Sunday, January 23, 2011

Random Observations that Drive Economists and Regulators Nuts

While each of the following is probably worth a posting, they are worth reading about in their condensed form.

  • The credit crisis ends the myth of the efficient market hypothesis.  The efficient market hypothesis is built on the assumption that all useful, relevant information is available to the market in an appropriate, timely manner and is therefore incorporated in pricing of securities.  The opaque, toxic structured finance securities clearly show this assumption to be false.


  • Zero interest rate policies (ZIRP) and quantitative easing (QE) are barriers to economic recovery.  Your humble blogger divides individuals into three categories:  a) those who spend all their earnings; b) those who earn so much money that it is virtually impossible to spend it all; c) those who recognize that their career earning money is going to be shorter than their life expectancy and therefore save money for after they retire.  As pointed out over a century ago by Walter Bagehot, it is the individuals in category C who hate ZIRP and QE.  It is effectively a tax on them that results in their reducing CURRENT consumption.  This is a natural response as they realize that they are going to need much more money due to lower expected earnings on their savings to fund their retirement.  If the only group that could be expected to increase its consumption is decreasing its consumption, then how can ZIRP or QE add to the economic recovery?  Instead of pursuing ZIRP and QE which are barriers to economic recovery, the Fed should have been raising interest rates to at least 2% to stimulate the economy by allowing the Category C individuals to increase their current consumption.
  • Boosting stock prices does little to influence consumption by Category C individuals.  These individuals maintain a significant amount of their investments in retirement accounts which blunt the potential impact of a stock gain wealth effect. 
  • Also, your humble blogger questions why ZIRP or QE should increase investment by business.  First, businesses can see that category C individuals are cutting back on consumption.  If demand is not increasing, why invest?  Second, when businesses make a decision to invest, the cost of debt, particularly when interest rates are below 8%, has very little impact on a discounted cash flow analysis (remember:  return on equity is still 12+%).  This is particularly true when there are significant concerns about demand.  The conclusion should be that ZIRP and QE are barriers to business investment.
  • Extend and pretend policies make it hard for financial institutions to make loans after a real estate bubble bursts.  By definition, banks are suppose to be senior, SECURED lenders.  The largest asset most borrowers have to pledge is real estate.  When a real estate bubble bursts, it is hard for the bank to determine what the value of the real estate pledged as collateral is.  Why?  Because they have on their books all these real estate backed loans that they are extending and pretending are performing.  If the extend and pretend policy were to end, the loans would no longer be performing and the bank would most likely have to seize the real estate and try to sell it.  Hence, the bankers know that current real estate "market" prices are distorted by extend and pretend policies.  They just do not know how badly distorted.

Goldman, Facebook and its implications for current asset-level disclosure

Over the last couple of weeks there have been numerous comments about Goldman's private investment in Facebook and its subsequent resale of this position to investors.  Gordon Crovitz's column in the Wall Street Journal related this saga to the issue of disclosure. [emphasis added]
Facebook raised $500 million last week, but the only people who could invest were the wealthiest private clients of Goldman Sachs. Instead of offering shares to the public, Facebook chose a private version of a public offering.
The case of an unsocial Facebook should be a wake-up call about how regulations have undermined public markets. 
... In this context it is useful to recall that for the past century the public stock markets set a vibrant, pre-Internet example of social media combined with crowd sourcing: People gathered information on companies and through their trading moved share prices. This combined wisdom rewarded good companies and punished others.
"Nobody in Wall Street knows everything," explained William Peter Hamilton in his 1922 classic, "The Stock Market Barometer," which focused on the investment theories of Charles Dow and his Dow Jones Indexes. Hamilton, then editor of The Wall Street Journal, described how information flowed through the still-young U.S. stock markets, which had funded utilities and industrial companies: "The market represents everything everybody knows, hopes, believes, anticipates, with all the knowledge sifted down to . . . the bloodless verdict of the market place."
Private markets close off this exchange of information, making it likelier that prices are wrong, letting bubbles brew.   
... Until recently, U.S. capital markets were the world's most open, public and well-informed. A free flow of information can't eliminate booms and busts, but as we saw a decade ago, companies in fast-growing industries such as the Web can be the quickest to implode—so the more public information about them the better.
The goal of securities regulation should simply be to ensure that accurate information gets to the market as quickly as possible. By this measure, the regulations of the past decade have undermined public stock markets and their vibrant flow of information about companies.
Not surprisingly, the same conclusions would apply if the discussion had been about bonds and structured finance securities were substituted for private investments.  After all, Wall Street wants the lack of disclosure in private investments and structured finance securities because it makes it easier on them to make a profit.

Mr. Crovitz wants accurate information to be disclosed to the market as quickly as possible.  This is the current asset-level data for both financial institutions and structured finance securities discussed on this blog previously.

To work, Spain's rescue of its banks requires current asset-level disclosure

Despite running stress tests that showed that the savings banks, cajas, did not need significantly more capital, the Spanish government announced a restructuring of the savings banks.  In addition, it promised to inject capital into the newly restructured savings banks if private investors were unwilling to.
Forty out of a total of 45 Spanish cajas will merge or form operating alliances with each other as the authorities look to prevent fears over the banking system from morphing into a wider market run on the country as a whole.
Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, Spain's deputy prime minister, said: "The government is preparing a plan, the aim of which is to increase the solvency and the credibility of the savings banks."
As readers of this blog know, the only way to increase credibility is to make current asset-level information available for each cajas.  This current asset-level information can be used by market analysts to independently determine how much capital each cajas needs.
It is hoped that private investors can be found to put money into the cajas. However, Spain's Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring could take stakes in those that are unable to attract outside investment.
Private investors are not going to buy existing losses.  They are going to want to examine the current asset-level data even if it is not made available to all market participants to decide for themselves if their investment is just purchasing existing losses or is being made into a viable financial institution capable of generating a return on their investment.

In addition, if investors cannot do their own independent analysis, why should they believe that the Spanish government has injected enough capital into the cajas that were unable to attract private investors?  Investors have the experience of Ireland trying three times to rid its banks of troubled loans.  Why should investors assumed that Spanish regulators are better than their Irish peers and that the firms that advised Ireland will do a better job this time?
Spain's main IBEX index of leading shares closed up nearly 2pc on the back of the news, which helped calm fears of a banking crisis brewing in the country.
Shares in Spain's two largest banks, Banco Santander and BBVA, led the rebound, each rising more than 3pc.
While all of Spain's major banks passed last year's European Union-organised bank stress tests, five out of the 19 cajas included in the test failed it.
Speaking before the announcement of the restructuring plan, analysts at ratings agency Fitch said the country would need a "credible" plan to ensure it maintained its sovereign credit rating at its current level.
David Riley, global head of sovereign ratings at Fitch, said he expected the cost of the recapitalisation of the cajas to come in at about €50bn (£42bn) to €60bn.
"If we get much larger recap costs than we have currently built into our rating, then obviously that would prompt us to have a look at the rating again," Mr Riley said.
Moody's, a rival credit rating agency, last month put out a negative outlook on Spain, citing its worries about the outlook for the banking system, which has struggled with losses largely related to loans to property developers.
The Spanish government creates an insider trading problem if it does not share the current asset-level data with all market participants.  If the cajas data is only shared with a few investors and investment banks, these investors and investment banks have information that they could trade on.  They would know if there is a need for more capital than the rating services currently anticipate.  The trades do not have to be in the securities of the cajas.  They could instead be in securities of the Spanish government.

If private investors do not make investments in the cajas, even if the Spanish government invests funds, it does not end the questions surrounding the solvency of the Spanish financial system.  In the absence of current asset-level data, investors do not know if the government funds were sufficient to restore solvency.

In support of what your humble blogger has been saying, Mohamed El-Erian of Pimco  observed in discussing the Spain's plans for its savings banks, [emphasis added]
“That is the weakest link right now in the financial system,” El-Erian said in an interview on Bloomberg Surveillance. “We are looking to what are they going to do, how are they going to do it, and will that calm sentiment in Spain?”
Spain is pushing savings banks, or cajas, to bolster capital and wants them to plug any shortfalls with private funds, using the bank-rescue fund known as FROB only as a last resort. The country is forcing the cajas, regional institutions run as foundations that helped fund the property boom and account for about half of Spain’s loans, to detail their risks linked to developers and real estate by the end of the month.
“They are looking to somehow recapitalise the system, but the big question is, ‘who is going to pay for it?’” said El- Erian, who also serves as co-chief investment officer with Pimco founder Bill Gross at the world’s biggest manager of bond funds.
“It will be very difficult to raise private capital for the cajas. It’s more likely to be public capital.”
The European nation may change the law governing savings banks to make it easier for them to attract private investors, and could also tighten capital requirements, FROB said in a presentation on its website on Friday.
New steps may include incentives to “strengthen solvency and capital quality requirements, preparing the entities in advance to meet the most stringent international capital standards and future stress tests,” FROB said. In a separate statement, the rescue fund said the proposals were “working hypotheses” and legal changes are up to the Spanish government.
To avoid creating an insider trading problem and restore credibility to the solvency of both the cajas and the government, the Spanish government should have the cajas disclose their current asset-level data to all market participants.

Saturday, January 22, 2011

Another Financial Crisis is Unaffordable

Andrew Haldane made a speech in Ireland in which he discussed how another financial crisis is unaffordable.
THE world cannot afford another financial crash like that of 2008, which has already cost 30pc of global GDP in government support for the banking system, the Bank of England's head of financial stability said in Dublin yesterday.
Andrew Haldane said that in the UK alone, the implicit guarantee to the banks amounted to £100bn (€118bn) -- the same as running the National Health Service for a year.
"All this gives an incentive to the big banks to become bigger and more concentrated," Mr Haldane said. "This is the origin of the 'too big to fail' problem.
"Bankers had a 20-year party, but their market value relative to assets is back where it was 20 years ago."
Capital
Analysis suggested there were things regulators could have done to prevent such a huge crash. "They could have insisted on higher loan to value ratios as asset values rose. They could have made banks hold more capital as their loans expanded.
"If higher capital ratios had been in place in Ireland and the UK, it is possible that the credit boom would not have got out of control," he said.
With the permanent loss of output from the crash estimated as at least 100pc of global GDP, the world could not afford another crash on this scale. "The risk of another one will have to be combated with more and better regulation.
Actually, the existing regulations might have prevented the crash had there been current asset-level disclosure for all financial institutions and structured finance products. 
"Things like that are always said after a crash, and saying them wasn't much of a success this time."
Mr Haldane said he was optimistic that the new forms of capital, such as contingent convertible bonds, or Cocos, could change incentives for the banking system. These are loans to banks which convert into equity if the bank has trouble meeting its debts.
"If executives were paid partly in Cocos, and shareholders received part of their dividends in Cocos, it would make them more careful about the risks being run, because it could reduce the value of those payments.
Supporting Cocos because they would give management an incentive to be more careful about the risks being run is nuts and has already been shown not to work!  The heads of Bear, Stearns and Lehman Brothers had at risk and lost hundreds of millions of dollars from not properly managing the risks their firms took on.  Unless all of an executive's pay is in Cocos that they cannot sell for a decade after retirement, it is highly unlikely to have any impact on their risk management capabilities.
"The market price for such instruments could also serve as an early warning for regulators. There is a chance that they could provide simplicity and prompt corrective action rolled into one," Mr Haldane said.
In the absence of current asset-level disclosure, how could the market price of these instruments serve as an early warning over CDS prices or the firm's stock price?
 

Finance can not be reformed - it just needs to be modernized

Jeremy Warner ran an interesting column in the Telegraph in which he argues that there is no silver bullet to bullet-proof banking against a once in a hundred year crisis like we just experienced.  Readers of this blog know that current asset-level disclosure is the silver bullet.

How does Mr. Warner's observations stand up to disclosure?
Is there really any point in the UK Independent Commission on Banking? It’s chairman, Sir John Vickers, is due to give a speech in London on Saturday, airing some further thoughts on how the banking sector might be restructured – subsidiarisation seems to be the ICB’s latest hobbyhorse. As an exercise in academic thinking, jolly interesting it all is too. But will any of it have any practical import?
I guess the answer to this is still that it might do. The ICB is a Government sponsored exercise, so ministers will presumably feel bound, at least to some degree, by its recommendations. What’s more, they staffed the commission with some quite feisty intellectuals, none of whom look likely to settle for cosy and consensual, status quo thinking.
Thanks to what they’ve written on these issues, we already know what some of them think. Martin Wolf, chief economic commentator on the Financial Times, believes the Basel III proposals on capital reform don’t go nearly far enough, while Martin Taylor, former chief executive of Barclays (you shouldn’t think this makes him banking establishment, for even when at Barclays, he was never that) seems to be an outright Glass-Steagall man. As for Clare Spottiswoode, or the “laughing regulator” as she used to be known when she was overseeing the gas industry, we know she’s all in favour of radical structural reform; it was she who forced the breakup of British Gas.
Before proposing a solution, each of these individuals is likely to test a proposed solution against a series of questions: "would it have prevented the credit crisis by treating the cause or does it treat a symptom?" "will it reduce moral hazard in the future?"  "is it easy for regulators to implement?"
I’ve no doubt the Commission will influence the debate, but I don’t see it determining the outcome. The Government made itself something of a hostage to fortune by appointing such an independently minded group of individuals; unencumbered by the compromises of government, their recommendations have plenty of potential to embarrass.
Actually, the Commission has the opportunity to recast the entire discussion.  When the focus is on the issue of disclosure, investors also have a say. 
If, for instance, the Commission recommends root and branch breakup along business lines, will the Government implement it? As long as the international consensus remains in favour of universal banks, this seems rather unlikely, for it would in effect, remove one of the UK’s leading international industries from the international stage. Some banks would redomicile to avoid the Commission’s chopper.
With current asset-level disclosure, there is no need to break-up the banks.  If a bank is unwilling to provide this disclosure, the UK and the rest of the world are better off with their leaving. 
Part of the problem with the ICB is that it was never made entirely clear what it is for. Was it merely an exercise in government procrastination, or playing difficult issues off into the long grass? Is the purpose to find reforms that would prevent future banking crises, and iron plate the system against future risk, or is about finding mechanisms for dealing with a crisis in more optimal ways, without recourse to the taxpayer? And if issues such as capital adequacy are being decided internationally in Europe and elsewhere, does that mean the Government finds them insufficient, and wants even more?
None of these questions have been properly answered, so there is a real danger of the Commission going off all over the place. Personally, I think it madness to try and bullet proof banking for a once in a one hundred year event, if only because it is impossible. Markets are ingenius things, and they will find some way around whatever rocks are put in their way. Furthermore, the idea of a banking system without risk is just plain silly. In such circumstances you would also get no growth.
The beauty of current asset level disclosure is that it does not mean there will be no risk in the banking system.  Quite the contrary.  What current asset-level disclosure brings is the ability for investors and competitors to independently assess the risk of a specific bank and to make their investments accordingly.  This is what is known as exerting market discipline. 
It may be possible to create resolution regimes which better insulate the taxpayer from banking crises, but the idea that governments can be entirely removed from their traditional lender of last resort role strikes me as cloud cuckoo land. It’s a holy grail, and therefore by definition a hopeless endeavour.
Actually, the combination of competitors and market analysts are likely to identify a bank taking excessive risk well before there is a need for the government to step in.  Once identified, the pressure will be on bank's management to reduce this risk or face a) a falling stock price and b) less access to capital through the inter-bank market.
I wish Sir John Vickers luck in his search for the silver bullet, but I don’t rate his chances.
Actually, your humble blogger thought someone should hand Sir John Vickers and the Commission the silver bullet of current asset-level disclosure.

Friday, January 21, 2011

Can Tim Geithner Stop Bailing Out Large Financial Institutions?

As 2011 begins, the question is "can Tim Geithner stop bailing out large financial institutions"?

This is not an academic question.  Every time he bails out a large financial institution he sends the message that the institution and all similar large financial institutions are insolvent. If they were not insolvent, there would be no need for the bailout.

As recently as December 2010, Tim presided over a bailout for Bank of America.  This bailout took the form of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac settling claims against BofA for pennies on the dollar.

Briefly, when a mortgage is sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the seller makes a series of representations about the mortgage.  If any of these representations are not true, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have the right to put the mortgage back to the seller and ask for their money back.

While the seller might contest these put backs, it is in the seller's best interest to write a check for the full amount.  Why?  Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not have to do business with the seller in the future.

But how can Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stop doing business with the seller and still fulfill their mission?  Nowhere does it say that the agencies must continue to do business with a financial institution where they cannot trust the quality of the mortgages that the financial institution originates (in fact, they are suppose to stop doing business with firms like this).  As everyone knows, existing competitors in the mortgage market could easily replace BofA's origination capacity so there would be no disruption in access to funds by homebuyers.  It is the capacity to shut off access without disrupting the mortgage market that gives Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the leverage to insure that they are repaid the original purchase price.

Why are the deals between BofA and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a bailout?  Because the US Treasury is covering all of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's losses.  If Fannie Me and Freddie Mac were private institutions without any claim on the taxpayer, it would be a different story.

The bailout had two parts.

  • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received a fraction of the original purchase value of the mortgages.  The difference between what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received and the this original purchase value is the size of the bailout.  This bailout can be thought of as a direct equity injection into BofA.
  • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not stop doing business with BofA.  This bailout can be thought of as an indirect equity injection as it flows through BofA's income statement.
Please note that nowhere does Tim acknowledge that this was a bailout of BofA.  This is unfortunate because it prevents him from noticing a pattern of his continuing to resort to bailouts to fight the latest financial fire.

Tim has long argued that he finds bailouts necessary but distasteful.  If so, why does he keep doing them?

For example, is there any reason to believe that we have seen the last bailout of BofA?  Today, BofA announced that it had $10 billion of exposure to representation and warranty claims by investors in mortgage backed securities.  Is this figure remotely credible given that its Countrywide subsidiary was one of the largest originators and packagers of sub-prime mortgages?  Or does management know that Tim will step in and bail them out if losses exceed this figure?

Furthermore, what about BofA's liabilities with regards to mortgage foreclosures?  These liabilities arise for example if BofA sells a house that it foreclosed on, but it turns out that BofA did not have legal standing to foreclose.

How can Tim ever stop doing bailouts?  He runs stress tests and claims that the largest financial institutions are solvent, but then turns around and bails them out.  If they are solvent, why the ongoing need for a bailout?

Is Tim capable of stopping the government bailout machine?  If not, is President Obama?

Is there ever a point in time, when Tim and President Obama might acknowledge that being on the bailout treadmill is not getting the US very far and that it is time for a different approach?

Thursday, January 20, 2011

The Buyers' Strike Continues in the Euro RMBS Market

Structured Credit Investor reported that the European buyers of RMBS securities remain on a buyers' strike. [emphasis added]

The secondary European RMBS market has been reenergised by a busy and successful week or so of bid-list activity. However, S&P's counterparty criteria update (SCI passim) - and its potential impact on higher rated benchmark deals in particular - is causing some concern.
"The market is standing firm at the minute; there are a lot of buyers out there - or at least dealers who are happy to buy, thinking that there are buyers coming," one RMBS trader says.
This influx of buyers has driven the volume and outcome of bid-list activity over the past week or so, which has pushed prices up to significant levels. "We saw a large volume of bid-lists last week, with two or three launching a day - especially in UK non-conforming. They've had very good execution levels; levels that we haven't seen since 2008," the trader confirms.
He continues: "We had three in a row and every day the subsequent list was a point higher in pricing. Having said that, I've seen stuff on dealer offer sheets - as they bought it all - but I haven't seen much of it trade away from dealers yet."
The trader explains that while the bid-lists were extremely well received, activity has now stabilised somewhat, with one UK non-conforming list launching per day. "They are now selling at similar levels, perhaps dipping by a single point. Last week every single list was trading higher than the last, so it's levelled out now."
It would be surprising if the dealers could find buyers.  With the implementation of Article 122a, European credit institutions that invest in structured finance deals have to be able to document that they know what they own.  As has been discussed before on this blog (see here, here, and here for example), in the absence of loan-level information on an observable event basis, these institutions cannot document they know what they own.  As a result, they face both capital charges and liability if the purchases were done on a fiduciary basis.

EU Looks to US for Advice on Stress Tests

Bloomberg reported that the EU is looking to the US for advice on its stress tests so that the test will be seen by investors as credible.
European officials are taking advice from U.S. counterparts on how to improve their bank stress tests as they try to shore up their defenses against a debt crisis that has crippled the euro currency zone over the past year, according to Belgium's finance minister.
Didier Reynders said Tuesday that Europe has to organize "better" and more transparent stress tests than those conducted last summer. The results published in July came under a huge amount of criticism for giving the all-clear to a number of banks that have since been shown to need help, notably in Ireland. Many analysts dismissed them as nothing more than a whitewash.
"We need to organize the same kind of stress tests on both sides of the Atlantic Sea because if we don't have the same kind of stress tests as the U.S. and in Europe, we will have many criticisms of them," Reynders said ahead of a meeting of the EU's 27 finance ministers.
The problem with stress tests is that the results are determined by regulators before the fact and the market knows it.

For example, the US is conducting the current round of stress tests to 'show' that the too big to fail banks can start paying dividends again.  Most, if not all of these banks, will 'pass' the stress test.  In reality, none of these banks should pass the stress tests given their exposure to potential repurchases of mortgages sold to the agencies and private investors and the potential losses on second mortgages, commercial mortgages and toxic securities held on their balance sheet.
The comments come a day after ministers from the 17 euro nations discussed boosting the size and powers of the region's bailout fund as a way to help tame the market turmoil that has pushed Greece and Ireland to require rescues. While they indicated that final decisions on the matter would be taken over the coming months, the bloc is clearly trying to come up with a more comprehensive solution to its crisis.
Reynders said discussions about the stress tests are currently taking place between Michel Barnier, the EU's internal markets commissioner, and U.S. colleagues to organize similar stress tests.
While the European stress tests met a lukewarm response -- at best -- in the markets, the U.S. tests of 2009 were widely credited with helping to ease the financial crisis in the world's largest economy and limiting the length and depth of the recession.
Actually, it was not the stress test that helped to ease the financial crisis.  Rather, it was the commitment by the US Treasury to invest as much capital as it took to keep these 19 banks solvent.  The problem in Europe is that the size of the losses in the banking system is larger than the capacity of the governments to fund.
Ten of the 19 U.S. banks that were tested failed and were forced to raise nearly $75 billion to shore up their finances. In sharp contrast, only seven of 91 European banks tested failed and were required to raise a paltry euro3.5 billion.
The EU decided at the end of 2010 that it would have to do another round of stress tests this year following renewed concerns about Europe's banks as unease grew over the public finances of many countries.
The main reason why Ireland had to be bailed out to the tune of euro67.5 billion in November was that its public finances were saddled with banks' massive losses. The same banks got the all-clear last July from the little-known European regulator, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors.
The committee has since been replaced by the new European Banking Authority, which is currently working on the methodology of new tests, due to be published in mid-2011.
"The problem to my mind last time around was that there was a certain variety in the implementation in some member states," Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn said late Monday.
That variety was necessary unless the stress test were to reveal that entire banking systems are insolvent for several European countries.
The stress tests' methodology and implementation will be discussed at the meeting of EU finance ministers, who continue to grapple with the debt crisis despite some easing in market tensions over the past week.
The 17 eurozone finance ministers also continued to discuss with EU counterparts outside the eurozone -- such as Britain and Sweden -- about ways to improve their handling of the crisis. In their meeting Monday, eurozone ministers looked at ways of increasing the powers and scope of the bailout fund and enacting further economic reforms in order to get past simple fire-fighting -- that is, to build market confidence preventively rather than keep rescuing countries in need.
German finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said it's important that the euro countries put "together a package that absolves us from the necessity to react again every couple of months."
In addition to the short-term measures, like the bailout fund, Schaeuble said the package needs to focus on solid economic policies and strengthening competitiveness as well as economic and fiscal coordination between eurozone countries.
The stress tests in Europe are a delicate balancing act.  On the one hand, there is the capacity without jeopardizing the solvency of individual countries to increase their debt to bailout their banks.  Added to this is the capacity of the bailout fund.  On the other hand, there is the need for capital by European banks.  The results of the stress test need to come close to, but not exceed the combined bailout capacity of the governments and fund on a country by country basis.

Even if the stress tests can achieve this, there is no guarantee that the market will not think it is a whitewash.  After all, the market is aware of the bailout capacity constraint and has not forgotten the experience with Ireland.

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Warren Buffett, Michael Lewis and the Volcker Rule

A Wall Street Journal article on the most recent steps taken by regulators in implementing the Volcker Rule observed:
... [the Volcker Rule] seeks to prevent banks from putting capital at risk by prohibiting proprietary trading and banning certain relationships with hedge funds and private-equity funds.
As expected, the study didn't recommend a precise review of each trade to see if it complies with the law. But it did recommend firms flag each trade in a variety of ways, including whether a customer or the trader initiated the position.
The council acknowledged it is difficult to distinguish between prohibited proprietary trading and a permitted activity, such as market-making, hedging or some other trade done on behalf of a bank's client.
Sorting out this "grey area" will be the key focus for the individual agencies, said Mary Miller, Treasury assistant secretary for financial markets, during the open meeting.
The study recommends requiring banks to close proprietary trading desks, since their activity is unambiguously in violation of the Volcker rule. This is already happening. Major Wall Street firms, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley, have seen high-profile traders depart or plan to start new firms in anticipation of the new restrictions.
The study also recommends banks be required to set up internal controls and compliance regimes.
One new wrinkle getting notice on Wall Street: The study recommends company chief executives attest to their company's compliance, signaling how important the council considers the Volcker provision.
That all sounds wonderful, however, the reality is that the whole focus on sorting out the grey area is fundamentally flawed.

Recently, Michael Lewis wrote a column in which he discussed how hard it is to distinguish between proprietary trading and acting as an agent for the customer.
The banks have no intention of ceasing their prop trading. They are merely disguising the activity, by giving it some other name.
... The fullest explanation came from a former Lehman Brothers corporate bond salesman named Robert Wosnitzer, who is now at New York University, writing a dissertation on the history of proprietary trading. He’s been interviewing Wall Street bond traders, he said, and they have been surprisingly open about their intentions to exploit one obvious loophole in the new law.
... “One trader I interviewed,” Wosnitzer says, “said that from here on out, if he wants to take a proprietary position in a credit, he will argue that he bought the position because a customer wanted to sell the position, and he was providing liquidity; and in order to keep the trade on, he would merely offer the bonds 10 basis points higher than the offered side, so that he will in effect never get lifted out of the position, while being able to say that he is offering the bonds for sale to clients, but no one wants ‘em. When the trade finally gets to where he wants it -- i.e., either realizing full profit, or slaughtered by losses -- he will then sell it on the bid side, and move on.
Of course, there is all sorts of flawed logic here, but the point is that...there are a hundred different ways to claim to be acting as an agent or for a customer.”
This ambiguity is no doubt one reason the financial reform bill passed in the first place. Even its clearest prohibitions are couched in language inviting Wall Street to evade them.
These hundreds of different ways to "hide" from the Volcker Rule provide plausible deniability to CEOs and allow them to sign on that their firm is in compliance with the Volcker Rule when in fact the "proprietary trading" activity has not stopped.

Mr. Lewis discussed why proprietary trading is so important to the large financial institutions.
But the new game of cat and mouse raises a simple, even naive question: Why do these giant Wall Street firms want so badly to make huge bets with their shareholders’ capital?
Save Us
After all, the point of the ban on proprietary trading is as much to save the banks from themselves as to save us from them. We have just come through a period where putatively shrewd individual bond traders lost not millions but billions of dollars for their firms, by making really stupid bets.
Even before the crisis there was never any reason to think that traders at big Wall Street firms had any special ability to gamble in the financial markets. Anyone with a talent for investing is unlikely to waste it on Morgan Stanley or Bank of America; he’ll use it for himself, or for some hedge fund, which allows him to keep more of his returns.
And if this were true before the financial crisis it is even more true after it, when trading inside a big Wall Street bank will be less pleasant and more fraught with politics.
Yet Wall Street’s biggest firms apparently still badly want their traders to be allowed to roll the bones. Why?
What They Do
One answer -- which Wosnitzer points to -- is that this is what Wall Street firms now mainly do. Beginning in the mid- 1980s, the Wall Street investment bank, seeing less and less profit in the mere servicing of customers, ceased to organize itself around its customers’ needs, and began to build itself around its own big and often abstruse gambles.
The outsized gains (and losses), the huge individual paychecks, the growing ability of traders to bounce from firm to firm from one year to the next, the tolerance for complexity that doubles as opacity: all of the signature traits of modern Wall Street follows from the willingness of the big firms to allow small groups of traders to make giant bets with shareholders’ capital, which the shareholders themselves don’t and can’t understand.
It is not only the shareholders that don't and can't understand.  It is also the regulators that don't and can't understand the giant bets being taken.

Given all the obstacles the regulators face in drafting regulations that actually achieve the outcome intended by the Volcker Rule, the regulators came up with a novel solution.
Regulators seemed willing to allow Wall Street firms to draft the initial compliance programs.
The study's approach "empowers the industry to write a bottoms-up program that reflects how things are done," says William Sweet, a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. The big question now is how regulators will greet each firm's plan to comply with the Volcker Rule.
Both Wall Street and the regulators should be thrilled with each firm's plan to comply with the Volcker Rule.  Wall Street because it can write a plan that will not prevent it from continuing with proprietary trading under another name.  The regulators because they can claim that Wall Street is in compliance.

If the regulators ever actually wanted to perform their regulatory function, there is a simple regulation they could put in place that would guarantee compliance with the Volcker Rule and eliminate proprietary trading under any name by the large Wall Street firms.

The regulators should require that the Wall Street firms disclose to all market participants at the end of each business day each and every position in their trading and investment portfolios.

As Warren Buffett would be happy to point out, this simple regulation would dramatically squash the potential profitability of proprietary trading under any name.


A number of years ago, he negotiated with the SEC and received permission to delay disclosure for his investment positions.

Why would he have wanted to delay disclosure?

If he was buying, he wanted to delay disclosure to minimize the price he paid for his entire position.  By not filing, he does not have to compete with investors who piggyback on his reputation and ideas. These investors would have increased the cost of his position by driving up the price of stock with their buying.

If he was selling, he wanted to delay disclosure to maximize the price he received for his entire position.  By not filing, he does not have to compete with investors who piggyback on his reputation.  These investors would have decreased his sale proceeds by driving the price of the stock down with their selling.

Clearly, there are advantages to having opacity when it comes to buying and selling securities.


Eliminating opacity in the trading and investment portfolios also has another advantage for regulators.  Regulators can now turn to other market participants, like portfolio managers and competitors, for help in analyzing what are the risk of an individual firm's trading and investment portfolio.

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Obama Embraces 21st Century Regulatory System

On January 18, 2011, the Wall Street Journal published a column by President Barack Obama highlighting his commitment to having the US adopt and implement a 21st century regulatory system.

The test of the Obama Administration's commitment to this goal is whether it brings the financial regulatory system created by FDR in the 1930s into the 21st century by utilizing information technology and making available to market participants the current asset-level data for all financial institutions.

As President Obama said:
For two centuries, America's free market has not only been the source of dazzling ideas and path-breaking products, it has also been the greatest force for prosperity the world has ever known. That vibrant entrepreneurialism is the key to our continued global leadership and the success of our people.
But throughout our history, one of the reasons the free market has worked is that we have sought the proper balance. We have preserved freedom of commerce while applying those rules and regulations necessary to protect the public against threats to our health and safety and to safeguard people and businesses from abuse.
From child labor laws to the Clean Air Act to our most recent strictures against hidden fees and penalties by credit card companies, we have, from time to time, embraced common sense rules of the road that strengthen our country without unduly interfering with the pursuit of progress and the growth of our economy. 
Sometimes, those rules have gotten out of balance, placing unreasonable burdens on business—burdens that have stifled innovation and have had a chilling effect on growth and jobs. At other times, we have failed to meet our basic responsibility to protect the public interest, leading to disastrous consequences. Such was the case in the run-up to the financial crisis from which we are still recovering. There, a lack of proper oversight and transparency nearly led to the collapse of the financial markets and a full-scale Depression.
Created in the 1930s, the FDR Framework provides the common sense rules that served our financial markets well for over 70 years.  Updating how these common sense rules are enforced is the key for correcting the lack of proper oversight and transparency in finance that saw the financial markets freeze and almost tipped the global economy into a full-scale Depression.

In April 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt describe both what governments should do and what they should not do to provide genuine transparency and proper oversight.
[Although] the federal government should never be seen as endorsing or promoting a private security, there was “an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce be accompanied by full publicity and information and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”
In simple terms, the FDR framework is:

  • Governments must make sure that useful, relevant information is made available to all market participants in an appropriate, timely manner.
  • Governments must not endorse an investment.

A major cause of the credit crisis was the failure of global governments to adhere to what FDR said governments should do and should not do with regards to genuine transparency for either structured finance securities or financial institutions.
Over the past two years, the goal of my administration has been to strike the right balance. And today, I am signing an executive order that makes clear that this is the operating principle of our government.
This order requires that federal agencies ensure that regulations protect our safety, health and environment while promoting economic growth. And it orders a government-wide review of the rules already on the books to remove outdated regulations that stifle job creation and make our economy less competitive. It's a review that will help bring order to regulations that have become a patchwork of overlapping rules, the result of tinkering by administrations and legislators of both parties and the influence of special interests in Washington over decades.
As technology, markets and financial products evolve, the challenge for governments is to insure genuine transparency for all investments, including investments in financial institutions.  A major source of overlapping rules, outdated regulations and failure to provide adequate oversight in finance was the result of the government's failure to use technology as markets and financial products evolved.  


One of the problems that FDR faced when he took office was the high frequency of bank runs across the US.  The question was how to stop these runs and the harm they caused the local economy in which they occurred.

As discussed in an earlier post, bank runs result from a change in belief about the soundness of a bank.  Since depositors cannot see how the assets that the bank invests in are performing, they have to trust that any losses will not cause the depositor to lose any of their money.  For whatever reason this trust is lost, it is in the depositor's best interest to run to the bank and withdraw all their money.

FDR addressed stopping bank runs in multiple ways.  First, he guaranteed deposits below a certain amount.  For many individual depositors, this meant that the government protected all of their deposits.  This eliminated their need to worry about the soundness of the bank.  Second, he closed a number of banks and effectively said that the remaining banks were sound.  Third, he created a regulatory infrastructure with the power to examine banks and to takeover failing banks.

How does FDR's solution for the banking system reflect the FDR framework and the rule that investors should be provided with useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

In the 1930s, it was impractical to make current asset-level data available to depositors and investors.  As a result, under FDR's solution for the banking system, the deposit guarantee put the US into the position of representing all investors.  The regulatory infrastructure provided the authority for regulators to access what they determined was useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  This included having bank examiners on site at a financial institution receiving current asset-level information.

There were two potential problems with the government representing investors and depositors.

First, it puts a burden on regulators to keep pace with the evolution of the banking system.  Specifically, as the banking system evolves, regulators have to understand what is useful, relevant information and when the information must be received in order for it to be timely for each financial innovation and product in the banking sector.

Second, it puts a burden on regulators to be able to use the information.  



A WSJ article presented a possible reason for why banking examination and the financial regulatory system failed at the beginning of the credit crisis:
A top Bank of England official, Andy Haldane, said the new regulator will curtail the FSA's practice of dispatching dozens of examiners to banks to collect loads of granular information... Mr. Haldane noted that ... they rarely yield much useful information for regulators, who can find themselves overwhelmed by the quantity of data.
Mr. Haldane identified the flaw in the implementation of the 20th century bank oversight model.  He also understood that solution was to have financial institutions disclose granular asset-level information to the markets.

There are a number of market participants, including competitors, who are able to and have an incentive to analyze all of the individual asset level data that financial institutions could provide and turn it into useful information.

Please re-read that paragraph as it is the key to 21st century oversight of banks.  

Since the markets can and have an incentive to turn the disclosed asset-level data into useful information, the markets are able to bring discipline to the financial system that the regulators with their resources cannot.

For the US to update the financial regulatory system created by FDR in the 1930s to a 21st century regulatory system requires using 21st century information technology.  

Specifically it means applying observable event based asset-level performance reporting not just to the loans and receivables underlying structured finance securities, but across the entire asset side of bank balance sheets.  

What is observable event based asset-level performance reporting?  For each individual loan or receivable on the bank balance sheet, it is simply whenever there is a payment, a delinquency, a default, an insolvency filing by the borrower or similar event, it is reported on a borrower privacy protected basis to the market on the day that it occurs.

Observable event based asset-level performance data is the current information markets need to analyze and assess the risk of each individual bank.  It is the current information markets need to bring discipline to the financial system.


There are no technological hurdles that prevent making this data available.  There are no technological hurdles that prevent the market from using this data.  

Where necessary, we won't shy away from addressing obvious gaps: new safety rules for infant formula; procedures to stop preventable infections in hospitals; efforts to target chronic violators of workplace safety laws. But we are also making it our mission to root out regulations that conflict, that are not worth the cost, or that are just plain dumb.
For instance, the FDA has long considered saccharin, the artificial sweetener, safe for people to consume. Yet for years, the EPA made companies treat saccharin like other dangerous chemicals. Well, if it goes in your coffee, it is not hazardous waste. The EPA wisely eliminated this rule last month. 
But creating a 21st-century regulatory system is about more than which rules to add and which rules to subtract. As the executive order I am signing makes clear, we are seeking more affordable, less intrusive means to achieve the same ends—giving careful consideration to benefits and costs.
Andrew Haldane put a value on asset-level transparency for both financial institutions and the products they produce.

As discussed on NakedCapitalism,

In a March 2010 paper, he compared the banking industry to the auto industry, in that they both produced pollutants: for cars, exhaust fumes; for bank, systemic risk. While economists were claiming that the losses to the US government on various rescues would be $100 billion ([Yves Smith] ahem, must have left out Freddie and Fannie in that tally), it ignores the broader costs (unemployment, business failures, reduced government services, particularly at the state and municipal level). His calculation of the world wide costs:
….these losses are multiples of the static costs, lying anywhere between one and five times annual GDP. Put in money terms, that is an output loss equivalent to between $60 trillion and $200 trillion for the world economy and between £1.8 trillion and £7.4 trillion for the UK. 
Yves Smith then goes on to relate the cost of systemic risk to transparency.

... opacity, leverage, and moral hazard are not accidental byproducts of otherwise salutary innovations; they are the direct intent of the [financial firms'] innovations. No one at the major capital markets firms was celebrated for creating markets to connect borrowers and savers transparently and with low risk. After all, efficient markets produce minimal profits. They were instead rewarded for making sure no one, the regulators, the press, the community at large, could see and understand what they were doing.
Clearly the financial industry will balk at the cost of providing depositors and investors access to all useful, relevant asset-level information in an appropriate, timely manner.  However, this cost is orders of magnitude less than the cost of not having transparency quantified by Andrew Haldane.  As a result, there is no legitimate reason remaining for governments not to require asset-level data for both financial institutions and the products they produce.
This means writing rules with more input from experts, businesses and ordinary citizens.
As an expert in disclosure, I have designed, developed and patented a low-cost information system for  disclosing borrower privacy protected asset-level data on an observable event basis to all market participants.  I look forward to talking with you and your administration.  You can reach me at (781) 453-0638.
It means using disclosure as a tool to inform consumers of their choices, rather than restricting those choices. And it means making sure the government does more of its work online, just like companies are doing.
With current asset-level data available for each financial institution online, bank examination can now be done online.  For example, with each individual financial institution's asset-level data available to all market participants, no longer will bank examiners have to just ask the management of the institution they are concerned about to explain their balance sheet risks.  Now they can turn to credit and equity market analysts and analysts at other financial institutions for answers to their questions.
We're also getting rid of absurd and unnecessary paperwork requirements that waste time and money. We're looking at the system as a whole to make sure we avoid excessive, inconsistent and redundant regulation. And finally, today I am directing federal agencies to do more to account for—and reduce—the burdens regulations may place on small businesses. Small firms drive growth and create most new jobs in this country. We need to make sure nothing stands in their way.
Providing current asset-level data on an observable event basis can also significantly reduce the reporting burden on financial institutions.  A significant percentage of the existing reports and almost all the special requests for additional information by the various regulatory agencies can be eliminated.
One important example of this overall approach is the fuel-economy standards for cars and trucks. When I took office, the country faced years of litigation and confusion because of conflicting rules set by Congress, federal regulators and states.
The EPA and the Department of Transportation worked with auto makers, labor unions, states like California, and environmental advocates this past spring to turn a tangle of rules into one aggressive new standard. It was a victory for car companies that wanted regulatory certainty; for consumers who will pay less at the pump; for our security, as we save 1.8 billion barrels of oil; and for the environment as we reduce pollution. Another example: Tomorrow the FDA will lay out a new effort to improve the process for approving medical devices, to keep patients safer while getting innovative and life-saving products to market faster.
Despite a lot of heated rhetoric, our efforts over the past two years to modernize our regulations have led to smarter—and in some cases tougher—rules to protect our health, safety and environment. Yet according to current estimates of their economic impact, the benefits of these regulations exceed their costs by billions of dollars.
The cost of providing current asset-level data on an observable event basis is not a hurdle.  Particularly when this cost is compared to the trillions of dollars of losses that the global financial system suffered in the credit crisis because market participants did not have this data and could not properly assess risk.
This is the lesson of our history: Our economy is not a zero-sum game. Regulations do have costs; often, as a country, we have to make tough decisions about whether those costs are necessary. But what is clear is that we can strike the right balance. We can make our economy stronger and more competitive, while meeting our fundamental responsibilities to one another.

What has prevented current asset-level data on an observable event basis for each financial institution from being made available until now is the Obama administration and the regulators have not championed moving to a 21st century approach.  

Since striking the right balance in oversight and transparency is now an operating principle of our government, I am confident that the administration and the regulators will champion the 21st century approach.

This approach eliminates reliance on only regulators to detect problems at and curb the risks of a single institution.  This approach eliminates reliance on only regulators to identify systemic problems.  

This approach instead allows the regulators to harness the resources of the market, including ironically, the ability of each financial institution to evaluate its peers.  This approach allows market participants to perform their own analysis on each financial institution and not have to rely on the government and its bank examiners.