Showing posts with label SEC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SEC. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Did Deutsche Bank hide $12 billion in losses?

The Financial Times reports that three individuals filed complaints with the SEC alleging that Deutsche Bank hid $12 billion in losses during the financial crisis by mis-valuing its derivative holdings.

Simply put, if it did, that is unacceptable.  If it did not, Deutsche Bank should never have put itself in a position where it could be accused of that behavior.

Whether Deutsche Bank did or did not mis-value its derivative holdings highlights why it is absolutely necessary that banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Without this information, market participants do not know what is going on.

I expect Deutsche Bank will be the first large bank to provide ultra transparency.

If it didn't mis-value the derivatives, it prevents future erroneous complaints.

If it did mis-value the derivatives, there is no possible way that it will ever regain the trust of market participants without providing ultra transparency.  After all, what investor would trust anything about Deutsche Bank's financial position knowing they hid $12 billion in losses.  Who knows what else they could be hiding.
Deutsche Bank failed to recognise up to $12bn of paper losses during the financial crisis, helping the bank avoid a government bail-out, three former bank employees have alleged in complaints to US regulators. 
The three complaints, made to regulators including the US Securities and Exchange Commission, claim that Deutsche misvalued a giant position in derivatives structures known as leveraged super senior trades, according to people familiar with the complaints. 
All three allege that if Deutsche had accounted properly for its positions – worth $130bn on a notional level – its capital would have fallen to dangerous levels during the financial crisis and it might have required a government bail-out to survive. 
Instead, they allege, the bank’s traders – with the knowledge of senior executives – avoided recording “mark-to-market”, or paper, losses during the unprecedented turmoil in credit markets in 2007-2009. 
Two of the former employees allege that Deutsche mismarked the value of insurance provided in 2009 by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway on some of the positions. The existence of these arrangements has not been previously disclosed. 
Deutsche said in a statement that the allegations were more than two and a half years old and were publicly reported in June 2011. It added that they had been the subject of “a careful and thorough investigation”, and were “wholly unfounded”. 
The bank said the investigation revealed that the allegations “stem from people without personal knowledge of, or responsibility for, key facts and information”. Deutsche promised “to continue to co-operate fully with the SEC’s investigation of this matter”.... 
The complainants allege that the bank misvalued the positions by failing to account for losses it faced when the market worsened. Had the proper valuations been made on the positions during the tumultuous period, they allege, the losses for the whole portfolio would have exceeded $4bn and could have risen to as much as $12bn. 
“Self preservation can be a powerful motivator,” said Jordan Thomas, head of the whistleblower practice at the law firm Labaton Sucharow, who is representing Mr Ben-Artzi. 
“During the financial crisis, many financial institutions faced an existential threat and the evidence suggests that Deutsche Bank crossed the line by substantially inflating the value of its credit derivatives portfolio – the largest risk area in its trading book.”

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Data is King in mortgage finance space as lack of data cost $13 trillion

Reporting on the MBA's 2012 Risk Management and Quality Assurance Forum, HousingWire carried two articles, see here and here, that concluded

If the conference put anything into perspective, it drove home one key point: 
Data is king in today's mortgage finance space ... 
those who can analyze it to detect hidden risks may be sitting in the right place at the right time.
This confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about the need for observable event based reporting for structured finance securities.  With observable event based reporting, all activities like a payment or default on the underlying collateral are reported before the beginning of the next business day.

The need to be able to detect hidden risks also confirms that all non-borrower privacy protected data fields need to be disclosed.  There is a reason that the experts, mortgage originators and servicers, track the data fields they track:  to detect risks that would otherwise be hidden.  As a result, all the non-borrower privacy protected data fields rather than a subset of these data fields needs to be disclosed.

To drive home the point how important data is in mortgage finance, Ann Fulmer, vice president of industry relations at fraud analytics firm Interthinx observed

The housing crisis cost the nation about $13 trillion when tallying all losses from lawsuits, mortgage-backed securities litigation and taxpayer bailouts.... 
To put this $13 trillion into perspective, U.S. gross domestic product — the nation's entire output of goods and services — hit $15 trillion in 2011.  
"We did not pay attention to data integrity on the way up, and so we have wiped out almost an entire year of gross domestic product in the United States," .... 
When looking at just REOs, short sales, RMBS suits and crisis-related litigation, the meltdown cost the mortgage/housing industry roughly $2 trillion, Fulmer explained. In addition, U.S. taxpayers and the government lost $3 trillion, while losses tied to homeowner equity reached approximately $8 trillion.
Please re-read the highlighted text because it puts the benefit of having observable event based reporting at $13 trillion.

Compare this to the less than $10 billion it would cost to provide observable event based reporting and the cost/benefit analysis of the SEC requiring observable event based reporting under a revised Reg AB is massively in favor of requiring observable event based reporting.


Monday, August 6, 2012

Cost-Benefit analysis by SEC major factor in financial crisis

Dennis Kelleher, Stephen Hall and Katelynn Bradley of Better Markets wrote a very interesting white paper on cost-benefit analysis and financial reform at the SEC.

In the paper, they make the critically important point that the SEC is specifically excluded from having to factor in a cost-benefit analysis when they introduce a rule.  What the SEC must consider is does the rule protect investors and the public interest.

While the authors do not say it directly, the common sense reason that the SEC is exempted from worrying about a cost-benefit analysis is that the cost of a financial crisis is far greater than the cost of any single rule or combination of rules that might be applied on the financial industry.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been very active in trying to bring transparency to structured finance securities.  Specifically, I have both talked with individuals at the SEC about the revision of Reg AB (the regulation that lays out the disclosure requirement for structured finance securities) and provided input through a response to their public consultation.

My recommendation has been that all structured finance securities, including covered bonds, be required to report on an observable event basis any activity that occurs with the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day [as opposed to the sell-side's preferred once per month reporting after the end of the month].

In addition, the disclosure should include all data fields tracked by the originators, billers and collectors while protecting borrower privacy consistent with HIPAA standards [as oppose to the sell-side's preferred data templates that exclude valuable data fields].

With that background, now to the role that cost-benefit analysis played in the financial crisis.

During one of my conversations with a senior SEC staff member, the subject turned to the cost-benefit analysis that was done when Reg AB was originally mandated in the mid-2000s.  According to the staff member, while the SEC knew that disclosure should include all data fields and be made on an observable event basis, it could not justify this requirement based on their internal cost-benefit analysis.

Let me repeat that:  based on the results of its cost-benefit analysis, the SEC knowingly backed off of requiring transparency and instead issued a rule saying that then existing disclosure practices that were inadequate for valuing individual structured finance securities (see the Brown Paper Bag Challenge) were adequate.

Shortly after the financial crisis began, the Bank of England's Andy Haldane estimated that the losses on structured finance securities from investors not being able to value these opaque securities exceeded $1 trillion.

My bet is that the SEC's cost-benefit analysis did not place the benefit of being able to value the structured finance securities at over $1 trillion.  Hence, the reason that the SEC did not require transparency when it promulgated Reg AB.

However, now that we know the benefit is over $1 trillion, an annual cost of $10 billion to provide investors with disclosure of all borrower privacy protected data fields on an observable event based reporting basis under a revised-Reg AB can easily be seen as money well spent.

The fact that the SEC's internal cost-benefit analysis did not include the benefit of avoiding over $1 trillion in losses reaffirms the common sense reason for not subjecting any single rule or combination of rules from the SEC to a cost-benefit analysis.

Common sense says that if the SEC does not perform a cost-benefit analysis, there is no chance that doing a cost-benefit analysis incorrectly will result in a rule that doesn't protect investors and the public interest.


Monday, April 23, 2012

MF Global bond offerings make case for requiring ultra transparency

In his Bloomberg column, William Cohan looks at the reasons that investors in MF Global bonds felt duped.

Had MF Global been required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, each of the ways that investors might have been duped would have gone away.

On July 28 and again on Aug. 3, MF Global raised $325 million by selling bonds -- the first a 3.375 percent convertible-note offering, due 2018; the other a 6.25 percent senior note offering, due 2016.... 
Not surprisingly, in addition to all the other lawsuits that MF Global executives and board of directors are facing, one brought by the buyers of these notes is wending its way through federal court in the Southern District of New York. 
The plaintiffs make a compelling argument that they were duped by the public statements of Jon Corzine, MF Global’s former chief executive officer, and the company’s Securities and Exchange Commission filings.
Had their been ultra transparency, the investors would not have had to rely on MF Global's representations.  They would have had the information they needed to verify the facts for themselves.
The class-action complaint claims that MF Global’s collapse was caused by management’s “wholesale disregard for its purported risk management and internal controls as MF Global sought to transform itself from broker-dealer to a full service investment bank at all costs.”... 
the plaintiffs cite the statements MF Global made in its 2011 Form 10-K about its abundant liquidity as evidence that the company was intentionally misleading investors. 
“Our policy requires us to have sufficient liquidity to satisfy all of our expected cash needs for at least one year without access to the capital markets,” reads the form. “To manage our liquidity risk, we have established a liquidity policy designed to ensure that we maintain access to sufficient, readily available liquid assets and committed liquidity facilities.” 
The plaintiffs argue these statements were false. “MF Global was suffering from severe liquidity pressures” -- as quickly became evident -- “based on its exposure to the European debt crisis through its enormous holdings of European sovereign debt,” according to the complaint. “MF Global was materially undercapitalized.”
With ultra transparency, it would have been easy for the investors to see if MF Global was experiencing severe liquidity pressures.
Further, the plaintiffs claim, whereas the offering documents for the bonds claimed that the use of proceeds would be partly for “general corporate purposes” -- a typical catch- all -- MF Global management knew that large chunks of the $650 million were “desperately needed to provide required liquidity and working capital given the then-deterioration in value of MF Global’s $6.4 billion holdings of European sovereign debt.”...
Again, with ultra transparency, investors could have determined with the market value of MF Global's $6.4 billion holdings of European sovereign debt was and seen that most of the proceeds would be used to plug the hole between the cost of these securities and the then current market value.
And few tears should be shed for sophisticated investors who miscalculate the risks of owning securities in companies that are highly leveraged and have new management intent on changing business plans. (By last summer, it was certainly no secret that Corzine intended to change the way MF Global conducted its business by making big bets with other people’s money. He said as much publicly on several occasions.)
It is one thing for investors to miscalculate risk when they have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner under ultra transparency and quite another when the true condition of the firm is hidden by opaque reporting practices.
Still, the level of deception by MF Global’s executives and board members demands that they be held personally accountable for the losses suffered by these bondholders -- just as they should be held personally liable for the losses suffered by MF’s customers. 
It seems to me, demanding this level of accountability -- which, of course, their lawyers will say is unjustified -- is the only way Wall Street executives will begin to take seriously their fiduciary duties to their customers, counterparties and creditors. 
At the moment, though, that is just a columnist’s fantasy. No MF Global executives have been held accountable for their actions, more than six months after the firm’s collapse and billions of dollars of other people’s money have been lost. 
Come to think of it, no one else on Wall Street has been held accountable for blowing up our economy, either. How can this still be the case?
Ultra transparency brings accountability to Wall Street.  With this information, market participants are able to exert discipline on Wall Street.  Particularly when their is a gap between what they represent as the condition of their firm and what is the actual condition.

Friday, February 3, 2012

SEC is avoiding tough sanctions for large banks

The NY Times ran a very interesting article on how the SEC is avoiding tough sanctions for the Too Big To Fail banks.  Specifically, the agency's track record shows minimal punishment for cases involving fraud.

Unfortunately, the effect of the minimal punishment track record is compounded by the agency's failure to enforce its responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information for a security in an appropriate, timely manner.

This blog has frequently highlighted two examples of inadequate disclosure:  structured finance and banks.

At the beginning of the financial crisis, structured finance securities became permanently associated with two adjectives:  opaque and toxic.  It was the failure of the SEC to require through Regulation AB an appropriate level of disclosure that allowed Wall Street to sell such a toxic security.

In my discussions with the SEC, they explained that the reason they did not require all the useful, relevant information on the underlying collateral be disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner (think updating each mortgage for every observable event like an interest payment or default that occurs with the mortgage) is they thought it was too expensive.

The Bank of England's Andy Haldane estimated that the global cost of these opaque, toxic securities was $4 trillion.  A number that is not one, not two, but three orders of magnitude higher than the cost of providing all the useful, relevant information to all market participants (I know the cost as I designed and patented an information system to provide this information).

Since its inception in the 1930s, the SEC has not required banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  There are two reasons for this:

  • Disclosure of all its accounts was considered in the 1930s to be the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.  The industry did it voluntarily.
  • The agency deferred to the bank regulators who had access to the exposure details.  By deferring to regulators who have access to the exposure details, the SEC ended up with disclosure requirements that leave banks looking like, in Mr. Haldane's words, 'black boxes' to all other market participants. 
This failure to require banks to provide ultra transparency has been very costly.

One of the ways it has been costly is that rather than having Wall Street rescue Main Street, Main Street has had to rescue Wall Street.  Wall Street was suppose to protect Main Street from the financial excesses that built up in the capital markets.  Instead, it is Main Street that has been bailing out Wall Street and absorbing the brunt of these losses.

Another way it has been costly is the fact that the financial markets are on life support.  For example, the ECB recently provided almost 500 billion euros in funding because banks couldn't raise money from each other (the interbank loan market is frozen) or from unsecured creditors (another frozen debt market).

Regular readers know that if your humble blogger could he would have the SEC focus on its responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  This would eliminate opacity in every segment of the financial markets.

Ultimately, ultra transparency allows investors to actually protect themselves as it provides them with the information they need to independently assess risk and adjust the amount and price of their exposures based on this assessment.
Even as the Securities and Exchange Commission has stepped up its investigations of Wall Street in the last decade, the agency has repeatedly allowed the biggest firms to avoid punishments specifically meant to apply to fraud cases. 
By granting exemptions to laws and regulations that act as a deterrent to securities fraud, the S.E.C. has let financial giants like JPMorganChase, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America continue to have advantages reserved for the most dependable companies, making it easier for them to raise money from investors, for example, and to avoid liability from lawsuits if their financial forecasts turn out to be wrong. 
An analysis by The New York Times of S.E.C. investigations over the last decade found nearly 350 instances where the agency has given big Wall Street institutions and other financial companies a pass on those or other sanctions. Those instances also include waivers permitting firms to underwrite certain stock and bond sales and manage mutual fund portfolios. 
JPMorganChase, for example, has settled six fraud cases in the last 13 years, including one with a $228 million settlement last summer, but it has obtained at least 22 waivers, in part by arguing that it has “a strong record of compliance with securities laws.” Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, which merged in 2009, have settled 15 fraud cases and received at least 39 waivers. 
Only about a dozen companies — Dell, General Electric and United Rentals among them — have felt the full force of the law after issuing misleading information about their businesses. Citigroup was the only major Wall Street bank among them. In 11 years, it settled six fraud cases and received 25 waivers before it lost most of its privileges in 2010. 
By granting those waivers, the S.E.C. allowed Wall Street firms to have powerful advantages, securities experts and former regulators say. The institutions remained protected under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which makes it easier to avoid class-action shareholder lawsuits....

“The ramifications of losing those exemptions are enormous to these firms,” David S. Ruder, a former S.E.C. chairman, said in an interview. Without the waivers, agreeing to settle charges of securities fraud “might have vast repercussions affecting the ability of a firm to continue to stay in business,” he said. 
S.E.C. officials say that they grant the waivers to keep stock and bond markets open to companies with legitimate capital-raising needs. Ensuring such access is as important to its mission as protecting investors, regulators said. 
The agency usually revokes the privileges when a case involves false or misleading statements about a company’s own business. It does not do so when the commission has charged a Wall Street firm with lying about, say, a specific mortgage security that it created and is selling to investors, a charge Goldman Sachs settled in 2010. Different parts of the company — corporate officers versus a sales force, for example — are responsible for different types of statements, officials say.

Thomas Lee Hazen, a securities law professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, said that it is understandable that the S.E.C. might relax some potential sanctions on Wall Street firms — where it appears that lessons have been learned, or when a fine is thought to be sufficient punishment. 
“The ripple effect of having a sanction that could shut them down or could seriously impede a company’s operations would seriously affect a lot of innocent customers,” he said. “It’s a very fine balance. That’s not to say that the S.E.C. is striking the balance properly. That is in the eye of the beholder.”
I prefer to avoid the debate over striking the balance properly and simply ensuring that all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner.

Thursday, January 19, 2012

Banks to SEC, we will only disclose European exposure only when the market forces us to

The Wall Street Journal ran an article on how US financial institutions did not comply with an SEC request that they provide much more detail about their exposures to Europe and how these exposures are hedged.

This lack of compliance was not surprising.  As Jefferies showed, Wall Street firms only discloses their detailed exposure information when the market forces them to.

Of course, by not disclosing this information, Wall Street is sending a message to market participants that they have something to hide.


With big banks' earnings season nearly over, details on their European debt exposure remain incomplete—and it doesn't look to clear up until annual reports are filed, if ever. 
Disclosures varied widely among the banks reporting results over the past week. Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp. included detailed tables with their earnings reports sorting out the numbers by region or country including their various hedging strategies.
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., on the other hand, didn't include any details in their earnings releases. Instead, executives addressed questions during their conference calls. 
The divergence follows a recent warning from the Securities and Exchange Commission that information on European exposure was inconsistently disclosed in banks' quarterly filings with the agency and asked them to consider providing a detailed breakdown. 
Regulators also want to know how gross exposures are hedged through instruments such as credit-default swaps. 
The issue of disclosure has gained import as the European debt crisis has raged for two years in the weaker peripheral nations, with flare-ups continuing into a third year. 
Late last year, MF Global Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy protection as questions over the futures firm's European exposure prompted a run on the bank. Also last year, Jefferies Group Inc. saw its stock slide as analysts questioned the investment bank's exposure. 
Annual securities filings, known as 10-Ks, are expected to show more details for all banks when they begin appearing next month. For now, however, banks' disclosures on their European debt positions varied widely, at least in their earnings reports. 
For some of the banks, it's a matter of battling perceptions. Morgan Stanley had to defend itself in the fall when concerns about its exposures sent its stock into a tailspin. 
"We were a little bewildered by it to be honest which led us to a very fulsome disclosure in the appendix last quarter and it's been added to" with disclosures this quarter, said James Gorman, the firm's chief executive, on a conference call Thursday....

Last month Jefferies Group, which has been updating details on its exposure frequently since concerns erupted in November, said its net short exposure was $123 million. It had slashed its gross exposure by 75% during the fall.

Monday, January 9, 2012

SEC calls for detail on debt exposures

A Financial Times article describes the recent SEC call for banks to release the details on their debt exposures.

Regular readers know that this blog has been calling for ultra transparency and requiring the banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this data that market participants can truly assess the risk of each bank and adjust the amount and price of their exposure accordingly.

It appears that the SEC is reluctantly agreeing that ultra transparency is necessary, but is trying to experiment with different levels of opacity first to see if they can convince the market participants to accept less than the data they want and need to assess each bank's risk.
US banks should publish much more detail on their exposure to European debt, improving disclosure that has been “inconsistent in both substance and presentation”, according to new guidelines from the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
The guidance from SEC staff published on Friday comes as the largest Wall Street banks, starting with JPMorgan Chase this week, prepare to report quarterly earnings. 
The guidelines tell banks they should be breaking down their exposure by individual countries and dividing it between sovereign, corporate and financial institution debt. They should also spell out the source of credit default protection and the effects of a sovereign downgrade, the SEC said. 
Concern about US exposure to the eurozone debt crisis has already sparked the bankruptcy of MF Global and continues to weigh on the shares of companies such as Morgan Stanley in spite of their efforts to reassure investors that their holdings are manageable. 
The SEC staff said they were “concerned about the risks to financial institutions ... from direct and indirect exposures to these holdings” and said inconsistency could lead to a lack of transparency and make it impossible for investors to compare US banks’ exposure. 
To stave off shareholder worries, Jefferies, the independent investment bank, published the reference number of each European bond it held in November. Other banks have published far less.  
Wells Fargo was last year warned by the SEC that its disclosures – not specifically for European debt – were inadequate.... 
Most institutions have ramped up their disclosure in the past year, providing exposure numbers for the most troubled eurozone countries, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. 
The SEC’s guidelines suggest that it has been partly behind this move. It said it had contacted institutions warning them that their disclosures were inadequate. 
But some analysts have argued that the disclosures remain insufficient. They want to know about an institution’s gross debt holdings as well as the hedges, such as credit default swaps, which banks say help them reduce their exposure to a lower net level.
There has been concern that the CDS would be ineffective in the event of a default and so the banks’ net numbers might paint too rosy a picture. In this scenario, a European bank that has written CDS on a European country might find itself the victim of collateral damage in the sovereign default and in no position to make payments to the US holder of CDS.
The SEC suggests investors should be given all the information so they can decide whether the hedges will be effective or not.
The bottom-line is that analysts want the detail that can only be provided under ultra transparency and the SEC is finally beginning to move in that direction.
The latest effort from the SEC to improve banks’ disclosure comes after a push to force institutions to give more information on their risks for mortgage losses and litigation. 
Fifteen months ago, the SEC wrote to chief financial officers to “remind” them of their obligations to disclose the potential cost of being forced to repurchase some of the billions of dollars of mortgages which had breached underwriting guidelines.