Showing posts with label Bank Capital Risk Weighting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bank Capital Risk Weighting. Show all posts

Friday, September 6, 2013

BoE's Carney calling for clampdown on bank risk model to restore trust

Bloomberg reports that Bank of England Governor Mark Carney is calling for a clampdown on bank risk models to restore trust.

This call highlights the need for banks banks to disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Without this disclosure, market participants are never going to trust bank financial statements as they have no idea what the banks, with the permission of their regulators, are hiding on and off their balance sheets.

As for a clampdown on bank risk models, this is a classic case of why complex rules combined with regulatory supervision doesn't provide the same benefit as transparency and market discipline.

In the world envisioned by Mr. Carney, all banks would value securities the same way.

Fortunately, this isn't the way the real world works.  There are legitimate business reasons why different banks would assess the risk of and value the same security differently (hint: this difference of opinion is what makes markets).

To have all banks assess the risk of and value securities in the same way would be to make the financial system more prone to instability.

If the mandated risk assessment and valuation proves faulty, then every bank is has a problem.  This doesn't add to stability, but rather instability.

Regular readers know that trust in the financial markets is a function of transparency.  By making the banks disclose their current exposure details, each market participant can independently assess the risk of and value of each bank's exposures.  Market participants trust their own assessment.

Based on this assessment, market participants can adjust their exposures based on the risk of each bank.  This subjects the banks to market discipline and adds an additional layer of robustness and stability to the financial system.

The additional layer of robustness and stability takes the form of market participants limiting their exposure to each bank to what they can afford to lose and ending the risk of financial contagion.

“The risk models that banks use to calculate their capital needs show worryingly large differences,” Carney, governor of the Bank of England, said in a letter yesterday to leaders from the Group of 20 nations meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia. “This must be addressed for depositors, investors, clients and authorities to have full confidence in the strength of bank balance sheets and their resilience during a downturn.”...

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international regulators group, said in July that some lenders were backing investments with as much as 20 percent more capital than other banks. European banks generally apply lower risk weights to their holdings of bank-issued debt than lenders based elsewhere, the Basel group said. 
“Given large banks risk-weight based on internal models approved by supervisors and populated with their own historic data, it is not surprising that there is substantial inconsistency,” Bob Penn, financial regulation partner at law firm Allen & Overy LLP in London, said in an e-mail.

“Consistency is arguably a good thing here: but for so long as the Basel rules explicitly embed inconsistency it is hard to see how Mr. Carney’s call will be heard,” he said.

Sunday, July 28, 2013

How much capital should banks have?

In a Vox EU column, the IMF's Lev Ratnovski tries to answer the question: "how much capital should banks have?".

His conclusion after studying the level of non-performing loans and then estimating losses in prior economic crises: 9% on a simple leverage ratio basis and 18% under Basel III.

Of course, Mr. Ratnovski assumes that regulators will actually require banks to recognize the losses on their exposure to excess debt.  History shows that this is not the case.

In addition, regular readers know that the amount of capital that each bank should have is the amount of capital that the market requires given the riskiness of each bank's exposures.

So that the market can assess the riskiness of each bank's exposures and exert discipline on each bank to achieve an appropriate level of capitalization, each bank must disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

During the early 1900s when banks were required to disclose their exposure details, market discipline on the banks resulted in an average simple leverage ratios that exceeded 10%.  A level that is consistent with Mr. Ratnovski's analysis.

Friday, July 5, 2013

Basel study shows banks game their reported capital ratios by up to 20%

Bloomberg reports that the Basel Committee has confirmed just how easy it is to manipulate and overstate bank capital ratios.

Specifically, the Committee looked at the variations in the risk-weights banks assign to their assets, particularly corporate and household debt, and found that this variation results in banks reporting capital ratios that are up to 20% higher than a more conservative peer bank's risk-weighting would suggest.

Please note, we are only talking about manipulating and overstating bank capital ratios by the assignment of risk-weights.  The study excludes manipulating and overstating bank capital ratio by suspension of mark-to-market accounting or regulatory forbearance.

Naturally, the Basel Committee is looking for how to address this problem of gaming the capital ratios.
“The short-term policy options that the committee will consider include enhanced disclosure, additional guidance and possible clarifications of the Basel framework,” the group said.
Regular readers know and the Basel Committee confirms that the number one way for ending gaming of bank capital ratios is to require the banks to provide enhanced disclosure.

Specifically, banks must disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, any market participant who is interested can independently calculate a bank's capital ratio and compare this independent calculation with what the bank reports.

With market participants having an ability to independently calculate a bank's capital ratio, banks have an incentive to be as conservative as possible in the capital ratio they report.  This minimizes the chances of the bank being portrayed as even riskier than it is.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Sheila Bair: capital ratios let regulators make banks look safer than they are

In her Wall Street Journal column, former FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair drives a stake through the heart of bank capital, the Basel capital requirements in particular, by observing that capital ratios let regulators make banks appear safer than they actually are.

Ms. Bair's conclusion is exactly what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Bank capital ratios suffer from two fundamental flaws:

  • They are easily manipulated by banks, regulators and policy makers.  Banks manipulate the ratios by gaming the calculation of risk adjusted assets.  Regulators manipulate the ratios by practicing regulatory forbearance and letting banks engage in 'extend and pretend' to turn their non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans.  Policy makers manipulate the ratios by insisting on the suspension of mark-to-market accounting for securities.
  • They are designed to hide the true condition of the banks.  Having been involved in the development of Basel I, I can tell you the basic idea behind Basel I was to hide the amount of leverage that banks were taking on so they could generate a high return on equity.  Regulators bought into the idea that banks needed a higher return on equity to attract capital.
There is only one way to assess the risk of a bank.  That is to look at a bank's current global exposure details.

This is why your humble blogger has been saying that banks need to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can assess the true condition of the bank.

With this information, market participants can, if they want, calculate a capital ratio that is not subject to measurement errors introduced by banks, regulators or policy makers.
The recent Senate report on the J.P. Morgan Chase JPM +0.77% "London Whale" trading debacle revealed emails, telephone conversations and other evidence of how Chase managers manipulated their internal risk models to boost the bank's regulatory capital ratios. 
Risk models are common and certainly not illegal. Nevertheless, their use in bolstering a bank's capital ratios can give the public a false sense of security about the stability of the nation's largest financial institutions. 
At a minimum, risk models introduce measurement error and the ability for banks to manipulate their appearance of safety and soundness.
Capital ratios (also called capital adequacy ratios) reflect the percentage of a bank's assets that are funded with equity and are a key barometer of the institution's financial strength—they measure the bank's ability to absorb losses and still remain solvent.
Capital ratios are nice in theory, but don't work in practice for two reasons.

First, capital ratios are easily manipulated, they are not an accurate measure of a bank's ability to absorb losses and remain solvent over the long term.

Second, banks are uniquely designed so they can continue to operate even when they are insolvent for a period of time.

This is a very important point as it highlights the simple fact that only in the world of bank regulators and academic economists are capital ratios important.

As I highlighted in my hierarchy for dealing with insolvent banks (where the market value of the bank's assets is less than the book value of its liabilities), the first place to absorb losses and the primary source of a bank's financial strength is the bank's ability to generate earnings before banker bonuses in the future.  It is a bank's ability to generate earnings in the future that allows it to rebuild in book capital levels.
This should be a simple measure, but it isn't. That's because regulators allow banks to use a process called "risk weighting," which allows them to raise their capital ratios by characterizing the assets they hold as "low risk."...
As we learned during the 2008 financial crisis, financial models can be unreliable. Their assumptions about the risk of steep declines in housing prices were fatally flawed, causing catastrophic drops in the value of mortgage-backed securities. 
And now the London Whale episode has shown how capital regulations create incentives for even legitimate models to be manipulated....
The ease with which models can be manipulated results in wildly divergent risk-weightings among banks with similar portfolios. 
Ironically, the government permits a bank to use its own internal models to help determine the riskiness of assets, such as securities and derivatives, which are held for trading—but not to determine the riskiness of good old-fashioned loans. 
The risk weights of loans are determined by regulation and generally subject to tougher capital treatment. As a result, financial institutions with large trading books can have less capital and still report higher capital ratios than traditional banks whose portfolios consist primarily of loans.
Regulators need to use a simple, effective ratio as the main determinant of a bank's capital strength and go back to the drawing board on risk-weighting assets. 
It does make sense to look at the riskiness of banks' assets in determining the adequacy of its capital. 
But the current rules are upside down, providing more generous treatment of derivatives trading than fully collateralized small-business lending.
Your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that the only way to determine the riskiness of a bank is by looking at its assets.  Here is Ms. Bair confirming that point.

All of this makes the case for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current exposure details as it takes away the ability of either banks or regulators to distort the true safety of the banks.

It is intuitively ridiculous to have capital requirements that assign a lower risk weighting to derivatives that fully collateralized loans.
The main argument megabanks advance against a tough capital ratio is that it would force them to raise more capital and hurt the economic recovery....
That is the beauty of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It doesn't force the banks to raise more capital.  It gives them the alternative to shrink by eliminating proprietary bets and subsidiaries that exist solely to engage in regulatory or tax arbitrage.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

JP Morgan, other banks gaming risk models renders bank capital meaningless

As reported by Fox Business, JP Morgan and other banks have engaged in gaming their risk models so as to minimize their risk adjusted assets and maximize their capital ratios.

By doing so, the banks reveal the simple fact that bank capital and the ratios on which it is based are easily manipulated and, therefore, are meaningless.  A fact previously highlighted and reached by the OECD.

Regular readers know that bank capital is an accounting construct.  This bears repeating, bank book capital levels are an accounting construct and reflect accounting rules rather than reality.

Because it is an accounting construct, it is by definition easy to manipulate.  

By simply shifting a security from the trading account to the investment portfolio, the security goes from being subject to mark-to-market accounting to held at cost.  In a market where the value of the security is declining, which is the only market that the security will be moved to the investment portfolio, this overstates both assets and bank book capital.

Manipulation of bank book capital levels is not just something done by the banks.  It is done by the regulators too.

For example, regulators adopted regulatory forbearance at the beginning of the financial crisis.  This allowed and still allows banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans.  The result is that assets, net income and bank book capital levels are overstated.
In 2011, senior executives at JPMorgan Chase & Co told one of the bank's trading and hedging groups to scale back its riskier positions as new regulations would make these bets much more expensive to maintain. 
The group, called the Chief Investment Office (CIO), was asked to cut risk-weighted assets, a key measurement that regulators use when assessing a bank's stability and how much capital it needs to hold, according to a U.S. Senate subcommittee report on Thursday. 
In December 2011, the CIO came up with a plan to change its risk models. It estimated that by calculating risk differently, the bank could reduce its risk-weighted assets by $7 billion - more than half the targeted amount - without having to actually sell the securities....
Who would use an easily manipulated, accounting construct like bank book capital as a key measurement when assessing a bank's stability?

Only a market participant who is shortly to see the value of their exposure decline. [Banks with high capital levels have a history of being nationalized.  See Dexia.]
Investors say they fear that JPMorgan is not alone in tinkering with risk models to meet tougher capital requirements laid out in new regulations known as Basel III. 
Global banks are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to install elaborate computer models to measure risk and make sure they are adequately capitalized. 
Under Basel III, banks can shrink their risk-weighted assets - and boost profits - if they can build a model to prove the bond or loan is not so risky. 
While banks can use these models legitimately, they can also be tweaked to try to game the system, said Adam Compton, a portfolio manager at Atlanta-based hedge fund GMT Capital Corp. 
"You're naive if you don't think it ever happens," said Compton, who scrutinizes financial statements for banks.
The EU bank regulators have been talking about just how much difference exists between the banks on how they value and assign a risk-weight to the same asset.

A game that banks can only engage in because they are not required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants, including banking competitors, would be easily able to identify banks that are gaming the rules so as to maximize the capital ratios they show.
Capital is a key source of safety for the global banking system, and bad models could lead to undercapitalized banks. 
Many big banks were not holding enough capital when the financial crisis erupted in 2008, forcing some to fail or take government bailouts as they were unable to absorb losses.
There is a fallacy that bank capital is there to absorb losses.  In fairy tales like the Bankers' New Clothes it is, in reality it is not.

The US Treasury and Federal Reserve adopted the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine years ago.  Under this policy, bank capital levels are protected at all costs because of concerns about financial contagion (if one bank fails it could bring down others).
But keeping capital levels high makes banks less profitable. 
As JPMorgan's experience with the CIO shows, the line between optimizing capital and manipulating it is fine, and often hard for outsiders - including regulators - to discern, say experts in regulatory measurements of risk.....
With ultra transparency, it would be easy for outsiders, including regulators, to see which banks are optimizing capital and which are manipulating it.
Banks need to seek regulatory approval for new risk models, but regulators may not have the time or sophistication to figure out when they are being duped, according to financial risk experts.
Basel III rules run to 616 pages, compared with 347 pages for Basel II and 30 pages for the 1988 Basel I accord. 
An examiner of bank books, who is stationed inside one of the biggest U.S. banks by a regulatory body, said regulators can - and do - back-test model changes, ask for detailed information on what specifically changed, and fight the banks on changes if they are inappropriate. 
"We are going into their credit books all the time, literally pulling out securities and testing them on the models every quarter," the regulatory examiner said...
Who can do a better job of valuing a bank's risk models:  an examiner or the market with all of its experts?

With ultra transparency, the examiner gets to piggy-back on the market's expertise in analysis.
A survey by a research analyst at Barclays Capital last year found that half of investors distrust banks' risk-weighted asset figures....
On both sides of the Atlantic, 13 of the biggest financial institutions have together announced plans to reduce their risk-weighted assets by 20 percent, or $1 trillion in total, according to consulting firm McKinsey & Co.
JPMorgan, for example, wants to reduce its risk-weighted assets by $80 billion to $100 billion. Goldman Sachs Group (GS) plans to shed $28 billion worth of risk-weighted assets by the end of this year, from $728 billion as of September 30. 
Goldman is using new technology so that traders can assess risk-weightings of individual securities more quickly, Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein said in November. The bank has said that without its modeling efforts, upcoming Basel III rules would result in 40 percent higher risk-weighted assets, compared with the prior risk-weighting regimen....

"Risk-weighted assets used to be done by some department of the bank and no one concentrated on them; they were insignificant," the European bank source said. "Now, we're all trying to optimize them."...

Monday, March 11, 2013

BBC's Robert Preston searches for how to restrain bank risk taking

In a terrific column, the BBC's Robert Preston examines how both bank regulators and Basel capital requirements failed in the run-up to the financial crisis and asks what can be done to restrain bank risk taking.  Mr. Preston proposes a cap on bank leverage as a solution.

Regular readers know that the only way to restrain bank risk taking is to subject the banks to market discipline by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is not the size of the bank nor the leverage that it has, but the riskiness of all of its exposures that needs to be restrained.
Leverage is the ratio between what banks lend and invest on the one hand and the capital they hold to absorb potential losses on their loans and investments. 
So all else being equal, which they never are of course, a bank with a lower leverage ratio is a safer bank, because it has relatively more capital to protect depositors from losses.
But that doesn't necessarily mean that you should always place your precious savings in the bank with the lowest leverage ratio: the bank with the low ratio might be lending and investing in a particularly reckless and risky way; although it might have more capital than other banks, its losses might turn out to be massively bigger than those other banks. 
That's why a low leverage ratio is not a guarantee that a bank is safe..... 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston makes a very important point that a bank's leverage ratio is not necessarily a good indicator of how much or little risk it has.

Dexia confirms this.  Dexia had one of the lowest leverage ratios as measured by the Basel capital requirements in the EU shortly before it was nationalized.
Here are the important points: riskier loans and investments provide bigger rewards to banks, until the loans and investments go bad; and capital is expensive for banks. 
Which is why governments did not trust banks to behave prudently if they were subject to a simple gross leverage restriction. 
The assumption was that if every bank was told it could not lend - for example - more than 20 times its capital, large numbers of those banks would lend everything they could to reckless gamblers prepared to pay the highest interest rates, till gamblers and banks went bust. 
Instead governments hired regulators to check that banks were not taking insane risks. And the regulators invented the Basel system of risk-weighted capital ratios, which stipulates different leverage ratios for different categories of loan, in theory to take account of the riskiness of those loans. 
To put it another way, governments set up a system that in effect treated bankers as naughty children or ravenous puppies who could not be trusted not to eat too much of the dangerously fattening stuff - and regulators were to be the health conscious parents. 
The perhaps predictable result is that the bankers lived up to the low expectations of their common sense, and devised ever more clever ways to raid the biscuit tin without being seen. And the regulators turned out to be the worst kind of parents: ignorant of what was really happening in the world; prescriptive in all the wrong ways....
In the many hundreds of pages of Basel rules in their assorted iterations since the 1980s, each bank became an amalgam of hundreds of different leverage ratios, reflecting the perceived riskiness of the different categories of the loans it made and indeed of the age and size of the bank....
With good intentions on the road to ruin, regulators through the Basel rules were trying to provide a framework in which the risks and rewards of lending were properly captured. 
In practice they did precisely the opposite: the Basel system provided the following arguably insane incentives: 
1) banks had incentives to become bigger and bigger, to benefit from "advance" status that rewarded them with relatively lower capital requirements; 
2) banks had a disincentive to know their corporate and personal customers, but instead had an incentive to insist that each loan was a mortgage backed by property - thus encouraging a dangerous boom in property lending; 
3) banks had an incentive to become huge in trading loans and investments; 
4) banks had incentives to convert risky loans into opaque AAA bonds that appeared - spuriously - to be safe. 
In other words, regulation in the form of the Basel rules contributed directly to so much that is wrong with today's banks....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston has nicely summarized why when it comes to restraining bank risk taking the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight doesn't work.

Besides, all of the Basel capital requirements have been designed to provide opacity so that banks can increase their leverage and their return on book equity.
And the big banks could stick to the letter of the Basel rules and appear to be sound, when in fact they were massive, fiendishly complex and impenetrable institutions taking insane risks....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston makes the case for why banks should be subjected to market discipline and required to provide ultra transparency.

With ultra transparency, banks cannot hide behind the facade of appearing sound under either the complex Basel capital requirements or leverage ratios.

With ultra transparency, banks are no longer impenetrable institutions and their complexity and risks are exposed.
Now the 2008 Crash made it impossible any longer to pretend that the system of keeping banks on the straight and narrow was working. 
But government's response has been a bit skewed and odd. 
On the one hand, the collapse of the financial system has been taken as proof that bankers are incorrigibly, irredeemably naughty children. 
By contrast, there is a presumption that the regulators who got it so wrong - the useless parents - can be redeemed.
Who can forget former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner assuring us that the regulators had learned their lesson from the 2008 Crash?

Actually, the response of the regulators and policymakers was predictable because they are simply continuing with their existing policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine.
One consequence is that the Basel rules that were so hopelessly flawed have been redrafted, and in the process have become even more complicated and impenetrable. 
And regulators have been given more powers to interfere in banks, to supervise them, and deter them from misbehaving. 
Some might say that the banks have been punished, and the regulators - who arguably were just as much at fault - have been rewarded.....
Actually, neither the banks or the regulators have ever been punished.
Which brings us back to where we started, the bloomin' gross leverage ratio. And it is to ask the question whether the global financial system, and the economies of developed countries like Britain, would be in such dire straights if banks had been subject to a simple leverage ceiling, limiting how much banks could lend in total, irrespective of the nature of their loans, as a multiple of their capital....
It brings us back to the issue of how to restrain bank risk taking as Mr. Preston has already acknowledge that a bank with a low leverage ratio can be carrying substantially more risk and incur far greater losses than a bank with a higher leverage ration and lower risk profile.
All that said, some might argue that this important debate still misses the big point. Because any leverage ratio is being seen - in Basel and Westminster - as a backstop, or only a bit of background insurance in case the Basel rules prove inadequate yet again. 
There is no serious discussion of the idea that a low leverage ratio should be the first line of defence, and that the Basel risk-weighting rules should be less prescriptive and more in the form of guidance....
The entire discussion needs to be taken off of leverage ratios or Basel risk-weighting rules.

The discussion needs to be focused on requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their exposure details.  It is the exposure details that reveal the risk a bank is taking.

Ultimately, it is the amount of risk that a bank takes that needs to be restrained.  And the best way to limit bank risk taking is to have the investors who are first in line for absorbing any losses exerting discipline to restrain bank risk taking.
All of which is perhaps to point out that the terms of the debate about how to sanitise the bloated financial system have been set by a regulatory community whose legitimacy should perhaps have been destroyed but which still seems (amazingly?) to be in loco parentis.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston confirms Jeff Connaughton's observation about why Wall Street always wins.  The Blob (aka, policymakers, regulators and Wall Street's lobbyists) set the terms of the debate.

Do you think it is by accident that transparency is not in the discussion by regulators and policymakers as a means for restraining bank risk taking?

Friday, March 1, 2013

Bank capital manipulation: the regulatory capital trade

One of the reasons that Basel bank capital ratios are a truly horrible idea is the ease with which banks can manipulate the ratios to deceive financial market participants, including the bank regulators.

Previously, your humble blogger has discussed how banks game the capital ratios by changing the assumptions underlying the models used to risk-weight their exposures.

Bloomberg reports on a different technique that banks use to game the capital calculation:  the regulatory capital trade.

Blackstone Group LP, the world’s largest private-equity firm, has devised a way to profit from regulation: It’s helping banks meet tougher capital rules without the pain of selling assets or raising equity. 
The firm last year insured Citigroup Inc. (C) against any initial losses on a $1.2 billion pool of shipping loans, said two people with knowledge of the transaction, who asked not to be identified because the matter is private. 
The regulatory capital trade, Blackstone’s first, will let Citigroup cut how much it sets aside to cover defaults by as much as 96 percent, while keeping the loans on its balance sheet, the people said. 
For banks, the transactions offer a way to redeploy capital more profitably while meeting the stiffer requirements of the latest round of Basel rules. Critics say the practice doesn’t make the lenders any safer and pushes the lending risk into the unregulated shadow-banking industry. 
“It’s a form of financial engineering,” said Philippe Bodereau, London-based head of European credit research at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world’s largest bond investor. “It was dead but it seems to be coming back as investors scramble for yield. If you saw this on a massive scale, you would certainly question whether this was the best way for regulators to de-risk the system.”

Under the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s rules, banks are required to set aside a set amount of capital based on the likelihood a borrower will default....
Regulators have criticized banks for trying to meet the target by adjusting the models they use to calculate risk- weighted assets rather than raising capital. The Basel Committee, which brings together regulators from 27 nations, said in a January report that there are “substantial variations” in how banks determine the riskiness of assets.
Variations that regular readers know would go away if banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
Blackstone closed the transaction at the end of last year “very quietly,” said Jasvinder Khaira, a principal in the firm’s Tactical Opportunities Group, a specialist unit that invests in unusual, illiquid deals. 
“Why would Blackstone be interested in doing this deal? The short answer is” because of “changes to the Basel III framework and in general to how regulators are viewing loan exposures,” he told delegates at Marine Money’s 4th Annual London Ship Finance Forum, without identifying Citigroup.

The trades, also known as synthetic securitizations, work by transferring part of the credit risk on a pool of assets to a third party through derivatives such as credit-default swaps in exchange for capital relief from regulators. 
Deals range from simple transactions between two firms to more complex structures, where special-purpose companies are set up to provide protection to the bank and are in turn funded through the sale of notes to investors. 
Blackstone has set up a separately capitalized company, which has written the credit-default swaps on the loans, one of the people said. They declined to say how much the firm has injected as collateral to cover any potential losses. 
By buying credit protection on the first 10 percent or 15 percent of losses, lenders are able to reduce the amount of capital they need to hold to close to zero under Basel rules. 
The extent of the capital relief is based on banks’ own internal risk-weightings and approved by regulators. Unlike in traditional, or cash, securitizations, the assets stay on the balance sheet.
Perhaps I am misreading the highlighted text, but it appears that a bank can obtain capital relief by buying credit protection without having to determine if the seller of the credit protection can actually perform.

If the seller cannot perform, what good is the credit protection?

Why would the authors of the Basel III capital requirements allow banks capital relief for buying worthless insurance?
The Blackstone deal is one of the first examples involving a private-equity firm, which traditionally look to take a more active role in managing assets. It demonstrates the extent to which banks are prepared to pay up for capital when other sources, such as issuing shares or unsecured bonds, are closed.... 
And why can't banks issue shares?

Because without ultra transparency, banks are 'black boxes' and no market participant knows what is inside.

Buying bank shares or unsecured bank debt is simply blindly gambling on the contents of a black box.
Blackstone’s Khaira described the Citigroup deal as an “elegant solution” for banks and investors, amid an industry- wide shipping crisis that’s extending into a fifth year.... 
“Banks are always trying to find pain-free ways to boost capital ratios, whether that is fiddling RWAs or outsourcing risk,” said Bodereau.“Some deals are legitimate but it is ultimately regulatory arbitrage. We are supposed to be moving to a world where bank balance sheets are more transparent and less complex and this goes backwards.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes what your humble blogger has been saying about the substitution of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

We are suppose to be moving to a world where bank balance sheets are more transparent (hint: ultra transparency).

However, bank regulators, through Basel III capital requirements and other complex rules, are moving us away from transparency and towards more opacity.

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

UK looks into how meaningless bank capital is

The Wall Street Journal reports that UK regulators are looking into just how meaningless bank capital ratios are.  Specifically, the regulators are looking at how banks assign risk weights to their assets.

This exercise is exactly as useful as rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Why?

Because since the beginning of the financial crisis, bank capital has been meaningless.  The suspension of mark-to-market accounting combined with regulatory forbearance has effectively divorced what is reported in bank financial statements from reality.

The OECD made the point that the suspension of mark-to-market accounting combined with regulatory forbearance distorts both the asset and equity accounts.  This renders any bank capital ratio meaningless.

The UK regulator's examination of how banks apply a risk adjustment to their overstated assets doesn't address the underlying problem that the assets are mis-stated.
As part of a review that began in November, U.K. bank supervisors are assessing the "risk weights" banks assign to their assets—a notoriously subjective process that many analysts and investors are convinced banks have used to understate the riskiness of their balance sheets. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as it explains the simple fact that even if the financial statement accounts were accurate, Basel capital regulations are subject to being gamed by the banks.
Because banks' capital cushions are generally calculated as a percentage of their risk-weighted assets, banks can make their capital buffers look fatter by understating the riskiness of their assets. 
Not all assets are created equal. Banks can hold smaller amounts of capital against less risky assets, such as residential mortgages or government bonds. The riskier the loan, the more a bank must put aside. 
British banks are locked in tense discussions with the Financial Services Authority to determine how and whether they need to shore up their balance sheets, according to regulators and bank executives. 
The results of these negotiations, which could see banks sell chunks of their businesses or issue debt, will be presented by the Bank of England in March.
Given the stakes, naturally the banks have an incentive to game the calculation of their risk-weighted capital ratios.
A Europe-wide rule change in 2008 gave banks more freedom over calculating their risks and resulting capital needs. In combination with pressure from investors to boost their capital levels, that led to British banks systematically cutting their risk weights over recent years. 
The Bank of England recently published data showing that average risk weights for U.K. banks are at their lowest levels since 1987. Further analysis shows British banks could be overestimating their capital levels by between £5 billion ($7.9 billion) and £35 billion by applying aggressive risk weights, according to the BoE.... 
Surprise! Given the incentive and the freedom to game their capital ratios the banks did just that.
The U.K.'s biggest banks use complex in-house models to predict how likely borrowers are to default and how much capital they should hold to cover potential losses. Although these models are ratified by the U.K. regulator, investors and analysts are worried that banks' methodologies are too opaque or simply don't add up. ... 
For instance, according to its most recent disclosure, Lloyds assigns a 2.2% risk weighting to £143.5 billion in mortgages—more than half of its total portfolio. That means it only needs to keep back £250 million to cover potential losses. Using a pre-2008 model, where mortgages had a 35% weighting, Lloyds would have to hold £4 billion in reserves.... 
Of course the bank methodologies are opaque.  If they told the market how they were modeling their assets to minimize their capital ratios, market participants would realize that the banks are far riskier than they are presenting themselves to be.
The benefits to banks of adjusting their internal models can be enormous.  
Deutsche Bank Thursday said it shaved around €55 billion from risk-weighted assets in the fourth quarter through changes to its models and other adjustments, a move that boosted its capital ratios but drew concern from some analysts on what would happen if regulators took a tougher stance.
Deutsche Bank's ability to dramatically change its capital ratios by changing its models reveals the fundamental flaw in relying on capital ratios that can be gamed by the banks.
Concern around risk weights is shared by regulators globally. 
The Basel Committee in charge of setting new international rules for banks said Thursday it found material differences on risk weightings from bank to bank in a recent study, in large part because of the choices banks made on what to include in their models and how regulators policed them. 
"Model-based approaches haven't given as accurate results as regulators had anticipated they would. Everyone is on a learning curve, so what constituted a good model back in 2006 may not constitute a good model today," said Vishal Vedi, a partner in Deloitte's financial services advisory practice. 
It is currently unclear what steps regulators will take to reappraise risk weights. 
One idea would see minimum risk weights for certain types of assets, such as home loans. Swedish regulators made such a move in November, with a plan to set a 15% floor on mortgage risk weights. 
Another approach is to go back to fully-standardized risk weights. For example last year, U.K. banks were ordered to change the way they treat commercial-property loans, a move that collectively added around £45 billion to risk-weighted assets at RBS, Lloyds and Barclays BARC.
A better idea is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, the market would value each bank's exposures and exert discipline on the banks to ensure they are adequately capitalized.

Monday, January 14, 2013

More on meaningless bank capital: Bragging banks keep mum on this number

In his Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column, David Reilly exposes the vast gap between the banks' claim to 'fortress balance sheets' and the reality.

Regular readers know that bank capital is meaningless for several reasons.  As pointed out by the OECD, the level of bank capital is meaningless for several reasons including:
  • Regulatory forbearance has allowed the banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn losses on bad debt into 'zombie' loans; and
  • Suspension of mark-to-market accounting has allowed the banks to engage in 'mark-to-mythology'.
Besides overstating book capital levels, the Basel-based bank capital ratios have their own reasons for being meaningless starting with
  • Banks use their own internal models to value their securities.
In his column, Mr. Reilly looks at how banks brag about what a great meaningless bank capital ratio they have and remain silent on the tainted leverage ratios when the banks' risk adjustment of their assets is removed.
My fortress is stronger than yours. 
Ever since J.P. Morgan Chase started referring to its "fortress" balance sheet, other banking giants have sought to portray themselves in a similarly strong light. The latest front in this bragging battle has been estimates of Tier 1 common capital under new Basel III capital rules. 
As big banks roll out fourth-quarter results in the coming week, investors can expect to hear more chest-thumping on this front. Besides being the main gauge of bank strength, this ratio also will figure in the Federal Reserve's consideration of requests by big banks to return capital. 
Given that the gauge divides one meaningless number, bank book capital, by another meaningless number, bank risk adjusted assets, it is hard to imagine that the result is a meaningful number.

Regular readers will recall that the Basel capital ratios have always been about hiding the true amount of leverage that the banks are taking on (your humble blogger knows this having worked on the creation of Basel I).

The idea the banking industry sold their regulators on was that Basel I was needed so the banks could hide their use of leverage to generate a higher return on equity and this higher return on equity was needed to attract capital investment.

And why would the regulators have wanted the banks to attract capital?  Because in the 1980s, the large banks were insolvent (the book value of their liabilities exceeded the market value of their assets) because of the losses on their loans to Less Developed Countries.
Banks have been far quieter, though, about another important measure of their financial strength: leverage ratios under the new Basel rules. Those have received far less attention than the Tier 1 common ratio or new liquidity rules, which central banks recently eased. 
Yet given all the criticism of the Basel rules, in large part due to the emphasis many of its gauges place on risk-weighted measures of assets, the leverage ratio should be getting far more attention and disclosure. That is because it is based on total assets, not an adjusted measure of them. 
And the difference between the risk-weighted and unadjusted measure of assets can be telling. Risk-weighted assets were equal to just 67% of total assets at U.S. banks at the end of the third quarter, according to Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. data. That is down from about 75% before the crisis. 
The gap is even wider at the biggest banks. At the big four—J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo —risk-weighted assets averaged 60% of total assets at the end of the third quarter. 
The lower risk-weighted assets are, the higher capital ratios appear, meaning banks need to hold less equity. Moreover, calculations of risk-weighted assets are in many cases dependent on models devised by banks themselves. 
One of the reasons that your humble blogger has been advocating that banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is that market participants can use this information to independently "calculate" capital ratios for the banks.

Market participants can see and make adjustments for losses hidden by 'zombie' loans and the suspension of mark-to-market accounting.  Furthermore, market participants can assign values to those illiquid securities sitting on bank balance sheets.

The result of these adjustments is a capital measure that market participants can trust.
Granted, this year investors might start to get a glimpse of what leverage ratios look like under the new Basel rules, but not in the U.S. 
Banks in the U.K., for example, are supposed to begin disclosing these as they report final 2012 results. In its November Financial Stability Report, the Bank of England said this will "represent an important first step in helping to reduce investors' uncertainty about firms' resilience, given market concerns about inconsistencies in risk-weighted asset calculations." 
Although European banks generally have far lower levels of risk-weighted assets to total assets, it is still too bad U.S. banks aren't being pressed by regulators to follow suit. None of the big U.S. banks so far have chosen to disclose estimates of their leverage ratios under the new Basel rules. 
Until banks do so, it will be easy for investors to assume they are playing coy because the figures might not be as flattering as their Tier 1 common ratios, which in most cases are now close to or have met minimum thresholds. That is especially the case because the biggest U.S. banks are likely to see their assets rise under the new Basel leverage-ratio rules. 
Unlike banks that report under international accounting rules, U.S. banks show the "net" value of their derivative assets and liabilities on the face of the balance sheet. Under the Basel leverage rules, though, some of these will be included in their assets. 
That will potentially make them look more levered. This could call into question claims about how thick their fortress walls actually are, even as they look to return "excess" capital to shareholders.... 
So, the sooner U.S. banks start showing this measure the better, given questions about the risk weighting of assets. 
With banks still trying to water down new regulations, it is easy for investors to forget that questions over bank capital, and just how thick it is, are far from resolved.
Investors should always assume that the bank capital ratios are meaningless, because until there is ultra transparency and the banks are forced to clean up their balance sheets, these ratios are meaningless. 

Thursday, December 20, 2012

As shown by Basel Committee, regulators know there is something wrong with securitization, but cannot figure it out

As reported by Reuters, the Basel Committee knows there is something wrong with the reform of structured finance to date and has issued a public consultation that has the sell-side howling in protest.

Regular readers know that what the Basel Committee is troubled by, but hasn't put its finger on yet, is that disclosure has two components:  "what" is disclose and "when" it is disclosed.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the sell-side has set the agenda at focusing on "what" is disclosed.  This issue of "when" has been completely pushed off the agenda.

As a result of the sell-side's agenda, reform of structured finance appears incomplete.  The regulators sense that it is incomplete and have basically said, its time to restart the process as if we were at the beginning of the crisis and the financial system was collapsing because of opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed securities.

The key word is opaque.  That is where disclosure comes in.

The public consultation is also a direct rebuke of the European Data Warehouse and the Prime Collateralise Securities initiative.  Clearly, the regulators sense that neither of these is going to satisfactorily address the issue of opacity.
Market participants warned this week that a new consultation launched by the Basel Committee on securitisation fell into the same traps as previous initiatives. 
Securitisations are backed by a huge variety of different claims, but the framework treats everything presented in securitised format as being part of the same asset class. 
The new paper aims to change the amount of capital banks hold against securitisations, despite the fact that current capital levels were only agreed in 2009 and will be further changed when Basel III is implemented. 
Furthermore, it comes as the Financial Services Board aims to look again at securitisation as part of its shadow banking reforms, a project it only started late last year. 
Market participants warned that there was much technical detail contained in the proposed new framework as well as other potential pitfalls. 
"There is also initial concern that once again policymakers may have fallen into the trap of characterising all securitisations with the poor performance of certain markets during the crisis, namely US subprime and CDOs," said Richard Hopkin, a managing director at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe.
Please note that the Association for Financial Markets in Europe is a sell-side dominated lobbying group.  Therefore, it is not surprising that Mr. Hopkin's statement suggests that all securitizations do no contain common elements.

In fact, all securitization transactions do contain common elements.  They are lemons without adequate investor protections.

Common to all securitization transactions is the lack of the most basic investor protection: disclosure.  Everyone knows that the standard for disclosure is that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess each security and make a fully informed investment decision.

For structured finance securities to meet this standard of disclosure, they have to provide observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

Without observable event based reporting, investors cannot know what they are buying or after buying know what they own.
One senior securitisation lawyer said: "Outside the securitisation framework, SME risk and mortgage risk are treated completely differently, but once you put them in a securitisation, for regulatory purposes, they become the same."...
In the absence of observable event based reporting and other credible investor protections, the argument that the different asset types perform differently is a red herring argument.

By treating all asset types the same, the Basel Committee is effectively saying that in the absence of observable event based reporting and other credible investor protections, banks don't know what they are buying regardless of what type of underlying assets.  As a result, banks need to hold a lot of capital against these blind bets.

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Sweden and Norway show how hard it is for regulators to 'lean against the wind' of rising asset prices

In response to the current financial crisis, financial regulators said that they have learned their lesson and in the future they will 'lean against the wind' in the face of rapid asset price increases.

To ensure the financial regulators do this, in the US we saw the introduction of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and in the UK we saw the introduction of the Financial Policy Committee.

A Bloomberg article on Sweden and Norway shows how hard it will be for regulators to successfully lean against the wind.

The article supports the Nyberg Report on the Irish Financial Crisis conclusion:  regulators, particularly individuals who work inside the regulators, are isolated and find it hard to act when they want to lean against the wind against rising asset prices as these higher prices are supported by politicians, bankers and society.

Sweden and Norway say their banks have underestimated the risk in their mortgage portfolios and will need to set aside more capital to guard against losses as the two nations move to stop debt bubbles forming.
Norway’s government said yesterday it wants to triple the risk weights assigned to mortgage assets, bringing the minimum requirement to 35 percent. That followed a similar decision in neighboring Sweden, where the regulator on Nov. 26 set the minimum risk-weight requirement at 15 percent, almost three times existing levels. 
As central banks respond to the crisis in Europe with interest rate cuts, households are amassing record amounts of debt.
Is this an unintended or intended consequence of central bank policy?
In Norway, the world’s fourth-richest nation per capita, private debt will swell to more than 200 percent of disposable incomes next year, while Sweden’s debt load hit a record 173 percent this year, the countries’ central banks estimate. 
That’s putting pressure on regulators to ensure banks have buffers that can withstand sudden adjustments in asset prices. 
“There is a substantial risk that there is a housing bubble” in Norway, Harald Magnus Andreassen, chief economist at Swedbank First Securities in Oslo, said in a phone interview. “If you look at a graph, you would be quite confident that something could be wrong.”

House prices in Norway have doubled since 2002 to reach a record, according to the Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents. Sweden’s National Housing Board has warned that the property market in the largest Nordic economy is in the grip of a bubble. 
Bengt Hansson, an analyst at the board, estimates Swedish house prices are 20 percent overvalued, adjusting for the effect of inflation. 
“This is based on an optimism regarding rising prices in the future and low interest rates in combination with very generous lending policies,” Hansson said by phone yesterday. 
Yet banks argue that stricter capital and risk-weight rules will put them at a competitive disadvantage relative to their rivals elsewhere in Europe....
Notice how the banks are pushing back even though household debt is at record levels and house prices appear to be over-valued.
Risk weights, as defined by Basel II regulations, on mortgage loans in Norway are now 11 percent, compared with 15 percent in Germany and as high as 35 percent in Spain, according to data provided by Sweden’s central bank. Norway’s proposed 35 percent floor would be the highest in the Nordic region. 
Raising risk weights to 15 percent in Sweden would force the largest banks there to set aside an additional 20 billion kronor ($3 billion) in capital, the FSA estimates. Norway’s regulator hasn’t provided estimates for the cost to its banks....
Any how will the banks respond to possibly needing more capital?
Lenders will respond by raising customer rates, Jan Digranes, head of the banking and capital markets department at Finance Norway, which represents about 180 financial institutions, said by phone from Oslo. “Banks have to increase interest rates to increase net earnings and they will have to discuss whether it will be necessary to issue more capital to comply with the new requirements.” 
DNB ASA (DNB), Norway’s biggest bank, hasn’t changed its financial targets based on yesterday’s announcement. The government’s proposal, which the regulator is due to follow up on in March, sets risk weights “too high,” DNB spokesman Thomas Midteide said in an e-mailed reply to questions.
By lobbying against the increase and by keeping the interest rate on loans high even when the central bank lowers rates as Sweden's did yesterday.
Both Sweden and Norway are pushing stricter regulatory requirements after enduring a banking meltdown in the 1990s. ... 
Household debt levels now are even higher than they were at their peak back then, according to Michael Wolf, chief executive officer of Sweden’s largest mortgage lender Swedbank AB. Wolf said in a Dec. 4 interview that Sweden’s housing market probably faces “some sort of adjustment.” 
Household debt levels in Norway and Sweden have continued to rise even after both countries introduced an 85 percent cap on loans relative to property values. 
That’s spurred discussion among central bankers on the extent to which monetary policy should be deployed to curb housing-market imbalances. Swedish central bank Governor Stefan Ingves, who is also the chairman of the Basel Committee, has argued in favor of using policy interest rates to stem the threat of housing bubbles. 
Yet Ingves, like his counterparts elsewhere in Europe, is finding his freedom to raise rates curtailed by the fallout of the debt crisis further south. His bank cut its main rate today by a quarter point to 1 percent. 
Policy makers in Norway and Sweden need to decide whether the imbalances in their housing markets are temporary or long term. That could guide them to the right response, according to Andreassen at Swedbank. 
“Risk weighting is more a structural argument, in the sense that if it is too cheap for banks to extend credit to housing then you have a risk at all times to have too much debt,” he said. “Usually you would think of the interest rate as a business cycle adjustment.”

Saturday, December 8, 2012

Risk-weighted assets: ground zero for games played by regulators and bankers

The Economist ran an interesting article in which it looked at some of the problems with the risk-based capital.

Regular readers know that risk-based capital came into being in the 1980s to hide the fact that banks were taking on greater leverage and risk.  Bank regulators blessed risk based capital as it was seen as a way to attract more capital to the banks by allowing them to provide a more competitive return on equity.

One example of how risk based capital hides the greater leverage and risk is to look at sovereign debt.

To calculate risk adjusted assets, the denominator in the capital ratio calculation, the risk weighting for each asset type is multiplied by the amount of each type of asset.  Basel I assigned a zero risk weighting to sovereign debt.  A zero risk weighting implies these assets have no risk and therefore they go away for calculating capital ratios.

Clearly sovereign debt has risk.  In the 1980s, a large US bank showed there was interest rate risk when it lost over half of its book capital after buying a sizable US Treasury bond position and having interest rates move against it.  More recently we saw there is also credit risk with the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt.

What made the adoption of risk-based capital possible is the opacity surrounding bank balance sheets.  As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says, banks are 'black boxes'.

What made risk-based capital a danger to the financial system was that as the regulators moved from Basel I to Basel II they created more opacity surrounding the leverage of and the risks on and off the bank balance sheets.

This made it impossible for the market participants to properly assess the risk of the banks, adjust their exposures to reflect this risk and exert discipline on the banks to restrain their risk taking.  The result was the financial crisis that began in 2007.

Risk-based capital is the classic example of the combination of increasingly complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight being substituted to the detriment of the financial system for transparency and market discipline.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants could independently assess the risk of the banks.  During this independent assessment, market participants could, if they chose to do so, calculate risk-based capital ratios for the banks.

As a practical matter, market participants are unlikely to calculate risk-based capital ratios.  What the market participants care about is the risk that each bank is taking.  Market participants can then adjust both the amount and pricing of their exposures to each bank to reflect this independent assessment of risk.

“Risk-weight optimisers” are those wizards of finance whose job it is to reduce the size of the balance-sheet—or at least the one that is used to calculate how much capital banks need to hold against bad times—without sacrificing returns. 
The job may soon have less scope for creativity. 
Regulators are beginning to wonder whether to keep letting banks decide the riskiness of their own assets, which in turn has an impact on the capital they set aside.... 
But the system was soon gamed. Banks realised that they could spice up their returns by holding assets that were safe enough to require little capital, but risky enough to deliver profits. The obvious pre-crisis examples were American subprime mortgages that had been bundled up and then insured. Because risk models said these would hardly ever produce losses, banks were able to load up on them without having to set aside much capital. 
Figuring out how much trickery is still going on is difficult, even for regulators, since the big banks use complex “internal models” based on the quality of their own assets. 
Some of the variation between banks is explained by genuine differences in the riskiness of their assets. German mortgages, say, tend to be less risky than American ones. 
Some differences, however, smell fishy. Britain’s Financial Services Authority has found that banks assign wildly different numbers to identical baskets of borrowers. ...
Regulators are responding. 
The correct regulatory response would be to require banks provide ultra transparency.

Unlike setting minimum capital levels or leverage ratios, ultra transparency restrains the banks from loading up on riskier assets.  This restraint occurs because unlike capital ratios, with ultra transparency the bank's cost of funds increases with the more risk the bank takes.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

You know bank capital is meaningless when a Basel executive defends it citing need for regulatory complexity

The Financial Times ran an article in which Wayne Byres, the secretary-general of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, defended the enormous complexity of Basel III and provided a number of legitimate reasons why a simple formula favored by the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane and the FDIC's Thomas Hoenig doesn't work.

Your humble blogger is not going to get in the middle of this debate beyond reminding regular readers that bank capital is meaningless.  An opinion shared by the OECD.

Bank capital is meaningless because it is an easily manipulated accounting construct.

For example, when regulators adopt forbearance, banks can engage in 'extend and pretend' and transform their bad debt into 'zombie' loans.  By definition, this activity overstates both the value of the assets and the level of book capital (as the losses did not flow through earnings).

If bank book capital levels are overstated, they are meaningless.  If assets are overstated, they too are meaningless.  Dividing one meaningless number by another meaningless number does not create a meaningful number.

Allowing banks to 'risk' adjust their assets using internal models or external weightings from the Basel Committee does not change the simple fact that these risk adjusted asset levels are also meaningless.  Dividing meaningless book capital levels by meaningless risk adjusted asset levels does not create a meaningful number.

Dexia demonstrate that capital ratios are meaningless as it had great capital ratios shortly before being nationalized.

Regular readers know that the focus on bank capital is simply a way to divert attention from the real issue and that issue is transparency into each bank's exposure details.  It is only with access on an ongoing basis to each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants can assess the risk and solvency of each bank.

It is solvency that market participants care about as equity investors are first in line to lose money if the bank becomes insolvent.

With ultra transparency, market participants could adjust each bank's assets and book capital level to reflect the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets.  Then, if the market participants cared to, market participants could calculate capital ratios for themselves.

I realize that bank regulators are desperate to keep the focus on bank capital and not on the need for ultra transparency.  So long as the focus is on bank capital, the financial market is dependent on them.  If banks were required to provide ultra transparency, the market would no longer be dependent on them and the regulators would experience a substantial decline in their importance.

I would like to remind regular readers that so long as the market is dependent on regulators it is inherently unstable (see current financial crisis).  It is only when the market is not dependent on regulators that market discipline acts as a restraint on bank risk taking and the financial system is stable.
Bank safety rules cannot be reduced to a simple formula and recent calls to scrap the “Basel III” reform package because of its complexity are unrealistic, the secretary-general of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision warned on Wednesday. 
“Being reliant on a single metric to capture all risks within something as complex as a modern bank is asking too much,” Wayne Byres told a Lisbon conference sponsored by the Bank of Portugal. 
The Basel package, which begins to take effect in January, uses complicated formulae and models to determine how risky a bank is and how much capital it must hold against unexpected losses.
Rather than use complicated formulae and models with millions of assumptions, doesn't it make sense to simply have the banks disclose their current exposures?
But a growing chorus of critics wants to scrap the hard-fought global agreement in favour of a much simpler metric, known as a leverage ratio, which simply divides the bank’s equity by its total assets.
I want to scrap both complicated and simple metrics.  I think that market participants should look at the actual bank exposures and determine for themselves how risky they think the bank is.
In a speech that compared running a global bank to flying a modern passenger aircraft, Mr Byres warned that banks would seek to game such a simple calculation by piling into risky, high-yielding activities. Instead, he said, regulators need to use several measures including both the leverage ratio and more complicated formulae that take riskiness into account. 
Citing Albert Einstein’s famous dictum that “everything should be as simple as possible, but not simpler”, Mr Byres said, that in banking regulation “a solution of either extreme complexity or absolute simplicity will almost inevitably be suboptimal – like most things in life, we need to find a balance between the two.”
The simplest is scrapping both measures and requiring the banks to disclose their current exposure details.

I also find it interesting that Mr. Byres thinks that bank regulation requires calculating a capital ratio.  It doesn't.

For example, the C in CAMEL Ratings used by bank examiners stands for capital adequacy and not capital ratio.  The issue addressed by capital adequacy is does the bank have enough capital to protect the taxpayer deposit guarantee for any losses it might incur on is current exposures.

Under the FDR Framework, which is the basis for most western countries financial systems, the role of the regulators is to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so the market participants can independently assess this data and make a fully informed investment decision.

Nowhere in the FDR Framework does it say that the role of bank regulators is to calculate a capital ratio.

Regular readers know that capital ratios are a creation of regulators and came into being as a way to allow banks to leverage up their balance sheets in a hope that this would improve their Return on Equity and allow them to attract more capital. [I know because I was involved in Basel I].

Hence, the time has come to scrap any further discussion of bank capital.
Mr Byres’s speech marks the global regulator’s most cogent response to the criticism of Basel III launched in August by Andrew Haldane, director of financial stability at the Bank of England. 
Mr Haldane called on regulators to tear up the rulebook and restart in a much-cited speech entitled “The dog and the frisbee” that compared the scientific formulae needed to predict the flight of a frisbee to the actions of a dog, which simply watches the toy in flight and then moves to catch it....
The dog and the frisbee solution is exactly what market participants would do if they had access to each bank's exposure details.
But the Basel secretary-general countered the frisbee analogy with one of his own – the aircraft pilot. Modern aircraft, like global banks, are extremely complicated and it is all but impossible for users to tell whether they are safe....
It is impossible for market participants to tell if the banks are safe because as Mr. Haldane observed their disclosure leaves them resembling 'black boxes'.

However, if the banks were required to provide ultra transparency, then the users could independently determine if they were safe.
Rather than obsessing about finding the perfect formula for bank safety, Mr Byres said, regulators should focus on making sure that bankers’ personal incentives are aligned with those of their customers and investors. 
“Our goal is rather simple: to reduce the risk of flying in unsafe planes where the pilot is the only one with a parachute,” he concluded.
Given this goal, the only solution is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It is only with this data that market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure to each bank based on what they can afford to lose given the risk of the bank.

Thursday, October 18, 2012

Senators Brown and Vitter recognize that bank capital is meaningless

In their October, 2012 letter to the Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC, Senators Brown and Vitter argue for simpler capital requirements while making the case for why bank capital is meaningless.

Regular readers know that in the absence of ultra transparency where banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, bank book capital is meaningless.

This is not just your humble blogger's opinion, but also the opinion of the OECD.

The primary reason bank book capital is meaningless is because it is an accounting construct that is easily manipulated by both the banks and their regulators.

For example, regulators can engage in forbearance which allows banks to avoid taking losses on bad loans and instead engage in extend and pretend.  This overstates both common equity and assets.

Why does ultra transparency make bank book capital more meaningful?

With ultra transparency, market participants can independently assess the value of the bank's on and off-balance sheet exposures.  They can then adjust the bank's book capital to reflect this assessment.

While this makes bank book capital more meaningful, I doubt that the market participants will really care more about something else.

With ultra transparency, market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank.  With this assessment, market participants can adjust the amount and price of their exposure to each bank to reflect what they can afford to lose given the risk of the bank.

It is the adjustment in their exposures that is far more important than what the market participants calculate is the adjusted book value of the bank's capital.

It is through this adjustment that the market exerts discipline on the banks to restrain their risk taking.

Which just happens to be the outcome that Senators Brown and Vitter would like to see.
The largest U.S. financial institutions have become remarkably complex. This complexity inhibits corporate executives or regulators from properly executing their oversight responsibilities, making management, much less calculation of the proper capital standards, next to impossible. 
For example, the six largest banks currently have a combined 14,420 subsidiaries, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimates that it would require 70,000,examiners to study a trillion-dollar bank with the same level of scrutiny as a community bank.  It is no wonder  then that former  executives have admitted that it is impossible to fully understand all of  the positions that trillion-dollar megabanks are taking....
Institutional complexity has grown hand-in-hand with regulatory complexity.  
Morgan Stanley Chief Economist Vincent Reinhart told the Senate Banking Committee that "balance sheets of large firms have been splintered into a collection of special purpose vehicles, and securities have been issued with no other purpose than extracting as much value as possible from the Basel II Supervisory Accord."...
[The Bank of England's Andrew] Haldane argues that this complexity and opacity provides limitless arbitrage opportunities. Risk-weighting can obscure banks’ true capital situations, distorting the views of markets and regulators, and undermining confidence.
By requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, all of this complexity would have to be disclosed. The natural reaction of market participants will be to assume that this complexity is associated with higher risk.  As a result, they will charge these banks more for funds.

This market discipline puts pressure on the banks to shrink and reduce, if not completely eliminate, their complexity.

First to go will be the proprietary bets.  Traders know that if the market can see their positions, the market can trade against these positions to minimize the profits from proprietary bets.

Second to go will be all the subsidiaries that are there no to support the real economy, but to arbitrage some complex rules and regulations.

Please note, as the banks shrink in size and reduce their complexity, market confidence is restored as market participants know they can assess the risk of the banks.

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Capital: a very strange way to assess bank safety

Anyway your look at it, bank capital levels or ratios are a very strange way to assess bank safety.

Regular readers know that bank capital, in particular shareholder equity, is an accounting construct with two main components:  capital paid in to buy stock and retained earnings.

Capital paid in cannot be manipulated.  It is simply a reflection of the number of shares sold and the price at which they were sold.

Unlike capital paid in which is based on historic facts, retained earnings are a derived number based on a series of assumptions. Assumptions that can be easily manipulated.

Earnings can be manipulated by the banks.

For example, earnings can be manipulated by simply moving an investment (think opaque, toxic structured finance securities) from the trading account where it is subject to mark to market accounting to the bank's investment portfolio where it is held at acquisition cost to avoid taking a loss.  The result of this manipulation is to a) overstate earnings, b) overstate book capital and c) overstate the value of the assets.

Earnings can be manipulated by the regulators.

For example, by practicing regulatory forbearance, regulators allow the banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn their bad loans into 'zombie' loans rather than recognize the losses on the loans.  The result of this manipulation is to a) overstate earnings, b) overstate book capital and c) overstate the value of the assets.

Because of the ease with which regulators can manipulate capital, the regulators use capital, both the balance sheet level and the ratio, to mislead the public and the financial markets.

For example, Tim Geithner said that the stress tests were rigged in an effort to restore market confidence.  What the stress tests were suppose to show was that the banks had sufficient capital.

Because of the ease with which earnings can be manipulated, even a simple ratio like shareholder equity to assets is meaningless as a measure of the bank's risk.  Piling on complexity by risk-adjusting the assets simply gives banks and regulators more ways to game the capital ratio and render it even more meaningless as a measure of the bank's risk.

Based on these facts, the OECD concluded that bank book capital and capital ratios are meaningless.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger thinks that the only way to assess the risk of a bank is by looking at its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

I am not alone in this.

For example, Goldman's Lloyd Blankfein said that the only way Goldman knows to manage its own risk is to monitor every position every day.

For example, banks with deposits to lend stopped lending in 2008 when they realized they could not assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  The interbank lending market remains frozen.

Despite being meaningless and useless as a measure of risk, bank capital does have its supporters.

In his Bloomberg column, Professor Simon Johnson tries to save bank capital as a measure of bank risk.
Global regulators have a peculiar way of assessing the soundness of big banks: Ask bankers how risky their investments are, then figure out if they have enough capital to absorb the potential losses....
The strategy of trying to make sure that expected losses are less than a bank's book capital level is not unreasonable given that the goal of the financial regulators is to protect the deposit insurance funds.
This method ... has failed repeatedly -- most spectacularly during the 2008 financial crisis....
Is the problem with this method the question of do banks have enough capital to absorb their potential losses or the regulators' ability to answer the question?

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane observed that the problem lays with the regulators' ability to answer the question.

I don't think that the stability of the financial system should depend on whether the regulators can or cannot answer the question.  By requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, we can use all the market participants to assess the soundness of the banks.
Like most firms, banks finance themselves with a combination of debt, which they get by taking deposits and issuing bonds, and equity, which they get from their shareholders. The latter, also known as capital, is crucial to the bank’s survival. 
If bad investments cause the value of a bank’s assets to fall, its equity decreases by an equivalent amount.
Not necessarily as shown by the examples above.
If equity is depleted, the bank is insolvent.
By definition a bank is insolvent if the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities.  Capital does not directly factor into this definition.

What is critically important to note is that a bank can be insolvent and still continue operating.
There will be either bankruptcy or some form of government bailout.
Actually, there is a frequent third choice made by regulators.

A modern banking system is designed so that banks can operate with low or even negative book capital levels.  The reason banks can do so is the combination of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.

With deposit guarantees, taxpayers effectively become the bank's silent equity partner when the bank has low or negative book capital levels.

While the taxpayer is the silent equity partner, if a bank can generate earnings, it can rebuild its book capital levels.

This choice has been made repeatedly.  Sometimes successfully.  Sometimes not.

An example of when the choice was unsuccessful was the US Savings and Loans.  To rebuild their book capital levels, they gambled on redemption.

One of the reasons for requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency is that it allows market discipline to restrain bank risk taking and prevents gambling on redemption.
Hence the need for capital requirements....
The facts simply do not support this conclusion.
One big problem is incentives. Bankers like to use as much borrowed money as possible, relative to their equity. This boosts the return to shareholders in good times, but also presents a threat to the financial system and the broader economy. 
If bankers are in charge of calculating their own risk weights, they will try to understate the risks. This happened with mortgage-backed securities and associated derivatives in the U.S., with real-estate-related loans and assets in countries such as Ireland and Spain, and with sovereign debt in much of the euro area.
This problem goes away if banks are required to provide ultra transparency.  Market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank and adjust both the amount and price of their exposure to reflect this risk.

As a result, simply increasing leverage or risk will result in a higher cost of funds and not necessarily a better ROE.
Second, regulators are no better than bankers at figuring out the right risk weights. For one, they are often heavily influenced by the bankers -- a reality I have experienced personally in my conversations with central bankers and other officials, who meet with banking staff continually and even now are convinced that top executives really know how to measure and handle risk. Beyond that, they are out of their depth. The system of risk weights has become too complex, unwieldy and far too easy to game.
This is what happens when complex rules and regulatory supervision are substituted for transparency.
Actually, no one can calculate proper risk weights. They are unknowable. Analysts at credit-rating companies, even if one sets aside all the conflicts of interest they face, are just as prone to group think, fads and misconceptions as the rest of us. Academics would do no better. And the “wisdom of crowds” -- as reflected in the market for credit-default swaps -- suggested that Citigroup Inc. was a low-risk investment until 2007.
The reason that Citigroup credit-defaul swaps were mis-priced was the combination of lack of transparency into Citigroup's actual exposure details and the Federal Reserve claiming that risk had been taken out of the banking system.

Professor Johnson actually makes the case for requiring ultra transparency.  The "wisdom of crowds" can only be realized if they have the exposure details necessary to assess risk.
The right approach, as articulated by Hoenig, is to choose capital rules that are “simple, understandable, and enforceable.”...
Of course, for any capital rule or risk reduction rule like the Volcker Rule, the enforcement mechanism is market discipline made possible by ultra transparency.

The bottom line:  talk about bank capital is simply a distraction so that we don't talk about what is really necessary for assessing bank safety ... ultra transparency.