Showing posts with label ECB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ECB. Show all posts

Monday, August 26, 2013

Why should ECB's bank asset quality review be believed?

Given Mario Draghi's commitment to do whatever it takes, why should the ECB's review of the asset quality at the EU banks be remotely believable?

Please recall, this is not the first time a governmental entity has overseen an asset quality review.  Previously, these reviews were done in Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain.

The result of these reviews was predictable.  The banks took additional reserves for potential losses and the governments declared their balance sheets had been cleaned up.

Of course, the banks were not required to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so that market participants could confirm that all their losses had been recognized.

A few savvy market participants recognized that this lack of transparency was the equivalent of waving a giant red flag and announcing that the banks were still hiding losses on and off their balance sheet.

These market participants' insight have always been confirmed as shortly after the asset reviews it would be shown that there were in fact many more losses hiding on and off the bank balance sheets.

This pattern has held true whether the asset review was carried out by the government itself or using an "independent" third party (accounting firm or BlackRock).

This pattern has also held true when the asset quality review has been combined with stress tests.

So your humble blogger's question stands: why in the absence of transparency would anyone believe the results of the ECB's asset quality review?

One of the downsides of the ECB running an asset quality review without requiring the banks to provide transparency is that ECB puts itself in the position of now having to accept as collateral any of the assets it reviewed and didn't require loss recognition on.

From a Financial Times article on the ECB's asset quality review,

Within a matter of weeks, assuming legislative go-ahead, the ECB is expected to establish its new “single supervisory mechanism”, hiring the 1,000 staff it will need to police the banks, and making its mark with a tough root-and-branch Asset Quality Review (AQR) to determine how truthful banks are being about the loans on their balance sheets....
Properly done, the exercise could quickly establish the ECB as a tough regulator and help restore investor faith in Europe’s lenders. A succession of botched stress tests over recent years and laggardly recapitalisation of troubled lenders have deterred investors from backing the sector. 
A credible AQR, followed immediately by a stress test to show how balance sheets would stand up to further trouble, would, it is hoped, convince the world that Europe’s lenders are as resilient as US banks okayed by the Federal Reserve’s annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR).
No one thinks the US banks are okay.  Everyone knows that as a result of the stress tests the US on an annual basis renews the vow made by then US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner when he pledged the full faith and credit of the US to keep the banks solvent.
All of which explains the flurry of preparations. 
Italy’s Intesa SanPaolo has been the most upfront about its desire to be ready for the ECB process. This month the bank revealed a “conservative” 30 per cent increase in the amount it has set aside to cover bad loans, undertaken explicitly “in the light of the [ECB’s] asset quality review”....
In the absence of exposure detail transparency, how would anyone know if a 30 percent increase in the amount set aside to cover bad loans is "conservative" or not?

Based on the history of Ireland, Greece,.... it is a fairly safe bet that this additional 30% will not be shown to be conservative and that much more in the way of losses will materialize.
The ECB exercise is set to implement new pan-European definitions of non-performing loans, standardising an NPL as anything that is 90 days past due, and also forcing banks to categorise all exposures to a single borrower as non-performing, even if only one of a number of loans is actually in default....
In the presence of regulatory forbearance which allows banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans, it is nice to have a standard, but the regulators have already undercut it.
Autonomous, an independent research house, predicts the changed definitions could increase problem loans by an average of 40 per cent – forcing weaker banks to raise fresh capital. Lenders in Germany, Austria and France could face the biggest shocks in the AQR....
I guess Autonomous doesn't see the 30% increase in loan loss reserves as conservative.
But a litany of ifs and buts still hangs over the whole process. Most immediately, it is still uncertain whether the EU will deliver the legal go-ahead to empower the ECB next month.  
More fundamentally, there is still disagreement about how to deal with a bank if it fails to plug a capital shortfall under its own steam. 
Here, too, Europe must learn from the US, where the government’s Tarp scheme injected capital as necessary back in 2009. For the ECB exercise to work, the sovereign-focused European Stability Mechanism must become a bank bail-out vehicle of last resort.
The issue for a bank fixing its book capital shortfall is can it generate earnings after all the losses have been realized.

If a bank can generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it can recapitalize itself over time by simply retaining earnings.

If a bank cannot generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it should be resolved.

Friday, August 16, 2013

ECB discovers why transparency into bank current exposure details needed

Reuters reports that the ECB has discovered why transparency into bank current exposure details is needed.
Policymakers at the European Central Bank had initially hoped that the asset review would feed into the stress tests in part because it is difficult to measure the sturdiness of a bank without knowing precisely the contents of its balance sheet.
Please re-read the highlighted text as your humble blogger has been saying this since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Without ultra transparency, there is simply no way of knowing if a bank is sturdy, as in solvent, or unstable, as in insolvent.

Without ultra transparency, stress tests are meaningless.

Sunday, July 7, 2013

Bundesbank chief: ECB cannot solve Eurozone crisis

Reuters reports that Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank chief, said the ECB's monetary policy could buy time to end the Eurozone crisis, but it cannot solve the Eurozone crisis.

Please recall that Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author, said the Fed and the policies that Ben Bernanke chose to pursue also would not end the US financial crisis.

The reason that monetary policies will not end the global financial crisis is that we are dealing with opacity in large parts of the global financial system that has expressed itself in a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Until transparency is brought back to all the opaque corners of the financial system, pricing in the global financial market is distorted and capital is misallocated.

Contributing to this distortion and misallocation are the low interest rate and quantitative easing policies being pursued by central banks.  Since they are contributing to the distortion of prices and the misallocation of capital, by definition we know central bank policies cannot end our financial crisis.

Anna Schwartz made this point when she Bernanke's policies would not end the problem of bank solvency.

The European Central Bank cannot solve the euro zone crisis, Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann told economists on Sunday, pressing the bloc's governments to get their economies in shape and tighten their fiscal rules. 
Weidmann addressed an economists' conference in Aix-en-Provence, southern France, only three days after the ECB broke with precedent by declaring that it intended to keep interest rates at record lows for an extended period and may yet cut further. 
"Monetary policy has already done a lot to absorb the economic consequences of the crisis, but it cannot solve the crisis," Weidmann said in his speech. 
"This is the consensus of the Governing Council. The crisis has laid bare structural shortcomings. As such, they require structural solutions."... 
While he does not see sufficient support in the euro zone for governments to give up sovereignty on fiscal matters to forge a fiscal union to prevent such crises in the future, Weidmann pressed them to stiffen Europe's fiscal rules. 
"To fully unleash the common currency's potential, efforts are needed on two fronts: structural reforms as well as the abolition of implicit guarantees for banks and sovereigns (government bonds)," Weidmann said. 
"In addition to stronger rules, we need to make sure that in a system of national control and national responsibility, sovereign default is possible without bringing down the financial system. Only then will we really do away with the implicit guarantee for sovereigns." 
The Bundesbank chief also called for euro zone governments to sever what he describes as the "excessively close links" between banks and sovereign governments, saying that European banks hold too many of their own governments' bonds. 
"This is because banks do not have to hold any capital against their government debt, as the risk-weight assigned to sovereign bonds is zero. 
To counteract excessive investment in sovereign bonds, Weidmann believes that the capital rules need to be changed to take account of risk and exposure levels. 
"Only then will banks be able to cope with the repercussions of sovereign default."

Monday, May 6, 2013

ECB continues to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance

The Wall Street Journal reports that the ECB is continuing to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance as it sees structured finance as crucial to reviving lending to small and medium size eurozone companies.

Regular readers know that in the absence of observable event based reporting on the performance of the underlying collateral, buying or selling structured finance securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Leading up to the financial crisis, this gamble did not work out to well for buyers.

The realization that Europe’s troubled economies are faced with long and protracted weakness has encouraged European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to suggest a long-term solution to unlock credit to their cash-starved businesses.... 
Mr. Draghi on Thursday said the ECB was working to promote a funding market for asset-backed securities, which allow banks to pool together shorter-term debt they have sold–such as auto loans, credit cards, and residential or commercial mortgages–and sell those pools as a single package to investors.
The ECB wants ABS to be a sizeable source of bank financing that will encourage lending to small-to-medium sized companies, or SMEs....
Your humble blogger thinks that there is a significant role for structured finance to play in supporting the lending to small-to-medium sized companies not just in the eurozone, but globally.

The issue is what does it take to restart the structured finance market?

I have been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that what it takes to restart the structured finance market is disclosure that allows investors to know what they own or know what they are buying.

The only way to achieve this level of disclosure is by having observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

With this reporting, investors have access to current collateral performance so they know what they own or know what they are buying.

Without this reporting, investors are simply guessing at what is a readily knowable fact.  A knowable fact that the sell-side knows and uses when it trades against the buy-side (see WSJ article on Goldman and Senderra Funding).

Your humble blogger predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis that the buy-side, except for hedge funds who charter is to gamble with their investors' money, would stay away from structured finance until this informational advantage was eliminated.

To date, despite 5+ years of zero interest rate and quantitative easing monetary policies, this prediction has been accurate.
At the moment, banks aren’t lending to SMEs. Without financing, these companies can’t grow: can’t hire employees, can’t invest in new projects. This is a serious problem in Europe, especially in the southern countries facing multi-year recessions and unemployment at depression levels. 
The ECB cut its main interest rate to a record low 0.5% Thursday, with the idea that cheaper money will help encourage a greater flow of money, eventually boosting the economy. 
But getting this extra cash to the real growth engines, i.e. companies, is not as easy as cutting rates. This is where ABS comes in. 
“Securitization can play a key role in funding Europe’s growth since it provides funding which matches the cash flows of the securitized assets and carries little or no refinancing risk, which is an important component of Basel III capital requirements,” said Rick Watson, head of capital markets at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe. 
But at the moment, these products still suffer from an association with bad deals sold before the financial crisis, like U.S. subprime mortgages, a type of ABS that catalyzed fears across the banking system. 
Since then, investors, especially those in Europe, have yet to regain confidence in the product....
Investors staying away from structured finance securities isn't a question of confidence, but rather the result of a costly lesson.  Investors know that while the product retains its information asymmetry it is good for Wall Street and bad for them.
“We’re seeing a market that is slowly grinding to a halt. The market isn’t going to disappear, but the risk is that it becomes small, bespoke, and reverse-inquiry driven. That is, not a real solid market for funding the European economy,” said Ian Bell, head of the Prime Collateralized Securities Initiative.
PCS was launched in November with the aim of labeling ABS deals that comply with a set of standards relating to quality, transparency and simplicity. Mr. Bell noted the good news was PCS labels have been granted to 12 of all qualifying ABS transactions. The bad news was this is 75%-80% of what has been sold to investors.
As noted earlier, a PCS label is nothing more than sticking lipstick on a pig.  The label is awarded to structured finance securities with the same transparency as opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.
The first step for ABS is restoring confidence....
Confidence in the financial system has always been associated with transparency.

Confidence is the result of investors having access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Confidence results because investors trust their own assessment.
The ECB said did not say how close it was to activating any program. If they do launch one, it wouldn’t be the first crisis-era plan to buy collaterized bank bonds. ... 
“The experience with the first covered bond purchase program can be useful. It was the announcement there that produced the most effect. The implementation was indispensable; without it, the effect would have been undone. But if the ECB were to announce something similar for ABS, it could also have a positive short-term impact,” said Francesco Papadia, former director general for market operations at the ECB....
General expectations are that this will not happen soon. Rabobank analysts summed up the gist of opinions: “We would still view such action as some way off if it does indeed take place at all.” 
But Mr. Draghi’s publically sounded what other officials have been stating for four months. Something needs to happen, and this is a realistic path. 
“It would be a big disappointment if nothing comes of this… I’d be surprised if nothing material develops,” Mr. Papadia said.
What is likely to result is the ECB becomes the gambler of last resort and takes onto its balance sheet more opaque, toxic securities.

Thursday, December 20, 2012

Why have economic forecasts overstated recovery since the beginning of financial crisis

In an interesting Guardian column, Robert Skidelsky looks at why economic forecasts since the beginning of the financial crisis have overstated the recovery and concludes that the assumptions underlying the forecasting models are wrong.

This is a point that your humble blogger has been making.

It has been known since the 1870s that there is a lower bound to effective monetary policy.  Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, set this lower bound at 2%.  He observed that below this rate, behavior would change.

Mark Twain explained exactly what this change in behavior would be when he observed that he was more concerned about the return of his money than the return on his money.  In short, keeping interest rates below 2% interferes with investor attitudes towards risk taking.

I have documented that rates below 2% also interfere with current consumption.  Savers offset the lack of return on their investments by deferring current consumption.  I call this the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.

Confirmation of this self-reinforcing downward spiral is easily seen with companies with defined benefit pension plans.  To offset the lack of earnings on the pension assets, these companies must contribute more money to the pension plans.  The result of this is less money for the companies to reinvest or grow their own business.  This in turn triggers lower return on pension assets ...

"Why did no one see the crisis coming?" Queen Elizabeth II asked economists during a visit to the London School of Economics at the end of 2008. Four years later, the repeated failure of economic forecasters to predict the depth and duration of the slump would have elicited a similar question from the Queen: why the overestimate of recovery?
For the record, I saw the crisis coming and my estimates of recovery have mirrored what has actually taken place.
Consider the facts. ...
Some forecasters are more pessimistic than others (the OBR has a particularly sunny disposition), but no one, it seems, has been pessimistic enough.
Unfortunately, I have been pessimistic enough.  I said at the outset of the financial crisis until we bring transparency to the opaque corners of the financial system and deal with the losses on the excess debt, the global economy would be in a downward spiral.  A downward spiral that vast quantities of fiscal and monetary stimulus is attempting to offset.
Economic forecasting is necessarily imprecise: too many things happen for forecasters to be able to foresee all of them. So judgment calls and best guesses are an inevitable part of "scientific" economic forecasts. 
But imprecision is one thing; the systematic overestimate of the economic recovery in Europe is quite another. 
Indeed, the figures have been repeatedly revised, even over quite short periods of time, casting strong doubt on the validity of the economic models being used. 
These models, and the institutions using them, rely on a built-in theory of the economy, which enables them to "assume" certain relationships. It is among these assumptions that the source of the errors must lie. 
Two key mistakes stand out. 
The models used by all of the forecasting organisations dramatically underestimated the fiscal multiplier: the impact of changes in government spending on output. 
Second, they overestimated the extent to which quantitative easing (QE) by the monetary authorities – that is, printing money – could counterbalance fiscal tightening. ...
Forecasting organisations are finally admitting they underestimated the fiscal multiplier. 
The OBR, reviewing its recent mistakes, accepted that "the average [fiscal] multiplier over the two years would have needed to be 1.3 – more than double our estimate – to fully explain the weak level of GDP in 2011-12". 
The IMF has conceded that "multipliers have actually been in the 0.9 and 1.7 range since the Great Recession". The effect of underestimating the fiscal multiplier has been systematic misjudgment of the damage that "fiscal consolidation" does to the economy.
Which is a polite way of saying that austerity is the equivalent of throwing gasoline on a fire.  It takes a bad situation and makes it worse.

Please recall that the argument for austerity is to reduce the government debt built up since the beginning of the financial crisis.  And why was there an increase in government debt?  To bail out the banks and protect their book capital levels and banker bonuses.

Effectively, the government socialized the losses in the financial system.  This puts the burden of the excess debt on the real economy as oppose to the financial system that is designed to absorb it.  Servicing this excess debt diverts capital from reinvestment and growth in the real economy.  This is what triggers the downward spiral.
This leads us to the second mistake. Forecasters assumed that monetary expansion would provide an effective antidote to fiscal contraction. The Bank of England hoped that by printing £375bn of new money, ($600bn ), it would stimulate total spending to the tune of £50bn, or 3% of GDP. 
But the evidence emerging from successive rounds of QE in the UK and the US suggests that while it did lower bond yields, the extra money was largely retained within the banking system, and never reached the real economy. This implies that the problem has mainly been a lack of demand for credit – reluctance on the part of businesses and households to borrow on almost any terms in a flat market.
Actually, the decline in demand doesn't just represent a lack of demand for credit.  It represents a decline in demand from savers.
These two mistakes compounded each other: if the negative impact of austerity on economic growth is greater than was originally assumed, and the positive impact of quantitative easing is weaker, then the policy mix favored by practically all European governments has been hugely wrong. 
There is much greater scope for fiscal stimulus to boost growth, and much smaller scope for monetary stimulus.
Actually, there is still significant scope for monetary stimulus.

The question is what monetary policies need to be followed to stimulate the economy?

Your humble blogger has been saying for years, listen to Walter Bagehot, reverse current zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies and raise interest rates back to 2%.  Demand should increase as savers can generate a return on their savings and can boost their current consumption.

At the same time, stimulative fiscal policies should continue to be pursued.  This complements monetary policy and reinforces growth in demand.

But what about the losses on the excess debt?  Have the financial system absorb these losses.
This is all quite technical, but it matters a great deal for the welfare of populations. 
All of these models assume outcomes on the basis of existing policies. Their consistent over-optimism about these policies' impact on economic growth validates pursuing them, and enables governments to claim that their remedies are "working," when they clearly are not. 
This is a cruel deception. 
Before they can do any good, the forecasters must go back to the drawing board, and ask themselves whether the theories of the economy underpinning their models are the right ones.

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Geithner Doctrine undermines Draghi's claim that ECB oversight of banks will restore confidence

In a Reuters article, the head of the ECB, Mario Draghi, asserts that having the ECB at the head of a single eurozone bank supervisory mechanism will help to restore confidence.

In the US, the Fed is responsible for supervision of large, global banks.  Since at least the start of the current financial crisis, the Fed has operated under the Geithner Doctrine.  Yves Smith at NakedCapitalism stated the doctrine as follows:
Nothing must be done that will hurt the profits or reputation of any bank that is pretty big and/or well connected.
The manipulation of Libor provides an example of how the Geithner Doctrine is applied.

When told in May 2008 that banks were manipulating Libor interest rates for profit, in addition to trying to make their financial health look better than it was, Mr. Geithner sends to the UK a proposal to reform Libor that would not have ended the banks' ability to manipulate Libor.

For those who believe that the Geithner Doctrine is only being followed in the US, the ECB has already shown that it subscribes to the Geithner Doctrine.

For example, the ECB has been actively pushing for the creation of the European Data Warehouse so that banks can sell the equivalent of subprime mortgage-backed securities (think bank profits).  I say banks can sell the equivalent because transparency has two equally important elements, "what" is disclosed and "when" it is disclosed, and opaque subprime mortgage-backed securities meet the definition of transparency used by the data warehouse and endorsed by the ECB.
New European Central Bank powers to oversee euro zone banks will help restore confidence in the sector and revive interbank lending, its president, Mario Draghi, said on Monday. 
European ministers clinched a deal last week to give the ECB powers to supervise the currency bloc's banks from March 2014, taking the first step in a new phase of integration to help underpin the euro. 
"The single supervisory mechanism will contribute to restoring confidence in the banking sector across the euro area. It will help revive interbank lending and cross-border credit flows, with tangible effects for the real economy," Mario Draghi told the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. 
Bank-to-bank lending has yet to recover from the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, and many banks rely on the ECB for their liquidity needs while others hoard their cash rather than lend it on....
Regular readers know that the interbank lending market is frozen because of a lack of transparency.  Banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.

The solution for unfreezing and keeping the interbank lending market unfrozen is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, banks with deposits to lend can independently assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.
Draghi said: "The national supervisors' role gets bigger as the banks get smaller, but all national supervisors will be subject to the single rulebook as regulated from the centre. The ECB will retain power to call in any bank under its domain." 
Once ECB supervision is in place, the euro zone's rescue fund - the European Stability Mechanism - will be allowed in principle to recapitalise banks directly. 
For now, euro zone governments have had to shore up their banks, adding further to public debt and creating a vicious circle between weak banks and states. 
"Combined with possible direct recapitalisation of banks by the European Stability Mechanism and an envisaged single resolution mechanism, the single supervisory mechanism will go a long way towards breaking the vicious feedback loops between sovereigns and banks," Draghi said.
Regular readers also know that there is no legitimate reason (protecting banker bonuses not being a legitimate reason) that euro zone governments needed to shore up their banks and add further to public debt.

Modern banks are designed to be able to continue operating even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  They can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, taxpayers become the banks' silent equity partners when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  Since taxpayers are already the silent equity partners, there is no need to use the government's ability to borrow in the capital markets to recapitalize the banks.

Monday, December 17, 2012

UBS warns about groupthink at Fed and other central banks

As reported on BusinessInsider, less than a week after your humble blogger discussed how groupthink has come to dominate the major central banks, UBS economists are now warning about groupthink.

The UBS economists observed that groupthink could lead to major policy errors.

Hint:  it already has in the form of zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

The Federal Reserve surprised observers last Wednesday by revolutionizing its strategy for communicating with the public on its monetary policy outlook through the introduction of the "Evans Rule." 
By adopting the Evans Rule, the Fed has now laid out thresholds that must be met before the central bank will consider raising interest rates, which have been held near zero since the financial crisis several years ago.... 
The change has been hailed by critics of the Fed – those who charge that the central bank has not done enough to stimulate the economy – as a crucial step toward tapping its full stimulative potential by more forcefully shaping market expectations.  
UBS economists Drew Matus and Sam Coffin do not share such a positive view of Wednesday's meeting as everyone else, however. 
In fact, Matus and Coffin suggest that contrary to popular belief, the Fed's latest decision actually makes things more dangerous for markets and the economy. 
In a note, the UBS economists warn clients, "Given that policy is now tied to the perceptions of a small group of individuals who all adhere to the same orthodoxy, this implies that monetary policy will continue to operate as a poor substitute for responsible fiscal policy and that the possibility of policy errors from such 'groupthink' remains a key risk for the foreseeable future."... 
Matus and Coffin conclude that a dangerous dynamic may be brewing inside the Fed:
In short, consistency is lacking and the FOMC is increasingly tone deaf. 
This may be because, within the Federal Reserve System, the hawks are primarily “freshwater” economists who are concerned about the ever expanding balance sheet.  
In contrast, most of the rest of the FOMC are either non-economists (the majority of the Board of Governors) or “saltwater” economists. These economists dominate not just the Fed, but a number of central banks around the world. 
As such, critiques are limited and critics outside the Fed often dismissed out of hand. 
 A characteristic of groupthink.
Given that policy is now tied to the perceptions of a small group of individuals who all adhere to the same orthodoxy, this implies that monetary policy will continue to operate as a poor substitute for responsible fiscal policy and that the possibility of policy errors from such “groupthink” remains a key risk for the foreseeable future. 
Meanwhile, with Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker, the lone dissenter in several of the Fed's most recent policy decisions in 2012, set to become a non-voting member on the Committee in 2013, that groupthink may grow even stronger.
Groupthink among central bankers has been growing stronger since the beginning of the financial crisis.  Please note that they are all pursuing the same policies that Japan has shown failed over a 2+ decade period following its bank solvency led financial crisis.

Thursday, December 13, 2012

Governor of Reserve Bank of Australia lays out limitations of what central banks can do

In a must read speech (hat tip Zero Hedge) on the challenges of central banking, Glenn Stevens, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, laid out the limitations of what central banks can and cannot do.

  • Central banks can and did buy some time to address the problem of excess debt in the financial system that triggered our current financial crisis.


  • Central banks cannot fix the problem caused by this excess debt.

Mr. Stevens then noted that the policies adopted to buy time carry with them their own negative side-effects.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying that adopting the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and its related monetary and fiscal policies was and is a mistake.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  This puts the burden of the excess debt on the real economy and results in, at best, a Japan-style economic slump or, at worst, a depression like Greece is experiencing.

I say the ongoing pursuit of the Japanese Model is a mistake because our modern banking system is designed to support a different model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis:  the Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, the banks are required to recognize upfront all the losses that they would realize if the excess debt went through the long process of default and foreclosure.  Subsequently, banks retain 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.

Banks absorbing the losses on the excess debt protects the real economy as it does not take capital out of the real economy that is being used for reinvestment and growth and divert it for debt service.

Why don't policy makers need to foam the runway so that banks can absorb the losses gradually over time?

Modern banks are designed to continue operating and supporting the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, when banks have low or negative book capital levels, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners.

Since the problem of excess debt in the financial system has not gone away since the beginning of the current financial crisis, the choice to continue pursuing the Japanese Model must be made every day by policy makers.

Since the problem of excess debt in the financial system has not gone away, the Swedish Model could still be adopted and the current financial crisis brought to an end.

That policy measures of any kind have their limitations is a theme with broader applications, especially for central banks. 
The central banks of major countries were certainly quite innovative in their responses to the unfolding crisis. Numerous programs to provide funding to private institutions, against vastly wider classes of collateral, were a key feature of the central bank response to the situation. 
In essence, when the private financial sector was suddenly under pressure to shrink its balance sheet, the central banks found themselves obliged to facilitate or slow the balance-sheet adjustment by changing the size of their own balance sheets. This is the appropriate response, as dictated by long traditions of central banking stretching back to Bagehot.
Your humble blogger has argued that the implementation of the central banks' policy response was and still is inappropriate.

Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said that in their lender of last resort role, central banks are suppose to lend freely against good collateral at high interest rates.

So yes, central bank balance sheets should have expanded.

However, central banks didn't always lend against good collateral and they didn't lend at high interest rates.
Conceptually, at least initially, these balance-sheet operations could be seen as distinct from the overall monetary policy stance of the central bank. But as the crisis has gone on such distinctions have inevitably become much less clear as ‘conventional’ monetary policy reached its limits.
Bottom line, central bank balance sheets increased from both their role as lender of last resort and also from the use of unconventional monetary policies like quantitative easing.
It was fortuitous for some, perhaps, that the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates – modern parlance for what we learned about as the ‘liquidity trap’ – had gone from being a text book curiosum to a real world problem in Japan in the 1990s. 
Japan subsequently pioneered the use of ‘quantitative easing’ in the modern era. This provided some experiential base for other central banks when the recession that unfolded from late 2008 was so deep that there was insufficient scope to cut interest rates in response....
Japan demonstrated that quantitative easing doesn't solve the underlying problem of excess debt that occurs with a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Japan also demonstrated that there are limits to how much time central banks can buy to address the problem of excess debt.
For the major countries a further dimension to what is happening is the blurring of the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy. 
Granted, central banks are not directly purchasing government debt at issue. But the size of secondary market purchases, and the share of the debt stock held by some central banks, are sufficiently large that it can only be concluded that central bank purchases are materially alleviating the market constraint on government borrowing....
Having adopted policies to distort the price of government debt in the hope of stimulating demand, central banks have become the market for government debt.
The problem will be the exit from these policies, and the restoration of the distinction between fiscal and monetary policy with the appropriate disciplines. 
The problem isn't a technical one: the central banks will be able to design appropriate technical modalities for reversing quantitative easing when needed.
Who is going to buy all this government debt?
The real issue is more likely to be that ending a lengthy period of guaranteed cheap funding for governments may prove politically difficult. There is history to suggest so. It is no surprise that some worry that we are heading some way back towards the world of the 1920s to 1960s where central banks were ‘captured’ by the Government of the day. 
Most fundamentally, the question is whether people are fully understanding of the limits to central banks' abilities. 
It is, to repeat, not to be critical of actions to date to wonder whether private market participants, and perhaps more importantly governments, recognise what central banks cannot do. 
Central banks can provide liquidity to shore up financial stability and they can buy time for borrowers to adjust. 
But they cannot, in the end, put government finances on a sustainable course and they cannot create the real resources that need to be found from somewhere to strengthen bank capital. They cannot costlessly correct earlier misallocation of real capital investment. They cannot shield people from the implications of having mis-assessed their own life-time budget constraints and as a result having consumed too much. They cannot combat the effects of population aging or drive the innovation that raises productivity and creates new markets. Nor can they, or should they, put themselves in the position of deciding what real resource transfers should take place between countries in a currency union. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Stevens summarizes why the Swedish Model needs to be adopted.

As shown most recently by Iceland and previously by the US in the Great Depression, under the Swedish Model,

  • Bank book capital levels are rebuilt through retained earnings and equity sales after all the losses on the excess debt have been realized.  While this is occurring, taxpayers act as the banks' silent equity partners.
  • People are protected to the extent that their debts are written down to what they can afford.  This process does not create equity for the borrowers.  Rather, it attempts to keep families in their homes (after all, who is going to buy and live in all these homes if they go through foreclosure).
  • The real economy continues to produce the innovations that raise productivity and create new markets.  It can do this because the capital it needs for reinvestment, R&D and growth is not diverted to cover the debt service on the excess debt in the financial system.
  • Retirement saving plans can continue without the negative impact of central banks pursuing monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

Wednesday, December 12, 2012

Groupthink and central bankers' search for new ideas

The Wall Street Journal ran an article that lays out why the leaders of the major economy central banks suffer from a combination of groupthink and defense of the PhD dissertation syndrome.
Every two months, more than a dozen bankers meet here on Sunday evenings to talk and dine on the 18th floor of a cylindrical building looking out on the Rhine. 
The dinner discussions on money and economics are more than academic. At the table are the chiefs of the world's biggest central banks, representing countries that annually produce more than $51 trillion of gross domestic product, three-quarters of the world's economic output. 
Of late, these secret talks have focused on global economic troubles and the aggressive measures by central banks to manage their national economies. 
Since 2007, central banks have flooded the world financial system with more than $11 trillion. Faced with weak recoveries and Europe's churning economic problems, the effort has accelerated. The biggest central banks plan to pump billions more into government bonds, mortgages and business loans. 
Their monetary strategy isn't found in standard textbooks. The central bankers are, in effect, conducting a high-stakes experiment, drawing in part on academic work by some of the men who studied and taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1970s and 1980s. 
While many national governments, including the U.S., have failed to agree on fiscal policy—how best to balance tax revenues with spending during slow growth—the central bankers have forged their own path, independent of voters and politicians, bound by frequent conversations and relationships stretching back to university days.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it describes exactly the situation in which groupthink is most likely to occur.

The Wikipedia discussion of groupthink not only confirms this, but talks about signs that it has occurred.
Irving Janis led the initial research on the groupthink theory. In his first writing on groupthink in 1971, he defined the term as follows: 
I use the term groupthink as a quick and easy way to refer to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. 
The WSJ article clearly shows that we have a 'cohesive ingroup' that was 'concurrence-seeking' as they are following the same monetary policies of zero interest rates and quantitative easing.
Groupthink is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell used in his dismaying world of 1984. In that context, groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. Exactly such a connotation is intended, since the term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of group pressures....
Please re-read the highlighted text as it describes why these central bankers chose and continue pursuing monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing despite significant evidence that it doesn't work.

Each of these central bankers knew before the financial crisis began that
  • Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said in the 1870s that interest rates should not go below 2%; and
  • Japan has tried monetary policies that kept interest rates below 2% for almost 2 decades without success.  
For confirmation that the group knew these facts, prior to becoming chairmen of the Fed and the beginning of the financial crisis, Ben Bernanke even told the Japanese that their monetary policies weren't working.  The response of the Japanese was that it was easy to give this advice when you are not the one facing the financial crisis.

Despite knowing that keeping interest rates below 2% doesn't work and that the solution to a bank solvency led financial crisis is to adopt the Swedish Model, this group of central bankers chose to pursue monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

The policy choice of these central bankers fits Professor Janis' description as it reflects 'a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments' overriding a 'realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action'.
The main principle of groupthink, which I offer in the spirit of Parkinson's Law, is this: 
 The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the members of a policy-making ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups.
Professor Janis neatly summarizes what has and is still occurring in central banking.

For those who doubt this, Mr. Bernanke recently gave a speech in which he expressed his frustration with consumers for not doing what he wanted them to do.  Subsequently, the Fed announced quantitative easing till eternity.

This announcement was the equivalent in the world of groupthink to saying I am going to keep beating you until you stop crying.

The fact that the consumers did not do what he wanted them to do should have been a clear signal that he wasn't doing the right thing to get the outcome he wanted.

However, it appears the because he is so mired in groupthink Mr. Bernanke could not entertain this alternative.

Update

This comes from a previous post I did on Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author.  Please note that it appears that her critique was dismissed as one would expect as a result of groupthink.


From Anna Schwartz's Wall Street Journal obituary,
Across six decades, she contributed strong work and commentary on economics, notably the financial system. In all her efforts to understand and explain financial behavior, Anna Schwartz focused on the system's primary need: stability. 
Which brings us to the present economic instability, on which Schwarz had opinions that deserve to be heard again. Statements she made to this newspaper in a Weekend Interview three and a half years ago, in her early 90s, ring with clarity and relevance to current difficulties: "The Fed has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible." 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mrs. Schwartz has nicely summarized what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the bank solvency led financial crisis.

There is only one way to return 'stability' to the financial system and end uncertainty about the balance sheets of financial firms:  require ultra transparency and make the banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off balance sheet exposure details.

With this data, market participants can independently assess each bank and be confident in making buy, hold and sell decisions based on this assessment.

From her WSJ Weekend Interview,
She speaks with passion and just a hint of resignation about the current financial situation. And looking at how the authorities have handled it so far, she doesn't like what she sees... 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has called the 888-page "Monetary History" "the leading and most persuasive explanation of the worst economic disaster in American history."
Ms. Schwartz thinks that our central bankers and our Treasury Department are getting it wrong again. 
To understand why, one first has to understand the nature of the current "credit market disturbance," as Ms. Schwartz delicately calls it. We now hear almost every day that banks will not lend to each other, or will do so only at punitive interest rates. Credit spreads -- the difference between what it costs the government to borrow and what private-sector borrowers must pay -- are at historic highs. 
This is not due to a lack of money available to lend, Ms. Schwartz says, but to a lack of faith in the ability of borrowers to repay their debts. "The Fed," she argues, "has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible." 
So even though the Fed has flooded the credit markets with cash, spreads haven't budged because banks don't know who is still solvent and who is not. 
An observation that also appeared in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report.
This uncertainty, says Ms. Schwartz, is "the basic problem in the credit market. Lending freezes up when lenders are uncertain that would-be borrowers have the resources to repay them. So to assume that the whole problem is inadequate liquidity bypasses the real issue."
Please re-read the highlighted text as it confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning that it is a bank solvency crisis.
In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in "A Monetary History," the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector. As banks failed, depositors became alarmed that they'd lose their money if their bank, too, failed. So bank runs began, and these became self-reinforcing: 
"If the borrowers hadn't withdrawn cash, they [the banks] would have been in good shape. But the Fed just sat by and did nothing, so bank after bank failed. And that only motivated depositors to withdraw funds from banks that were not in distress," deepening the crisis and causing still more failures. 
But "that's not what's going on in the market now," Ms. Schwartz says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their ledgers -- "all these exotic securities that the market does not know how to value." 
"Why are they 'toxic'?" Ms. Schwartz asks. "They're toxic because you cannot sell them, you don't know what they're worth, your balance sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don't know whom to lend to because we don't know who is sound. So if you could get rid of them, that would be an improvement."...
While Ms. Schwartz understands the need for valuing structured finance securities, she does not understand that they present the identical problem that banks present:  they are opaque.

The only way to answer which bank is solvent and which is not is to require ultra transparency.

The only way to value structured finance securities is to require observable event based reporting on the underlying assets.  Under this reporting, investors have access to current performance information as every activity like a payment or delinquency is reported before the beginning of the next business day after it occurs.
But in doing so, [Mr Paulson] shifted from trying to save the banking system to trying to save banks. These are not, Ms. Schwartz argues, the same thing. In fact, by keeping otherwise insolvent banks afloat, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have actually prolonged the crisis. "They should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down." 
Rather, "firms that made wrong decisions should fail," she says bluntly. "You shouldn't rescue them. And once that's established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich." The trouble is, "that's not the way the world has been going in recent years." 
Instead, we've been hearing for most of the past year about "systemic risk" -- the notion that allowing one firm to fail will cause a cascade that will take down otherwise healthy companies in its wake. 
Ms. Schwartz doesn't buy it. "It's very easy when you're a market participant," she notes with a smile, "to claim that you shouldn't shut down a firm that's in really bad straits because everybody else who has lent to it will be injured. Well, if they lent to a firm that they knew was pretty rocky, that's their responsibility. And if they have to be denied repayment of their loans, well, they wished it on themselves.The [government] doesn't have to save them, just as it didn't save the stockholders and the employees of Bear Stearns. Why should they be worried about the creditors? Creditors are no more worthy of being rescued than ordinary people, who are really innocent of what's been going on."
The reason the ultra transparency is needed is so that lenders can once again be responsible for their decisions.

So long as governments have a monopoly on the information disclosed under ultra transparency, there is a moral hazard.  The moral hazard is the need to bailout investors after the government says that a bank is solvent.
It takes real guts to let a large, powerful institution go down....
As your humble blogger has said many times, a modern banking system is designed so that banks can absorb all the losses on the excesses in the financial system without having to be closed down.  Between deposit insurance and access to central bank lending, banks have ample liquidity.

As a result, banks can continue to support the real economy and retain 100% of future pre-banker bonus earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.
In 2002, Mr. Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve Board governor, said in a speech in honor of Mr. Friedman's 90th birthday, "I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again."
"This was [his] claim to be worthy of running the Fed," she says. He was "familiar with history. He knew what had been done." But perhaps this is actually Mr. Bernanke's biggest problem. Today's crisis isn't a replay of the problem in the 1930s, but our central bankers have responded by using the tools they should have used then. They are fighting the last war. The result, she argues, has been failure. "I don't see that they've achieved what they should have been trying to achieve. So my verdict on this present Fed leadership is that they have not really done their job."
Which is not surprising because they are fighting a bank solvency crisis and not a bank liquidity crisis.

The solution to a bank solvency crisis is adopting the Swedish model with ultra transparency.

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

Why have the ECB and BoE endorsed a solution that does not bring transparency to structured finance securities?

In attempting to bring transparency to structured finance securities, why have the ECB and BoE endorsed a solution that retains the reporting frequency that makes these securities opaque?

Let's rule out stupidity.  We are dealing with a bunch of PhD economists and a few lawyers.

More likely, we are dealing with regulatory capture.  Not something that you associate with central banks, but that exists none the less.

Reuters carried a fascinating article that helps to answer the question.  The article looks at how the ECB and the BoE used their influence to have the securitization industry build a data warehouse to provide "transparency" into the performance of the underlying collateral.

One way the ECB and BoE used their influence was to bless the data warehouse by saying that any structured finance deal that provides loan-level performance data through this data warehouse qualifies because it is transparent to be pledged as collateral to the central banks.

In addition, the ECB leaned on issuers to fund the project!

What emerged under the influence of the ECB and BoE was the European DataWarehouse.  A data warehouse that will provide loan-level performance data on the same reporting basis as opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities:  once-per-month.

Regular readers of this blog know that there are two elements to transparency:  what is disclosed and when it is disclosed.

Everyone knows that structured finance securities involve taking specific assets, like mortgages, and setting them aside for the benefit of the investor.  The physical equivalent of this would be to put them into a bag.

Once the mortgages are in the bag, it is important to know what is in the bag currently.

Why?

If an investor does not know what is in the bag currently, they cannot take the first step in the investment cycle.

The first step is to independently assess the risk and value the underlying collateral so the investor can know what the investor is buying and, after buying, know what they own (in the eurozone, please see Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive).

The second step is to compare this independent assessment to the prices shown by Wall Street or the City.

The third and final step is to make a buy, hold or sell decision based on the difference between the investor’s independent valuation of the security and the price shown by Wall Street or the City.

Please note that without the ability to know what is in the bag currently, it is impossible to accurately assess what is going to come out of the bag eventually.

The lack of knowing what is in the bag currently prevents investors from performing their own independent assessment and makes meaningless hiring an expert third party to do the assessment for them.  Simply put, without current information of what is in the bag, investors cannot go through the investment cycle.

Buying securities in the absence of an independent assessment is not investing.   Buying securities that cannot be independently assessed is the equivalent of blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

In case you doubt this, let me show it to you as I have shown both the ECB and BoE using a brown paper bag to hold the underlying collateral.

On the first business day of last month, $100 went into the bag.  On the third business day of this month, a trustee report with granular level data was issued that showed the bag contained $75 at the end of the last month.  This was made up of 3 $20 bills and 3 $5 bills.

So the question is:  what is in the bag currently?

Based on the fact that $25 came out of the bag last month, there are a number of ways of guessing what is in the brown paper bag?  First, we could guess that nothing has been taken out of the bag and it still holds $75. Or a $5 bill has been removed and left $70 in the bag.  Or a $20 bill has been removed and left $55 in the bag?  Or both a $5 bill and a $20 bill have been removed and left $50 in the bag?

By simply asking what is in the brown paper bag currently, I have already created a $25 spread between the $75 a seller might reasonably value the contents of the brown paper bag at and the $50 a buyer might be willing to offer.

Let me assure you that with this wide a spread, the contents of the brown paper bag are not going to sell even if the performance of the underlying collateral had been reported through a data warehouse as there is no transparency into what is being purchased.

The simple solution to unfreezing the market is to allow investors and sellers to know what they are buying and selling by putting the underlying collateral into what is the physical equivalent of a clear plastic bag.

This can be done by providing observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, all activities like a payment or default on the underlying collateral are reported before the beginning of the next business day.  This way all market participants know exactly what is happening with the collateral so they can independently assess and value the security.
The European Central Bank's loan-level data initiative for structured finance, which should provide detailed loan data to the whole market through the European DataWarehouse (ED), is ready for action. 
The ED was established to ensure the ECB's loan information - which it needs to monitor ABS collateral used for its repo operations - is easily accessible to the whole market. 
The ED will check data that comes in from issuers, ensuring full compliance with the ECB's standard templates, and provide the IT systems for data providers to hook into its systems. 
The project is supposed to "create a central point (or forum) where industries, associations and national agencies can lodge their data and information in an open, transparent and trusted environment". 
The ECB hopes this will boost private sector demand for securitisation - allowing peripheral banks to replace some of their EUR371.7bn of ABS-backed central bank repo funding with transactions placed with third-parties. 
With that much exposure, the ECB has an incredible incentive to push for the creation of a data warehouse.
Issuers wanting their securitisations issues to be ECB-eligible will have to provide this data to the European DataWarehouse....
This certainly gives the ECB a big lever to force the issuers to provide data and invest in the data warehouse.
The data initiative began in 2009, when regulators became convinced that the securitisation industry needed to improve disclosure on the assets which backed the securities if it was to regain investor trust. Transparency became a major part of the drive to re-regulate securitisation....
Please note, that on April 14 2008, your humble blogger wrote a Total Securitization Learning Curve column that laid out why transparency was needed for structured finance securities and that it should be provided through a data warehouse.

I was invited to write this column, because, from the buy side's perspective, I am the independent global expert on transparency and structured finance securities.
Various senior market participants were invited to help draft templates to present loan level data in standard, comparable format across Europe. Each jurisdiction records different data about borrowers - and different information depending on whether they are borrowing via credit card, mortgage, or unsecured loan. This must be anonymous - but be specific enough to be useful.
This exercise was led by the sell-side through its captured industry trade groups (the European Securitisation Forum and its successor AFME) with the explicit goals of delaying transparency as long as possible and assuring that the data being disclosed would be useless.

They have succeeded.

Based on my conversation with several valuation firms that work strictly for the buy side, the data fields that will be disclosed don't allow them to run some of their key analyzes.
Following production of the templates, the ECB decided to encourage the construction of a whole new piece of market infrastructure to provide this data.
One might wonder why the ECB which knew of my existence and the fact that my firm had already designed and held a patent on this new piece of market infrastructure did not talk to me.

Based on the my responses to its public consultation, it was clear to the ECB that my solution was biased to the buy-side.

Instead,
Paul Burdell of Link Financial, acting as an adviser to the ECB at this time, took on the project, soon dubbed the European DataWarehouse.
Eight institutions drawn from the technical working groups managed the procurement process, picking Sapient Global Markets as constructor.
As I said, regulatory capture?
The ECB maintained an arms-length distance from the project, aiming to present the European DataWarehouse as a market-driven exercise.
Clearly, the ECB did not have an arms-length distance from the project.  It endorsed the European DataWarehouse when there was already a viable solution, my firm's data warehouse, in the market.
Speaking on Thursday in Frankfurt, Peter Praet, chief economist at the ECB, described loan-level data as a classic collective action problem - no individual issuer had an incentive to start making this data available, but official sector organisations could act as catalysts to improve market practice. 
The central bank retained an observer role, since it anticipated being a major user of the resulting data - indeed, it is the only institution so far to have trialled access to the data.
A data warehouse would have been built and made available simply by the ECB and BoE making loan-level data a requirement for eligibility.

It would have been economically attractive to build this data warehouse as there are almost 400 billion euros on the ECB balance sheet that would have needed a data warehouse had the ECB and BoE stuck to making loan-level disclosure an eligibility requirement.

However, the ECB and the BoE did not stop with this simple requirement.  They wanted to choose a winner.  And in choosing a winner they managed to chose a solution that is designed to protect opacity in the structured finance market.
No third party investors in ABS have yet approached the ED about using the data. 
Which shows that these investors are listening to your humble blogger as the data is worthless because it is out of date and does not answer the question of what is in the bag currently.

Investors know that structured finance securities are lemons unless there is observable event based reporting so there is no reason to "pay" for useless data.

Investors also know that under Reg FD (fair disclosure), the information must be disclosed for free to US investors.  Again, no reason to pay.

Finally, money managers know that in the absence of observable event based reporting by ED they have to disclose to their investors that they are blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag if they use the data from ED.  Without this disclosure, the money managers and their firms are liable for any losses on investments in these securities.

Of course, this disclosure would also make it impossible for the money managers to buy these securities with ED reporting as investors are not going to give their money to someone to blindly bet on the contents of a brown paper bag.
The project has proved controversial, particularly with some of the large UK issuers, because while the ECB was the main driver of the project, the central bank refused to pay for it, arguing that the industry needed to show willing. 
Again, the central bank didn't need to pay for it.  They simply had to make transparency a criteria for eligibility.  Transparency that addresses both what is disclose and when it is disclosed in a way that places the underlying collateral in the equivalent of a clear plastic bag.
Instead of being a public utility, ED is a profit-making private sector company, paid for by a private share placement to market participants, managed by Perella Weinberg. 
Shareholders get a discount on submitting their data. The idea was a co-operative system, analogous to SWIFT, the payments communication standard owned by its member banks. 
Loading loan-level data into the DataWarehouse is necessary to make ABS central bank eligible, but can only be achieved by paying ED a fee. One senior figure close to the project described it as a toll-booth on the only route to a destination. However, the profit rate is to be limited to 10% and is to be used for reinvestment.
And here we get to the real reason that the sell-side pushed the ECB into promoting the European DataWarehouse.  My firm would have owned the data warehouse and charged a toll.

This way, the sell-side can both minimize the toll and make some money off of the toll.
Initial target funding was EUR20m, though this was subsequently revised to EUR11m. Fundraising for this smaller amount was completed by July 2012, but 15 other institutions have publically committed funds so far, with Dutch institutions also involved, despite reports to the contrary. 
The shareholder list, available on the ED website, is heavily skewed towards peripheral institutions. 
Some firms were initially reluctant to offer financial backing to the project - Executive Board members of the ECB had to use their contacts with senior bank management to encourage them to buy shares. 
Despite this encouragement, some issuer communities decided to only invest under the guise of existing market associations - German banks under the banner of True Sale International and Dutch banks through the newly minted Dutch Securitisation Association.
So much for arms-length or just being an observer.  When a central bank uses their contacts to encourage bank management to buy shares, they have step directly into endorsement mode.

An endorsement that subjects both the ECB and the BoE to public examination.  

When the European DataWarehouse fails to reopen the market for structured finance securities in the first quarter of 2013, Mr. Draghi, the head of the ECB, and Sir Mervyn King, the governor of the BoE, should be held responsible for explaining why they endorsed blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Monday, December 10, 2012

Bank for International Settlements: global economic fundamentals do not support market prices

The Guardian reports that the Bank for International Settlements has issued a warning about the growing disconnect between prices for stocks and bonds and the underlying economic reality.

This warning effectively undermines the central assumption supporting current monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

These policies are justified by central bankers by the wealth effect argument.  Under the wealth effect argument, the high stock and bond prices that result from pushing investors out on the risk curve are suppose to make investors feel "wealthier" and as a result they will increase their spending.

Clearly, this has not happened.  Anyone not trained as an economist immediately recognizes that the wealth effect the central bankers are hoping for relies on amnesia.  Investors have to forget that the markets collapsed in 2008/2009.

If investors don't have amnesia, then they see the gains in their investments as temporary and not something that can be spent.

Asset prices are rising to levels not seen since before the crisis despite continuing long-term risks to the markets, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has warned. 
The warning should ring alarm bells across the world as the Swiss-based organisation can claim to be one of the few organisations that saw the financial crash coming. 
In its quarterly report, the bank said: "Unusually, equity and fixed income gains coincided with a weakening of the global economic outlook. In the past, falling growth forecasts have usually been associated with rising expected default rates and higher bond yields." 
It noted that equity prices had risen even as the outlook for companies deteriorated. 
Companies' earnings expectations have dropped and "an unusually high proportion of firms warned that future profits could fall short of analysts' forecasts". 
The bank said investors were taking on more risk for lower returns – driving prices higher – in the hunt for returns in a world where central banks are keeping interest rates at record-low levels. 
"Numerous bond investors said that they felt less well compensated for risk than in the past, but that they had little alternative with rates on many bank deposits close to zero and the supply of other low-risk investments in decline." 
In some cases that has caused asset prices to reach levels that no longer reflected the risk involved. "Some asset prices appeared highly valued in a historical context relative to indicators of their riskiness," it said....

Thursday, December 6, 2012

Matthew Lynn: the era of central bank independence is over

In his MarketWatch column, Matthew Lynn presents a case for why the era of central bank independence is coming to an end.

He cites a variety of factors like how quantitative easing redistributes wealth or how zero interest rate policies punishes savers.

What he leaves off the table is the elephant in the room.  The justification for central bank independence was that it was needed so they could take away the punch bowl and keep the financial system from collapsing.  The central banks in the EU, UK and US all failed to take away the punch bowl that let the financial sector get out of control leading up to the current financial crisis.

When you are independent and don't do your job, you lose the right to this independence.
for the last decade there has been one principle that everyone has agreed on. Independent central banks free of political interference are a good thing. 
But now that is under attack everywhere. 
Increasingly it looks like the model of the independent, technocratic central bank is on the way out — and will be replaced by direct control of monetary policy by governments. And that will change the rules of the game for investors. 
Central bankers used to be grey, colorless figures. ...
Now they are in the thick of the day-to-day political battle....
The days when central bankers were above the political fray are long gone. It is not hard to figure out why. 
First, the game has changed. The main intellectual argument for independent central banks was that they could make long-term decisions without short-term politics getting in the way. They would have more credibility with the markets when they set inflation targets, because investors would know they wouldn’t get blown off course by the need to pump the economy up and get incomes rising ahead of an election. 
That doesn’t seem so important anymore. Central bankers aren’t fighting inflation — there is not much sign of it — and recession is their main enemy. They don’t have that much credibility either: very few investors believe something is going to happen just because the Fed or the ECB say it will. 
And the assumption that there are simple mechanical choices to make — slightly slower growth this year, for example, in exchange for healthier long-term expansion — no longer seems to apply. 
The result? There isn’t any reason to suppose that an independent central banker will do a better job than an elected politician. 
Second, central bankers are now acting like politicians anyway. They always have to some extent, of course. But it has become more obvious. 
Take quantitative easing, for example. It redistributes wealth. It punishes savers and rewards debtors. It permits a far-larger state than would otherwise be possible — although at the expense of future generations who will have to pick up the bill for current spending. 
Or take near-zero interest rates. They help younger people who are trying to buy their first home. But they punish older people who are getting far-lower pensions from their savings than they could have expected. They are all choices about who gets what, and who picks up the bill. 
You can agree or disagree with them; there are perfectly respectable arguments to be made on both sides of the issue. But they are political choices, of the sort that used to be settled by politicians and involve elections. When they are making those kind of choices on behalf of society, central bankers have to expect to get drawn into the public debate.
But central bankers are going to struggle in that role. There are two big problems. First, they have no mandate. They are chosen from within a narrow pool of career bankers and officials. They don’t have the legitimacy that comes from having won an election, and that makes them easy to attack. Next, none of them know the language to defend their decisions. They have no training in oratory, nor do they know how to win support for their decisions. Again, they are an easy target.
I disagree with his two reasons for why central bankers struggle.

First, central bankers adopt policies that support the policies of the elected officials.  It was the elected officials who chose to pursue the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

As a result, the central banks have adopted policies designed to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.  Even if this means destroying the financial markets, the real economy and the social contract.

Second, central bankers are trained to verbally defend their decisions.  For most of them, this training came in the oral defense of their PhD dissertations in economics.
By the end of the decade, it is unlikely any central banks will still be independent. 
Instead, governments will take direct control of monetary policy. 
The U.K. may well go first. It was only in 1997 that the Bank of England became independent. Until then, interest rates were set by the government. Europe will be next. The ECB president is already running half the continent. The Fed may hang on longer. Americans are historically reluctant to give their government any more power. But it will be put under tighter political control.

Monday, December 3, 2012

Don't trust politicians to supervise banks

In his Financial Times post, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi makes the case for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency by arguing for combining monetary policy and bank supervision in one independent organization.

Mr. Smaghi ignores the fact that the Fed combined monetary policy and bank supervision in one independent organization and it failed in the lead up to the financial crisis (the US was ground zero for bank insolvency) and it is still failing in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

One of the fatal flaws in combining monetary policy and bank supervision in one organization is if it allows a bank solvency crisis to occur, it uses monetary policy to try to hide the fact.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, your humble blogger has written from personal experience from having worked at the Fed a number of posts explaining why the conduct of monetary policy is mutually incompatible with the conduct of bank supervision.

These posts can be summarized as follows:  in the same way that there are macro-economists who focus on the big picture and there are micro-economists who focus on the detail, monetary policy is all about focus on the big picture while bank supervision is all about focus on the detail.

Fed chairman Ben Bernanke confirmed this when he said how much he hated listening to the bank supervisors presentations.  He knows they are important, however, he found them painfully dull to listen to.

The simple reason why anyone thinks that monetary policy and bank supervision need to be linked is that central banks are the lenders of last resort.  In theory, they are suppose to lend at high interest rates to solvent banks.

This requires that the central banks are able to assess the solvency of the banks.

Before the development of 21st century information technology, it was the bank supervisors who had access to all the data needed to assess bank solvency.  Hence, there was a reason to combine monetary policy and bank supervision in one organization.

However, this reason no longer exists as we live in the information age.

If banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail, a central bank that only exercises monetary policy could access this data for purposes of performing its lender of last resort function.
When the Bank of England was made independent in 1997 it had to surrender its power to supervise the banking system. 
Parliament used two main arguments to justify this. The first was that there is a conflict of interest between monetary policy and the conduct of banking supervision. The second was that banking supervision cannot be as independent as monetary policy, and therefore needs to be much more accountable to the political authorities. 
Both arguments proved wrong, not only in theory but also in practice. And not only in England. 
Rather than a conflict of interest between monetary policy and bank supervision, the opposite has turned out to be true in recent years. 
The lack of information on the solvency of the banking system made it much more difficult for central banks, such as the BoE, to interpret market developments and to provide liquidity to sound institutions only. 
National supervisors had the tendency to paint a rosy picture of their financial system, which enabled banks to easily qualify as counterparties for central bank operations.
Based on Mr. Smaghi's observations, the solution is not to merge monetary policy and bank supervision in one organization, but rather to require ultra transparency.

With ultra transparency, the central banks can access the data they need so they only provide liquidity to sound institutions.

With ultra transparency, there is market discipline on the national supervisors so that they don't paint a rosy picture of their financial system.
It is also unlikely that independent central banks that are accountable for their monetary policy objective, in terms of price stability, would seek to use monetary instruments for other reasons. Trying to address banks’ solvency problems by extending central bank liquidity support is not very effective over time.... 
Japan has been trying to address bank solvency problems by extending central bank liquidity support for 2+ decades.  This same policy has been adopted by the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve.
The conflict of interest argument might have been an issue in the old days of politically dependent and non-transparent central banks. It is less relevant today. The opposite may actually be true. 
Without bank supervision powers the central bank may nevertheless be induced to use monetary policy to resolve problems created by ineffective bank supervision out of fear that those problems might impact on financial stability and, as a consequence, on price stability.....
The BoE, the BoJ, the ECB and the Fed are using monetary policy to resolve problems created by ineffective bank supervision out of fear that those problems might impact on financial stability and on price stability.

The only difference between these central banks is that the Fed was the party responsible for ineffective bank supervision.
Bank supervisory authorities that are not sufficiently independent, and are too closely associated with the political authorities, are generally under pressure to delay the identification of insolvent banks, for the fear that taxpayers would get upset. The problem thus tends to be postponed, and the cost to the taxpayer rises. 
The experience of the recent crisis has shown that taxpayers have paid most in countries where supervision was less independent and where the political authorities are most closely associated with the banking system....
By definition, regulators are under pressure from political authorities to not recognize anything bad happening in the financial system.

The Nyberg Report on the Irish Financial Crisis described this pressure and how it is hard to say to a politician who is dependent on increasing tax revenues that action needs to be taken when nothing appears to be wrong.

The way to circumvent political pressure is by requiring ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, market participants can assess the risks for themselves and adjust their exposures to levels that they can afford to lose given this independent assessment of risk.
The crisis has shown that the system is indeed broken. 
Had there been a single supervisor from the very start of the euro, independent like the ECB, the truth about some of the most problematic banks would probably have come out earlier. The excess leveraging accumulated in some countries would not have been tolerated for so long. The stress tests conducted since the start of the crisis would have been applied seriously, in a homogeneous way across countries. The cleaning up of banks’ balance sheet would have started earlier.
The truth about the problematic banks would come out if banks are required to provide ultra transparency.  In addition, with ultra transparency, market participants could conduct their own stress tests.  Finally, with ultra transparency, there would be significant pressure on the banks to clean up their balance sheets and recognize their losses.

None of this requires that there is a single european bank regulator.
A single supervisor would probably have confronted several governments at an early stage of the crisis with clear-cut decisions aimed at ensuring an adequate capitalisation of their banking systems, as happened in the US. Maybe that’s what some actually did not want. But that’s what the eurozone needs in order to solve the crisis and avoid new ones in the future.
The US government has never confronted its insolvent too big to fail banks.

It is only the market itself that is both big enough and willing to confront these banks.  It is the market that can exert discipline so that banks recognize their losses and retain an adequate level of bank book capital to handle future problems.

However, in the absence of ultra transparency, the market cannot do this.

Instead, everyone is reliant on politicians to supervise banks through the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight that the current financial crisis has shown did not work in the past and is unlikely to ever work in the future.