Showing posts with label Group Think. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Group Think. Show all posts

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Fed chose not to understand fundamental driver behind financial crisis

Why has the Fed chosen not to understand that opacity and with it the freezing of major areas of the capital markets is the fundamental driver behind our current financial crisis?

In an earlier post (see here), your humble blogger looked at the transcripts from the Fed's 2007 meetings and conference calls and noted that Fed officials knew about the problem with opacity in large areas of the financial system.  Yet, they effectively ignored it by assuming it away.

For example, in response to the freezing of the subprime mortgage securities market at the beginning of the financial crisis, the Fed chose to provide liquidity to the capital markets until such time as the market figured out how to value and price these opaque securities.

Of course, without transparency, the market will never be able to figure out how to value and price the opaque subprime mortgage-backed securities.

The Washington Post's Neil Irwin (see here) suggested that the reason the problem of opacity was and still is ignored is that very bright people can have access to data that the rest of the market participants would love to have, but still not understand how to interpret this data to make it useful information for purposes of setting policy and addressing the financial crisis.

I have written numerous posts that would support Mr. Irwin's observation.  These posts cover group think (many of the leading central bankers were at MIT at the same time), failure to understand that transparency is the necessary condition for the proper operation of the invisible hand, and regulatory capture by the banking industry directly and indirectly through politicians.

However, I don't think these posts provide a satisfactory answer to why the Fed continues to choose not to understand the role of opacity in the current financial crisis.

Princeton's Paul Krugman (see here) provides more insight into the Fed's actions as he saw the 2007 transcripts providing personal vindication for the economic policies that he has been suggesting.

He too completely skips the importance of opacity.  He seems to think that because he said that the fiscal stimulus program was too small to restore the economy to health that this indicates his analysis of the problem is correct.

In reality, as shown by Japan over the last 2+ decades, the burden on the real economy from servicing all the excess debt in the financial system can offset a tremendous amount of fiscal stimulus.

Professor Krugman prediction was directionally correct, but this was not because of his insight into the driver of the economic crisis, but rather because the impact of this driver was in the same direction he predicted.

The reason I said that Professor Krugman provides more insight into why the Fed chose not to understand that opacity was the fundamental driver of the current financial crisis is that his self-serving analysis reminded me of my conversations with various Fed officials ranging from governors to economists.

Regular readers know a) I worked at the Fed in the early 1980s and b) that I was very vocal about the impending financial crisis and how to moderate its impact.

Naturally, I reached out to the Fed and these officials.

Each of my conversations fit perfectly into the Professor Krugman view of the world.  Each of these officials effectively told me that opacity could be ignored because their economic model of how the economy worked explained what the right policy response was.

I recall one governor hearing my description of opacity (I used my example comparing structured finance securities to a Brown Paper Bag) and the response was the Fed could predict the US economy using data that was available on a quarterly basis and therefore a Brown Paper Bag was not opaque.

This mind set continues to this day.  It is clear that the Fed officials will cling to the belief in the infallibility of their economic models.  After all, they have modified their models to include a banking sector (something that prior to the crisis the models assumed was irrelevant).

What we have learned in the 2007 transcripts and since is that the Fed's economic models could not predict the US economy as they didn't predict the financial crisis and they have not predicted the success or failure of the various fiscal and monetary policies implemented since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Despite this track record of failure, the Fed continues to chose not to understand the role of opacity as the fundamental driver behind our current financial crisis.

As shown by Professor Krugman, his comments reflect the simple reality that economists prefer working with their models and the assumptions behind these models and ignoring inconvenient real world facts.

Real world facts tend to make the models messy.  Although, in this case, the real world fact of opacity actually makes the model much simpler.  After all, their economic models are built on the assumption that the invisible hand is operating properly.

The existence of opacity gives them an excuse to say why their models haven't worked and that the models cannot be expected to work until transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Update
From a quest post on Zero Hedge by Gary Evans of Global Macro Monitor:

In his lecture at the Latsis Symposium 2012 “Economics on the Move” in Zurich,  Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz nails the fundamental problem and crisis of modern macroeconomics, which failed to predict the financial crisis. 
If you say…what is good science is prediction… and you can’t predict the most important event in 75 years, what good are you?  
In particular, it might be very nice you can talk about the likelihood of an one tenth increase in GDP growth rate…and you miss a major economic downturn….or worse, they said the things can’t happen… 
Here are the money quotes: 
We all know the shock in this crisis…was a credit bubble and we have had those credit bubbles since the beginning of capitalism…So it was remarkable the intellectual bubble led people to believe there were no such thing as credit bubbles when there was 200 years of history of that…..How could people be so stupid? …The theory was with well functioning financial markets, spreading risk, diversifying risk, risk is contained.  They came to believe the models and that’s always dangerous.
Actually, it is not that they came to believe the models so much as they did not know that the models are based on the idea of transparency.

The models assume that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

The models and the economic system failed because large parts of the financial system are opaque.  This includes both structured finance securities and bank balance sheets.

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Can economics be re-established as a relevant social science?

In an interesting post, Lars Syll, a Swedish economist, looks at what it would take to re-establish economics as a realist and relevant social science.
Economics – and especially mainstream neoclassical economics – has as a science lost immensely in terms of status and prestige during the last years. Not the least because of its manifest inability to foresee the latest financial and economic crisis – and its lack of constructive and sustainable policies to take us out of the crisis....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Professor Syll has nicely summarized both the failure of economics to foresee the crisis and, much more importantly, the failure of economics to present constructive and sustainable policies to get us out of the crisis.
Neoclassical economists, however, have wanted to use their hammer, and so decided to pretend that the world looks like a nail. Pretending that uncertainty can be reduced to risk and construct models on that assumption have only contributed to financial crises and economic havoc....
Please  re-read the highlighted text as Professor Syll has nicely made the critically important point that the economics profession has contributed greatly to the financial crisis.
How do we re-establish credence and trust in economics? Five changes are absolutely decisive.  
(1) Stop pretending that we have exact and rigorous answers on everything. Because we don’t. We build models and theories and tell people that we can calculate and foresee the future. But we do this based on mathematical and statistical assumptions that often have little or nothing to do with reality. By pretending that there is no really important difference between model and reality we lull people into thinking that we have things under control. We haven’t! This false feeling of security was one of the factors that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008.
Your humble blogger has frequently said that the every economist who offers their opinion about how to respond to the financial crisis should first say whether they publicly predicted the crisis or not.

Everyone knows that if you didn't see the crisis coming it is highly doubtful that your analysis of the crisis will be accurate.  After all, leading up to the financial crisis you had no insight into what was wrong with either your models or the financial system.
(2) Stop the childish and exaggerated belief in mathematics giving answers to important economic questions. Mathematics gives exact answers to exact questions. But the relevant and interesting questions we face in the economic realm are rarely of that kind. Questions like “Is 2 + 2 = 4?” are never posed in real economies. Instead of a fundamentally misplaced reliance on abstract mathematical-deductive-axiomatic models having anything of substance to contribute to our knowledge of real economies, it would be far better if we pursued “thicker” models and relevant empirical studies and observations.
A classic example of where the models haven't worked is the Fed's models of the economy.  The Fed models neither predicted the financial crisis nor have they predicted the subsequent economic performance that has occurred.

I have previously noted on this blog how economists get upset that consumers and savers are not responding in the way that their mathematical models suggest.  Perhaps the consumer or saver is not wrong, but rather the mathematical model is wrong.
(3) Stop pretending that there are laws in economics. There are no universal laws in economics. Economies are not like planetary systems or physics labs. The most we can aspire to in real economies is establishing possible tendencies with varying degrees of generalizability....
Actually, there is one law in economics.  For the invisible hand to operate properly, buyers must have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can assess and make a fully informed decision.

Where this isn't true is an example of an imperfect market.
(5) Stop building models and making forecasts of the future based on totally unreal micro-founded macromodels with intertemporally optimizing robot-like representative actors equipped with rational expectations. This is pure nonsense. We have to build our models on assumptions that are not so blatantly in contradiction to reality. Assuming that people are green and come from Mars is not a good – not even as a “successive approximation” – modeling strategy.
Update

From the IMF.


A session at the annual American Economic Association conference in San Diego January 4–6 heard that debt levels have exploded across the advanced economies since the financial crisis, and are now at unprecedentedly high levels. High debt levels are a potential drag on growth, the session was told. 
At the conference, economists from the IMF, academia, and a broad range of other institutions acknowledged that, five years after the start of the Great Recession, economists are still struggling to find solutions to the mounting debt and high unemployment the crisis has triggered....
“The past few years have highlighted how little we actually know,” stressed Donald Kohn, a former Vice Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve who is currently at the Brookings Institution. 

Monday, December 17, 2012

UBS warns about groupthink at Fed and other central banks

As reported on BusinessInsider, less than a week after your humble blogger discussed how groupthink has come to dominate the major central banks, UBS economists are now warning about groupthink.

The UBS economists observed that groupthink could lead to major policy errors.

Hint:  it already has in the form of zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

The Federal Reserve surprised observers last Wednesday by revolutionizing its strategy for communicating with the public on its monetary policy outlook through the introduction of the "Evans Rule." 
By adopting the Evans Rule, the Fed has now laid out thresholds that must be met before the central bank will consider raising interest rates, which have been held near zero since the financial crisis several years ago.... 
The change has been hailed by critics of the Fed – those who charge that the central bank has not done enough to stimulate the economy – as a crucial step toward tapping its full stimulative potential by more forcefully shaping market expectations.  
UBS economists Drew Matus and Sam Coffin do not share such a positive view of Wednesday's meeting as everyone else, however. 
In fact, Matus and Coffin suggest that contrary to popular belief, the Fed's latest decision actually makes things more dangerous for markets and the economy. 
In a note, the UBS economists warn clients, "Given that policy is now tied to the perceptions of a small group of individuals who all adhere to the same orthodoxy, this implies that monetary policy will continue to operate as a poor substitute for responsible fiscal policy and that the possibility of policy errors from such 'groupthink' remains a key risk for the foreseeable future."... 
Matus and Coffin conclude that a dangerous dynamic may be brewing inside the Fed:
In short, consistency is lacking and the FOMC is increasingly tone deaf. 
This may be because, within the Federal Reserve System, the hawks are primarily “freshwater” economists who are concerned about the ever expanding balance sheet.  
In contrast, most of the rest of the FOMC are either non-economists (the majority of the Board of Governors) or “saltwater” economists. These economists dominate not just the Fed, but a number of central banks around the world. 
As such, critiques are limited and critics outside the Fed often dismissed out of hand. 
 A characteristic of groupthink.
Given that policy is now tied to the perceptions of a small group of individuals who all adhere to the same orthodoxy, this implies that monetary policy will continue to operate as a poor substitute for responsible fiscal policy and that the possibility of policy errors from such “groupthink” remains a key risk for the foreseeable future. 
Meanwhile, with Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker, the lone dissenter in several of the Fed's most recent policy decisions in 2012, set to become a non-voting member on the Committee in 2013, that groupthink may grow even stronger.
Groupthink among central bankers has been growing stronger since the beginning of the financial crisis.  Please note that they are all pursuing the same policies that Japan has shown failed over a 2+ decade period following its bank solvency led financial crisis.

Wednesday, December 12, 2012

Groupthink and central bankers' search for new ideas

The Wall Street Journal ran an article that lays out why the leaders of the major economy central banks suffer from a combination of groupthink and defense of the PhD dissertation syndrome.
Every two months, more than a dozen bankers meet here on Sunday evenings to talk and dine on the 18th floor of a cylindrical building looking out on the Rhine. 
The dinner discussions on money and economics are more than academic. At the table are the chiefs of the world's biggest central banks, representing countries that annually produce more than $51 trillion of gross domestic product, three-quarters of the world's economic output. 
Of late, these secret talks have focused on global economic troubles and the aggressive measures by central banks to manage their national economies. 
Since 2007, central banks have flooded the world financial system with more than $11 trillion. Faced with weak recoveries and Europe's churning economic problems, the effort has accelerated. The biggest central banks plan to pump billions more into government bonds, mortgages and business loans. 
Their monetary strategy isn't found in standard textbooks. The central bankers are, in effect, conducting a high-stakes experiment, drawing in part on academic work by some of the men who studied and taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1970s and 1980s. 
While many national governments, including the U.S., have failed to agree on fiscal policy—how best to balance tax revenues with spending during slow growth—the central bankers have forged their own path, independent of voters and politicians, bound by frequent conversations and relationships stretching back to university days.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it describes exactly the situation in which groupthink is most likely to occur.

The Wikipedia discussion of groupthink not only confirms this, but talks about signs that it has occurred.
Irving Janis led the initial research on the groupthink theory. In his first writing on groupthink in 1971, he defined the term as follows: 
I use the term groupthink as a quick and easy way to refer to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. 
The WSJ article clearly shows that we have a 'cohesive ingroup' that was 'concurrence-seeking' as they are following the same monetary policies of zero interest rates and quantitative easing.
Groupthink is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell used in his dismaying world of 1984. In that context, groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. Exactly such a connotation is intended, since the term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of group pressures....
Please re-read the highlighted text as it describes why these central bankers chose and continue pursuing monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing despite significant evidence that it doesn't work.

Each of these central bankers knew before the financial crisis began that
  • Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said in the 1870s that interest rates should not go below 2%; and
  • Japan has tried monetary policies that kept interest rates below 2% for almost 2 decades without success.  
For confirmation that the group knew these facts, prior to becoming chairmen of the Fed and the beginning of the financial crisis, Ben Bernanke even told the Japanese that their monetary policies weren't working.  The response of the Japanese was that it was easy to give this advice when you are not the one facing the financial crisis.

Despite knowing that keeping interest rates below 2% doesn't work and that the solution to a bank solvency led financial crisis is to adopt the Swedish Model, this group of central bankers chose to pursue monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

The policy choice of these central bankers fits Professor Janis' description as it reflects 'a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments' overriding a 'realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action'.
The main principle of groupthink, which I offer in the spirit of Parkinson's Law, is this: 
 The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the members of a policy-making ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups.
Professor Janis neatly summarizes what has and is still occurring in central banking.

For those who doubt this, Mr. Bernanke recently gave a speech in which he expressed his frustration with consumers for not doing what he wanted them to do.  Subsequently, the Fed announced quantitative easing till eternity.

This announcement was the equivalent in the world of groupthink to saying I am going to keep beating you until you stop crying.

The fact that the consumers did not do what he wanted them to do should have been a clear signal that he wasn't doing the right thing to get the outcome he wanted.

However, it appears the because he is so mired in groupthink Mr. Bernanke could not entertain this alternative.

Update

This comes from a previous post I did on Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author.  Please note that it appears that her critique was dismissed as one would expect as a result of groupthink.


From Anna Schwartz's Wall Street Journal obituary,
Across six decades, she contributed strong work and commentary on economics, notably the financial system. In all her efforts to understand and explain financial behavior, Anna Schwartz focused on the system's primary need: stability. 
Which brings us to the present economic instability, on which Schwarz had opinions that deserve to be heard again. Statements she made to this newspaper in a Weekend Interview three and a half years ago, in her early 90s, ring with clarity and relevance to current difficulties: "The Fed has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible." 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mrs. Schwartz has nicely summarized what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the bank solvency led financial crisis.

There is only one way to return 'stability' to the financial system and end uncertainty about the balance sheets of financial firms:  require ultra transparency and make the banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off balance sheet exposure details.

With this data, market participants can independently assess each bank and be confident in making buy, hold and sell decisions based on this assessment.

From her WSJ Weekend Interview,
She speaks with passion and just a hint of resignation about the current financial situation. And looking at how the authorities have handled it so far, she doesn't like what she sees... 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has called the 888-page "Monetary History" "the leading and most persuasive explanation of the worst economic disaster in American history."
Ms. Schwartz thinks that our central bankers and our Treasury Department are getting it wrong again. 
To understand why, one first has to understand the nature of the current "credit market disturbance," as Ms. Schwartz delicately calls it. We now hear almost every day that banks will not lend to each other, or will do so only at punitive interest rates. Credit spreads -- the difference between what it costs the government to borrow and what private-sector borrowers must pay -- are at historic highs. 
This is not due to a lack of money available to lend, Ms. Schwartz says, but to a lack of faith in the ability of borrowers to repay their debts. "The Fed," she argues, "has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible." 
So even though the Fed has flooded the credit markets with cash, spreads haven't budged because banks don't know who is still solvent and who is not. 
An observation that also appeared in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report.
This uncertainty, says Ms. Schwartz, is "the basic problem in the credit market. Lending freezes up when lenders are uncertain that would-be borrowers have the resources to repay them. So to assume that the whole problem is inadequate liquidity bypasses the real issue."
Please re-read the highlighted text as it confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning that it is a bank solvency crisis.
In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in "A Monetary History," the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector. As banks failed, depositors became alarmed that they'd lose their money if their bank, too, failed. So bank runs began, and these became self-reinforcing: 
"If the borrowers hadn't withdrawn cash, they [the banks] would have been in good shape. But the Fed just sat by and did nothing, so bank after bank failed. And that only motivated depositors to withdraw funds from banks that were not in distress," deepening the crisis and causing still more failures. 
But "that's not what's going on in the market now," Ms. Schwartz says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their ledgers -- "all these exotic securities that the market does not know how to value." 
"Why are they 'toxic'?" Ms. Schwartz asks. "They're toxic because you cannot sell them, you don't know what they're worth, your balance sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don't know whom to lend to because we don't know who is sound. So if you could get rid of them, that would be an improvement."...
While Ms. Schwartz understands the need for valuing structured finance securities, she does not understand that they present the identical problem that banks present:  they are opaque.

The only way to answer which bank is solvent and which is not is to require ultra transparency.

The only way to value structured finance securities is to require observable event based reporting on the underlying assets.  Under this reporting, investors have access to current performance information as every activity like a payment or delinquency is reported before the beginning of the next business day after it occurs.
But in doing so, [Mr Paulson] shifted from trying to save the banking system to trying to save banks. These are not, Ms. Schwartz argues, the same thing. In fact, by keeping otherwise insolvent banks afloat, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have actually prolonged the crisis. "They should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down." 
Rather, "firms that made wrong decisions should fail," she says bluntly. "You shouldn't rescue them. And once that's established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich." The trouble is, "that's not the way the world has been going in recent years." 
Instead, we've been hearing for most of the past year about "systemic risk" -- the notion that allowing one firm to fail will cause a cascade that will take down otherwise healthy companies in its wake. 
Ms. Schwartz doesn't buy it. "It's very easy when you're a market participant," she notes with a smile, "to claim that you shouldn't shut down a firm that's in really bad straits because everybody else who has lent to it will be injured. Well, if they lent to a firm that they knew was pretty rocky, that's their responsibility. And if they have to be denied repayment of their loans, well, they wished it on themselves.The [government] doesn't have to save them, just as it didn't save the stockholders and the employees of Bear Stearns. Why should they be worried about the creditors? Creditors are no more worthy of being rescued than ordinary people, who are really innocent of what's been going on."
The reason the ultra transparency is needed is so that lenders can once again be responsible for their decisions.

So long as governments have a monopoly on the information disclosed under ultra transparency, there is a moral hazard.  The moral hazard is the need to bailout investors after the government says that a bank is solvent.
It takes real guts to let a large, powerful institution go down....
As your humble blogger has said many times, a modern banking system is designed so that banks can absorb all the losses on the excesses in the financial system without having to be closed down.  Between deposit insurance and access to central bank lending, banks have ample liquidity.

As a result, banks can continue to support the real economy and retain 100% of future pre-banker bonus earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.
In 2002, Mr. Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve Board governor, said in a speech in honor of Mr. Friedman's 90th birthday, "I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again."
"This was [his] claim to be worthy of running the Fed," she says. He was "familiar with history. He knew what had been done." But perhaps this is actually Mr. Bernanke's biggest problem. Today's crisis isn't a replay of the problem in the 1930s, but our central bankers have responded by using the tools they should have used then. They are fighting the last war. The result, she argues, has been failure. "I don't see that they've achieved what they should have been trying to achieve. So my verdict on this present Fed leadership is that they have not really done their job."
Which is not surprising because they are fighting a bank solvency crisis and not a bank liquidity crisis.

The solution to a bank solvency crisis is adopting the Swedish model with ultra transparency.

Friday, November 2, 2012

'group think' : filtering policies to make them palatable behind failure of economic policies prior to financial crisis

As reported in the Telegraph, Sir John Gieve sees the failure of economic policies before the crisis as the result of global regulatory group think.  Specifically, the filtering of policy analysis to make them palatable to senior members of the Bank of England and other financial regulators.

Regular readers were first presented with the idea that financial regulators are fatally flawed because they speak with one voice and suppress dissent by the Nyberg Report on the Irish Banking Crisis.

What is interesting is Sir John's solution to this fatal flaw:  transparency.

It is nice to see another distinguished individual calling for transparency.
The Bank of England needs to encourage a new culture that allows staff to “challenge” senior figures to prevent potential damaging “house views” developing, a former deputy governor has urged.
This is particularly true given the new responsibilities that the BoE is taking on including bank supervision.
Sir John Gieve said the failure of economic policy before the crisis at the Bank and other institutions across the world was largely the result of “group think” that needs to be stamped out. 
His comments at Fathom Consulting’s Monetary Policy Forum echoed those made in three reviews into the Bank’s recent performance released today. 
They found that “there appears to be some tendency for [staff] to filter recommendations in such a way as to maximise the likelihood that senior staff will find the recommendation palatable” and that the Bank needed to cultivate “a more assertive and experienced staff” who would “seriously challenge” policymakers.
These reports confirm the findings of the Nyberg Report.  Like the staff, these reports pull back on their conclusions in the hopes of maximizing the likelihood that senior staff will find the recommendations palatable.
Sir John, who was deputy governor for financial stability until 2009, said: “The biggest errors of economic policy were before the crisis in allowing the boom to develop. They were the result of a remarkable degree of group think – not just in the UK. 
“That was a problem in the Bank, as it was in the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. We need to redouble efforts to challenge orthodoxy in these institutions.”...
And how do we do this?
To stamp out group think, Sir John said the Bank should adopt the reviews’ proposal that it publish more detail on its economic forecasts. 
“How do you bring challenge into a hierarchical institution? One way of doing that is to publish more detail on the forecasts. Transparency on how they see the economy developing would be helpful in freeing up the discussion on what’s going right and what’s going wrong in its forecasts,” he said.
Sir John's bottom line is the way to challenge group think is through transparency.

Regular readers know that transparency is needed so that the financial system is not dependent on regulators who, because of the need to speak with one voice, are prone to group think.

With transparency, each market participant can independently assess the information and come to their own conclusion.

Friday, August 3, 2012

Central banks can't save the world; but they can cause unlimited damage

It is only fitting that in a week where the Bank of England's Andy Haldane admitted that economists share blame for the financial crisis and the ongoing recession:

  • Pimco's Mohamed El-Arian should point out that central banks, which are led by economists, can't save the world; and
  • Ros Altmann should point out that the pursuit of zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing has set off a 'death spiral' for pension funds and the real economy by diverting funds needed for growth to paying for pension obligations.
Regular readers know that Walter Bagehot, the man who literally wrote the book, Lombard Street, on central banking, observed in the 1870s that the lower limit for interest rates that was consistent with functioning financial markets and by extension the real economy was 2%.

Regular readers also know that Japan has confirmed the accuracy of this observation by pursuing zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing with a result of over 2 'lost' decades when it comes to meaningful economic growth.

However, the current generation of economists, particularly those in academia and that run the central banks in the EU, Japan, UK and US, are true believers in what Mr. Haldane refers to as a "theological doctrine".  

They justify and pursue policies based on their belief that the assumptions underlying their economic models are facts.  In reality, these assumptions are not facts.  Something that Walter Bagehot pointed out in the 1870s.

The result of pursuing policies based on flawed assumptions has been an unmitigated disaster.

Your humble blogger is an optimist and believes that it is still not too late to save the global economy.  However, doing so will require more than economists admitting they are wrong.

Doing so will require that economists, particularly central bankers, stop pursuing policies that are crushing the real economy.  This shouldn't be too difficult to do.  

They can start by following Walter Bagehot's advice and raising interest rates back to 2%.

At the same time, the Bank of England, ECB and the Fed can require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  

The central banks have the power to do this by simply making it a requirement for any bank to have access to central bank funding.  This is a reasonable requirement because the market will value all of the assets on and off a bank's balance sheet and the central banks only want to lend against assets where the value is well known.

Saturday, November 26, 2011

Regulators as source of financial instability: the failure to forecast the Great Recession

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York published an interesting post on the failure of economic forecasts since 2007.

At its heart is the idea that no one predicted the Great Recession and therefore that the failure of the Federal Reserve System to do so was excusable.

The idea that no one predicted the Great Recession is not true.  The idea that no one has accurately predicted what has happened since the beginning of the Great Recession is also not true.

One of the reasons my blog attracts readers is that I have predicted both.

Prior to the beginning of the Great Recession, I observed that if opacity in the financial system was not addressed, we would have a crisis.  Once the crisis began, I added the observation that we would continue in a downward spiral with no logical stopping point until opacity in the financial system was addressed.

Unfortunately (I say unfortunately because of the suffering that occurred to everyone outside of Wall Street/Washington), these two predictions have turned out to be very accurate.

In his post, Simon Potter does try to qualify who he includes in the group that failed to predict the Great Recession and its aftermath.  He observes that the economics profession failed - which by definition includes everyone with a PhD currently working in the Federal Reserve System.

A casual observer might conclude if they failed, we should immediately remove anyone who is a trained economist from a position where they can have any impact on the economy... say beginning with the chairman of the Federal Reserve.

Having worked for the Federal Reserve in DC in the area responsible for the analysis supporting monetary policy, I do not think this is the right solution.

Consistent with this blog's focus on disclosure, the right solution is that the Fed should be turned into the single most transparent financial market participant.

Everything the Fed does should be subject to disclosure.

This should apply to everything from the individual bank examination reports to every financial transaction involving the Fed up to and including telecasting the FOMC meetings as they are happening.

You simply cannot root out opacity in the financial system if you let a major financial institution regulator, the lender of last resort and the monetary authority operate in an opaque environment.
Looking through our briefing materials and other sources such as New York Fed staff reports reveals that the Bank’s economic research staff, like most other economists, were behind the curve as the financial crisis developed, even though many of our economists made important contributions to the understanding of the crisis. Three main failures in our real-time forecasting stand out: 
  1. Misunderstanding of the housing boom. Staff analysis of the increase in house prices did not find convincing evidence of overvaluation (see, for example, McCarthy and Peach [2004] and Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai [2005]). Thus, we downplayed the risk of a substantial fall in house prices. A robust approach would have put the bar much lower than convincing evidence.
  2. A lack of analysis of the rapid growth of new forms of mortgage finance. Here the reliance on the assumption of efficient markets appears to have dulled our awareness of many of the risks building in financial markets in 2005-07. However, a March 2008 New York Fed staff reportby Ashcraft and Schuermann provided a detailed analysis of how incentives were misaligned throughout the securitization process of subprime mortgages—meaning that the market was not functioning efficiently.
  3. Insufficient weight given to the powerful adverse feedback loops between the financial system and the real economy. Despite a good understanding of the risk of a financial crisis from mid-2007 onward, we were unable to fully connect the dots to real activity until 2008. Eventually, by building on the insights of Adrian and Shin (2008), we gained a better grasp of the power of these feedback loops.
However, the biggest failure was the complacency resulting from the apparent ease of maintaining financial and economic stability during the Great Moderation. Perhaps most important, as noted by some analysts as early as the 1990s, these adverse consequences of the Great Moderation were most likely to arise from the actions, judgments, and decisions of financial market participants: 
Longer stretches of economic growth imply greater leverage and complacency and thus, greater financial problems when recessions do occur.
--William Dudley and Edward McKelvey3

Monday, November 14, 2011

Bank reform can't wait

In a column in the Guardian, Robert Jenkins, a member of the BoE's Financial Policy Committee, flatly states that bank reform can't wait.

Absolutely true.

He then goes on to urge the implementation of the Vicker's Commission proposals.

This just goes to show that once again the banking industry can count on economists and regulators to get in the way of bankers adopting the only reform that matters - ongoing disclosure of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Let us imagine that banks fully comply with the Commission's proposals over the next 24 months.

Will banks be any closer to telling which of their competitors are solvent and which are insolvent?

Where does the excess leverage and bad debt that currently exists in the financial system go under Vickers?  This includes sovereign debt, consumer debt (including mortgages), commercial real estate debt and those toxic subprime securities.

Given the massive amount of regulatory forbearance that has occurred to date, is there any reason to believe that all the losses will be recognized over the next 24 months?

If these losses are not recognized, how can market participants tell if the "bank" inside the ring-fence is solvent or not?
In his Independent Commission on Banking report, John Vickers produced a good plan. It should be implemented within 24 months. Such a timetable will shock several bankers ... Why wait? 
The coalition moved quickly to create the commission and Vickers began its work in mid-2010. The objectives were formidable. These included: reduce systemic risk; mitigate moral hazard; reduce the likelihood and impact of bank failure; shrink subsidies to investment banks; and increase competition in retail banking.... 
All of which would be better achieved by simply requiring current disclosure of each bank's asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market discipline, which has been blocked by the regulators' information monopoly for the last 80 years would be reintroduced to the banking industry.

Systemic risk would be reduced as each bank adjusts the amount and price of its exposure to other banks to reflect these banks' riskiness and the chance of loss.

Moral hazard would be mitigated because each bank would know that the government is not going to bailout any of the banks and that they are responsible for the losses on their exposures.

The likelihood of bank failure would be reduced as an increase in a bank's cost of funds as it adds risks acts as a disincentive to add risk.  In fact, market discipline would push banks to reduce their risk profile as high returns with low risk is what the market will pay a premium for.

The parts of investment banking focused on proprietary trading and not market making would be reduced as everyone could see the bank's positions and potentially trade against or front run the purchase or sale of this position.
The Vickers proposal, published in September, goes a long way towards meeting these challenges. It places the interests of depositors ahead of equity and bondholders. It largely "ringfences" retail and small business banking from investment banking. And it calls for the ringfenced entity to be better capitalised than currently required. In short, it seeks to make safer that part of banking critical to households and businesses....
Really?  How can a market participant know if the part of banking critical to households and businesses is safer if they cannot tell if it is solvent or not?
There are only two possible justifications for delay. The first is the risk of adversely affecting the supply and cost of credit to an important sector of the economy at a time of financial fragility. The commission's analysis suggests it will not. A separate report by accountants Ernst & Young concurs.
Oops...Lord Turner, head of the Financial Services Administration has recently come out and said that requiring banks to reach a 9% Tier I capital ratio is adversely affecting the supply of credit and there is nothing that regulators can do about it (see here).
The second reason is that banks would be unable to execute the reorganisation within the foreseeable future. This is absurd....
This is not to say implementation will be easy. There will be contracts to rewrite, legal vehicles to establish, and boards to recruit. Most of all, there will be choices to be made between what activities go where. Such choices will require thought – but no more or less than that which goes into any number of routine strategic reviews. And yes, there will be many unanticipated problems – there always are. But the sooner we start the sooner we will resolve them....
Why would you want to jump through all of these implementation difficulties when simply requiring on-going detailed current disclosure gets the same benefits without the headaches?
Why are we timid when it comes to financial reform? Is it that we are intimidated by those for whom the reforms are destined? 
Given that the Vicker's Commission did not adopt requiring banks to make ongoing detailed current disclosure, the evidence is clear for either cognitive capture by Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team or both timidity and intimidation.

Remember, FDR publicly invited the wrath of the bankers as opposed to deferring to the bankers when it came to disclosure.
There is one major danger in implementing Vickers quickly: that having taken this bold step we will be lulled into thinking the regulatory job is over. It will not be. Over-leveraged banks operating outside the ringfence will still threaten financial stability. But knowing this should not deter us from solving those problems we can fix now... 
Unlike the implementing Vickers, implementing detailed current disclosure also addresses the over-leveraged banks operating outside the ringfence that could threaten financial stability.

Which raises the question of why would you risk being lulled into thinking the regulatory job is over by implementing Vickers?

Sunday, November 13, 2011

Group think: Bob Diamond's unconvincing public relations campaign

In his Financial Times column, Martin Wolf shreds Barclays CEO Bob Diamond's public relations campaign, but in so doing raises several areas dominated by group think.
Talk is cheap. Action is expensive.... 
That is why this blog challenged Mr. Diamond to lead the global banking industry and provide utter transparency into Barclays' current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail on an on-going basis.
Mr Diamond is one of those clever investment bankers who, as my colleague John Kay has noted, now manage most important global banking institutions. He focused on rebuilding trust....
Mr Diamond argued that banks need to show they support growth, accept responsibility for what has gone wrong and “become better and more effective citizens”....
So why am I cynical? I look at incentives and behaviour, not words.... 
It is not enough for banks to accept the principle of “strong regulation”, as Mr Diamond does. We need to see changes in how banks manage themselves if we are to believe in protestations of reform. 
This is the first area of group think.  The idea that there is an overlap between strong regulation and bankers making voluntary changes that show they have "reformed".

On a Venn Diagram, this is the empty set as there is no relationship between strong regulation and bankers voluntarily reforming.

If bankers were the voluntarily reforming type, they would have reformed during the Great Depression and we would never have had the financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007 and the Great Recession.
First, bank managements must stop targeting returns on equity that are unadjusted for risk, particularly ones as high as 15 per cent, as I have argued on the Wolf Exchange. The easy way to achieve such targets is to raise leverage – a practice concealed behind the smoke screen of risk-weighting of assets. Robert Jenkins, a member of the financial policy committee of the Bank of England, puts it well: “Return on equity is the wrong target. Over the past 10 to 15 years it has helped to make many bankers rich and loyal shareholders poor. Moreover, it prompts banks to fight to keep loss absorbing capital low. This makes their enterprises vulnerable and our financial system fragile. As the key driver of bank behaviour it has to go.” Amen. 
This is the second area of group think.  The idea that bankers' compensation and related risk taking occurred in a vacuum.

Regular readers know that this idea completely ignores the role of the global financial regulators.  The global financial regulators had a responsibility and the authority to prevent bankers' compensation from putting the financial system at risk.

The fact is that without the approval every step of the way by the global financial regulators, bankers could not have put the financial system at risk.
Second, banks should welcome attempts to raise capital and lower gearing, over time. This is also the best way to make Mr Diamond’s intention that we will never again need to rescue banks at all plausible. As things stand, this is “time inconsistent” – a promise unlikely to be fulfilled. Better capitalised banks would be more resilient. Furthermore, this must be real capital against actual assets. The turmoil in markets for supposedly safe sovereign debt shows why risk weights can be so dangerous. 
This is the third area of group think.  The idea that bank capital is anything other than a meaningless, easily manipulated number.

This blog has repeatedly debunked this example of group think by pointing out

  • a parent would not use it to assure their child that the child's savings would be save at the bank, 
  • bank capital includes retained earnings which in turn represents the accumulation of net income and net income is easily manipulated by the assumptions made about the size of the losses in the bank's loan portfolio, 
  • market participants do not use it when they determine the solvency of a bank as they look at the market value of the bank's assets less the book value of its liabilities, and
  • Walter Bagehot's observation that a well-run bank needs no capital and no amount of capital will save a badly run bank.

Saturday, November 12, 2011

Group think: The Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee and bank capital

I am several weeks late in calling readers attention to a very important article in the Telegraph on group think and the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee (FPC).

The FPC is charged with promoting financial stability.  Given this responsibility, it is a very encouraging sign that the members are aware of the risks of group think blinding them to the source of the next financial crisis.

Group thinks happens when the desire for harmony in a decision-making group overrides a realistic appraisal of the alternatives.  One of the primary causes of group think is when the group members share educational backgrounds and face highly stressful external threats after recently experiencing failure.

The question is will they realize that the most dangerous form of group think is close-mindedness where they rationalize away warnings because they challenge informed opinion and the group's assumptions?

This type of group think occurs when there is broad agreement on conventional wisdom, particularly when this conventional wisdom is supported by academic studies that assume their conclusion.  As a result, no one bothers to check to see if this conventional wisdom or the academic studies are actually supported by the facts.

Examples of this sort of conventional wisdom include and are certainly not limited to:  house prices in the US always increase and financial engineering transfers risk out of the banking system into the hands of market participants who are better able to hold it.

Regular readers know that rationalizing away a challenge to the group's assumptions runs wild when it comes to the issue of bank capital.  Specifically, many financial regulators and economists actually think and are on record saying that a meaningless, highly manipulated number is important.

Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo said
regulation of banks' capital remains the single most important element of prudential financial regulation.
In fact, bank capital is about as meaningless and highly manipulated a number as you can find anywhere in the financial world.  But don't take my word for it.  According to the OECD's Blundell-Wignall,
The core Tier 1 ratio is a ratio of two meaningless numbers, which itself is a meaningless number because banks can alter the ratio themselves.
Your humble blogger also does not think bank capital is important, but then besides working for the Federal Reserve, I worked in the capital management area of a bank.

Let me share with you an e-mail I sent to a member of the FPC in response to the Telegraph article:
I read with great interest your statements in the Telegraph about being wary of and trying to prevent group think on the Financial Policy Committee.  These statements were catching in light of the discussion on bank capital and restoring confidence in the financial system. 
The statements released by the Financial Policy Committee show massive group think when it comes to bank capital and restoring confidence in the financial system. 
Before I explain why, let me tell you a little about myself.  I am one of the handful of individuals who publicly predicted the financial crisis.  What separated me from most of the others was I did not trade on the call (my pocketbook being worse for that, but conscious being better), rather I proposed a simple method for moderating the impact of the crisis. 
You can trust me when I tell you I have had nothing put push back from Wall Street and the financial regulators on my proposed solution. 
Now let me explain.  You are probably familiar with Walter Bagehot, the author of Lombard Street.  He had a number of remarkable things he said with his observation on bank capital being relevant for the FPC:  "A well-run bank needs no capital.  No amount of capital can rescue a badly run bank." 
This statement suggests the question:  how do we know who is a well-run bank and who is a badly run bank? 
The answer to this question comes from FDR and a small bank in Illinois.  FDR introduced the global financial system to the philosophy of disclosure.  Simply put, he made it the government's job to ensure that market participants had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner. 
When it comes to banks, what would useful, relevant information be?  We know it is not regulators saying they are solvent.  They said this before the financial crisis and look how much money has been injected into them.  They have said this after numerous stress tests and Europe is still bailing out the banks. 
A small bank in Illinois answered the question in the 1930s when it published all of its accounts.  When asked why, the head of the bank replied that transparency was the mark of a well-run bank that could stand on its own two feet. 
Why does disclosure restore confidence in banks and the financial system?  With disclosure, market participants can assess the risks for themselves.  They trust their own assessment and as a result can make portfolio management decisions like buy, hold and sell. 
In markets characterized by opacity (think bank stocks and structured finance securities), the markets are essentially frozen because there is no useful, relevant information to perform the independent analysis on. 
Even though several individuals on the FPC know about my suggestion to require disclosure of each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail, my bet is no-one on the FPC suggested it as an approach to restoring confidence.  A sure sign of group think and unfortunately why the financial crisis continues.