Tuesday, June 21, 2011

As practiced by Wall Street, the organizing principle of modern credit markets is secrecy

As regular readers of this blog know, the global financial system is suppose to be based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the practice of caveat emptor.  This framework puts the burden of ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner on regulators.

This blog has focused on two areas of the capital markets, structured finance securities and financial institutions, where the regulators have not ensured that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  The results of this lack of information have included:
  • Financial instability as market participants do not know which banks are solvent and which are not.
  • Frozen credit markets as investors have been unable to value structured finance securities.

As Yves Smith discussed on NakedCapitalism,

... opacity, leverage, and moral hazard are not accidental byproducts of otherwise salutary innovations; they are the direct intent of the [financial firms'] innovations. No one at the major capital markets firms was celebrated for creating markets to connect borrowers and savers transparently and with low risk. After all, efficient markets produce minimal profits. They were instead rewarded for making sure no one, the regulators, the press, the community at large, could see and understand what they were doing.
A ZeroHedge post stated the intent in more colorful language.
[Wall Street's] business model is designed around the exploitation of secrecy.   Secrecy is [the] organizing principle that governs modern credit markets. Credit default swaps, privately placed structured securitizations (e.g. CDOs), and hedge funds have all flourished-- they dominate the debt markets--because they are all designed to exploit secrecy.   They all create extraordinary profits by keeping the rest of us in the dark. 
So in late 2006, if you wanted to find out what was happening in this newly created synthetic RMBS market, you couldn't find out much of anything.   You couldn't find out anything about who bought or sold any CDO, or what was in any CDO, or how any CDO performed, unless Goldman or some other CDO underwriter deemed you sufficiently worthy of their selective disclosures. 
  • You couldn't learn anything from the sales or trading activity of mortgage bonds, because the related trading in credit default swaps was kept hidden beneath the surface. 
  • You didn't know anything about the trading activity related to the ABX indices, since that, also, was kept secret. 
  • And since the privately-held company that owned the ABX, CDS IndexCo LLC, operated in total secrecy, and since the privately-held company that published the price of the ABX, Markit Group Limited , operated in total secrecy, you had no way of knowing the extent to which the price of the ABX was manipulated through round-tripping, side deals with synthetic CDOs, or anything else. 
The only thing you knew, your only link to the illusory "reality " of market sentiment, was the quoted price of the ABX.   And you might happen to know that the Chairman of CDS IndexCo was Brad Levy, a managing director at Goldman, which, along with a handful of other banks, controlled CDS IndexCo and Markit Group.

UK Financial Policy Committee needs different points of view

In a GFS News article, several academics criticized the composition of the current UK's Financial Policy Committee members and hinted that there is a need for all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner as required under the FDR Framework.
The new UK Financial Policy Committee has been criticised for a lack of external representation which could lead it to suffer from group think. 
Four academics have voiced a number of concerns with the regulatory authority including a lack of representatives from the US, while speaking in front of the Parliamentary Treasury Select Committee on Monday. 
... the [interim FPC] will be made up of six members who currently work at the Bank of England, with just four members being brought in as external members. 
"There are not enough external members, and if the interim FPC is an indicator of the line-up we will need, we probably have the wrong externals," Dr Andrew Hilton, director of the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, told the TSC.

"We need an American regulator and an American investment banker," he added, commenting that the skillset of the 'outsiders' would not be able to provide a varied enough critique on the build-up of systemic risk. 
The interim FPC has been set up in anticipation of new regulation formally establishing it. 
In its current form it is chaired by Bank of England governor Mervyn King, who is joined by BoE deputy governor for financial stability, Paul Tucker, BoE deputy governor for monetary policy Charlie Bean, future chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority Hector Sants, chairman of the FSA Adair Turner, the BoE executive director for financial stability Andy Haldane, and BoE executive director for markets Paul Fisher. 
Joining the committee externally are former adviser to the BoE governor, Alastair Clark, former co-head of corporate and investment banking at Deutsche Bank, Michael Cohrs and former vice chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Donald Kohn. 
... Jane Fuller, a co-director also at the CSFI, added that there should be "at least as many external [representatives] as there are internal". 
"There should be more people from the real world in there helping to spot credit bubbles," she declared. 
... "Regardless of what you think in a perfect world, then the court has to be reengineered and restaffed," Hilton commented, without making reference to specific employees. 
Dr Hilton also showed an interest in the US Office for Financial Research, which will have the power to demand companies supply it data in order to identify emerging systemic risks. 
In a previous post, your humble blogger offered to sit on the FPC.  What makes me uniquely qualified is

  • I would be the only member who was recognized by the mainstream media for talking about the credit bubble in 2007 and putting forth a disclosure solution that would have moderated the impact of its bursting and helped to limit future bubbles.
  • I developed the FDR Framework understanding that with 21st century information technology it was now possible to base the global financial system off of the combination of the philosophy of disclosure and the practice of caveat emptor.

EU stress tests confirm regulators addiction to creating financial instability [update]

Had the article on the current round of EU stress tests not appeared in Reuters, I would never have believed it.  Unfortunately, there is the Reuters' article quoting from EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Officer Olli Rehn.
"In the agreed methodology of the stress tests, the capital requirements were in fact tightened, and many other improvements were made," Rehn told a news briefing after a meeting of EU finance ministers. 
"In this context it was a deliberate choice that we will not assume a default of any euro area or any EU member state and of course that's linked to our policy, because we do not believe restructuring is good for Greece or other countries. 
"We have decided today that we are engaged in a Vienna-style initiative on a voluntary basis, which will avoid a credit default, which does not mean debt restructuring and we do not envisage default as a scenario," Rehn added.
I had to re-read the highlighted text as it confirms that this round of stress tests is designed to be no more credible than the last round.

I can understand why the EU would prefer that Greece not restructure its debt.  However, the whole point of stress tests is to find out what the impact might be if this were to occur.

By not knowing what the impact might be, regulators are not constrained in their statements about how Greece would be Europe's Lehman Brothers.

It is the choice by regulators to not know a knowable fact and then issue armageddon type statements that directly contributes to financial instability by highlighting the fact that the market does not know which banks are solvent and which banks are not solvent.

Barclays and Standard Charter have greatly reduced their unsecured lending exposure to eurozone banks as a result of not knowing who is solvent and who is not.  Activity like this greatly increases financial instability.

Compare this to what would happen under the FDR Framework.  Under the FDR Framework, all market participants would have access to the useful, relevant current asset and liability-level data in an appropriate, timely manner.

With this data, market participants could run for themselves or hire third party experts to run for them stress tests.  They could choose to look at a Greece restructuring.  As a result, they could change the pricing and amount of their exposure based not on fear, but facts.

[Update]
Since the original post, the EU has changed its mind or including a restructuring of Greece in the stress tests.  According to an article on Reuters,
Europe's banks have been told to put a figure on potential losses from holdings in Greek and other sovereign debt to ensure a health check of lenders realistically reflects the deepening euro zone crisis. 
Sources involved in the European Union stress test of 91 banks said regulators are "tightening the thumb screws" on lenders to spell out the impact of a government debt default -- but without having to make the politically unacceptable assumption in the test that a default can happen. 
... Until now fallout from the sovereign debt crisis was focused on a bank's day-to-day trading book but most government bonds are held on a bank's core banking book. 
The disconnect has become even starker as sovereign woes get worse, giving regulators a bigger headache as they try to avoid another stress test flop. 
"Banking books are being stressed much more harshly than last year and than in the original draft of this year's stress test. That will help increase the credibility of the tests," an official in charge of the stress test at his bank said. 
"That will result in factually putting countries like Greece on default status," the official added. 
The test is aimed at shoring up investor confidence in the sector which is already being hit by the prospect of tougher regulation eating away into profitability. 
After last year's test flopped -- Irish banks had to be bailed out after passing -- the fledgling European Banking Authority (EBA) which is conducting the health check, is staking its reputation on delivering a credible exercise this time round. 
Europe has raised the bar for banks this year, demanding they hold more, better-quality capital to withstand a possible 2-year recession. They have to hold more than 5 percent of core Tier 1 capital to pass the exam, or raise capital. 
A German regulatory source said the EBA had tightened the screws to draw up the "harshest version" of haircuts or losses on government debt. 
... The EBA's tougher approach looks at how a bank would survive a four-notch rating downgrade to low rated government debt holdings -- a move that would take Greek bonds into default territory. 
Germany's Landesbanks are seen as among the weaker lenders in Europe but are still expected to pass despite a toughening up of the banking book rules. 
"We still assume that the Landesbanks will pass the EBA stress tests," a spokesman for the Association of German Public Sector Banks said. 
More data on banking book fallout from the euro zone crisis will also help the EBA fulfil another aim -- giving markets enough detail so they can conduct their own tests to include scenarios such as the impact of government defaults.
If the EBA really wanted to give markets enough detail so they can conduct their own tests, they would release the current asset and liability-level data for each bank. 

Monday, June 20, 2011

Higher capital requirements or current asset and liability-level disclosure

The Wall Street Journal ran an interesting column on higher capital requirements and disclosure.
Left and right, a consensus has formed that "too big to fail" banks are a danger to the real economy and something needs to be done. 
The latest solution to gather fans is imposing much higher capital minimums on such banks—a step in the right direction, but no panacea. The problem remains how to discipline their risk-taking even given a bigger capital cushion. 
Such banks fund their bets with cheap leverage—cheap because lenders believe their principal is guaranteed by government. At the same time, bank managers are incentivized by the equity markets to exploit every advantage to produce competitive returns to satisfy risk-hungry, well-diversified stock investors. Stiffer capital standards might just prompt them to take concealed risks in ways not understood by regulators. 
Higher capital requirements might be a real solution, however, if pushed to their logical conclusion. Let such banks that are "too big to fail" be taxed out of existence by taxing away the value of their implicit government guarantee. 
Their complexity and opacity would revert to being what it should be: a reason for investors and lenders to steer clear of them. Let their functions be dispersed to smaller and more focused institutions whose risk-taking can be monitored and disciplined by the capital markets.
Here's guessing that a world without too-big-to-fail banks would not be bereft of financial innovation or diversified services aimed at every kind of customer. It might be a very nice world.
The author recognizes that the problem is how to discipline a financial institution when its opacity makes it impossible for capital markets to monitor.

The FDR Framework suggests a solution for this problem.  Allow financial institutions to take their choice between holding higher capital requirements or disclosing their current asset and liability-level data.

  • Those institutions that opt for disclosing their current asset and liability-level data can now be monitored and disciplined by the capital markets.
  • Those institutions that opt for higher capital requirements will have told the capital markets that they are taking on risks that they would prefer to hide.  In turn the capital markets can adjust the price and amount of exposure to these institutions to reflect the existence of this risk. 

Sunday, June 19, 2011

SEC takes dead aim at ECB's ABS data warehouse

In what should be the death knell for the ECB's support for the Market Group's version of the ABS data warehouse, a Wall Street Journal article describes how the US SEC is investigating whether the rating services committed fraud by using out-of-date information when rating mortgage bonds.

The rating services testified before the US Congress in the fall of 2007 that
  • they did not have any special access to loan performance data and instead had the same access to loan performance data that investors and other market participants had, and
  • this loan performance data was inadequate for making timely updates to ratings.  
Regular readers of this blog know that the rating services had to have used out-of-date information even if they used the once-per-month data that was made publicly available to all market participants.

By definition, once-per-month data is out-of-date at the time it is released because it does not include all the knowable facts about the performance of the underlying mortgages.  These knowable facts included the observable events (like payments, delinquencies, defaults and foreclosures) that have occurred involving the underlying mortgages since the end of the previous month.

The Market Group is proposing using once-per-month data in its version of the ECB's ABS data warehouse.  The is the same frequency of disclosure that the rating services thought was inadequate for making timely rating updates and that the US SEC is investigating for its role in the rating services committing fraud.

How exactly is an ABS data warehouse that offers once-per-month disclosure suppose to restore investor confidence?

In addition, in a wonderful display of why no conflicts of interest should be permitted in any financial information vendor, Moody's is a finalist to design, build and operate the Market Group's ABS data warehouse.  

On the one hand, Moody's wearing its rating hat sees once-per-month disclosure as inadequate.  On the other hand, Moody's thinks this disclosure is useful for market participants.

Should the ECB finally decide to abandon support for the Market Group's efforts, my firm is ready to step in and offer, using its patented information infrastructure, a conflict of interest free ABS data warehouse that provides all market participants with the loan-level performance data on the observable event basis that is necessary for restoring investor confidence.

However, it is highly doubtful that the ECB will stop supporting the Market Group.

Like the US Federal Reserve, the ECB does not want to ever publicly acknowledge making a mistake.  This unwillingness is related to their efforts to conduct monetary policy independent of politics - if you publicly acknowledge a mistaken policy in one area, it opens you up to potentially having to acknowledge mistakes in another area.

Unfortunately, central bankers do not consult in an area outside of monetary policy with someone like myself who has the relevant subject matter expertise.  Instead, central bankers set up a technical working group that lacks this subject matter expertise and end up adopting fundamentally flawed policies that cast significant doubt on the competence of the central bankers.

For example, the ECB now finds itself supporting the Market Group and its ABS data warehouse even though the European Union competition committee is investigating Markit and saying that financial information data vendors need to be free of all conflicts of interest.

Why should the ECB stop its flawed policy of supporting the Market Group now?

Perhaps because European financial institutions that are covered under Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive are required to know what they own.  It is hard to imagine that the combination of the rating services saying once-per-month is inadequate for timely rating changes and the US SEC thinking that once-per-month data is out-of-date supports the idea that financial institutions know what they own.

If the ABS data warehouse does not support the idea that financial institutions know what they own, then the ABS data warehouse is essentially useless in Europe and highly unlikely to restore confidence in the structured finance market.

Hopefully, the ECB will decide that it is better to acknowledge their mistake, adopt my solution and restore confidence in the structured finance market.  [please note, this folly was not limited to the ECB, but was also joined in by the Bank of England.  The BoE accepts as collateral ABS securities' eligibility with useless once per month reporting.]
U.S. securities regulators are weighing civil fraud charges against some credit-rating companies for their role in developing the mortgage-bond deals that helped unleash the financial crisis, according to people familiar with the matter. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission's long-running probe into the deals has widened to the major credit-rating firms, including Standard & Poor's, the people said.

The leading ratings companies have been criticized by lawmakers as "key enablers" of the financial meltdown, helping to fuel the $1 trillion Wall Street mortgage-securities machine before the boom ended.

But the major ratings firms have largely avoided any regulatory crackdown and beaten back private lawsuits. Their business has rebounded as financial markets regained their footing. 
Now, SEC officials are focusing on the question of whether the ratings companies committed fraud by failing to do enough research to be able to rate adequately the pools of subprime mortgages and other loans that underpinned the mortgage-bond deals, according to people familiar with the matter.
It is a common tactic for regulators to accuse financial firms of fraud for allegedly misrepresenting information to investors, either recklessly or intentionally, according to lawyers. 
In the case of the rating companies, the firms could face allegations from the SEC that they relied on incomplete or out-of-date information supplied to them on the pools of loans in the mortgage-bond deals or ignored clear signs of problems among subprime loans and so gave unduly high ratings to slices of the deals that were then sold to investors, say people familiar with the matter. 
The SEC is looking closely at the conduct of Standard & Poor's, a unit of McGraw-Hill Cos., said people familiar with the matter. They said the agency is also reviewing the role played by Moody's Investors Service, owned by Moody's Corp., in relation to at least two mortgage-bond deals.

Saturday, June 18, 2011

To solve problem caused by regulators' information monopoly, Fed's Hoenig wants to restructure banking system

The Kansas City Fed President and CEO Thomas Hoenig co-authored an article titled "Restructuring the Banking System to Improve Safety and Soundness".  He identifies the key to improving safety and soundness
[As the ability of the] market, bank managers and regulators to assess, monitor and/or contain risk taking that endangers the public safety net and financial stability.
Regular readers of this blog know that the ability to assess, monitor and/or contain risk is dependent on having access to all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate, timely manner.  Without this data, the market, bank managers and regulators cannot assess, monitor and/or contain risk.  Fortunately, accessing this data can be easily done using 21st century information technology.

Mr. Hoenig tries to solve this dependence on data without adopting 21st century information technology.

Instead, he chooses to adopt a new Glass-Steagall that restructures the banking industry by limiting what businesses banks can be in to only those that he thinks are sufficiently transparent to regulators so the regulators can assess, monitor and/or contain risk.

His proposal to restructure the banking industry is identical in impact to the ring-fence, on a stand-alone basis, being proposed by the UK's Independent Banking Commission.  Under the ring-fence proposal, certain business activities like deposit taking and lending will be included inside the fence and other business activities like trading will be outside.

Banks with a variety of activities are less transparent. Relative to nonfinancial companies, it is difficult for investors to evaluate the condition of banks and their riskiness because their balance sheet assets and activities are opaque and easily changed [Donald Morgan provides evidence on the increased opacity of banks from combining lending and trading activities in “Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry,” American Economic Review, September 2002].
He understands that the market cannot exert discipline since it does not have the necessary data. 
Traditional banking is opaque because only the bank knows the risk and quality of its loans.
On-balance sheet traditional banking is opaque because the information has, since the 1930s, historically not been shared with the market, but only with regulators.  There is no reason it must remain opaque.  In theory, banks are suppose to disclose the risk and quality of their loans when they are bundled into off-balance sheet structured finance securities.
Banks that engage in nontraditional activities such as trading, hedge funds, private equity, and market making are even less transparent because the success of these strategies depend on the confidentiality of the positions and speed with which the banks are able to change their exposures. 
It is a feature, not a bug of disclosing to market participants all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate, timely manner that it would make these nontraditional activities less economically attractive.
Given the lack of transparency, regulators must play a larger role relative to the market in monitoring and disciplining banks.  However, as already discussed, regulators are also at a disadvantage when dealing with banks engaging in complex activities.
This is the very real problem that was at the heart of the 2008 credit crisis and continues to create enormous financial instability.

This bears repeating.
  • The market is reliant on the regulators to monitor and discipline the banks.  The market cannot monitor and discipline the banks itself because the regulators have an information monopoly on the data needed for monitoring and discipline.
  • However, and this is the core of the problem, the regulators are not up to the task of monitoring and disciplining the banks.  Like the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, Mr. Hoenig explicitly recognizes this fact.

There are two ways to solve this problem.
  • Restructure the banking system by limiting the business activities of the banks to those where the capabilities of regulators allow them to assess, monitor and contain risk.  However, this does not end the opacity caused by the regulators' information monopoly or the market's dependence on the regulators.  The financial system is still subject to financial instability and the potential for a new credit crisis due to errs in regulatory judgment.  This solution is preferred by Mr. Hoenig.
  • End the regulators' information monopoly and provide market participants with access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  To do this would require overcoming the opposition of the banks, which should not be too hard given that developed countries cannot afford another crisis, and the adoption of 21st century information technology.  This is the solution preferred by your humble blogger.

In making his case for restructuring banks, he identifies the complexity of the universal bank model as the impediment to the market's and the regulator's ability to access all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate, timely manner.
... Overall, the largest financial companies conduct a variety of traditional and non-traditional banking activities, many of which have increased the complexity of their operations and portfolios. 
These companies benefit from additional activities, for example, if they increase the diversification of their assets and revenue streams. However, these benefits are outweighed by the significant complications it poses for the market, bank management, and regulators to assess, monitor, and/or contain risk taking that endangers the public safety net and financial stability. 
Specifically, as explained below, combining banking and nonbanking activities makes it more difficult to supervise and regulate banks, to price deposit insurance, and for bank management to manage risks. It also reduces market discipline by making banks less transparent. 
In a nutshell, a member of the Fed's Open Market Committee has summarized the problems caused by opacity in the regulated banking system.  Because of his focus on banks, he leaves out the problems caused by opacity in the unregulated banking system.
Some activities make it more difficult to supervise banks. The goal of prudential supervision is to control bank risk taking so that they are safe and sound and do not endanger the safety net. This is done by monitoring a bank’s financial condition, lending, operational, risk management, and other practices and enforcing regulatory rules. 
Due to the periodic nature of bank supervision, supervisors are able to get only a snapshot of bank processes, risk exposure, and capital positions at a given point in time. These snapshots are useful only as long as they are able to predict the bank’s processes, risk exposure, and capital positions between the supervisory examinations. The flexibility to adjust risk profiles between exams depends to some extent on the activities banks engage in and the nature of the risks.  
Mr. Hoenig implies that the bank supervisors embedded on-site for the large, complex banking organizations are not actively monitoring what is happening.  The Wall Street Journal carried a long article on how embedded regulators are monitoring what is happening in essentially real-time.
Many of the nontraditional activities that the large, complex banking organizations engage in are difficult to supervise effectively because they are very risky in the short term and can be used to quickly change a bank’s risk profile. 
For example, trading and market-making are high frequency activities that can take place between exams with little evidence that they ever occurred. As a result, a snapshot of positions of these activities on one day has no predicative value for the positions, for example, a week later. 
Monitoring these activities on a high-frequency basis would be very costly for banks and supervisors. Moreover, it requires substantial transparency that banks are likely to strongly oppose.  Thus, while examiners may err in their judgment on the riskiness of any activity, they do not have the tools to monitor the riskiness of many traditional non- banking activities.
Mr. Hoenig asserts that monitoring these activities on a high frequency basis is very costly.  This is an important assertion because it drives his conclusion that banks need to be restructured so they only have what he views as transparent activities.

Is there any evidence that providing market participants access to all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate, timely manner for high frequency activities and subsequently monitoring these activities is very costly?

No.  In fact, a great deal of work has been done showing that the economic benefits of providing market participants access to all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate, timely manner are multiples of any expenses incurred in providing the data.  This blog has highlighted examples of this work.
  • As discussed in one post,  Bank of England's Andrew Haldane estimated the minimum loss from the 2008 credit crisis to be $4 trillion.  This was before factoring in broader social costs like unemployment and business failure.  Including these drives the estimated loss from the credit crisis up by a factor of 10.  The low-end of this loss range was then compared to the multi-billion dollar cost to provide and use this information on an annual basis.  The conclusion based on this cost/benefit analysis was that it makes sense to provide and use this information to minimize the risk of incurring trillions of dollars of losses again.
  • As discussed in a different post, the cost of providing transparency for a single security was compared to the increase in value of the security that results from the elimination of opacity.  It is a basic tenet of finance that the lower the risk of a security, the lower the return required by investors to own the security.  In theory, removing opacity, a form of risk, should lower the investors' required rate of return.  Structured finance securities were used as an example.  The annual cost of providing transparency is approximately 5 basis points (0.05%).  The annual savings from the elimination of the opacity related illiquidity premium (there is a limited secondary market since without transparency it is difficult for a potential new buyer to analyze the security and know what they are buying) is at least 25 basis points (0.25%).  The conclusion based on this cost/benefit analysis was that it makes sense to provide this information for the market to use.
Mr. Hoenig assets that banks are going to strongly oppose transparency.  This is an important assertion because it is used as justification for not requiring transparency, but instead arguing for restructuring the banks.

Is there any reason to believe that banks will strongly oppose transparency?

Yes.  As Yves Smith discussed on NakedCapitalism,

... opacity, leverage, and moral hazard are not accidental byproducts of otherwise salutary innovations; they are the direct intent of the [financial firms'] innovations. No one at the major capital markets firms was celebrated for creating markets to connect borrowers and savers transparently and with low risk. After all, efficient markets produce minimal profits. They were instead rewarded for making sure no one, the regulators, the press, the community at large, could see and understand what they were doing.

Transparency eliminates the profits bank earn from opacity.  Hence, banks are going to oppose it.

Regular readers know that under the FDR Framework the government is responsible for [and in the US regulators already have the legislative authority for] ensuring that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  

Opposition by the banking industry is to be both expected and ignored if the government is going to fulfill its responsibility and/or legislative authority.

Friday, June 17, 2011

Financial Time's Lex column weighs in on need for data

A Financial Times' Lex column has weighed in on the need for data.  Echoing the imagery of the FDR Framework, the column is titled "UK Bank Regulation:  Back to the Future".

As regular readers of this blog know, ultimately effective regulatory oversight and market discipline are based on transforming all the banks' current asset and liability-level data into information.

It is nice to see that the Financial Times' Lex column supports this observation and recommends that the Bank of England change how it is using the data (this blog has long advocated sharing it with all market participants so that banks can truly be subject to market discipline) and start investing in computers!
Back to the future. As the Bank of England prepares to take back regulatory oversight of banks in the UK at the end of next year, bank supervision will change. But not as much as Sir Mervyn King, governor, may hope. 
He wants to cut the mass of data required from banks so that policymakers and supervisors can see the wood for the trees, the better to spot systemic risks. The BoE will also have far greater powers for top-down regulation. But Sir Mervyn cannot hope to wield his supervisory baseball bat effectively unless he has decent data. 
Sure, the tripartite regulatory system failed UK taxpayers. For all the previous government’s love of more regulation and more reporting, the box-ticking did not make the banking system safer. In the words of George Osborne, chancellor, the tripartite’s failure was not “a series of unfortunate accidents – it was hard-wired into its design.” Responsibility for monitoring systemic financial risks and changing financial institutions’ behaviour was split. 
But supervisors from the BoE’s new Prudential Regulation Authority will need as much data as ever from banks if they are to do their job properly. It is how that information is used and the regulatory culture that must change. 
When tomorrow’s supervisor calls on banks’ senior executives, armed with intelligence from the BoE’s new, financial bubble and systemic pitfall-detecting Financial Policy Committee, he should be better able to zoom in on the two or three key risks that could bring down the bank. Or so goes the theory. 
The proposed new regulatory framework under the BoE’s aegis looks broadly sensible. But whatever Sir Mervyn’s determination to cut red tape and costs by doing things differently, looming Basel III reforms and European Union variations on them could still derail his plan. Time to start investing in more computers, then.

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Ring-fences and higher capital requirements work better with disclosure

The members of the Independent Banking Commission know that a ring-fence between retail and investment banking and higher capital requirements by themselves are not adequate to restore financial stability.  They know that disclosure as defined under the FDR Framework is also required.

Jeremy Warner wrote a terrific column in the Telegraph that lays out the inadequacies of a ring-fence between retail and investment banking and higher capital requirements that disclosure cures.
Whenever a big bank becomes insolvent, the Chancellor is faced with a stark choice. Either you can bail the bank out with taxpayers’ money, his officials will tell him, or tomorrow there will be mayhem in the markets followed by economic collapse. With the gun placed firmly against his head, the Chancellor will always opt for the apparent lesser of the two evils, and order a bail-out. 
That’s what Alistair Darling did, first with Northern Rock, and then later with Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS. There were any number of more generalised bail-outs of the banking system in between, in the form of government-sponsored liquidity support. 
The scandalous nature of this “non-choice” is all too familiar. Highly paid bankers are always the first to lecture the rest of us on the importance of market disciplines, as well as threaten us with the ultimate sanction of bankruptcy, but they are not subject to the same disciplines themselves.
This blog has frequently explained that the reason bankers are not subject to market discipline is because the financial regulators have an informational monopoly on bank's current asset and liability-level data.  Without this data, market participants cannot do their homework and adjust the price and amount of their exposure based on the risk of the individual bank.

This point bears repeating.  Market discipline in the form of higher costs to access funds impacts the risks that bankers take before they become insolvent.  The regulators' information monopoly interferes with the proper functioning of market discipline.
Their position at the heart of the payments system means that, in extremis, the taxpayer always has to bail them out. The profits of finance get privatised, but the losses, it seems, are invariably nationalised. 
Higher capital requirements and a ring-fence between retail and investment banking redirect the losses away from the taxpayer and back onto the bankers and the investors.
How to rid the taxpayer of the “too big to fail” problem has therefore become one of the chief objectives of banking reform. 
The humongous size of Britain’s banking sector, with liabilities more than four times bigger than GDP, makes the issue particularly acute for the UK. Britain struggled to accommodate the last round of bail-outs; it could not afford a second. 
Or as the Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, put it in his Mansion House speech last night, “Until we find a solution to the 'too important to fail’ problem, the size of our banking system will remain too large for the UK taxpayer credibly to support in future.”
This blog has frequently explained that disclosure of current asset and liability-level data is the lowest cost and most efficient way to reduce the risk of the banking sector.

Risk and not size is what is important.  Which poses a larger threat to the UK taxpayer, a bank invested in $500 billion in short term UK government debt or a bank invested in $250 billion in subprime mortgage backed securities?

Why does disclosure result in a less risky banking sector?  Market discipline.  The return that investors require is related to the amount of risk a bank takes.

Banks with higher risk will see their cost of funds, both debt and equity, increase.  Increasing the cost of both debt and equity reduces a bank's share price.

  • An increase in the cost of debt means the bank's profitability will decrease (the return on the assets is independent of how they are funded).  This should result in a lower share price.  
  • An increase in the cost of equity means that for the same level of income, investors are willing to pay less for the shares.  This should result in a decline in the share price.  

Management has an incentive to try to maximize and not minimize the share price of the bank.  As a result, management has an incentive to reduce the riskiness of the bank and can select how it wants to do so.

Disclosure has a second mechanism that works to shrink the risk in the banking sector.  When a bank has to disclose all of its trading positions, it limits the size and profitability of these positions.  Imagine how much harder it would have been for Goldman Sachs to short the sub-prime mortgage market if all market participants could see its growing short position.
George Osborne, the Chancellor, believes he has found part of the answer in the Independent Commission on Banking’s (ICB) suggestion of a limited degree of structural separation, so that the domestic, retail part of the bank is ring-fenced and separately capitalised from its so-called casino operations. 
The theory behind this proposal is that however reckless the investment bankers become, the retail bank, or the bit that’s important to the UK economy, will always be safe. When the bank as a whole gets itself into trouble, the retail bank can be cordoned off, leaving the casino bankers to pay for the consequences of their own follies by going bust in the normal way. Furthermore, use of the retail bank’s balance sheet to play at the roulette wheel of international finance will become very much more difficult, if not outright impossible. The Chancellor will never have to face the impossible choice again. 
It all sounds a great idea in theory, but will it work in practice? Frankly, I’m sceptical. Forgive the cliché, but the devil is always in the detail, none of which has yet been spelt out, and which when translated into practice threatens to be extraordinarily costly. 
Actually, the direct benefit of providing disclosure exceeds the cost of disclosure.

Just as market discipline punishes risky banks with higher costs, it rewards low risk banks with lower costs.  Low risk banks should want disclosure because as they emerge from behind the opacity caused by the regulators' information monopoly the market will reward them with a lower cost of debt and a higher share price (lower cost of equity).  This lower cost will more than offset the de minimus cost of providing disclosure.
What’s more, the whole concept is based on an unsatisfactory compromise between the objectives of safety and keeping the City competitive as a financial centre, which necessarily requires retention of the universal banking model in some form.
Actually, with disclosure there is no compromise between the objectives of safety and keeping the City competitive as a financial centre.  Would the City prefer to be known for its banks providing the best disclosure in the world or for its banks being attracted to it because they can hide what they are doing?

In the past, investors have shown a preference for gravitating to financial markets where there is the best disclosure since it is only with disclosure that investors can assess and properly price risk.
Ring-fencing is neither one thing nor the other – neither the full separation of functions that used to exist in the US under the old Glass-Steagall Act, nor full acquiescence in the universal banking model that exists virtually everywhere else. Depending on precisely what’s put behind the fence, the reform also promises to be anywhere between moderately and fiendishly expensive, further increasing the cost of credit and reducing its availability. 
Nor is it even likely that the ring-fencing will succeed in its public policy purpose of reducing or eradicating the potential costs of banking crises to taxpayers. The financial maelstrom of the last four years was as much a crisis in conventional banking, and in particular good old-fashioned commercial property lending, as it was in the overly aggressive expansion of the casino. On any realistic definition of a retail bank, both Anglo Irish and HBOS would have almost wholly fallen within the ring fence and would therefore still have needed bailing out. 
The ring fence would not in itself have prevented Royal Bank of Scotland going to the wall either. What, on the other hand, would have saved RBS is a 10 per cent capital buffer, combined with a regulator with the wherewithal to prevent RBS from further expanding its balance sheet at the top of the market by making high-risk overseas acquisitions. The Government is in danger of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. 
Disclosure addresses the need to moderate bank management's behavior using market discipline before the bank becomes insolvent.  However, disclosure and market discipline do not prevent banks from becoming insolvent.  As RBS showed, sometimes management insists on screwing up.

Ring-fencing and higher capital requirements address how to clean up and allocate the cost if a bank does become insolvent.
But worst of all, far from removing the moral hazard of implicit taxpayer support for bank creditors, the ring-fencing enshrines it and makes it explicit. 
If everything within the ring fence is deemed utterly safe and guaranteed by taxpayers, then it won’t be long before bankers find ways of exploiting this public subsidy with ever more high-risk forms of conventional lending. The casino will merely switch from the barrow boys of the City to the Captain Mainwarings of the local branch network. 
Disclosure is the tool for regulators preventing the public subsidy from being exploited.  With disclosure, market participants, including the global regulatory community, can easily identify if risk is increasing (think IBM's "Watson" monitoring the current assets and liability-level data from the ring-fenced portion of these banks looking for increases in risk to notify regulators about).
Something plainly has to be done about the “too big to fail” problem, but does it really make sense to push through a restructuring that puts British banking at a disadvantage to overseas rivals while doing little to make the system fundamentally safer? 
It is one thing to reform an industry that has done untold damage to the economy, but to render it uncompetitive and oppressively costly, in punishment for a crisis whose chastening effect on behaviour already means it’s most unlikely to be repeated for a generation or more, doesn’t seem a sensible way forward. 
The combination of disclosure, ring-fencing and higher capital requirements promises to make banks in the UK more competitive and less prone to repeating a financial crisis.  A result I prefer over gambling on the chastening effect on behaviour from the last financial crisis. 

Ireland's turning to BlackRock for loan valuations as part of bank restructuring failed to restore confidence

This blog has frequently observed that the only way to restore confidence in the Irish banking system is to disclose the current asset and liability-level data for the surviving banks.  It is only with this data that market participants, like credit and equity market analysts, can determine if the banks are solvent or if they are not solvent and if not solvent, how long it might take for them to earn their way back to solvency.

An article in the Independent shows that the exercise pursued by the Central Bank, for which it paid BlackRock a sizable fee for valuing the loans in the Irish banking sector, has failed to restore confidence in the Irish banks.
FOREIGN banks are now almost twice as active in the Irish deposits market as they are on the lending scene, the latest data from the Central Bank reveal. 
The news comes as the same monthly bulletin shows that Ireland's bailed-out banks are still turning to monetary authorities for a near-record €130bn of funding to keep their businesses ticking over. 
The latest 'Money and Banking' statistics reveal that the few foreign banks left here shrank their Irish loan books by 12pc in April alone and now account for just 17pc of all loans to Irish residents. 
The same banks house about 30pc of Ireland's private sector deposits, giving them some €45bn of funding from Irish companies and individuals. 
The foreign banks' higher share of the deposits market is partly explained by the fact that banks like RaboDirect take deposits but do not lend. 
Foreign banks, like Danske's National Irish Bank and Belgian-owned KBC, have also boasted of the growth in their deposit books as worried savers moved money out of Irish banks. 

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Is Greece fast approaching the point of no return?

The Greek debt crisis highlights the contribution to financial instability caused by national financial regulators having an information monopoly on financial institutions' current asset and liability-level data and why this information monopoly must come to an end.

Without access to this data, market participants do not know if restructuring the Greece debt is a serious problem.

The ECB suggests that through the mechanism of contagion or the interconnectedness of the financial system it is.  If there really is a significant contagion problem, then it is not limited to European banks, but also extends globally.

Three years after the credit crisis began, the ECB has put the question of which banks are solvent and which are not back on the table.  This is a question that ring-fencing retail and investment banking does not answer.  This is a question that higher capital requirements does not answer.  The only way to answer this question is to have the underlying bank asset and liability-level data.

According to an article on MarketWatch, which focused only on the direct and indirect exposure to Greece itself and not to the exposures to the rest of the global financial system that might be negatively impacted by a Greece restructuring,
U.S. banks had total exposure of $41 billion to Greece by the end of 2010, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements issued June 9. Most of the financial commitments appear to be indirect. 
About 83% is tied to “guarantees” that range from protection for sellers of credit derivative contracts to other obligations owed to third parties. Still the data are murky, according economic consultant Kash Mansori. 
“We don’t know exactly what the form of exposure is,” said Mansori, who authors the Street Light blog. “We can only make educated guesses.” 
He thinks U.S. banks are mostly exposed to Greek’s financial crisis through credit-default swaps, which essentially are insurance contracts. Mansori believes U.S. banks largely sold these deals to European banks, which own bonds issued by Greek banks and the Greek government.
Or is restructuring the Greece debt not a problem at all.  Since Greece's ability to repay its debt has been in doubt for almost two years, financial institutions should have taken the opportunity to adequately reserve for the potential restructuring.  Presumably, the national financial regulators should have insisted upon this if the financial institutions had not done this voluntarily.

When market participants do not know something in a situation like a potential debt restructuring with potentially significant contagion elements, they assume the worst.  By definition, this in turn leads to more market volatility and financial instability.  This financial instability is avoidable if the knowable facts are made available.

In the case of Greece, would the knowable facts show a serious problem or a minor bump in the road?

A Guardian column neatly summarizes the instability caused by the financial market's not having access to all the readily knowable facts.
Greeks rioted , the country's prime minister offered to resign and the yield on Greek two-year sovereign bonds hit 28%. Meanwhile, the Dow Jones industrial average fell 190 points at one stage. Markets are carrying a simple message: we fear politicians and policymakers are losing control of the plot. The long-feared "Lehman moment" – an uncontrolled debt default by Greece, with the impact being felt across the eurozone banking system – suddenly seems a horrible possibility. 
Investors' worries are understandable. The past month has seen the European Central Bank and eurozone politicians squabble over the design of the next bailout package for Athens. Private sector investors must share some pain, says German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, if German taxpayers' money is to be dispatched. Unacceptable, says the ECB, we cannot allow anything that looks like a debt default, it would be too dangerous. 
That squabble over the design of a bailout that wasn't meant to be necessary (Greece was supposed to be borrowing in the market by now, according to last year's plan A) suddenly looks a sideshow. If Greece doesn't have an effective government capable of imposing the austerity measures demanded by its lenders, the game is close to up. 
A unity administration in Athens might allow bailout talks to resume, but by then investors might have zero faith that the next package of loans could succeed where the last one failed. More austerity, even if the Greeks could be coerced into accepting more pay cuts and more state sell-offs, might simply damage the economy further. 
Default, then, seems to be looming one way or another. The best policy would be to try control the damage by ensuring the impact of the rest of the eurozone banking system is as soft as possible. That assumes, of course, that damage-control is still an option. The point of no return is fast approaching.