Monday, November 8, 2010

The Sell-Side and Its Lobbyists Take on The Brown Paper Bag Challenge: Part II

In Part I of this series, the focus was on how current once-per-month or less frequent disclosure practices are inadequate for valuing individual structured finance securities.  They do not provide the investor with the information the investor needs 'when' the investor needs it to make a fully informed buy, hold or sell decision.  


Current structured finance disclosure practices are the equivalent of putting the underlying collateral into a brown paper bag.  Then asking the investor when the contents have changed, but have not been reported, to guess the value of contents of the brown paper bag.  The proposed solution was to put the collateral into the equivalent of a clear plastic bag by providing observable event based reporting.  With observable event based reporting, all the changes, like payments or defaults, to the underlying collateral are reported on the day that the changes occur.  Investors can see what they are buying and can value the structured finance security.


Has the sell-side and its lobbyists (including sell-side dominated industry trade associations and lawyers), which claim to want sensible regulatory reform, championed the Brown Paper Bag Challenge conclusion that observable event based reporting should be part of the revised structured finance disclosure requirements?

No!  In fact, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to try to oppose observable event based reporting and champion the disclosure practices that result in investors blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Those opposed to observable event based reporting in securitization transactions have asserted various types of objections.  The following briefly summarizes these objections and explains why the objections are not valid:

1.    Existing ABS reporting is sufficient.  Investors could have done their homework with once-per-month or less frequent data and seen the problems with ABS. 
This objection substitutes the ability to recognize a trend for the ability to value a specific security.  Clearly, the stale data disclosed in once-per-month reporting allows investors to see trends in the performance of the assets underlying a specific type of asset-backed security.  A few investors made a substantial amount of money from recognizing the downward performance trend of subprime mortgages. 
However, as demonstrated by the Brown Paper Bag Challenge, once-per-month reporting does not provide investors with the current detailed information that is necessary to value a specific ABS.  The gap between the ability to recognize a trend and the ability to value individual ABS cost investors several hundred billion dollars during the financial crisis. 
Whereas current ABS reporting practices resemble a brown paper bag, observable event based reporting resembles a clear plastic bag.   Observable event based reporting would provide the necessary disclosure so that investors can value specific ABS.  Observable event based reporting is necessary for restarting the securitization market and creating deep, liquid secondary markets.
2.    This much data will confuse investors.  Frequently, this objection is specified in terms of the number of loans.  For example, the objection is stated to be that loan-level disclosure makes sense when there are five thousand loans but not when there are fifty million loans.  Alternatively, the objection is specified in terms of the volume of data.  For example, the objection is stated to be that investors cannot handle billions of individual data points.
No matter how it is specified, this type of objection is false.  According to the AFME’s February 26, 2010 response to the European Central Bank’s Public Consultation on Provision of ABS Loan-Level Information, “from an investor perspective, loan-level data could provide a number of benefits: … provision of loan-level data will give investors certain options:  either to rely on the level of data that they currently use, or, alternatively, to employ third parties to transform the large amount of data into a more useable and value-added format.”  Since investors have the ability to use the loan-level data and they are willing to use third parties when necessary, providing loan-level data on an observable event basis is appropriate.
As discussed in the Association of Mortgage Investors’ March 2010 white paper on reforming the ABS market, it would be both “absurd” and inaccurate to assume that the investors are unable to use (or to engage third parties to help them to use) the loan-level data.
Under observable event based reporting, it is quite likely that there will be daily disclosure for securities backed by large numbers of loans or receivables. Investors who purchase the riskiest tranches will use this disclosure to closely monitor their positions.  Other investors might use the information less frequently.  For analysts who prefer to guess the contents of the brown paper bag and look at the performance data on the old once-per-month or less frequent basis, this would still be an option.
In addition, without loan-level disclosure on an observable event basis, investors cannot look at the non-performing loans and determine if there are borrower specific problems or systemic problems. 
ABS investors have computers to process loan-level data.  To the extent that ABS investors are unable to analyze loan-level data, they have a history of relying on third parties with computers who can analyze loan-level data for them.
3.    Implementing observable event based reporting would require significant changes to computer systems.  
Existing databases used by servicers handling the daily billing and collecting of loans and receivables already track observable events such as payments on a loan-by-loan basis.  As a result, loan-level data on observable events can and should be made available to investors on the day the observable event occurs or as soon thereafter as practicable so investors can know the current status of every loan or receivable backing an asset-backed security.

Consider an observable event-based report that can be accessed today by any person who holds a credit card.  The individual credit cardholder can, using existing technology, access a web site of the credit card issuer on any day of the month and review all charges and payments that have been made on the credit card on each day during the month.  Similarly, the credit card issuer can, using existing technology, on any day of the month review all the charges and payments that have been made on each day during the month on i) all of its credit cards, ii) a subset of credit cards which are collateral for a securitization or iii) an individual credit card.  Credit institutions have considerable expertise in observable event-based reporting.  This same expertise and the same information systems could be used to support observable event-based reporting for securitizations.
4.    The cost of observable event based reporting outweighs the benefits. 
The following is a comparison of the costs and benefits of observable event based reporting against the costs and benefits of keeping the existing once-per-month disclosure standard. 

·      In the TYI, LLC response to the FDIC Safe Harbor Proposal, a discussion of the costs and benefits of observable event based reporting was presented.  The response noted that investors such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had access to loan-level observable event based data through their investment in or ownership of firms handling the daily billing and collecting of the underlying loans and receivables.  By late 2006, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had concluded that the risk in subprime mortgage backed securities was mispriced.  As a result, they not only reduced their exposure to these securities but also shorted these securities.  

     What would have happened if investors had access to the same loan-level observable event based data as the Wall Street firms?  Would they have also concluded the securities were mispriced?  If so, they would have avoided several hundred billion dollars in losses by not buying subprime mortgage backed securities originated in the years leading up to the financial crisis.  

     Based on the cost of comparable information services for securitizations, the cost of a data system to collect, standardize and disseminate observable event based data on a borrower privacy protected loan-level basis to all securitization market participants would be approximately 5 basis points (0.05%) of the principal amount of the loans that are supporting a securitization.  

     The bottom line to the cost/benefit analysis is that the benefit of not losing several hundred billion dollars far outweighs the cost of providing observable event based loan-level data. 
·      The alternative timeframe is the existing once-per-month disclosure standard.  This disclosure standard neither prevented the credit crisis and the associated several hundred billion dollars in losses nor has it restarted the securitization market.

Based on a comparison of the cost/benefit analyses, observable event based disclosure is far superior to retention of the existing once-per-month disclosure standard.

5.    It is too hard for sponsors to report this data.  This objection is specified in terms of the complexity or the ability of the sponsor to report loan-level data for all of an issuer’s deals. 
It will not be difficult for sponsors to report data on an observable event basis because each loan or receivable is linked in the daily billing and collecting database to a specific deal.  If this were not the case, how would anyone know if payments received went to the right deal?  It is a simple database query to identify every loan or receivable supporting a specific deal that had an observable event that must be disclosed.
6.    Providing loan-level data will require disclosure of internally calculated credit ratings, which will hurt a sponsor’s competitive position. 
Observable event based reporting will not require the disclosure of a sponsor’s internally calculated credit ratings.  Investors in ABS do not need such internally calculated credit ratings.  ABS investors do need all of the data fields that went into calculating the internal credit rating, such as the borrower’s credit score and income, in order to analyze the risk of the loans and receivables supporting the securitization. 
This objection is also presented as a reverse engineering argument.  If competitors are given all the information that the investor needs to properly analyze the risk of the loans and receivables, competitors can back into how the sponsor prices its financing relative to the borrower’s credit quality.  This argument is misleading as competitors already have multiple sources of this information including professionals who move between competitors and borrowers who disclose competitors’ offers in the hopes that someone will them make a better deal.  However, so as not to force disclosure of proprietary data, the SEC should refine the disclosure requirement to exempt disclosure of internally calculated credit ratings.
7.    The information has already been disclosed to third parties conducting due diligence on the underlying loans or receivables and therefore the investors do not need to see the data. 
This objection is another way of saying that investors should rely on the rating agencies.  However, reliance by investors on rating agencies who implied they had access to loan-level performance information was one of the primary contributors to the credit crisis.  In Europe, under Article 122a, there is a mandate that investors do their own homework so they know what they own.  In the US, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets’ March 2008 Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments also stressed the importance of investors doing their own homework.  Global investors need to have access to loan-level observable event data so they can do their own homework regardless of whether third parties have conducted due diligence on the underlying loans or receivables.
8.    The cost of compliance with loan-level disclosure is too high.  It will adversely affect the economic attractiveness of securitization and reduce the amount of credit available to the economy.  The related objection is that after a certain period, say twelve (12) months, investors no longer need disclosure and when this happens, to save costs, disclosure should be discontinued. 
As noted above, the cost of observable event based reporting will be minimal.  At five basis points (0.05%) or less, the cost of observable event based reporting is significantly less than the illiquidity premium currently built into the securitization market.  The “illiquidity premium” refers to the fact that buyers in the primary securitization market know that without effective disclosure they will have to hold the security to maturity as it is unlikely that they will find buyers in the secondary market for the contents of a brown paper bag.  As a result, investors in the current once-per-month disclosure environment require a higher yield on ABS than they would if observable event based reporting were available.  It can be expected that observable event based reporting would reduce the illiquidity premium charged by ABS investors and that such reduction in the illiquidity premium would more than offset the 5 basis points (0.05%) cost of observable event based reporting.  In order to reduce the illiquidity premium over the life of the transaction, observable event based reporting should be required so long as the transaction is outstanding.

9.    Protecting obligor privacy requires that the sponsor disclose only a fraction of the data fields that the sponsor tracks. 
This objection ignores the ability of observable event based reporting to protect borrower privacy.  We would expect that observable event based reporting rules would require borrower privacy to be protected in a manner similar to the protections under HIPAA.  If borrower privacy is protected in a manner similar to the protections under HIPAA, there are very few data fields that could not be disclosed to ABS investors.
10. Sell-side has been talking with investors in ABS securities and the sell-side claims it knows what information investors need. 
It may be true that the sell-side believes that it understands what ABS investors need, however, it is equally clear that under current reporting standards ABS investors are not receiving the information necessary to analyze individual ABS.  

For example, we understand that it takes approximately 300 data fields to run all the standard analyses for CMBS deals.  However, fewer than 200 data fields are included in the sell-side dominated trade association template.  With observable event based reporting, we would expect this type of problem not to occur.  Subject to protecting borrower privacy, all of the data fields that are used by originating, billing and collecting entities would be provided to ABS investors.
11. Asset classes other than RMBS, CMBS and CDO have not experienced significant credit problems, so loan-level disclosure would be inappropriate for such other asset classes. 
The fact that some ABS investors have bought the contents of a brown paper bag in the past without sufficient information or without losing their investment, does not mean that ABS investors should continue to blindly place bets or that they will not experience credit problems in the future.  Observable event based reporting would allow ABS investors to evaluate ABS and select ABS which meet their investment criteria.
12. In revolving ABS transactions, some assets are not in the pool for very long and therefore it is not worthwhile to provide loan-level disclosure and instead only summary data is needed.
The fact that the pool of assets is not static is even more reason that ABS investors should know what is in the securitization pool.  AIG discovered this when the managers of the CDOs insured by AIG replaced lower risk securities with higher risk securities.

Part III of this series looks at the tactics used by the sell-side and its lobbyists to try to offset the deficiencies in its objections to observable event based reporting. 

Friday, November 5, 2010

The Sell-Side and Its Lobbyist Take On the Brown Paper Bag Challenge: Part 1

The ultimate success of financial reform is in the hands of the regulators.  As Timothy Ryan, CEO of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association ("SIFMA"), a leading sell-side lobbying organization, said, "the administration and the regulators have a mandate to move forward.  Our job is to work with them to try to achieve something that makes sense."

Let us look at how the sell-side and its lobbyists, including sell-side dominated industry trade associations and law firms, have done in working with the regulators on the revision of structured finance disclosure requirements and achieving something that makes sense.

As regular readers of this blog know, TYI, LLC developed the Brown Paper Bag Challenge in early 2008 to demonstrate that current securitization industry disclosure practices do not adequately address the timing of disclosure to investors and prevent investors from valuing individual ABS.  This is true even if the collateral performance is reported using current disclosure practices in an industry standard template being advocated by the American Securitization Forum, a former affiliate of SIFMA.

To create an asset-backed security, loans or receivables are placed into a trust for the benefit of the investors.  Among its other duties, the trustee provides reports to the investors on the performance of the underlying loans or receivables.  Under existing securitization disclosure practices, these reports are provided on a once-per-month or less frequent basis. 

A brown paper bag is the physical model that best represents these asset-backed securities.  Investors know what loans or receivables went into the bag, but under current reporting practices they do not know what is in the bag, ie how the loans are performing, on a current basis.

The Brown Paper Bag Challenge highlights why knowing what you own, in this case knowing what is in the bag currently, is important for valuing individual asset-backed securities ("ABS").  

As part of this challenge, assume that at the start of last month, $100 was placed into a brown paper bag (which is analogous to the loans or receivables being placed in a securitization trust).  A report has been issued that indicates at the end of last month there was $75 in the bag (which is analogous to the once-per-month disclosure to investors in securitization transactions in an industry standard template).  The Brown Paper Bag Challenge is as follows: what is the value of the contents of the bag today? 

In the Brown Paper Bag Challenge, everyone is invited to submit an offer to buy the contents of the brown paper bag.  If the price offered is accepted by TYI, then money changes hands.  If the price offered is greater than the value of the contents of the bag, then the difference is paid to TYI.  If the price offered is less than the value of the contents of the bag, then the difference is paid to the individual submitting the purchase offer.  

Potential buyers of the contents of the brown paper bag should be aware of the following fact:  in this challenge, TYI, in a role that is similar to the Wall Street firms that invest in or run servicers handling the daily billing and collecting in securitization transactions, has observable event data, in this case withdrawals of money, so it knows what is in the brown paper bag currently.

Based on the once-per-month report, current and potential investors do not know what is in the bag right now.  They can only guess at what is a knowable historical fact.  The same is true with respect to ABS.  Once-per-month reporting blocks investors from knowing what is currently in ABS and limits investor valuation of the contents of ABS to an exercise of blind betting.  If investors guess incorrectly, whether buying ABS or taking the Brown Paper Bag Challenge, they lose money.

To date, TYI has been unable to find anyone who is willing to take the Brown Paper Bag Challenge. 

However, when a clear plastic bag, which is analogous to providing observable event based reporting, is substituted for the brown paper bag, everyone is willing to make an offer for the contents of the clear plastic bag.  This is because the contents of the clear plastic bag can be seen and valued.  The same could occur for specific securitization transactions; if current information were provided by observable event based reporting, then investors would be able to make informed buy, hold and sell decisions with respect to ABS.

This simple example using brown paper and clear plastic bags may explain why investors have been reluctant to return to the securitization markets in the absence of observable event based reporting.


Part II of this series looks at the sell-side and its lobbyists objections to providing loan-level performance data on an observable event reporting basis and their arguments for why disclosure that results in investors betting blindly on the contents of a brown paper bag is just fine.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Government Issuers Should Use Best Structured Finance Disclosure Practices: Part II

Standard and Poor's published a report that indicates that the overhaul (bailout) of Fannie and Freddie could cost $685 billion.  This is a significant increase from the $400 billion that the US Treasury allocated for the bailout last year and the $200 billion that the agency overseeing Fannie and Freddie thought was necessary during the Bush Administration.

The fact is that without best structured finance reporting practices across Fannie and Freddie's entire book of business, no one knows the true dimensions of their current losses and the probable ultimate size of their bailout.  Without this, it is impossible for Congress to make a fully informed decision about what to do with them.

If Congress really wants to begin to address the issue of what to do with Fannie and Freddie, the starting point would be requiring that each organization report their entire book of business on an observable event basis to their regulators and for the securities they guarantee to all market participants.  This is technological feasible and would allow the Administration and Congress to get the answers to their questions.

Don't Make Covered Bonds the New Toxic Securities

Covered bonds are the original structured finance security and are frequently mentioned as a potential replacement for the multi-tranche structured finance securities used to fund mortgages, credit cards and auto loans.  


Covered bonds were developed decades ago in Europe and share several features with all asset-backed securities, including the toxic asset-backed securities:  

  1. They use the cash-flow from a pool of assets to make the bond’s principal and interest payments;
  2. They give the investors in the bond a perfected security interest in the pool of assets that isolates the assets and insulates the pool should the issuer becoming insolvent;
  3. They use over-collateralization in the asset pool as a credit enhancement;
  4. They provide very little in the way of disclosure on the underlying assets on a once-per-month or less frequent basis.  
This where the major similarities to the multi-tranche asset-backed securities ends.  

There is one feature in particular which is unique and has drawn attention to covered bonds.  During the life of the bond, the issuer remains on the hook for the performance of the underlying collateral.  If the collateral does not perform as expected whether from prepayments or defaults, the issuer must replace all “non-performing” assets in the collateral pool with performing assets or other acceptable collateral.

This is a one hundred percent (100%) skin in the game retention requirement.

Is there any reason that investors should take comfort from this retention requirement and skip doing their homework on the individual assets backing the covered bond?

Supporters of covered bonds would say yes.  They have to be saying yes because the legislation proposed to start the US covered bond market requires once-per-month reporting with little to no information on the actual performance of the individual assets.

The supporters assume that because this retention requirement gives issuers an incentive to underwrite and place in the covered bond pool only good loans or receivables, that they will do so.  Therefore, investors can 'trust' the quality of the underlying collateral because of the retention requirement.

Is this basic assumption true?  NO!

Over the last 40 years, there have been numerous examples of credit originators misjudging the riskiness of the loans they underwrote to their own detriment.  The list includes commercial banks that made loans to less developed countries (spurred on by the idea that countries never go bankrupt, but people do), Savings and Loans that made loans to commercial real estate (spurred on by trying to recover from its losses on fixed rate residential mortgages in a rising rate environment) and, most recently, the entire housing finance industry that made loans on residential real estate (spurred on by the idea that house prices in the US never decline).

Investors know this track record of credit institutions misjudging risk in the midst of a credit bubble.  They realize the high likelihood that at the same time the underlying assets are losing value, the issuer will also be failing and no longer able to replace the prepaying or dodgy assets in the covered pool.

In light of this history with credit bubbles, the question facing all covered bond investors is how to value these securities.

Since existing covered bonds offer an almost total lack of information on the performance of the underlying assets, investors are valuing and trading these covered bonds based on the perceived solvency of the issuer.  In particular, just like with the toxic asset backed securities for which no current information is available, investors rely on credit ratings.  In the case of covered bonds, investors look at how the issuer is rated.

One result of this reliance on ratings as a substitute for performance information is that covered bonds perform in a highly pro-cyclical fashion.  When the issuer is highly rated, the issuer has access to the covered bond market on attractive terms.  As shown from late 2007 through early 2009, when there were doubts about the solvency of the issuers in Europe, access to the covered bond market on any terms disappeared as the market froze except for purchases by the European Central Bank.

Another result of reliance on ratings as a substitute for performance information is that the covered bonds of issuers that fail become just like the toxic mortgage-backed securities.  Impossible to value.  

Fortunately, there is a solution that reduces the pro-cyclicality of covered bonds and allows investors to value and trade the covered bonds in a deep, liquid secondary market even if the issuer fails.

The solution is to disclose loan-level performance data on the assets supporting the covered bonds on the day an observable event occurs.  Observable events include payments and delinquencies on the underlying loans.  Investors will therefore always have current information about the status of the underlying collateral.

With performance data, investors in both the primary and secondary markets can do their own homework and analyze and value the covered bonds.  With performance data, investors can assess how dependent the covered bond's interest and principal payments are to replacement of the non-performing assets.  The less dependent, the more the covered bond is priced off the asset quality and not the issuer’s credit rating.  The more the covered bond is priced off asset quality, the more attractive this product becomes as a source of funding for issuers whether they have a credit rating or not.  The more the covered bond is priced off asset quality, the more robust the primary and secondary markets are and the less likely they are to freeze.

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Free Lunch: Part IV

The Telegraph published an article today, The Bank of England must use QE to buy 'bad mortgages' warns  Fathom Consulting, that supports the "Free Lunch" idea discussed last week on this blog.

In the article, the consulting group makes the case for the Bank of England to fund a 'bad bank' to purchase the mortgages of households who can only make their debt payments because of near zero interest rates.  Whether there is an explicit bad bank set up or the Bank of England/Fed were to bring the mortgages/mortgage-backed securities on to its balance sheet, does not change the reliance on using the zero cost of funds to support the assets as a critical feature of the recommendation.  As discussed previously, it is the zero cost of funds that allows a central bank to fund the purchase of these assets at higher prices than other market participants, turnaround and offer the borrowers a modification that makes sense given the borrower's economic condition, and be able to do both without realizing a 'loss' if the borrowers ultimately pay enough through interest and principal to cover the purchase price.

The consulting group cites numerous benefits of taking this action including 1) freeing up monetary policy so that interest rates can be allowed to rise and 2) recapitalizing the banks so they are no longer constrained in their lending by the overhang of potential bad debt.

Finally, the consulting group claims that the idea is gaining traction with "Monetary Policy Committee members and other interested parties."

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Government Issuers Should Use Best Structured Finance Disclosure Practices

As the debate over new disclosure regulations for structured finance securities goes on, government issuers, including agencies and sponsored entities, are missing the opportunity to lead by example.  They should be using best disclosure practices as oppose to the disclosure practices that contributed to the credit crisis.

Prior to the credit crisis, the standard for disclosure of the underlying loan-level performance data was once-per-month or less frequently.  This frequency of disclosure did not prevent the structured finance market from freezing at the start of the credit crisis.  This frequency of disclosure has not subsequently thawed the structured finance market despite explicit bribes, like PPIP, and implicit investor coercion, like zero interest rate policies.

This frequency of disclosure is great for investing based on performance trends, but terrible for valuing individual securities.

The current once-per-month or less frequent disclosure practice is ideal for placing a macro bet.  Look at how much money hedge funds made by noticing there was a gap between the performance on the underlying loans and the assumed performance built into the price.

Unfortunately, current once-per-month or less frequent disclosure is terrible for valuing individual securities.  The Brown Paper Bag Challenge shows how once-per-month disclosure leaves investors blindly betting on the value of the loans backing a structured finance security.

Historically, government issuers (like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and the FDIC in the US) have set the standard for disclosure frequency by reporting once-per-month.  Once-per-month reporting is adequate for investors in these securities because the government is guaranteeing and absorbing one hundred percent (100%) of the credit risk of these deals.

Once-per-month reporting is not adequate for investors who are exposed to credit risk.  Look how much money was lost by investors who were receiving once-per-month reports on structured finance securities that were guaranteed by financial guarantors like the mono-line insurers.

Once-per-month reporting is not adequate for taxpayers who are ultimately on the hook for the credit losses of government issuers.  Notice how Fannie and Freddie's regulator is still scrambling to get its arms around the actual performance of the mortgages these firm's guaranteed and the size of their losses.  The regulator's inability to get its arms around the losses has resulted in the US Treasury explicitly stating that it would cover whatever losses are incurred.

There is a best practice for structured finance disclosure.  Best practice is to disclose loan-level performance data on an observable event basis.  Observable events include payments on the loans, delinquencies, defaults, insolvency filings by the obligors and filing, acceptance or denial of representation and warranty claims.

Can the underlying loan-level performance data be reported on an observable event basis for all structured finance securities?  Yes.  Financial institutions currently use observable event based reporting to monitor the loans and receivables on their balance sheets.  The same systems that support the on-balance sheet loans and receivables are used to support structured finance securities.  The data is available, it is only a question of disclosing it.

Would it cost a lot to provide observable event based reporting on the underlying loan-level performance?  No.  It does not fundamentally alter the economic attractiveness of structured finance from an issuer's perspective.  The cost is approximately one-tenth of the cost of billing and collecting the underlying loans or receivables.

What benefit would the global governments receive from having government issuers reporting on an observable event basis?  For very little cost, particularly when compared to the cost of all the government programs that have been put into place as a result of this crisis, it would dramatically reduce the likelihood of a repeat of the credit crisis and its trillions of losses.  For example, it would have led to more effective oversight and a reduction of the losses at Fannie and Freddie.

If the government is already guaranteeing and absorbing one hundred percent (100%) of the credit risk, what is the benefit of providing observable event based reporting to investors?  It sets the standard for reporting for all structured finance securities regardless of their underlying assets or the minimum disclosure requirements required by regulation.

Setting the standard for disclosure by example is a whole lot easier than through the issuance of globally coordinated regulations.

Setting the standard for disclosure by example provides investors with structured finance securities that they can truly know what they own.

Ultimately, if government issuers of structured finance securities can provide observable event based reporting, then all issuers can provide observable event based reporting.  The only reason non-governmental issuers would not provide observable event based reporting is because they are trying to hide something.  Should investors really be investing in structured finance securities where issuers are trying to hide something?

Friday, October 29, 2010

Chairman Volcker's Concerns on Banks Gaming Regulations Applies to Structured Finance Disclosure

Chairman Volcker's concerns about the implementation of the "Volcker Rule" banning proprietary trading in today's Wall Street Journal article, Volcker on his 'Rule' - Keep It Broad, are also relevant for the regulatory efforts to revise disclosure requirements for structured finance securities.

His concern is that narrow or prescriptive rules, like setting the specific data fields that must appear in a structured finance reporting template, invite gamesmanship by the banks that ultimately could allow them to avoid the intent of the rules.

Examples of gamesmanship cited in the article are the efforts of banks and their lobbyists to sway the regulators to write rules in a certain way.  This is an excellent description of the activities of the Association of Financial Markets For Europe (AFME) and the American Securitization Forum (ASF) with regards to structured finance security disclosure.

Particularly susceptible to this form of gamesmanship are Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive and SEC Regulation AB.  Article 122a requires European credit institutions that invest in structured finance securities to know what they own and issuers to provide the loan-level performance data so that these investors can do their homework.  Regulation AB establishes disclosure requirements for structured finance securities in the US.

Article 122a and Regulation AB need regulators to define disclosure:  either broadly or with narrow, prescriptive rules.  To be effective for investors, 'what' is disclosed has to be done 'when' it is most relevant.  For example, tender offers for common stock have to be announced when the tender offer is made and not at the end of the month or quarter.

The gamesmanship surrounding Article 122a and Regulation AB has been to focus on 'what' and keep repeating that the current frequency of reporting must be the appropriate 'when' for disclosure since it is the current frequency of reporting.  

As readers of this blog who have taken the Brown Paper Bag Challenge know, investors need current information, what is in the bag right now, if they are going to know what they own and not be blindly betting on the value of the contents of the bag.  Current information, which is only achievable through observable event based reporting, is not the same as existing structured finance reporting practices of once-per-month or less frequently.

For structured finance, the way to keep the structured finance disclosure rules from being gamed is to require issuers to disclose on a borrower privacy protected basis all the loan-level data fields that they track on an observable event basis.  Where observable events include activities like payments, delinquencies, defaults, insolvency and identification, acceptance or denial of representation and warranty claims

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Free Lunch: Part III

There is another way for the Fed to acquire the non-agency residential mortgage backed securities from the bank balance sheets.  It could simply exchange agency RMBS for the non-agency RMBS.

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

The Failure of Models that Predict Failure

Attached is a very interesting article from the academic community.  The key takeaway is that disclosure  regulations for structured finance need to require all variables tracked by the lender be reported to investors.  Otherwise, information that is necessary for analyzing the credit risk is missing.

I added the bold emphasis in the article abstract:

Statistical default models, widely used to assess default risk, are subject to a Lucas critique. We demonstrate this phenomenon using data on securitized subprime mortgages issued in the period 1997--2006. As the level of securitization increases, lenders have an incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors, even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality. Consistent with this behavior, we find that over time lenders set interest rates only on the basis of variables that are reported to investors, ignoring other credit-relevant information. The change in lender behavior alters the data generating process by transforming the mapping from observables to loan defaults. To illustrate this effect, we show that a statistical default model estimated in a low securitization period breaks down in a high securitization period in a systematic manner: it underpredicts defaults among borrowers for whom soft information is more valuable. Regulations that rely on such models to assess default risk may therefore be undermined by the actions of market participants.



Authors

Uday Rajan 
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Amit Seru 
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Vikrant Vig 
London Business School

Clarity is the Purpose of Disclosure

"Disclosure has come to be a dirty word. Disclosure has become like shrubbery, a dense thicket of words that are a good place to hide tricks and traps. Clarity is about emphasizing the key pieces of information that someone needs to know... I have great faith in the capacity of people to make good financial decisions — when they have good information. No one makes great decisions — consumers or businesses — if the relevant information is hidden from view."  Elizabeth Warren

The quote from Mrs. Warren appeared in an interview with the Chicago Tribune in which she was discussing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

This quote could just as easily have been applied in the world of structured finance.  A product that has become synonymous with opacity.  

Currently, there is a global regulatory effort focused on rewriting the disclosure rules for the structured finance industry.  My firm has responded to each regulator when they have requested public comments.  

The responses use a brown paper bag to demonstrate that "when" information is disclosed is as important as "what" information is disclosed for structured finance investors.  The Brown Paper Bag Challenge highlights the difficulty investors have trying to value a specific security based on out of date information.

The responses use a clear plastic bag to demonstrate the solution to the "when" problem is to provide current information.  The way to accomplish this for structured finance is through observable event based reporting.  If you have ever looked at your credit card account over the Internet, you know that observable event based reporting is the way that all firms handling daily billing and collecting track loan-level information.

There has been significant push back from the structured finance industry on addressing "when" in the new disclosure regulations.  The TYI, LLC response on October 21, 2010 to the SEC discusses the objections raised by the industry.