Tuesday, October 25, 2011

Contagion: A Wall Street term to remind regulators that they do not know what is going on

The Independent ran an interesting column discussing the fact that no simple deal can save Greece.  What made the column interesting is its explanation for why Greece had to be saved.

Contagion.

As described by Wall Street, contagion occurs when banks are required to recognize losses.  Once banks are forced to recognize their losses, there is a risk of a loss of confidence in these banks and that, like a disease, this loss of confidence will spread to other presumably healthy banks.

In short, contagion is Wall Street's term for reminding regulators that they do not know what is going on in the banking system.

Previously, this blog described the immunization against contagion.  This immunization was implementation of the FDR Framework.

Under the FDR Framework, governments ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information they need to make a fully informed decision.  Market participants, since they are responsible for all gains and losses under the principle of caveat emptor, have an incentive to use this data to assess the risk of any exposure.

It is the principle of caveat emptor that immunizes against contagion.  Since each market participant is responsible for the gains and losses on their exposures, they have an incentive not to take on any exposure that is bigger than they can afford to lose.

For banks who have to disclose their current detailed asset and liability information, market discipline acts to enforce adherence to not taking on any exposures greater then they can afford to lose.  Each bank has an incentive to limit its exposures to other banks to only those banks that limit their exposure to what they can afford to lose.

THE eurozone debt crisis rumbles on. To be more accurate the current impasse is the Greek debt crisis but the key issue is what impact the Greek default will have on the rest of the eurozone. 
Greece is going to default. What is needed is not another part-attempt at a resolution of the problem but a realisation that the Greek government cannot repay it’s debts....
The problem the ongoing EU summits are trying to address is to minimise the fallout when it is finally accepted that Greece cannot pay backs its creditors.... 
It is now accepted that Greece will also require at least a 60pc write down on its government debt. It is estimated that the losses that will be imposed on other European banks will be as high as €100bn. 
The sticking point in the current EU negotiations is where are the banks going to get the money to cover these losses .... The funds will have to be provided to cover the losses as many of these banks are retail banks that have huge connections with the real economy. These banks have billions on deposit from savers and also owe substantial sums to their own bondholders.
While it is reasonable to expect that depositors will have their money protected, the mantra of the crisis over the past few years has been that “bank bondholders will not be burned”.  If this is to be maintained public money will once again have to be used to cover for losses in banks. 
This policy has been adopted to try to avoid contagion and a loss of confidence in the European banking system. This policy has failed. No one has confidence in the European banking system, least of all the banks themselves. 
Why should they as no one has any idea of each banks exposure to the other banks or to sovereign debt?  As this blog has repeatedly said, the only way to restore confidence is through disclosure, specifically by making each bank disclose its current detailed assets and liabilities.
Usually, there are hundreds of billions of overnight deposits moving from bank to bank as banks seek and use liquidity. In recent weeks banks have been less and less willing to deposit money with each other.
Banks are now more willing to place excess liquidity on deposit with the ECB at very low rates, rather than earn a better return by lending the money to other banks. There have been occasions where the ECB has received nearly €250 billion of overnight deposits. This is the money that should be providing liquidity to the European banking system but doubts about the strength of all banks to handle the Greek default have meant that the money is warehoused in the ECB. 
EU leaders have to banish these doubts. At least now there is a realisation of the scale of the problem and the proposals on the table are based on realistic losses from the Greek default. 
Markets are likely to be indifferent between each solution but just want to see that something will be done.
This is an important point and needs to be re-read.

Markets are looking for a process that leads to resolution of the solvency problem at both the sovereign debt and bank level.  That is what has been proposed under the FDR Framework blueprint for saving the financial system.

Markets are not looking for a solution that just purchases a one to two year reprieve.

Mervyn King: Europe's response to solvency crisis is only going to buy year or two

According to the Telegraph live, Mervyn King sees Europe's response (a leveraged European Financial Stability Fund and 100 billion euro bank recapitalization) to the solvency crisis as only buying a year or two of breathing space as it does not address the underlying problems.

The question becomes what does Europe do with the year or two of breathing space.

Does it require the Eurozone banks to disclose the detailed information on their current assets and liabilities so that the issue of bank solvency can be addressed?

Monday, October 24, 2011

Thank you Simon Johnson for using European crisis to make the case for banks providing detailed disclosure

In case you did not see Simon Johnson's excellent post on European Debt:  The Big Picture, he focuses on what is not in the NY Times' graphic A Spectator's Guide to the Euro Crisis.

Specifically he focuses on the lack of reliable data on US bank exposures to Europe and how this lack of data forces investors to guess what should be a readily knowable fact.
But you might think also about what is not in the NYT graphic because we lack reliable information.  For example, what is the exposure of US financial institutions to European debt, directly or indirectly, through derivatives transactions of any kind? 
The opaqueness of derivative markets means that most investors can only guess at what could happen.  Most of the relevant regulators and supervisors with whom I have talked seem also to be largely in the dark – remember the experience of AIG in 2008. 
Cross-border bank exposures through loans and other holdings are publicly disclosed – data from the Bank for International Settlements are represented by the arrows in the NYT graphic.  These data are surely not perfect, but they do convey the main points and they tell you where to focus attention. 
Why do we not require publication of similar data, preferably by financial institution, for all derivative transactions – including both gross and supposedly net exposures across borders?
Why not and while we are at it why not disclose each bank's detailed asset and liability account data so we can know the true degree of exposure and interconnectedness?

Bank of England's Andy Haldane wants to overhaul bankers' pay

According to an article in the Guardian, the Bank of England's Andy Haldane would like to overhaul bankers' pay.  In particular, he would like it switched from emphasizing return on equity to emphasizing return on assets to more accurately align pay with the risks being taken by the bank.

In point of fact, should the Bank of England adopt Mr. Haldane's proposal, it would incentivize bankers to take greater risk to maintain their pay.

As George Akerlof described in his seminal article on accounting control fraud, bankers can increase return on assets in the short-run by lending to riskier borrowers.  These borrowers pay a higher rate of interest which initially boosts ROA.  Bankers would be paid on this initial boost and not the subsequent decline in earnings when the bad debt comes due.

Regular readers know that there are two simple steps to fix the problems Mr. Haldane sees with bankers' pay without requiring a change in bank compensation plans.

First, regulators must require that banks disclose their asset and liability details.

Market participants can use this data to assess the risk of the bank and to adjust both the amount of and price of their exposure to the banks.   This market discipline will act as a brake on bank risk taking.  As a result, large bonuses will have to be earned the old fashion way - through delivering high earnings at low risk.

Second, regulators need to require banks to recognize the losses on their balance sheets.  Had this been done, banks' return on equity since the beginning of the financial crisis would not have merited any bonuses for their executives.
Bankers' pay should be radically overhauled, according to one of the Bank of England's most senior policymakers, who has called for a closer link between bonuses and the risks taken by banks.
Andy Haldane, the Bank of England's executive director for financial stability, argued that if the performance of bankers had been measured against loans rather than share prices, there would have been a dramatic reduction in their pay levels in the past two decades.
Speaking in a personal capacity, he said "deep-rooted incentive problems in banking need to be tackled". 
Analysing the pay of the chief executives of the biggest seven banks in the US, Haldane reckoned that the average pay had risen tenfold from $2.8m (£1.75m) in 1989 to $26m in 2007 because it was linked to return on equity (ROE). But if it been had based on the risks their banks took in granting loans, return on assets (ROA), their pay would have risen much more slowly – from an average $2.8m to $3.4m. 
"If you believed ROE were a reliable performance metric, US bank CEOs would have had a watertight defence back in 2007. Indeed, it was the L'Oréal defence: because we're worth it. But experience since suggests this performance was cosmetic," he said. 
Haldane, who is concerned about risks in the financial system and their wider impact on society, noted the "eye-popping" implicit guarantee to the UK banking system from taxpayers of $340bn per year – or $1.3tn globally – and said that while bankers have benefited from the risks they have taken, wider society is carrying the cost. 
"In England and Wales alone, over half a million individuals and nearly 100,000 businesses have found themselves in insolvency since 2007. Internationally, a growing number of sovereign states face a similar fate. This tells us that the risks from banking have been widely spread socially. But the returns to bankers have been narrowly kept privately," said Haldane. 
"That risk/return imbalance has grown over the past century. Shareholder incentives lie at its heart. It is the ultimate irony that an asset calling itself equity could have contributed to such inequity. Righting that wrong needs investors, bankers and regulators to act on wonky risk-taking incentives at source," he said....
Haldane set out a detailed argument to measure performance against assets (loans in the case of banks) rather than equity, arguing that ROE "flattered returns, and hence compensation" during the good times because it puts risks ahead of long-term returns. 
"It would be a relatively small step for banks to switch from ROE to ROA targets in their capital planning and compensation. Yet the effects on risk-taking and remuneration could be large," he said. 
It would have contained the rise in pay for bank chief executives in the US between 1989 and 2007. "Rather than rising to 500 times median US household income, it would have fallen to around 68 times," he said.

Fed's focuses monetary policy on housing market

According to a Bloomberg article, the Fed is pursuing zero interest rate, quantitative easing, Operation Twist and other policies to support the housing market.

One of the policies that the Fed has been pursuing is extend and pretend.  By not requiring the banks the Fed supervises to write-down the value of their real estate loans, the Fed is artificially propping up house prices.

As this blog has mentioned previously, the cost of this extend and pretend policy is that banks have a hard time making loans to small businesses.  Banks are senior secured lenders and it is difficult for the banks to assess the true value of the real estate these businesses have to pledge as collateral given that extend and pretend policies might end.

As William Dudley, President of the NY Fed said,
Bolstering the housing market is “particularly important” because it’s a key factor in household wealth ... 
“Continued house price declines could lead to even more defaults, foreclosures and distress sales, undermining wealth, confidence and spending,” Dudley said in his speech. “Breaking this vicious cycle is one of the most pressing issues facing policy makers.”...
“If prospective homeowners no longer fear that prices could decline further, they will be more willing to enter the market to take advantage of reduced prices and low financing costs, and existing homeowners will feel more confident about spending,” Dudley said. 
“A vicious cycle could be replaced by a virtuous circle, in which stabilization in house prices supports spending, growth and jobs.”
Is this a case where the Fed's policies are self-defeating?

So long as the Fed is pursuing policies to artificially support the housing market, isn't that a sure sign that prices on houses are too high?

Perhaps the economy would be better off if the Fed abandon all of its policies designed to help the housing market?

I realize that abandoning these policies would require banks to realize their losses and to wipe out the accounting construct known as book equity.  However, in a financial system with deposit guarantees and where banks are required to make detailed disclosure of their assets and liabilities, this would not necessarily be a bad thing.

Apparently the Irish banking system needs more capital

Despite multiple rounds of bank recapitalizations, apparently the Irish banking system needs more capital.

According to an article in the Independent,

FINANCE Minister Michael Noonan yesterday admitted that Ireland's banks might need to raise more capital to pass a new round of European stress tests, but said they "should" have enough "headroom" to cope with new targets.

This is not exactly a ringing endorsement of the solvency of the Irish banks given that banks have passed the previous two rounds of stress tests that needed to be nationalized shortly thereafter.

What makes the next round of recapitalization particularly distasteful, is that the banks are not using the capital put in previously to broadly address the problem of over-indebted homeowners and the drag they represent on the economy.

According to an Irish Times editorial,
Extra capital [based on the last round of stress tests] was then provided – mostly by the taxpayer – to allow [the banks to] meet the losses and thus reassure prospective investors and lenders. 
The objective may have been to reassure the markets, but the Government has created an expectation that there would be mortgage debt forgiveness or at least a formal structure put in place to carry out some sort of triage on over-indebted mortgage holders, allowing them to resolve their situations and move on with their lives. 
Instead the Government has put in place a safety net for those who are going to lose their homes and left it up to the banks to resolve the wider issue. It has suggested a few mechanisms such as split mortgages, but there is no compulsion on the banks to offer these alternatives or even exhaust them before moving to enforce their security. 
The Financial Regulator gave a strong speech last Friday promising to make the banks do what is expected of them, but in truth the Government’s main contribution will be an improved insolvency process to allow you tie up the loose ends once the bank is finished with you. 
As a result of all this, the over-borrowed remain at the mercy of the banks they have helped saved. Anyone seeking to resolve their situation has no certainty as to the outcome of the process once they walk into the bank and put their hands up. 
It is likely then that the current situation will pertain where most people struggle on trying to service unsustainable mortgage debt rather than moving to put their financial affairs in order. Situations that could arguably have been resolved in six months will now play out over many years. 
The short-term winners are the banks, as they can now husband the capital injected into them by the taxpayer to deal with these losses and drip-feed it out over the next five to 10 years. 
The long-term losers are pretty much everybody, including the banks, as a very large cohort of people – the over-indebted – will continue not spending, adding to economic stagnation. 
To understand why the Government went down this road you have to assume their mind is focused on the wider economic picture. Or that they have had their mind focused on it for them by the EU and IMF. 
In very simple terms it’s more important for the Government to have strong banks right now than try to lever economic growth through some sort of resolution of the mortgage debt issue. 
If and when Greece defaults the shockwave will run through the European banking system. A repeat of the credit crunch that followed the collapse of Lehman’s is not inconceivable. 
Many countries may be forced to step in and rescue banks, with consequences for their own fiscal positions and credit ratings. 
Ireland to a certain extent is ahead of the curve, having comprehensively recapitalised its banking system. This, plus the banks’ low direct exposure to Greece, should insulate Ireland from this aspect of the catastrophe should it happen.
Except of course that the additional capital was not enough...

Sunday, October 23, 2011

By focusing on bank capital, European policymakers lose sight that market only cares about bank solvency

Financial markets can live with banks that are solvent.  Financial markets cannot live with banks that have book capital and are insolvent (see Lehman Brothers for an example).

But don't take my word for it, take the word of the individual who wrote the handbook for how central banks should operate.  Walter Bagehot observed over a century ago - "a well-run bank needs no capital.  No amount of capital will rescue a badly run bank."

European policymakers appear to have lost sight of this fact.

Collapse of Dexia points to global risks

As a NY Times article by Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story points out, Europe is on the verge of replaying the failed policies of 2008-2009.  Specifically, public money is being used to bailout Dexia's creditors.

Once again governments are taking action based on the fear of contagion and the idea that "losses" will bring down the banking and financial system.

There is only one cure for contagion:  disclosure of each bank's current detailed assets and liabilities.

The fact that three years have passed since AIG and a global data warehouse has not been set up to cure contagion is simply disgraceful.  There is no excuse for not having done so!

This is a classic example of how the global financial regulators create financial instability at huge cost to taxpayers.
Among Dexia’s biggest trading partners are several large United States institutions, including Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, according to two people with direct knowledge of the matter. 
To limit damage from Dexia’s collapse, the bailout fashioned by the French and Belgian governments may make these banks and other creditors whole — that is, paid in full for potentially tens of billions of euros they are owed. This would enable Dexia’s creditors and trading partners to avoid losses they might otherwise suffer without the taxpayer rescue. 
Whether this sets a precedent if Europe needs to bail out other banks will be closely watched. 
The debate centers on how much of a burden taxpayers should bear to support banks that made ill-advised loans or trades. 
Many on Wall Street and in government argue that rescues are essential, to avoid the risk of destabilizing the financial system — with one bank’s failure to pay its obligations leading to problems at other banks. 
But others counter that the rescue of Dexia is reminiscent of the United States’ decision to fully protect big banks that were the trading partners of the American International Group when it collapsed, a decision that was sharply questioned and examined by Congress. 
Critics warn of a replay of the financial crisis in autumn 2008, when governments used taxpayer money to shore up troubled companies, then allowed them to transfer those funds to their trading partners to protect those institutions from losses. I 
n using public money to rescue private institutions, these critics say, policy makers effectively rewarded banks that traded with companies that were in trouble, rather than penalizing them, and that encouraged risky behavior. 
“The question is did the A.I.G. experience and the bailouts generally contribute to the current situation?” asked Jonathan Koppell, director of the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University. Would the banks, he continued, “have had a different view in dealing with Greece — or with Dexia for that matter — if those who had dealt with A.I.G. hadn’t been made whole?” 
Given the global and interconnected nature of the financial system, institutions around the world have other types of indirect risk to European debt problems. But the scope of these ties is not fully known, because the exposure is hidden by complex transactions that do not have to be reported in detail.

Saturday, October 22, 2011

IMF threat to not lend Greece more money is opportunity for Europe

According to an article in the Telegraph, the IMF is telling the European financial ministers that it will not continue to lend to Greece.

If this is true, it is extraordinarily good news as it presents the EU with the opportunity to truly address the sovereign debt and bank solvency issues.

In 2008-2009, like the US and UK, the EU elected to bailout its banking system.  The result was to change a bank solvency issue into a sovereign debt crisis.

Now, in 2011, the EU has the chance to lead the way and break from the failed policies of 2008-2009.

The time has come to force banks to recognize their losses.

Policymakers have to understand that banks recognizing losses is the safety valve in the financial system.  It is not recognizing the losses that is a primary driver of the sovereign debt crisis.  

Recognizing accounting losses will not cause the financial system to collapse.

Depositors will not run - they are covered by deposit insurance.  This deposit insurance can be enhanced by using the European Financial Stability Fund as an additional guarantor.  There is the European Central Bank to insure liquidity.

Banks can continue to originate loans that can be funded either through securities like covered bonds or by selling the loans to investors like pension funds, insurance companies and hedge funds.

Access to credit will actually be enhanced for small businesses.  Policymakers under appreciate the role that real estate plays in these loans.  Banks are senior secured lenders.  For most small businesses, the security they have to pledge is real estate.

When a real estate bubble bursts, the problem for bankers is to estimate the value of the real estate.  Not requiring the banks to write down the real estate related loans on their balance sheets prolongs the period of time in which bankers are uncertain as to the value of the real estate and thus the collateral being pledged.  It is this uncertainty that limits small businesses access to credit.

The EU should recognize the opportunity the IMF threat represents and fully utilize the safety valve that banks recognizing losses represents.

Its hard to fix the European financial system when bank lobbyists are invited to the summit

According to a Bloomberg article, as the European finance ministers debate how to solve the sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis the banking industry lobby is present at the summit.

How ridiculous is that?

Do any of these finance ministers expect the industry lobbyists or the European equivalent of Wall Street investment bankers to actually recommend a solution that does not benefit the industry?

Do any of these finance ministers actually understand that Wall Street is set up to make money if the ministers adopt their self-serving suggestions or to make money by saying the sky is falling if the ministers do not adopt these suggestions?

When I first proposed the FDR Framework's blueprint for saving the financial system, I realized it was an uphill fight to get it implemented even though the mainstream media had finally discovered the link between disclosure and trust/confidence.

Even though the banks have their lobbyists present and Wall Street is also well represented, I still expect the EU finance ministers to realize that all they are seeing is variations of failed ideas.  The EU finance ministers know these ideas failed before because they previously implemented them and turned a bank solvency crisis into a sovereign debt crisis.

I expect the EU finance ministers to listen to the UK's George Osborne's call to end "sticky plaster" short-term solutions.

When that occurs, the EU finance ministers will recognize that US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is right.  They do have the ability to solve the problem themselves.

They can simply apply what Walter Bagehot recognized in 1883.  "A well-run bank needs no capital.  No amount of capital will rescue a badly run bank."

The solution that common sense dictates is not to bailout banks, but rather to force the banks to become well run banks.

This requires the banks to take the losses on all the debt that the banks should not have underwritten in the first place.  This is not some option to be negotiated with the banks.  This is the country which hosts each of these banks exorcising its authority and telling the banks what they will do.

At the same time, the EFSF will guarantee all deposits at the European banks to reduce the possibility of a bank run.  Finally, the finance ministers will require that all Eurozone banks disclose their current asset and liability level data on an ongoing basis so that market participants, including regulators, can monitor these banks to be sure that they are well-run from now on.

Of course the lobbyists and investment bankers will dislike this solution, which is another reason to believe that it is the right solution.
A 10-hour meeting in Brussels failed to yield a blueprint for banks’ role in a revamped Greek rescue as European finance ministers haggled over what they called a “credible firewall” against fallout from deeper writedowns. 
The ministers’ meeting broke up at about 7 p.m. after reaching agreement that European banks may need about 100 billion euros ($139 billion) in capital after marking their sovereign-debt holdings to market values, according to a person familiar with the discussions. This amount is needed to reach a core tier 1 capital level of 9 percent based on a European Banking Authority test, said the person, who declined to be identified because discussions are private. 
The struggle to get an accord on bank capital was just one piece of solving the two-year-old financial crisis. Governments also are pushing for deeper writedowns on banks’ holdings of Greek debt, a step the investors are resisting. 
“Discussions are making progress, albeit limited,” Charles Dallara, managing director of the Institute of International Finance, the umbrella group for 450 of the world’s biggest financial companies, said in a statement late today. 
The negotiations were part of a six-day stretch of talks aimed at stopping contagion spreading to Spain and Italy as the turmoil pushes Greece closer to default, roils global markets and dents confidence in the survival of the 17-nation currency. Finance ministers now yield the conference tables after two days of talks to leaders, who meet tomorrow and on Oct. 26.