Friday, November 25, 2011

Banks and sovereigns 'inter-dependent'

The Telegraph published a column by Christine Johnson, a corporate bond fund manager for Old Mutual, that is a must read piece.

Mrs. Johnson cuts straight to the heart of the problem in the financial markets when she observes

But the reality is that the Santander deal is emblematic of a much wider – and in my view permanent – disruption to fixed income markets. 
Banks are now clients of state. States own bank equity and banks own state debt. Banks depend on the state, by way of monetary authorities, for their liquidity. 
What has developed is an intense, introverted, inter-dependent patron-client relationship. States and banks have become equivalent, and equally distressed. 
For bond investors, the outcome is brutal. Santander is not alone. Other banks are also keen to make their bond-holders offers they can’t refuse. It is being called by the euphemism ‘liability management’ but in essence it is a form of default. 
The rules that once applied are no longer relevant. Once the state is involved regulation can be re-written, as can the law. Where politics is concerned, etiquette is soon brushed aside....


The conclusion should not be hard to draw, though it is quite different to the one we are used to hearing. Neither governments nor banks are capable of providing a safe-haven in the challenging times we face. They are not the solution. They are the problem.

Over the last several months, this blog has documented how the relationship between banks, regulators and sovereigns has perpetuated the financial crisis to the detriment of investors and society.

I know I have said this before, but requiring the banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is the only way to solve the problems created by the relationship between banks, regulators and sovereigns.

Ultra transparency ends, at a minimum:

  • regulators hiding a bank's condition from the market while they try to stabilize the bank (think extend and pretend).  Instead, it substitutes market discipline with the idea being to prevent the bank from becoming a problem in the first place;
  • the focus on meaningless, highly manipulated bank book capital.  Instead, it substitutes the combination of a bank's solvency (the market value of its assets less the book value of its liabilities) with the reality that so long as depositors trust in the guarantee of their deposits, they will keep their money in the bank regardless of its solvency.  With this combination, banks can spend the next several years retaining earnings to restore their solvency; and
  • regulators, and by extension sovereigns, incurring the moral obligation to bailout investors when the regulators announce that a bank has passed a stress test.  Instead, investors know that they are responsible for all gains and losses which gives them the incentive to assess the risk of each bank independently using the data disclosed under ultra transparency.

Despite low interest rates, Irish house prices continue falling...83% in one case

The Independent reports that Irish house prices are now down 45% from their 2007 peak and continuing to fall despite a very low interest rate policy.

What makes this statistic particular worrying is that like the banks in the US, the Irish banks have not dealt with the losses in their mortgage book.  Despite the fact that the Irish banks received a significant equity infusion from the government, they have not modified these mortgages so that the borrowers can service them.

The result of not modifying the mortgages is that there continues to be downward pressure on house prices.
HOUSE prices fell last month at their fastest rate for two-and-a-half years, official figures have revealed. 
In further signs that the crash has yet to bottom out, average property prices are down 15.1pc in the last year, the largest annual decline since March 2010. 
The housing index from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) also showed the cost of a home is now 45pc cheaper than the peak in early 2007. 
A breakdown of the property market revealed that average prices in Dublin are down 51pc while outside the capital the fall is much lower at 42pc. 
The collapse has hit apartments much harder, with values down 60pc in the last four-and-a-half years. 
The fall of 2.2pc in average property prices in October is the largest monthly drop since April 2009. 
It emerged last week that more than 100,000 people are now struggling to repay their mortgages. 
This is made up of around 62,000 homeowners in arrears of three months, or more, and just less than 40,000 who have restructured their repayments, Central Bank figures revealed.... 
It equates to four out of 10 households in mortgage arrears with the four domestic banks who have now been behind on their repayments for a year or more. 
These families have missed so many of their monthly payments that they have run up an average of €27,000 each in arrears, according to the Central Bank. 
The Central Bank study of mortgages at AIB, Bank of Ireland, EBS and Permanent TSB also found that troubled home loans at these lenders represented 56pc of all the mortgages in arrears.

A separate Independent article reports how one Irish house sold at auction for 17% of what its peak price was in 2007.

IF you ever needed proof that the property market had collapsed, here it is. 
A Dublin father yesterday bought his ideal family home for €65,000 -- three years after walking away from the three-bed house when the asking price was €380,000. 
"We looked at that exact house three years ago and it was €380,000," the man -- who didn't want to be identified -- told the Irish Independent as he left the Merlin Property auction in Dublin. 
"It's unbelievable; I thought that when I went in I wouldn't get it. It is the best value I have ever seen.... 
The attractive, three-bed terraced home in East Wall, Dublin, sold for €65,000. 
But the previous owner was happy enough to sell the house he had grown up in with his parents. 
Noel Langrell (55) said that while it had been on the market for a number of years, he was unable to sell it and decided to go to auction when Merlin advertised. 
"If you have a property sitting there and it's going nowhere, this is the way to go," he said afterwards. 
"What can I say? What's the point of holding on to it? It was a family home since the 1920s, my mam died and I was on my own by then." 
Just four of nine properties at the small auction were sold by last night, with three remaining under auction and two withdrawn. 
Their collective earnings were €305,500 compared to a peak market value of €1.03m....
"It's frightening; it's scary," observed a bidder who asked to be identified only as Dermot from Kildare. "And it reflects your own house; if you can pay your mortgage or if you don't have one that's okay but if you have to sell then that's when the issue comes in."

Thursday, November 24, 2011

Why not pull the trigger on Greek credit default swaps? Authorities fear contagion.

A NY Times Dealbook article asks the question of why not pull the trigger on Greek credit default swaps.  The simple answer is fear of the unknown in the form of contagion.

Since financial regulators have not required that banks disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details on an on-going basis, they have no idea who would win or who would lose if the credit default swaps payout.

This lack of disclosure creates the potential for surprises and the financial regulators are trying to avoid this.

Far better that the financial regulators should have required ultra transparency so everyone could see what the impact would be.

The really important issue here centers on why the European Union cares so much about not setting off credit-default swap triggers in this exchange offer. The absurd lengths European leaders are going to in order to make this “voluntary” does raise a few eyebrows. And I have no really compelling explanations. 
Still, would it be so hard to imagine that the Eurpean Union wants to avoid setting off the swaps because of aggregate exposure among European banks to Greek and other European sovereign debt? For example, what if European banks have all been hedging their sovereign credit-default swaps with each other. If that proves to be the case, a German bank with seemingly modest net exposure to sovereign debts, for example, could really be heavily exposed because the hedge is with a French bank? 
And let us stop with the “Greek C.D.S. market is small” argument. Yes, the publicly acknowledged market is small. What about the bespoke market? 
Moreover, what would the collateral posting requirements be for European banks if non-Greek sovereign debt was downgraded after the triggering of Greek credit-default swaps? What if we also add collateral posting requirements that result from European banks being downgraded?

British banks are a 'dumb' investment

A Guardian article quotes the head of Royal Bank of Scotland explaining why banks have a tough time raising capital in the current environment.

Royal Bank of Scotland's share price tumbled on Wednesday as the chief executive of the bailed-out bank suggested that investors thought it was "dumb" to put money into in the banking industry.
Actually, it is very smart of investors not to put money into the banking industry.

As the Bank of England's Andy Haldane observed, banks are 'black boxes'.  Because of a lack of adequate disclosure, investors cannot assess the risk of what they are buying and are not investing (at a minimum, this shows that investors learned something from their experience buying opaque structured finance securities).

According to Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, adequate disclosure would be ultra transparency.  Banks would disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
Appearing before the treasury select committee, Stephen Hester was responding to criticism that banks were blaming tougher regulation regarding capital reserves for restricting lending to customers, when in fact they could be bolstering their reserves by cutting bonuses or raising more funds from shareholders. 
Hester, who was parachuted in to run the bank when it was bailed out by the taxpayer in October 2008, told MPs: "I would be interested to see the investor who wants to put more capital towards UK banks at the moment. They are thinking it is a dumb place to put more capital." 
The bank's shares, which had been under pressure all day amid anxiety about the ongoing eurozone crisis, took a deeper lurch down and eventually ended almost 6% lower at just above 17p after Hester's comments. 
The shares were already at their lowest level since January 2009. Taxpayers have invested £45bn in RBS shares, but at the current price that stake is worth less than £30bn. One analyst said: "It doesn't exactly encourage people to buy the bank's stock."

Wednesday, November 23, 2011

Regulators' information monopoly: the definitive statement on why monopoly must end now!

Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story wrote a must read article in the NY Times on how the financial regulators' work with the financial institutions they supervise to not only keep relevant information from market participants, but to actually misrepresent the information that does go to market participants.

Since its inception, this blog has repeatedly observed that the financial regulators' monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on the banks is a significant source of financial instability.

Regular readers know that without current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants cannot assess the risk of the banks.  Instead, market participants are reliant on the Fed and other financial regulators who have access to this data to properly assess the data and convey what they found.

This article is very important for a number of reasons including:
  • Financial regulators are part of Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team; and
  • It confirms that the problem with the current regulatory structure identified in the Nyberg Report on the Irish Financial Crisis also occurred in the US.  Specifically, information that was uncovered by the examiners was unable to reach the top of the regulatory structure or to be conveyed to market participants.
There is only one way to fix this problem and that is to require each bank to provide ultra transparency on an on-going basis.

It is only when all market participants can access current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that regulators can no longer block the assessment of the data or conveying what the results of the assessment to the market.

Until banks are required to provide ultra transparency, market participants should assume that the regulators  have something to hide.

The stress tests being run by the Fed are confirmation that the Fed is hiding something.  Otherwise, why not let the market participants run their own stress tests by requiring ultra transparency as suggested by Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher.

In the whodunit of the financial crisis, Wall Street executives have pointed the blame at all kinds of parties — consumers who lied on their mortgage applications, investors who demanded access to risky mortgage bonds, and policy makers who kept interest rates low and failed to predict a housing market collapse. 
But a new defense has been mounted by a bank executive: my regulator told me to do it. 
This unusual rationale is presented by the bank executive in one of the few fraud suits brought against a mortgage banking official in the aftermath of the financial crisis — the one filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission against Michael W. Perry, former chief executive of IndyMac Bancorp, which failed spectacularly in mid-2008. 
After being accused of fraud and misleading investors about his company’s financial health just before it collapsed, Mr. Perry set up a Web site this fall to defend himself. 
In a document on the site, he said that a top official at the federal Office of Thrift Supervision, IndyMac’s overseer, directed and approved an action related to the S.E.C.’s allegations. 
“It was O.T.S. who had the final say regarding IndyMac Bank’s capital levels,” Mr. Perry wrote. 
He went on to say that Darrel W. Dochow, former regional director for the Western region of the agency and a financial regulator for more than 30 years, had “specifically directed” Mr. Perry to backdate IndyMac’s report to regulators to include an $18 million cash infusion that would make it appear well capitalized. 
The shift masked IndyMac’s problems for any investors trying to assess its soundness and allowed it to continue attracting large deposits crucial to its operations....
Mr. Dochow was not accused of wrongdoing by the commission or any other prosecutor, though his role has been criticized by the inspector general of the Treasury Department, which oversees some bank regulators.... 
The IndyMac collapse, with its multibillion-dollar cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fund, highlights the role played by federal overseers of financial companies in the years leading up to the crisis. 
It also raises questions about whether government officials should be held accountable for dubious conduct related to the failure of an institution and whether the government has avoided pursuing some cases because of the roles regulators have played. 
For years, some bank overseers have maintained cozy ties with the institutions they monitor, treating bankers like clients because of the fees that banks pay to be regulated. 
This is one form of regulatory capture.

Fortunately, requiring ultra transparency addresses it as banks will be subject to market discipline even if they are not subject to regulatory discipline.
The Justice Department could not cite any regulator that it had named in a prosecution related to the crisis.  
However, Mr. Dochow’s conduct was referred to Justice for possible criminal charges in 2009, according to Eric Thorson, the inspector general of the Treasury Department. Mr. Thorson said Mr. Dochow’s action “was clearly improper and wrong.”...
A point that Occupy Wall Street and the 99% would agree with.
IndyMac is not the only institution whose questionable accounting was approved by regulators in recent years, though it is by far the largest of several highlighted by the Treasury inspector general. 
Even if regulators are involved in wrongdoing, they have some immunity. Internal disciplinary measures are rarely taken against regulators who perform badly in their jobs, say government officials.
Just look at what how the SEC treated its staff that dropkicked the Bernie Madoff ponzi scheme.
Some regulatory shortcomings may be chalked up to innocent mistakes and failures to spot problems. Still, some economists and lawyers would like the government to examine regulatory actions leading up to the financial crisis to determine whether officials actively participated in improper behavior. 
And, they say, in cases like Mr. Dochow’s, penalties should be levied on overseers who acted improperly. 
“The word conspired needs to be used here,” said Edward J. Kane, a finance professor and regulatory expert at Boston College who is familiar with the case. “Dochow conspired with IndyMac management to misrepresent this. He was trying to fool certainly the F.D.I.C. and the public, and anyone who lost a dollar as a creditor to this institution was harmed by relying on something they had every right to rely on.”
Whether he did or he did not, my point is that the regulatory system needs to be changed by the requirement of ultra transparency to make it impossible for this sort of activity to happen in the future.
Mr. Dochow was known within the O.T.S. to be bank-friendly. One former examiner said: “His approach was negotiating with the banks, as opposed to regulating the banks, and viewing them more as clients, as opposed to people or entities that needed to comply.” 
According to three former examiners who worked with Mr. Dochow but who requested anonymity because they feared retaliation from regulatory colleagues, he would sometimes negotiate between the banks and their lower-level O.T.S. overseers, arguing that an institution should be allowed to keep one component of its regulatory rating high if another was dropping. That way, the composite score representing a bank’s financial standing, would change little, if at all....
This is part of the regulatory structure problem identified in the Nyberg Report.  Information comes in to the regulator but is then buried.  The result is the financial crisis we are now in.
It would be difficult and unusual for the Justice Department or the S.E.C. to bring a case against a bank regulator, longtime securities lawyers say. Regulators enjoy some immunity from allegations of wrongdoing under the Securities Exchange Act, which says that you cannot file a case against an officer of a United States agency for violation of a securities law if the officer was acting within the scope of the job. 
For financial regulators like Mr. Dochow, a conflict comes into play when banks run into trouble — on one hand, regulators try to help banks maintain their stability. But, on the other hand, securities laws require companies to be transparent in their disclosures to public investors.
Requiring ultra transparency ends this conflict.
Any financial crisis case that named a regulator probably would turn into a huge political battle, because it would question many of the nontransparent acts that bank regulators take while trying to save banks, said Denise Voigt Crawford, former commissioner of the Texas securities board and now a law professor at Texas Tech University. 
In any prosecution of bank regulators, she said, “you’d have the Justice Department in a fight with the policy goals of the Department of Treasury. Particularly in this environment, you know the banking regulators would fight it tooth and nail.”
Is it a good thing that regulators take many nontransparent acts while trying to save banks?

It is far better for the financial system if there is ultra transparency.  With this information, market participants can exert market discipline on the banks before they need to be saved and presumably prevent them from having to be saved by regulators.  For their part, regulators can reinforce market discipline.
Some longtime lawyers go further and say the overall scarcity of cases related to the financial crisis might be in part because regulators want to avoid scrutiny of their own kind. 
“It’s not just one 30-year-old wunderkind who was responsible for the financial crisis,” said Dennis C. Vacco, who was the New York State attorney general in the 1990s and now is a lawyer at Lippes Mathias Wexler & Friedman. “Once you start pulling the string through in these complex cases, you might be surprised what you find at the other end.” 
Mr. Vacco continued: “What’s at the end of the string? The defense may be that ‘at the highest echelons of the financial institutions, we were in regular contact with the government.’ “
Which is exactly what the Nyberg Report found occurred in Ireland.  To prevent this from ever re-occurring requires ultra transparency as the foundation for a 21st century financial system.

Run on Eurozone banks continues

The NY Times carried an article updating the ongoing run on the Eurozone sovereigns and banks.

Banks clamored for emergency funds from the European Central Bank on Tuesday, borrowing the most since early 2009 in a clear sign that the euro region’s financial institutions are having trouble obtaining credit at reasonable rates on the open market. 
Indebted governments among the 17 members of the European Union that use the euro are also finding it harder to borrow at affordable rates as investors lose confidence in their creditworthiness....
Together, the commercial banks’ heavy reliance on the central bank to finance their everyday business needs, along with the growing borrowing burden for Spain and Italy, raise the risk of failure for some banks within the countries that use the euro and the danger that nations much larger than Greece could eventually seek a bailout or be forced to leave the euro currency union.... 
The European debt crisis has crimped the flow of funds to banks by raising doubts about the solvency of institutions with a large exposure to European government debt. In particular, American money market funds have severely cut back their lending to European banks in recent months, leading many institutions to turn to Europe’s central bank. 
Compounding the problem, many banks using the euro have also had trouble selling bonds to raise money that they can lend to customers. That raises the specter of a credit squeeze that could amplify an impending economic slowdown. In addition, some banks may fail if they are unable to raise short-term cash. 
The central bank said Tuesday that commercial banks had taken out 247 billion euros, ($333 billion), in one-week loans, the largest amount since April 2009. And the 178 banks borrowing from the central bank on Tuesday compared with the 161 banks that borrowed 230 billion euros ($310 billion) last week. 
Since 2008, the central bank has been allowing lenders to borrow as much as they want at the benchmark interest rate, which is now 1.25 percent. Banks must provide collateral. But the central bank is not supposed to prop up banks that are insolvent, only those that have a temporary liquidity problem. 

Market analysts confirm their interpretation that stress tests are backed by Fed guarantee of bank solvency (update)

A Reuter's article confirms that market analysts think that banks which are subject to stress tests have their solvency guaranteed by the Fed.

The analysts know that they do not have access to all the useful, relevant information like the Fed.  As a result, stress tests do not promote market discipline, but rather reliance on the Fed.

Even if the analysts believe the 100+ PhD economists at the Fed who are supervising the stress tests are clueless, the analysts know that by publishing the results of the stress tests, the Fed takes on the moral responsibility to bailout any investors in the banks.

The fact that the Fed is explicitly saying the banks are solvent...an investment in them is safe from any solvency problems...creates this moral obligation to bailout investors.

Only a regulator that is committed to hiding something from market participants or protecting the banks from market discipline would ever acknowledge that they were doing stress tests.

Regulators who are committed to bringing market discipline to the banking industry would require banks to provide on an on-going basis ultra transparency.  Banks would disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure data.

With this information, market participants, including competitors and analysts, would assess the riskiness/solvency of any bank.  The result of this assessment would be an adjustment of the amount and price of the market participant's exposure to the bank.

The U.S. Federal Reserve plans to stress test six large U.S. banks against a hypothetical market shock, including a deterioration of the European debt crisis, as part of an annual review of bank health. 
The Fed said it will publish next year the results of the tests for six banks that have large trading operations... 
"They are clearly worried about the issue of Europe," said Nancy Bush, a longtime bank analyst and contributing editor at SNL Financial. "In a time of risk aversion and concern, you need transparency."... 
The Fed will use the review of bank's capital plans to determine whether the banks are robust enough to raise dividends or repurchase stock, or whether they need to obtain additional capital.
The moral obligation to bailout investors.
The Fed plans to release more information than it did last year about the tests' results. The regulator said it is doing so to "foster market discipline."
Market discipline would result from banks being required to provide ultra transparency.  What market discipline could possibly occur after the Fed says the banks are solvent and can pay dividends?
The Fed said it will disclose the estimate of revenues, losses and capital ratios of the 19 biggest banks if they were to suffer a market shock. 
This type of disclosure could give investors and markets more certainty about the strength of U.S. banks at a time when there are deep concerns about their European counterparts. 
"Eventually, this will be viewed as a positive, and a lot of people will focus on this as a way to verify the viability of these companies," said Matt McCormick, portfolio manager at Bahl & Gaynor investment counsel in Cincinnati...
Yes, the stress tests will verify that the Fed is obligated to bailout the banks should any solvency problems arise.
"I don't think anyone could say that this is anything but an extremely stringent stress test," said Karen Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics. "It will really put the burden on the affected bank holding companies to prove they can make a capital distribution, not on the Fed to block it."
I will say that this is not an extremely stringent stress test.  An extremely stringent stress test would look at what would happen if all the credit default swap contracts did not payout.  In Europe, the regulators are spending great amounts of time making sure that debt restructuring is done is such a way that the contracts do not payout.  So, what would happen to the big six banks if their CDS hedges aren't a hedge?

Update
A Bloomberg article provides many more analysts chiming in and confirming that the Fed has a moral obligation to bailout the banks subject to the stress test.

The Fed imposed a tougher capital test on the 31 largest U.S. banks yesterday, releasing the criteria for measuring their wherewithal if the U.S. economy sours and major trading partners default on their debt. 
Lenders need to prove they have the capital to withstand a “severe” U.S. recession with 13 percent unemployment and an 8 percent decline in gross domestic product before they can increase dividends or repurchase shares... 
Remember, passing the stress test, even if it involves raising a de minimus amount of capital puts the Fed on the hook morally for bailing out investors.
The Fed limited banks to returning 60 percent of their retained earnings to shareholders in 2011, split evenly between dividends and share repurchases. Glenn Schorr, an analyst at Nomura Holdings Inc., said banks may possibly be restricted even further, to about 40 percent, under the more adverse scenario.

“The tighter you stress and the more extreme you stress, the more careful you’ll be in terms of letting banks return capital,” Schorr said in a phone interview. 
The Fed’s stressed scenario calls for unemployment to hit 12 percent by next year and 13 percent in 2013. It also tests banks’ performance in an economic decline that begins this quarter and bottoms in the first quarter of next year, with real gross domestic product falling 8 percent and home prices dropping 20 percent during the next two years. 
“An 8 percent decline in GDP, that’s a disaster,” Miller said. “That’s not a recession.”...
So if a bank can pass this test, it must really be solvent...
The test also subjects the trading operations of the six biggest U.S. banks -- JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Bank of America, Citigroup,Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley -- to portfolio “shocks” based on asset price moves in the second half of 2008. 
“This is similar to what we saw them do in the original stress tests in 2009,” said Andrew Marquardt, an analyst at New York-based Evercore Partners Inc. “That will be more painful for those banks. In 2009, that was a particular point of contention.”...
Wait a second, didn't the banks pass these portfolio 'shocks' in 2009?  Oh, this is analysts saying these stress tests are so rigorous "we don't need to do any homework on the banks ourselves ... end of market discipline" and "we really like having the Fed on the hook for bailing out investors for any bank solvency problems".
“At the end of the day, a stress test is to demonstrate to investors and the marketplace that the banks are strong and can withstand problems in their portfolios,” said Fred Cannon, a bank analyst with KBW Inc. in New York. “It’s all about credibility.”
And the fact that once a bank passes the stress test, analysts can come back to the Fed should the bank encounter solvency problems and point out the Fed's moral responsibility to bailout investors.

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

BoE Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins claims banks are 'lying' about cost of reform

A Philip Aldrick Telegraph article reports on Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins' observation about the banking lobby's deliberate dishonesty about the cost of reforms.
In some of the strongest words on self-interest in the financial industry to come out of the Bank, Robert Jenkins, an independent member of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), said the banking lobby has been deliberately dishonest to suit its argument that tough new regulations will damage the economy. 
"The latest lobby tactic is to convince pundits, public and politicians that encouraging prudence too soon will hit the economy too hard," he said. "This is no longer amusing. This strategy is intellectually dishonest and potentially damaging. It is dishonest because it is untrue." 
Banks across the world have been pushing against reforms that will force them to have bigger capital buffers, to protect them against future losses, and hold more liquidity, to stop a run on the bank from causing its collapse. 
Banks would prefer these reforms to ultra transparency as these reforms preserve opacity into the banks' exposures and let the casino bank continue to operate.

This blog has already shown how requiring banks to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details on an on-going basis will subject them to market discipline.

The result of market discipline will be banks that hold much less risk and much higher levels of liquid assets and capital.
The Institute for International Finance, the leading global banking lobby group, has claimed that the harsher rules could result in millions fewer jobs being created across the world in the coming years as global growth progressed at a more sedate pace. 
Stressing that "my remarks are my own", Mr Jenkins characterised the banks as attempting to hold regulators hostage by claiming that only by starving the economy of credit can they be made safer. "If we do, it will be all your fault," is how Mr Jenkins summed up the industry's approach. 
"The truth is that banks can strengthen their balance sheet without harming the economy. They can do so by cutting bonuses, by curtailing intra-financial risk-taking and by raising term debt and equity," he said. "Thus a profession which should stand for integrity and prudence now supports a lobbying strategy that exploits misunderstanding and fear."...
As Mr. Jenkins knows, bank lobbyists will present the facts in the best light for their clients' interests.  Recent events would seem to play into the lobbyists' story line.

First, we have the fact that banks have very limited access to capital as investors are not going to invest in banks where they cannot assess the risk of the banks.

Without ultra transparency, banks are what Bank of England's Andy Haldane calls 'black boxes'.  With ultra transparency, investors have access to the current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail they need to assess risk and make a decision on the amount and pricing of their exposure.


Second, we have the fact that market participants, including regulators, are justifiably nervous about bank exposure to sovereign debt.  As a result, Eurozone banks are reducing their holdings of none host country sovereign debt.  As banks cut back their exposure, it reduces demand and drives up the cost of sovereign debt in both the primary and secondary markets.


Third, we have the fact that Eurozone regulators are calling for banks to meet a 9% Tier 1 capital ratio by next summer.  One way for banks to achieve this ratio is to reduce the size of their loan book.  The decline in loans potentially hurts the economy.

Mr Jenkins, who as an FPC member will help decide when to restrain the banks, added that "not all bankers agree with" the lobbyists' tactics. 
"They should distance themselves quickly," he said. "For in pursuing its short-sighted approach the banking lobby is unwittingly making the case for more intervention in an industry which refuses to reform."
As this blog has frequently observed, the only reform the industry really needs is to require ultra transparency.  Market discipline will force the banks to carry a much higher capital ratio and much less risk.

Latest stress tests show Fed has learned nothing about transparency

In a Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column, the Fed is praised for the additional disclosure it is going to make involving the upcoming stress test.

These additional disclosures will be made in the context of preserving the Fed's information monopoly on all the useful, relevant data from the financial institutions.

What won't be provided is ultra transparency for each financial institution.  Disclosure of each financial institution's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details would let market participants run the tests for themselves.

Of course, there is one other  small problem with stress tests:  nobody believes the results of the Fed stress tests!

Several months prior to the banks releasing the results of their last stress tests, your humble blogger predicted the results.

Pulling out my crystal ball, I see that the stress tests show that Bank of America still needs to raise capital ...

This blog has repeatedly observed that the only analysis that market participants will believe is one that they can independently perform themselves or by hiring a third party expert.

In addition, there is one really large problem with stress tests:  after the Fed or the banks announce the results, the Fed is now explicitly on the hook for the next year for bailing out any debt or equity investor in the stress tested financial institutions.

Why?  Because the Fed is explicitly saying these financial institutions are solvent right down to their $5 trillion in derivative exposures.

Given the Fed's position and its access to better data than any other market participant, market participants will rely on the Fed's assessment.  This sets up a moral responsibility to bailout investors.

Too bad it takes a crisis to force more openness at the Federal Reserve. 
Earlier this year, the Fed conducted "stress tests" of leading financial institutions as it considered requests from them to return capital to shareholders. Unlike similar tests in spring 2009, during the height of the financial crisis, the Fed declined to make public specific test results. 
In fact, it didn't even release details on which banks' capital plans had been approved. Instead, it left that up to individual firms, leading to confusion among investors. 
And that was despite indications by some Fed governors, notably Daniel Tarullo, that greater transparency on the central bank's part could strengthen the financial system and lead to greater market discipline. 
Now, with Europe in crisis, the Fed, is coming around. In announcing stress tests for early next year on 31 financial institutions—compared with 19 tested earlier this year and in 2009—it said it would disclose test results for 19 of the firms. 
It also said it would release results of an additional test of how the six largest institutions would fare under a "hypothetical global market shock." 
Also telling is disclosure on the scenarios banks will have to use in testing their financial strength. 
While the scenarios don't represent the Fed's actual economic projections, they do give investors a sense of how bad things could get and how much things have changed.... 
Hopefully, this time, the Fed will have learned that it should strive for transparency in both good times and bad.

What is the contribution of the financial sector?

The Bank of England's Andy Haldane and Vasileios Madouros published an interesting column on VoxEU in which they asked "what is the contribution of the financial sector?"

Specifically, they focus on the distinction between risk-taking and risk management.

They observe that if risk-taking were a value-added activity,
Russian roulette players would contribute disproportionately to global welfare.
Risk-management, on the other hand, is a value-added activity.
The financial system provides a number of services to the wider economy, including payment and transaction services to depositors and borrowers; intermediation services by transforming deposits into funding for households, companies or governments; and risk transfer and insurance services. 
In doing so, financial intermediaries take on risk. For example, when they finance long-term loans to companies using short-term deposits from households, banks assume liquidity risk. And when they extend mortgages to households, they take on credit risk. 
But bearing risk is not, by itself, a productive activity. The act of investing capital in a risky asset is a fundamental feature of capital markets. For example, a retail investor that purchases bonds issued by a company is bearing risk, but not contributing so much as a cent to measured economic activity. Similarly, a household that decides to use all of its liquid deposits to purchase a house, instead of borrowing some money from the bank and keeping some of its deposits with the bank, is bearing liquidity risk....
What is a demonstrably productive economic activity is the management of risk. Banks use labour and capital to screen borrowers, assess their creditworthiness and monitor them. And they spend resources to assess their vulnerability to liquidity shocks arising from the maturity mismatches on their balance sheets. Customers, in turn, remunerate banks for these productive services.
Risk management is not solely the province of banks.  All market participants are suppose to manage their risks.

The key to managing risk is access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Without this data, there is no way to assess the risk of a given exposure.

Regular readers know that the current level of opacity engulfing structured finance securities and banks is similar to not seeing the bullet chambers while playing Russian Roulette.  Buying these securities is not investing, but rather blindly taking risk.

Risk management is like playing Russian Roulette, but being able to see if there is a bullet in the chamber and stopping before the trigger is pulled.