investors said several lenders are using the funds to snap up large quantities of government bonds in stressed countries. The theory: The banks could pocket a tidy profit thanks to high interest rates on the government bonds. 
That, in turn, could defuse governments' financial problems and simultaneously help repair banks' balance sheets by boosting their profits.... 
But it exposes banks to the risk of drops in the price of the bonds, particularly if the European crisis takes a turn for the worse....
Even if banks are using the funds to buy government debt, that won't necessarily provide permanent relief to cash-strapped European governments. "Without greater demand from nonbank investors, the level of supply absorption may not be sustainable," said Guy Mandy, a European rates strategist at Nomura, on an investor call Thursday. 
Some bank executives said they are loath to publicly confirm they are using ECB funds to buy government bonds for fear of public criticism that they are using central banks' money for a quick buck rather than to help kick-start the European economy by lending the funds to customers. 
Some bank executives said the ECB money will eventually trickle down into loans to businesses and individuals. 
"The cost of funding is going down very rapidly. That will put more money in the margins of the banking system, which is good because in order to give credit you need strong banks," said BBVA's Mr. Gonzalez. "We are in the process of filtering that money down to the real economy."
Actually, you do not need "strong banks" to provide credit.  As shown by the US Savings and Loans in the late 1980s, insolvent banks can provide credit.  In addition, there is the entire structured finance industry and shadow banking system to provide credit. 



Saturday, January 21, 2012

With effectiveness of additional liquidity diminishing, central banks show they are not answer to solvency crisis

Mohamed el-Erian wrote an interesting column for Project Syndicate in which he observed that the financial system's credit pipes have remained clogged since the beginning of the crisis in 2008 despite central banks providing massive amounts of liquidity to unclog them.

He then makes several recommendations for how to unclog the credit pipes whose adoption and implementation are independent of the central banks and under the control of global policymakers and regulators.

Several of these recommendations appear in the blueprint for saving the financial system.

More than three years after the global financial crisis, the world still has a nasty plumbing problem. Credit pipes remain clogged, and only central banks are working to clear them. 
But their ability to do so is waning, posing yet another set of risks for western economies blocked by too little growth, too much unemployment, deepening inequality, and debt in all the wrong places. 
Fortunately, it is not too late to build broader pipes that complement and replace the damaged infrastructure.... 
Central banks providing liquidity only buys time for the underlying solvency problem to be addressed.  By itself, liquidity does not fix the problem.  Mr. el-Erian confirms this with his observation that the credit pipes are still clogged despite all the liquidity central banks are providing.
The current situation embodies two narratives that seem contradictory, but are not.
One speaks to the reality that most large companies with access to capital markets have no problem securing new funding. In fact, they have been remarkably successful in lengthening their debt maturities, accumulating cash, and lowering their future interest payments. In sum, they now have "fortress" balance sheets. 
The other narrative speaks to an opposing, but equally valid reality. Too many small companies and households still find it difficult to borrow at reasonable terms. This includes those reliant on bank credit, as well as many mortgage holders with very high legacy interest rates and balances that exceed their homes' market value. 
From every angle, the extremity of this state of affairs – in which those with access to credit do not need it, and those who do cannot get it – is highly problematic.... 
In the next round, as the system slowly implodes, even those with healthy balance sheets would be impacted, accelerating their disengagement from a deleveraging world economy.
All of this slows social mobility, tears already-stretched safety nets, worsens inequality, and accentuates genuine concerns about the functioning and sustainability of today's global economic system....

At the beginning of the financial crisis, your humble blogger observed that until opacity was eliminated in the financial system, we would continue in a downward spiral.  Mr. el-Erian confirms this and describes how he sees the mechanism behind the downward spiral working.

Central banks have recognised all of this for some time, prompting them to take enormous reputational and operational risks to slow the process. They have implemented a host of "unconventional policies" that previously would have been deemed unthinkable, even outrageous – and that can be seen in the enormous growth in their balance sheets. 
In the last four years, the United States Federal Reserve's balance sheet has more than tripled, from under $1 trillion (£645bn) to a mammoth $3tn. The growth relative to the size of the economy is even more stunning – from slightly more than 5% of GDP to 20%. The Bank of England's balance sheet is also at 20% of GDP. And both seem to be itching to do even more. 
The European Central Bank is often viewed as a laggard. No longer. Its balance sheet has now doubled, to a whopping 30% of GDP – and it, too, appears set to do even more. Mario Draghi, the ECB's new president, recently said that he expects heavy take-up on the next three-year long-term refinancing operation, a powerful tool to pump cheap liquidity into the banks. 
Unfortunately, the economic outcomes have come nowhere close to matching the intensity of these efforts. Effectively, the central banks have been unconventional bridges to nowhere, owing mainly to their imperfect tools and other government agencies' inability or unwillingness to act. At some point – and we are nearing it – bridges to nowhere become a standalone risk: they can topple over....
The financial system is facing a solvency problem as the result of its credit bubble bursting.  As Japan has shown after 2+ decades of unconventional central bank policies, liquidity does not fix a solvency problem.

With its blueprint for saving the financial system, this blog has laid out how the solvency problem could be fixed.  What follows is Mr. el-Erian's proposed cures.
It is high time to move on five fronts, simultaneously: 
• Countries such as Spain and the US need to be more forceful in unblocking the housing sector by making overdue decisions on burden sharing, refinancing, and conversion of idle and foreclosed housing stock.
• Countries with excessive debt, such as Greece and Portugal, need to impose sizeable "haircuts" on creditors to have a reasonable chance of restoring medium-term debt sustainability and growth.

Under this blog's blueprint, Wall Street rescues Main Street by stepping up and absorbing the losses on the financial excesses whether these excesses be mortgage-related or sovereign debt.

There are a number of reasons that Wall Street should absorb these losses including 1) it is the responsibility of a lender to be prudent in their credit judgments and not to extend more credit than the borrower can repay; and 2) banks are beneficiaries of both deposit insurance and access to central bank liquidity and therefore are in a position to recapitalize themselves through retention of future earnings.

• In several western countries, public-private partnerships should be formed to finance urgently needed infrastructure investment.
Under this blog's blueprint, banks recapitalize themselves through retention of future earnings.  This frees up governments to spend money on stimulating economic growth including making infrastructure investments.
• Regulators should stop bickering about the future configuration of key financial institutions, and instead set a clearer multi-year vision that is also consistent across borders.
Requiring banks to adopt ultra transparency is the only regulation that needs to be globally adopted.  There is no ambiguity in banks disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With ultra transparency, financial institutions become subject to global market discipline.  This discipline, through higher cost of funds based on the risk of the individual financial institutions, will force the financial institutions to reduce their complexity and risk profile.
• Finally, governments should inform their electorates explicitly and comprehensively that a few contracts written during the inadvisable "great age" of leverage, debt, and credit entitlements cannot be met, and must be rewritten in a transparent way that strikes a balance between generations, labour and capital, and recipients and taxpayers.
See Wall Street absorbing losses on financial excesses above.
Such policies would allow healthy balance sheets around the world, both public and private, to engage in a pro-growth and pro-jobs process. They require leadership, focus, and education. Absent that, plumbing problems will become more acute, and the repairs more complex and threatening to virtually everyone – including both the "one percenters" and those who worrisomely are struggling at the margins of society.

Sunday, January 15, 2012

With no other sources of funds, Eurozone bank borrowing from ECB set to soar

According to a Telegraph article, Eurozone bank borrowing from the ECB is set to soar.  This is not a surprise since without ultra transparency there is no way for investors to assess the risk of these banks.

In fact, as Eurozone bank borrowing from the ECB continues to soar, it becomes easier to require ultra transparency.

It is easier to provide ultra transparency because when the funding comes from insured depositors and the ECB the funding will not "run" away when the true extent of the losses hidden on and off the bank's balance sheet is revealed.

Eurozone lenders' borrowing of long-term central bank funds is expected to more than double to over €1 trillion (£828bn) next month when struggling banks will be handed another lifeline by European authorities. 
Use of the European Central Bank's three-year funding programme is expected to exceed €500bn in February when lenders are offered their second chance to access its new long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), according to Credit Suisse. 
Last month, banks borrowed a total of €489bn using the LTRO, which has effectively seen the ECB take on the role of providing a large part of the funding required by several eurozone banks....
The ECB's decision to increase its exposure to banks has effectively seen it provide the "bazooka" markets had been urging it to use to help stem the debt crisis.

Saturday, January 14, 2012

Jamie Dimon: ECB has removed Eurozone bank failure risk

In a Bloomberg article, JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon observes that through its expansion of eligible collateral and three year funding program, the ECB has eliminated the risk that a Eurozone bank runs short of funds for at least the next year.

Mr. Dimon does not qualify this statement.  For example, he does not say it excludes the banks in Greece, Spain, Portugal or Italy.

It is very nice to receive public confirmation of another element of my blueprint to save the financial system.

The specific element of the blueprint that Mr. Dimon confirmed is that so long as the central bank is willing to provide liquidity, no matter how insolvent the borrowing bank, the insolvent bank can stay in business as it cannot run out of funds.

The European Central Bank’s move to provide three-year loans to the region’s banks and accept a wider variety of collateral has eliminated the risk a bank runs short of funds for at least the next year, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon said. 
“It eliminates bank liquidity or funding problems for at least the next year, that’s a pretty powerful statement,” Dimon said today after his company reported a drop in fourth-quarter net income. “That was the biggest single risk of an uncontrollable surprise right there, so if that’s taken off the table, that’s a good thing.” 
ECB President Mario Draghi last month unveiled plans to offer banks 36-month, 1 percent loans through two so-called longer-term refinancing operations, known as LTROs. The plan replaced a 12-month lending facility established by the ECB in October and also allowed banks to use a wider variety of assets as collateral for the loans. 
“Europe is trying mightily to solve its problems. I still think the likely outcome is they will muddle through,” Dimon said. “The longer you wait, the higher you run the risk of something disorderly that you can’t really control. I think the ECB took off the worst outcome, i.e. a bank failure.”... 
Banks in Europe are still shedding so-called risk-weighted assets, or RWAs, because regulators are requiring them to increase their ratios of equity capital to RWAs, Dimon said. 
“They’re still reducing RWA by not rolling things over, you can see them selling aircraft loans, trade finance, they’re not participating as much in revolvers, there are certain conduits they’re not doing anymore,” Dimon said. “But that’s now just to create capital, not because they have a funding problem.”

Thursday, January 12, 2012

ECB considering lending against loans on bank balance sheet

Harry Wilson of the Telegraph reports that the ECB is considering expanding the collateral it will accept to include the loans on bank balance sheets.

By doing so, the ECB is effectively insuring that all Eurozone banks will have access to liquidity sufficient to handle a sizable run on the Eurozone banking system.

When the Bank of England asked for public comments on using bank loan portfolios as collateral, your humble blogger suggested this only makes sense if banks are required to provide ultra transparency.

By requiring the banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current loans and the performance of these loans, market participants can assess the value of these loans.  As a result, just like for publicly traded securities, the central bank has an independent value it can use so that it doesn't lend more than the loans are worth.

Without ultra transparency into the bank's loan portfolio, lending against this portfolio involves taking on the same type of risk as buying opaque, structured finance securities.  We know that buying opaque securities did not work out well for the capital markets.

The European Central Bank is considering a major easing in the rules on the assets it will accept from struggling lenders in return for loans that could expand by more than €10 trillion (£8.3 trillion). 
Analysts at Citigroup said allowing eurozone banks to use outstanding loans as collateral to borrow money from the ECB would increase the pool of available collateral by €11.7 trillion. 
"While the details are to be decided, one principle would appear to be clear: central banks will create as much liquidity as needed to back stop the European banking system. Banks will not run out of cash or collateral," said Citigroup. 
The ECB has been discussing easing its collateral requirement and the final rules are still not clear, with a further meeting of its council expected to discuss the matter on January 26. 
The opening last month by the ECB of a new three-year funding programme for banks helped calm market fears over the eurozone banking system.

Monday, December 19, 2011

Mr. Draghi: Eurozone banks have liquidity problems because they are insolvent

Over the last few weeks, the global central banks have setup a number of funding mechanisms to make sure that the Eurozone banks have access to liquidity should they not be able to rollover their debts held by the private sector.

Why would the Eurozone banks not be able to rollover their debts?

Because the private sector cannot independently determine if the banks are solvent or not and if they are insolvent, if the host country and the Eurozone will make good on the implicit guarantee of their investment; a legacy of the bailouts of 2008/2009.

The private sector knows the banks have losses.  The question is where do the losses reside.  A question that will still exist even if banks claim to have hit the 9% Tier I capital ratio as the private sector knows that banks have been able to hide losses as regulators practice forbearance.

In a Wall Street Journal article, Mr. Draghi tries to suggest that it is the other way around: the potential for liquidity problems is creating the solvency problem for banks.

Banks will experience a difficult period of funding constraints in the first quarter of next year and probably throughout all of 2012, and the ECB "wants to avoid a further slowdown in economic growth and a possible recession," Mr. Draghi said. The ECB is trying "to do its best" to avoid a credit crunch stemming from the lack of funding, he added. 
Avoiding a funding crunch is all the more important, since worries about banks' liquidity could easily turn into fears over their solvency, he said.
Banks are cutting back on lending and selling assets to reach the meaningless 9% Tier I capital ratio.  This is the source of the credit crunch.

The trigger for renewal of the ongoing solvency crisis is the simple fact that banks will not be able to shrink the asset side of their balance sheets as quickly as their liabilities mature.  As a result, they are going to have to raise funds from somewhere.

The ECB is the most likely source for funds because it just agreed to lend against any asset on a Eurozone bank's books.