Tuesday, August 23, 2011

UK MP demands that banks reveal exposure to sovereign debt

According to an article in the Telegraph, Andrew Tyrie, the chairman of the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee is demanding that banks reveal their exposure to sovereign debt to the Bank of England.

As regular readers know, the Bank of England is only one of the market participants that needs this information.  The rest of the market participants need this information if they are to properly assess the riskiness of banks in the UK.
Concern about sovereign debt has been at the heart of the past fortnight’s market volatility, which has seen share prices in UK banks collapse in scenes reminiscent of the financial crisis of 2008. The Royal Bank of Scotland lost 20.7pc of its value in the past week, closing at 21p on Friday night, a price not seen since early 2009. 
Mr Tyrie, the Conservative MP for Chichester who has been at the forefront of lobbying for change in the way the financial services industry is regulated, said he will speak to the Bank about the role of the fledgling Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) in this area. 
The PRA, which will take on macro financial regulation once the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is disbanded at the end of next year, is expected to take a more robust approach to regulation once it is formed. 
Speaking this weekend, Mr Tyrie said: “Most people are agreed in many respects we have had a burdensome but relatively ineffective form of regulation in this field. There’s a lot that needs to be done to put it right.” 
He went on to question the FSA's style of regulation, adding: "Smart regulation has to replace box ticking."
True and the first step in smart regulation is disclosure of the current asset and liability-level data for each financial institution.

This disclosure allows the regulators to enlist both the analytical ability and discipline of the markets.
 Mr Tyrie believes that major banks should be disclosing not just sovereign debt but other data which may pose a risk to the system.
Although he is aware that not everything can be disclosed, for competitive reasons, regulators and the banking industry should come to a flexible agreement on what constitutes a risk and what investors and authorities need to know.
Actually, there is very little that should not be disclosed (primarily, this falls into the category of preserving the privacy of individuals).  Everything else should be disclosed.

Opacity has its price even when practiced by central banks

In an interesting WSJ Heard on the Street column, Carrick Mollenkamp discusses the cost of opacity as it applies to the global banking system from the various programs the central banks have and are implementing to bail-out individual banks.

He provides further confirmation that regulators create stress in the financial system.
Central-bank support got the world's banks through the 2008 crisis. But secrecy around the recipients of such largess make it a double-edged sword that can create, as well as reduce, stress in the system.
If a bank seeks aid, it is a scarlet letter and may bring on a full-blown panic in that institution. Yet as the financial crisis showed, secrecy carries its own cost. If investors know an institution is under the gun, but can't tell who it is, that can undermine confidence in all firms. 
Please re-read the previous highlighted sentences as they summarize a point that this blog has made repeatedly.

Opacity creates systemic problems.  It transforms a financial problem from being firm specific to being a global problem.
The latest example: the Federal Reserve's dollar-swap program. This injects dollars into the global bank market via currency swaps with other central banks and is intended to prevent foreign banks from running out of greenbacks. 
In late June, the Fed extended the emergency-lending program with the central banks of England, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the European Central Bank. This month, banks tapped the program, picking up $500 million through the ECB and $200 million through the Swiss National Bank. 
This unnerved investors, who were left wondering who might face a dollar shortage. Was a big bank in trouble? Maybe it was the Geneva office of a French private bank simply in need of dollars? The worries became so severe that Switzerland's biggest banks, UBS and Credit Suisse Group, both were forced last week to deny they needed the $200 million.
Meanwhile, the central banks involved are staying mum, fueling investors' guessing game. 
Clearly, there is no easy way out of this central-banking quandary.
Actually, there is an easy way out of this quandary.  That way is to have all financial institutions disclosing their current asset and liability-level data.

If this disclosure were available, market participants would not have to guess who is borrowing.  They would know.  More importantly, they would know if the bank that was borrowing was solvent or not.

Bank shares dive as funding disappears due to questions about solvency

In his latest article, Harry Wilson at the Telegraph continues to document the ongoing run on the European banks.

Regular readers know that the cause of this bank run is investors asking the question:  which banks are solvent and which banks are not.  Due to the lack of disclosure of current asset and liability-level data, market participants are unable to answer this question.  As a result, the prudent step is to reduce the amount of exposure to all banks.

The falls [in UK bank stock prices] came as investors continued to worry about funding conditions for European banks, with shares in several major French, German and Italian banks closing at new lows despite the imposition more than a week ago of short-selling bans on financial sector companies. 
Concerns at the outlook for European banks were stoked further by Fitch Ratings releasing figures on Monday showing the increased difficulty lenders are having borrowing from US money market funds, one of the largest lenders to the industry. 
At the end of June, more than half of all the borrowing provided to French banks by money market funds was for in excess of 61 days, but by the end of last month this had fallen to about a third of the total. More alarmingly, Fitch said money market funds had almost closed their borrowing to Spanish and Italian banks. 
The withdrawal mirrors difficulties faced by Portuguese and Irish banks in the first half of last year as they became increasingly dependent on the European Central Bank of short-term funding. 
In total, the 10 US money market funds tracked by Fitch have cut their outstanding borrowing to European companies by about $100bn (£60.7bn) in the past two months to $658bn. 
"Money market funds are highly risk averse and what we are seeing could be a sign of them showing concerns on some credits," said Fitch analyst Robert Grossman. 
In Switzerland the Swiss National Bank was again forced to intervene in the currency markets to hold down the rise of the franc, which fell slightly against the euro. 

Bank of America's falling stock price shows why current asset and liability-level disclosure is needed

Yves Smith had a terrific post on NakedCapitalism today on Bank of America.  I would like to focus on the portion of the post that lays out why market participants need to be able to analyze a bank's current asset and liability-level data.

Bank of America's balance sheet is a black box.  As Yves points out, look at all the potential problem areas where market participants are forced to guess what is going on.

It is no surprise to regular readers that investor confidence in Bank of America is rapidly declining.  This is a direct result of the lack of disclosure.

... But that isn’t the most helpful way to frame the issue.
Think about it. BofA has $215 billion in book value of common equity. $40 to $50 billion is a huge number relative to that. For investors to react suddenly to one firm’s view (what, you own the stock and this is news to you?) points to something much more fundamental.
We are now seeing the downside to extend and pretend. Years of regulatory forbearance mean that investors know the marks on the balance sheet of a beast like Bank of America (and frankly all the other big banks) have a ton of air in them. And now that the economy is looking seriously wobbly and the odds of son of Credit Anstalt are well above zero, it means big banks are at real risk of getting seriously whacked in a major stress event. Worse, with Dodd Frank (supposedly) barring bailouts and Tea Partiers on an anti-bank, anti-Fed, anti-spending warpath, it might not be so easy for the authorities to rescue a big bank if a run started (not that I’m advocating a rescue, mind you, I’m looking at this from the vantage of a bank shareholder). [emphasis added as this applies equally well in Europe as it does to BoA]
Steve Waldman set forth the basic issue in a very important post last year:
Bank capital cannot be measured. Think about that until you really get it. “Large complex financial institutions” report leverage ratios and “tier one” capital and all kinds of aromatic stuff. But those numbers are meaningless. For any large complex financial institution levered at the House-proposed limit of 15×, a reasonable confidence interval surrounding its estimate of bank capital would be greater than 100% of the reported value. In English, we cannot distinguish “well capitalized” from insolvent banks, even in good times, and regardless of their formal statements.
Now normally, investors accept the unknowability of bank equity because they have some faith in the system. Does anyone have any confidence in the system now? Financial regulators have shown themselves to be incompetent and/or badly captured by banks. Earth to base: letting off bank management easy is bad for investors in the long run. Being an investor in an overly risky bank looks swell until it suddenly isn’t.
Look at how the officialdom blew the bank stress tests. The sole purpose of that exercise was to goose bank stock prices so they could afford to raise new capital and rebuild their balance sheets affordably. What happened instead? Treasury let the banks sell pretty small amounts of stock and allowed them to “pay off the TARP.” Huh? The economic motivation for that was solely to escape pretty minimal restrictions on executive pay. And to compound the error, banks (BofA being one of the few exceptions) were allowed to resume paying dividends.
It is pretty easy to construct a list things to doubt on Bank of America’s balance sheet. Here are a few:
Second liens. Net of reserves, they are about $80 billion. That should probably be written down by 60%. That gets you to $48 billion, conveniently in range with the capital raise number bandied about today.
Commercial real estate loans. $182 billion, per the bank’s latest Y9. Probably at least some modest impairment there.
Goodwill. $78 billion. Countrywide has been written off, but Ken Lewis loved overpaying. The bank made a botch of its acquisition of US Trust, and given that it is rumored to be unable to ditch Merrill, query whether any goodwill booked in connection with Merrill is worth anything now. Some it not a fair bit of this number is probably vapor-y.
European exposures. Ooh, this is fun. No number here per se. Moynihan was asked in the seriously misbilled “we’ll take tough questions” conference call. He said BofA had $17 billion of European sovereign exposures and claimed it was hedged.
First, hedges of sovereign risk are wrong way hedges. The AIG credit default swaps against CDOs were classic wrong way hedges. An event that will lead you to put in an insurance claim is very likely to kill the insurer, which means your hedge is no good.
Second, sovereign exposures aren’ t likely to be the biggest risk BofA faces in Europe. What about its European bank exposures?
Notice how this list looks pretty bad and we haven’t even gotten to mortgage litigation losses. Not to worry, those are years away.
More immediate is what might happen to other exposures, particularly derivatives positions, in a market stress event. The poster child was Lehman. Pre-crisis, analysts focused on the asset side of its balance sheet. But the black hole in Lehman’s balance sheet has proven to be way beyond anything that could be attributed to either the asset side items that everyone had been watching or the “disorderly collapse”. While the derivatives counterparties grabbed collateral (as they are permitted to do), the bankruptcy judge can and has been contesting cases where the other side looked like it took more than it was entitled to. The open question is whether this sort of blowout was specific to Lehman (and the terrible mess in its derivatives books) or whether this is a more generalized phenomenon when a big trading firm crosses over the finance equivalent of an event horizon.
The point is that there is objectively a lot not to like about Bank of America. And now that investors have decided to start thinking critically, as opposed to blindly accepting bank equity as the faith-based paper that it is, one shouldn’t be surprised that they are getting cold feet. And the fact that the authorities have undermined the limited value of bank balance sheets via allowing all sorts of rosy accounting treatments is a self inflicted wound.

Thursday, August 18, 2011

I will be traveling until August 22nd, so posts will be infrequent

As regulators gamble with financial stability, fears grow in Europe that banks need cash

Four years after the start of the solvency crisis, regulators are still gambling with financial stability by not requiring that banks disclose their current asset and liability-level data.

It is inexcusable that market participants should be guessing about the health of the banks when the information technology exists to provide them with access to all the facts.  By not making the facts available, regulators are creating uncertainty and financial instability.

What makes it even more inexcusable is that investors are asking for the granular level data.  As a NY Times article reports,
The European banking system is showing signs of a cash crunch, analysts say, but a lack of clear data may be exaggerating the gravity of the problem, sowing mistrust among banks and making them reluctant to lend to each other as well as businesses and consumers. 
Bank shares led a renewed plunge by global stocks Thursday, as tentative signs of stress in the interbank market caused investors to assume the worst. 
There was particular alarm after a single bank, out of nearly 8,000 in the euro zone, took advantage of a European Central Bankprogram that ensures institutions have ample access to dollars. The bank, which the E.C.B. declined to identify, borrowed $500 million on Wednesday, a relatively modest sum. 
But it was the first time any bank had tapped the E.C.B. dollar pipeline since February. A shortage of dollar financing for European banks was one of the more alarming features of the financial crisis in 2008. 
European shares tumbled Thursday, with the main stock index in France down 5.5 percent and the major German index off 5.8 percent. On Wall Street, the major indicators were down 4 percent or more in midafternoon trading, with the Dow Jones industrial average falling more than 450 points. In the sell-off of stocks, money poured into gold and U.S. Treasury securities. 
The market reaction highlighted how skittish investors are in the absence of comprehensive information about the banking system. While there are statistics to tell economists whether industrial output and unemployment are going up or down, there is no instrument on the financial dashboard that clearly signals when banks are having trouble meeting their daily cash needs by borrowing from each other. 
“We don’t have the basic data,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research organization in Brussels. “We need more granular information about liquidity conditions and conditions on the interbank market.” 
The lack of certainty makes bank executives fearful that other banks might be bad risks. Banks worry that they may have trouble borrowing themselves. So at times they may stop lending and hoard cash — which in 2008 contributed to a sharp recession, and which may be at work now. 
Investors are clearly unsettled. Banks like Société Générale in France and Barclays in Britain were among the biggest losers Thursday. 
“If you look at how bank share prices are doing, there is a concern in the market,” said Nick Matthews, senior European economist in London for Royal Bank of Scotland. “There is so much nervousness, it is one of these situations where there is scope for sentiment to be self-fulfilling.” 
“Currently many banks cannot access term funding markets at reasonable rates,” analysts at Morgan Stanley wrote in a note. “As a result, commercial banks continue to tighten their credit conditions, albeit marginally, to both their corporate and retail clients. If these term funding stresses continue well into the fall, the risks are rising that a lack of credit availability could dent domestic demand growth further.” 
Many analysts counseled calm, however, saying that while there was clearly stress in the market it was still far below 2008 levels. “There is undoubtedly some tension around,” said Jon Peace, a banking analyst in London for Nomura. But, he added, “I think the market is still overreacting to this funding issue.” 
They also point to big differences between now and 2008. Banks have more capital in reserve, they are less reliant on short-term financing, and policy makers have more practice dealing with financial emergencies. 
But Viral V. Acharya, a professor of economics at the Stern School of Business at New York University, notes an unsettling parallel. Then, as now, a damaged asset was spread widely through the banking system. In 2008 it was securities tied to subprime mortgage loans. Now it is sovereign debt. 
Because government debt was once thought to be almost risk free, banks did not set aside reserves in case of losses and were not required to by regulators. 
“This has been an asset considered too safe to fail,” Mr. Acharya said. “If your safest asset is going to take even a 1 percent or 2 percent haircut, and you have not been holding any capital, a lot of other asset classes will come under stress.” 
There are numerous indicators that analysts watch for signs of interbank stress, but they are ambiguous or open to interpretation. Investors closely watch how much banks borrow from the E.C.B., which can be a sign that they are unable to borrow from their peers at reasonable rates. It is no secret that most banks in Greece would collapse without access to E.C.B. loans. 
This week, 139 banks took out seven-day loans for €148 billion, or $212 billion, at the benchmark interest rate of 1.5 percent. That is more weekly borrowing than earlier this year but less than during July. But the borrowing figures can be misleading. If money market rates are higher than the E.C.B. rate of 1.5 percent, as they were last week, healthy banks may take advantage of easy money from the central bank to lend it out at a higher rate. The arbitrage inflates the level of borrowing. 
Perhaps the most closely watched indicator of bank stress is the so-called Libor-OIS spread and its close cousin, the Euribor-OIS spread. Both measure the difference between short-term money market rates, typically for three months, and overnight lending. 
“In a crisis, spreads widen because no one wants to lend long term,” said Mr. Acharya, who has studied the interbank market. 
On Thursday the spread was up 60 percent from the beginning of August, according to Bloomberg data, but still sharply lower than in October 2008, shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers brought interbank lending practically to a standstill. 
Nomura analysts argue that, unlike in earlier periods of stress, the spread is not as worrisome because it is not higher money market rates — the top part of the spread — that are rising, but because of lower rates for overnight lending — the floor of the spread. They have fallen because of actions by central banks to ensure that banks have enough cash, Nomura analysts said. 
But there are also good reasons to worry about what is going on in the banking industry. 
Official data this week showed that economic growth in the euro zone had slowed almost to a standstill. Slower growth may lead to an increase in the number of businesses and consumers who cannot repay their bank loans, which could do severe damage to the health of many banks. 
The E.C.B. this month acknowledged stress in the interbank market, deciding to make additional cash available by offering unlimited six-month loans to banks, which must provide collateral. 
The E.C.B. does not disclose what indicators it watches to determine when banks need extra help. It is in constant touch with banks in the euro zone, and has information that is not available to markets, including the volume of interbank lending. 
Many analysts took it as a positive sign that the E.C.B., which had been slowly withdrawing its low-cost loans to banks, reversed course at the first sign of trouble. “The E.C.B. is around to provide the funding if needed,” Mr. Peace of Nomura said.

Yields on 10 year US Treasury bonds trade fall below 2% further confirming solvency crisis

As investors flee European banks and soon, through the obvious channel of contagion, UK and US banks, yields on 10 year US Treasury bonds fell to an all time record low today.

For four years, we have had a solvency crisis and not a liquidity crisis.

Unfortunately, for four years, policy makers have chosen to act as if we have a liquidity crisis.

For four years, central banks have pumped massive amounts of liquidity into the global financial system. For four years, fiscal authorities have run stimulus programs.  For those four expensively purchased years, bank regulators engaged in extend and pretend rather than adopt current asset and liability-level disclosure and end the risk of the solvency crisis re-emerging.

Now, the solvency crisis has re-emerged.


Investors are once again asking the question of banks who is solvent and who is insolvent.  With the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus, investors are once again asking the question of where is economic growth going to come from.

As stated in an earlier post, when investors start asking these questions, they become like Mark Twain - more concerned with the return OF their capital than the return ON their capital.


For confirmation of this, a Bloomberg article on the on-going stock market meltdown and US treasury market melt-up.
U.S. stocks tumbled amid growing concern the economy is slowing and speculation that European banks lack enough capital, while hopes for more stimulus from the Federal Reserve receded. 
Bank of America Corp. (BAC) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) dropped more than 4.6 percent as Sweden’s financial regulator said his country’s lenders must do more to prepare for a worsening in Europe’s debt crisis that could cut off funding.  
The bank solvency crisis morphing back into frozen funding markets.
Caterpillar Inc. (CAT) sank 5.6 percent, pacing losses in companies most-tied to economic growth, as jobless claims rose, consumer inflation accelerated more than forecast and the Philadelphia-area manufacturing index fell to the lowest level since March 2009. 
The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index slumped 4.1 percent to 1,145.07 at 10:29 a.m. in New York. All 10 groups in the S&P 500 dropped at least 1.8 percent. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 438.62 points, or 3.8 percent, to 10,971.59. Treasuries rallied, pushing 10-year yields to a record low. 
“It’s almost like a worldwide buyers strike,” Michael Mullaney, who helps manage $9.5 billion at Fiduciary Trust in Boston, said in a telephone interview. “There’s a continued general malaise on global economic activity. People continue to downgrade their expectations on growth on a worldwide basis. There’s concern about funding problems. That’s making us very nervous here and as such we want to take risk out of portfolios at least for the immediate future."

Not only is disclosure effective, it is also has a fantastic cost/benefit ratio

The Dealbook section of the NY Times carried an article on how Wall Street is attacking the regulations issued under Dodd-Frank by focusing on the cost of compliance and comparing it to the benefits of the regulation.

As discussed in an earlier post, Thank You Andy Haldane, the cost/benefit analysis for fully implementing the FDR Framework for all financial institutions and structured finance products goes as follows:


Your humble blogger would like to thank Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England for putting a value on asset-level transparency for both financial institutions and the products they produce.

As discussed on NakedCapitalism,
In a March 2010 paper, he compared the banking industry to the auto industry, in that they both produced pollutants: for cars, exhaust fumes; for bank, systemic risk. While economists were claiming that the losses to the US government on various rescues would be $100 billion ([Yves Smith] ahem, must have left out Freddie and Fannie in that tally), it ignores the broader costs (unemployment, business failures, reduced government services, particularly at the state and municipal level). His calculation of the world wide costs:
….these losses are multiples of the static costs, lying anywhere between one and five times annual GDP. Put in money terms, that is an output loss equivalent to between $60 trillion and $200 trillion for the world economy and between £1.8 trillion and £7.4 trillion for the UK. 
Yves Smith then goes on to relate the cost of systemic risk to transparency.
... opacity, leverage, and moral hazard are not accidental byproducts of otherwise salutary innovations; they are the direct intent of the [financial firms'] innovations. No one was at the major capital markets firms was celebrated for creating markets to connect borrowers and savers transparently and with low risk. After all, efficient markets produce minimal profits. They were instead rewarded for making sure no one, the regulators, the press, the community at large, could see and understand what they were doing.
As laid out in the FDR framework,  the government's role in the financial markets is to insure transparency and not to endorse specific investments.

Clearly the financial industry will balk at the cost of providing investors access to all useful, relevant asset-level information in an appropriate, timely manner.  However, this cost is orders of magnitude less than the cost of not having transparency quantified by Andrew Haldane.  As a result, there is no legitimate reason remaining for governments not to require asset-level data for both financial institutions and the products they produce.

In summary, the cost of providing current asset and liability-level data is measured in billions and the benefits to society are measured in trillions.

As the Dealbook article says,


Until now, Wall Street relied largely on an army of lobbyists to chisel away at 300 new rules flowing from the S.E.C. and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, among other agencies. But while lobbying might yield the occasional loophole, judicial rulings can halt new rules altogether. 
“I would hope the agencies are taking to heart the potential consequences for Dodd-Frank rules,” said Eugene Scalia, the lawyer who won the proxy case on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce. 
Hal S. Scott, a professor at Harvard Law School and a director of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, a research group that has been a critic of Dodd-Frank, said, “I do see lots of challenges coming down the pike.” 
Regulators, reluctant to give in to industry pressure, are rushing to safeguard their rules from legal action. The commodity commission, having already delayed several Dodd-Frank rules for six months, is now studying the proxy case and considering adjustments to some proposed regulations, according to a person close to the agency. Earlier this month, the agency dispatched several staff members to meet with S.E.C. officials about the recent court decision. 
For its part, the S.E.C. is weighing an appeal of the proxy ruling. The S.E.C. is also adding economists, planning to hire eight over the next two years, after the appeals court rebuked the agency for not fully evaluating the proxy rule’s economic effects. 
The legal challenges are rooted in a 1996 law that requires the S.E.C. to promote “efficiency, competition and capital formation.” The law enabled the financial industry to build lawsuits around the economic costs of a rule, regardless of its merits.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

The Looting of the Irish and its implications for Greece

It would be understandable if the Greeks did not want to repeat the Irish experience of selling their assets for a fraction of their value.  Particularly, because this blog has already laid out exactly how the opaque auctions run by Wall Street result in the seller receiving less than the fair value of their assets.

As reported in an article in the Independent, the Irish bank Anglo will not generate the sale price it was hoping for from selling its US loan-book.

Think of the size of the discount we are talking.

The first discount from fair value occurs when Wall Street sets the expectation for what they think the assets can be sold for.  Naturally, because Wall Street makes a very large fee if a transaction occurs, this price is set as low as possible consistent with getting the mandate to sell the assets.

The second discount from fair value occurs when, in conducting its opaque auction, Wall Street seizes on current events to explain why the bids from investors who require at least a 20% return on their investment came in lower than expected.

Both of these discounts could be eliminated by full disclosure to all market participants before the auction.  This disclosure will result in independent analysts assessing the value of the assets for sale.  This is the value for the assets that Wall Street should have to meet or exceed to get its fee.

Without this independent valuation, any seller, be it Irish or Greek, is going to receive much less than fair value for their assets.
AS many as 25 investment groups, including some of the biggest names in finance, have reportedly lodged bids to buy parts of Anglo's $9.5bn (€6.6bn) US loan portfolio. 
But US publications have suggested that Anglo may get as little as $7bn from the sale, significantly below the $7.5bn to $8bn the bank had been hoping for earlier in the year. 
Note the lack of an independent market valuation.
The news comes after Tuesday night's deadline for first-round bids on the portfolio of 248 commercial loans stretching from Manhattan to Boston to Florida. 
The bids were lodged amid massive uncertainty in the US, as the country contemplated the economic impact of its first ever ratings agency downgrade. 
As well as depressing prices, the crisis has put buyers' ability to fund their offers into sharp focus, and financing will be a key factor in determining who will go through to the second round. 
The excuse for why the price is lower than the seller hoped for.
Anglo has already ruled out taking any role in funding a bidder, a view the bank still holds despite recent market events, sources confirmed. 
Bidders for the book are believed to include Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Lone Star Funds, TPG Capital and Blackstone Group. 
Most bidders are acting in consortium and only bidding for a section of the loan book, meaning the most likely outcome is that the book will be sold off in tranches....
The bank's official deadline is to sell the US assets by December 31, but management is working towards doing a deal by the end of the third quarter. 


Accountants call for timely disclosure

A Reuter's article highlighted how accounting experts are frustrated with the frequency of disclosure and are pushing for more timely disclosure.  Regular readers will find their argument for daily disclosure very familiar.
Author and lawyer Michael Young jokes about the days when it took more time to get some companies' financial statements than it did for Columbus to discover America. 
Alas, those days are still here. 
In an age of lightning-fast stock trades and instant communications, yearly and quarterly financial reports seem stuck on an industrial-era pace that some say was obsolete decades ago. 
"Financial reporting technology allows all sorts of possibilities about which we could not even fantasize back in the Great Depression when our periodic system was put in place," said Young, a partner at law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher. 
Young and other accounting experts have long called for a move to real-time, online reports in lieu of quarterly earnings statements that investors now use to decide whether to buy stocks. 
An example of the the information that could be reported for financial institutions are their current assets and liability-level data.
Cheap computing power has made real-time reports more technically feasible, but advocates still struggle to draw wide support for the idea....
"Almost any company with rational management tracks its performance daily and makes critical business decisions on the basis of data and trends that should be distilled and published for public consumption," said Harvey Pitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
This is particularly true of financial institutions.  
... Free, open-source software has allowed even much smaller companies to construct dashboard-like digital displays that continuously track sales, orders and other key figures. 
That kind of data could help make the stock market much more transparent, said Paul Miller, a University of Colorado accounting professor. 
"If I'm an investor, why can't I go on the Web and see what the Wal-Mart sales are today?" Miller asked. 
Instead, investors have to wait to find out what happened months ago. 
"It's a constant state of incomplete information and the consequence of that incompleteness is discounted stock prices, which means a higher cost of capital," he added. 
For financial institutions, the consequence of incompleteness is no one knows who is solvent and who is not solvent.
... Eventually, some companies may embrace real-time disclosures to build more trust in the capital markets, said W. David Stephenson, a homeland security expert and author of Data Dynamite, a book about data sharing. 
"I do think that quarterly reporting is going to become an artifact at some point and that it's going to start with some companies -- maybe banks -- that have a particular credibility problem," he said. 
Please reread Mr. Stephenson's quote as he makes the point that more and better disclosure is directly related to more and better credibility in the capital markets.
..."It would obviously be a headache for investors to try to process financial information on a daily basis, but what a real-time system would allow investors to do is step back and say to themselves: 'What period of analysis for this particular company makes sense?'" said Young, the lawyer at Willkie Farr. 
Actually, it is not difficult for investors to try to process financial information on a daily basis.  They do this all the time - think security prices.

More importantly, investors would let their computers do the processing (computers do not get a headache) and highlight the information that is relevant for the investor to look at.
More real-time reporting might also result in smaller gyrations in a company's share price because investors could adjust their expectations each day, he said. 
This is another critical point.  With daily reporting, markets can adjust over time and not in a short time period.