Monday, December 26, 2011

Looting of the Irish expands to looting of the Eurozone

This blog has frequently looked at the issue of regulators requiring insolvent financial institutions to increase their book capital ratios.  A subset of this policy is the requirement that insolvent financial institutions shrink their balance sheets at the same time as these institutions are required to maintain high capital ratios.

One hundred percent of the time this capital ratio policy results in the financial institution selling its bests assets at a discount.  It also does absolutely nothing to address the bad debt that is on the financial institution's balance sheet and that is causing them to be insolvent in the first place.

Why does this regulatory capital ratio policy always end up with the best assets being sold at a discount?

The buyers know several facts that reduce the selling bank's leverage in the negotiation.
  • The selling financial institutions cannot raise capital from the equity markets because no one can assess their risk or solvency;
  • The selling financial institutions have a limited time in which to achieve the target capital ratio -- frequently, the regulators publish a deadline; 
  • The amount of assets that the financial institutions must sell is large relative to the capacity of the buyers to acquire - in Europe, banks are trying to shed 3 trillion euros of assets; and
  • The selling financial institutions must sell their best assets because recognizing the losses on their bad assets would decrease their book capital levels and move them away from the regulators' targeted capital ratios.

The end result is that the regulators effectively required their banks to sell their best assets at a discount.

I call this "looting" because the taxpayer has been called on to bailout these financial institutions in the past and, unless ultra transparency is adopted, be required to bailout these financial institutions in the future.  When the taxpayer needs to step up for the future bailout, the size of this bailout is increased by the discount the banks realized when selling their best assets.

The NY Times ran an article that gives some idea of how attractive looting the Eurozone financial system is.
As Europe struggles with its debt crisis, American businesses and financial firms are swooping in amid the distress, making loans and snapping up assets owned by banks there — from the mortgage on a luxury hotel in Miami Beach to the tallest office building in Dublin.
The sales are being spurred on because European banks are scrambling to raise capital and shrink their balance sheets, often under orders from regulators. European financial institutions will unload up to $3 trillion in assets over the next 18 months, according to an estimate from Huw van Steenis, an analyst with Morgan Stanley....
At Kohlberg Kravis, Nathaniel M. Zilkha, co-head of the special situations group, is expanding his London team to eight, from two, and hoping to take advantage of opportunities in Europe. The firm is even considering potential investments in the country where the crisis began, Greece, despite headlines warning of a default by Athens or the possibility that Greece may withdraw from the euro zone. 
“If no one is willing to turn over the rocks, that’s when you can make extraordinary investments,” Mr. Zilkha said. “The market dislocation in Greece is creating significant opportunities that wouldn’t be otherwise available.” 
Besides Greece, Kohlberg Kravis bankers have also been looking for deals in Spain and Portugal, where private companies are having a similarly hard time winning new credit or extending existing loans.... 
Experts expect these kinds of sales to jump as European banks race to meet the June deadline imposed by the European Banking Authority to raise more than 114 billion euros in fresh capital. Financial institutions also have to increase their Tier 1 capital ratio — the strictest yardstick of a bank’s ability to absorb financial blows — to 9 percent of assets. 
Banks get a twofold benefit from unloading assets like real estate loans and other holdings; not only do they have more cash, but there are fewer assets they must hold capital against in case of losses, thereby quickly bolstering Tier 1 levels...
Inside his firm, Stephen A. Schwarzman, the chief executive of the Blackstone Group, recently cited the $3 trillion estimate of how much European banks will have to unload, and this summer he told investors that Europe was back on Blackstone’s radar after being absent for several years. 
“As people become increasingly negative on the environment there, we think we are buying good companies at very good values,” he said.

Sunday, December 25, 2011

Saturday, December 24, 2011

Nervous banks stash billions with ECB

A Guardian article confirms that Eurozone banks are facing a solvency crisis.  The first sign of a bank solvency crisis is when banks with excess funds refuse to make loans to each other over concern about repayment.

Banks from the 17 countries that use the euro have stashed €347bn (£289bn) with the European Central Bank, in another sign that they remain wary of each other despite a massive credit operation earlier this week. 
The figure, which was announced on Friday, is the highest for 2011, topping €346.4bn earlier this month. 
It is a sign of unease in the interbank lending market where banks raise operating funds. 
It suggests banks are depositing money with the ECB at low interest rates because they are afraid to lend it to other banks out of fear that they will not get paid back. 
Please re-read the previous sentence.

The far of not getting paid back is a function of the inability of banks to independently assess the creditworthiness of the borrowing bank.  Banks cannot make this assessment because of a lack of disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate timely manner.

It is only when banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants, including other banks, have the data they need to independently assess each bank's risk/creditworthiness.
Europe is suffering from a debt crisis marked by worries that heavily indebted governments such as Italy may be unable to pay off their bonds. That means trouble for banks because they typically hold government bonds.
Government bonds are just one of many bad assets that banks are holding.  The list includes residential and commercial real estate loans as well as toxic structured finance securities.
The large deposits come despite Wednesday's massive central bank credit operation, in which the ECB let banks borrow as much as they wanted for up to 3 years. As a result 523 banks took €489bn, the largest ECB loan operation in the 13-year history of the euro. 
The ECB has increased lending to banks to help them get through the crisis. Some are finding it impossible to raise money elsewhere, so the ECB steps in as lender of last resort, a typical role for central banks in times of turmoil. 

Friday, December 23, 2011

Is the global banking system being killed in the effort to save it?

Are global financial regulators, policymakers and central bankers killing the global banking system in their effort to save it?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger thinks the answer is yes.  I think so because they continue to treat the symptoms of a solvency crisis without addressing the cause.

For example, recently central banks have undertaken a massive two prong approach to provide funding to the Eurozone banks.  This funding is necessary to replace the withdrawal of funds by the private market and the unwillingness of banks that have funds to lend them to other banks.

Why has the private market stopped funding banks and why are banks unwilling to lend to other banks?


Because they have no way of independently determining if they will be able to get their money back!

What type of banking system do you have if only central bankers are willing to fund it?  One that is clearly not functioning properly.

Sir Mervyn King refers to the relationship between the banks and central bank funding as a 'dangerous dependence'.

It is particularly dangerous because as Gillian Tett pointed out in her Financial Times column,

Welcome to a key theme of 2012. During the past four decades, it was widely assumed in the western world that the main role of banks and asset managers was to provide funding to the private sector, rather than act as a piggy bank for the state. But now, that assumption – like so many of the other ideas that dominated before 2007 – is quietly crumbling.

Driving her observation is the pressure being applied on Eurozone banks to pursue the so-called Sarkozy Trade.  Under this trade, banks buy sovereign bonds of their host nation and fund these bonds through long term funding arrangements with the ECB.

How exactly is this different, aside from justifying very large bonuses for the bankers based on the bank's earnings, than the central bank simply handing money to the state?

I prefer not to examine this particularly dangerous Pandora's Box.  I find it unsettling enough to hear policymakers say that banks should be engaging in this trade as a risk-free way to recapitalize.

The fact is the global banking system is insolvent and has been since August 9, 2007.  In addition, no one knows how much equity is needed to recapitalize the global banking system.

Rather than acknowledge this fact, what policymakers, financial regulators and central bankers have engaged in since then is a) an attempt to cover up the insolvency and  b) a stealth attempt to recapitalize the global banking system through a series of programs that has succeeded mainly at generating sizable bonuses for bankers.

Let's look at one of the backdoor ways that has been attempted to recapitalize the banks:  Zero Interest Rate Policies.  In the very short run, say less than a year, banks gush earnings under ZIRP if their liabilities reprice faster than their assets.  Over the medium to long run, say more than a year, the interest being paid on the assets catches up with the zero interest being paid on the liabilities and, with the the collapse of the net interest margin, bank earnings head to zero.

No earnings, no ability to generate capital either through retained earnings or sale of stock to investors.  No additional capital, no ability to recognize the losses hidden on the balance sheet.  No ability to recognize hidden losses, no ability to end the massive distortion to the real economy not recognizing these losses causes....

I am sorry, but the cover-up of the bank solvency problem has been orders of magnitude worse than the solvency problem itself!

I could speculate all day as to why policymakers, regulators and central bankers have chosen to try to cover up the solvency problem.  However, frankly, I do not care why they made this choice.

What I care about is that they stop making this choice before they inflict more damage on the real global economy.

This blog has extensively documented that banks can continue to operate while they are insolvent and support the real economy.  It is time that the policymakers, regulators and central bankers recognize and act on this fact!

Eurozone banks confirm interbank loan market frozen, ECB deposits reach new 2011 highs

One of the signs of a solvency crisis is when the interbank loan market is frozen.  Banks refuse to lend to each other because they cannot determine if the borrower is solvent or not and if not solvent, whether they will repay the loan or not.

The Wall Street Journal ran an article that showed the Eurozone interbank loan market is frozen and treating it with massive amounts of liquidity is ineffective as the issue is one of solvency.
Use of the European Central Bank's overnight deposit facility reached a new record high for the year Thursday, suggesting recent measures by central banks and policy makers still aren't enough to restore confidence in inter-bank lending markets. 
Banks deposited €346.99 billion ($453.38 billion) in the overnight deposit facility, up from €264.97 billion a day earlier and a previous high for the year of €346.36 billion, reached earlier this month. 
The high level reflects ongoing distrust in inter-bank lending markets, where banks prefer using the ECB facility as a safe haven for excess funds rather than lending them to other banks. 
The high deposit level also suggests markets aren't fully convinced that the ECB's massive long-term loan allotment is enough to fortify the currency bloc's banking sector. 
The central bank extended nearly half a trillion euros in long-term loans to euro-zone banks Wednesday, hoping to ease fears of a new credit crunch as banks struggle to borrow from markets. 
Separate actions in recent weeks by central banks and policy makers have also sought to make dollar loans cheaper for euro-zone banks and to boost fiscal integration in the bloc.... 
The ECB further said banks borrowed €6.34 billion from the ECB's overnight lending facility, compared with €7.55 billion borrowed a day earlier. When markets are functioning properly, banks only use the facility to the tune of a few hundred million euros overnight.

Debt crisis is causing a dangerous dependence on central banks

In a Bloomberg article, the Bank of England's Mervyn King effectively points out that the solution to a solvency crisis is not massive amount of central bank liquidity.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying this since the beginning of the credit crisis.

The solution to a solvency crisis, and it was proven by the FDR Administration in 1933, is based on ultra transparency.  It involves three simultaneous steps:

  • Make the banks recognize the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets (this ends the mis-pricing of assets in the real economy caused by 'extend and pretend' activities);
  • Have the governments guarantee each bank's deposits and unsecured liabilities (this lets the banks continue in operation providing credit to the economy even with negative book equity); and
  • Require the banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details (this restores confidence in the market as participants know that all losses have been recognized and they can exert discipline to keep the banks from gambling on redemption).
What Mr. King identified in the article is the ongoing collapse of confidence by investors is leading to a dangerous over-reliance by banks on funding from the central banks.
Mervyn King, vice chairman of the European Systemic Risk Board, said Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is threatening to hurt the real economy and the outlook for financial stability has worsened. 
The damage to the real economy is caused by requiring the real economy to absorb losses from the financial excesses that have occurred rather than the banks.

It is a primary role of the banking system to act as a safety valve and absorb losses on financial excesses so that the real economy is not hurt.
Growth prospects “have deteriorated” since September, King, who is also governor of the Bank of England, said at a briefing hosted by theEuropean Central Bank in Frankfurt yesterday. “Investors lack confidence to continue to provide normal levels of funding. Dependence on central banks has risen.”
Why should investors have confidence in the banking system?  Because banks are not required to provide ultra transparency, there is no way for any market participant, including banking competitors, to know who is solvent and who is insolvent.

The solvency crisis began on August 9, 2007 and since that time the global financial regulators and policymakers have done absolutely nothing to address it.  The losses that existed in the global banking system are still there.  It is the cover-up of these losses by the regulators and bankers that is eroding confidence.

The only time when banks provide more transparency is when they are undergoing a bank run.  This blog has demonstrated this with French banks (BNP Paribas and Societe Generale) and US investment banks (Jefferies).
The ECB loaned banks a record 489 billion euros ($636 billion) for three years on Dec. 21 to avert a credit crunch from the sovereign debt crisis. The central bank said earlier this week that the turmoil has taken on systemic proportions not seen since the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
King said the outlook for financial stability has “worsened” since the last ESRB meeting in September, and while intervention by the ECB is expected to “assuage funding problems in the near term, in the longer term private funding markets must be revitalized.”
The only way to bring back the private funding market is for all sectors of the financial system that are currently opaque to have the sunlight of ultra transparency shown on them.

Banks are at the top of the list because they are opaque or in the words of the Bank of England's Andy Haldane 'black boxes'.  To revitalize the private funding market for banks requires the banks disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is this data that all the private funding market participants need to assess the risk of each bank and adjust both the amount and price of their exposure to each bank.

Without ultra transparency, all the useful, relevant information that market participants need in an appropriate, timely manner is not available.  It is no surprise that the private funding markets are not functioning as transparency is required for the invisibile hand to operate.
Bank shares have suffered this year as borrowing costs surged in the euro region.... 
King also appealed to banks not to “reduce lending to the real economy” as they increase their capital levels to meet new standards set by regulators. 
The best way to have avoided this regulator induced credit crunch is not to have set the meaningless 9% Tier I capital ratio targets in the first place.

Until banks provide ultra transparency, nobody believes that any reported Tier I capital ratio is anything other than an easily and highly manipulated, meaningless number.  
“We are very conscious there is extreme risk aversion in private financial markets,” he said. 
“We want a more robust banking system so that whatever risks crystallize, whatever their source, the banking system is in a better position than 2008.”...
The only way to have a more robust banking system is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  Until this is done, there is no way for the private market participants to know if the banking system really is in a better position than 2008.

Thursday, December 22, 2011

Confirming need for ultra transparency, Regulator fines Barclays Capital over inaccurate data supplied to subprime mortgage investors

The NY Times Dealbook reports that FINRA has fined Barclays Capital over inaccurate data supplied to subprime mortgage investors.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority said on Thursday that it had fined Barclays Capital $3 million for misrepresenting information about subprime mortgage securities the bank had sold from 2007 to 2010.
The fine appears a little light given a) the fees that Barclays Capital would have made on these deals and b) the losses incurred by investors who purchased the securities as a result of the misrepresentation.
Finra, as the nonprofit self-regulator is known, said in a statement that Barclays Capital had provided inaccurate data about the delinquency rates of mortgages packed into three securities. 
The misrepresentations “contained errors significant enough to affect an investor’s assessment of subsequent securitizations,” according to the agency. 
That data was then referenced for five additional subprime securities, the agency said. 
“Barclays did not have a system in place to ensure that delinquency data posted on its Web site was accurate,” J. Bradley Bennett, the agency’s enforcement chief, said in a statement. 
“Therefore, investors were supplied inaccurate information to assess future performance of RMBS investments.”
Please re-read the highlighted sentence.  There could not be a clearer confirmation of the need for ultra transparency.  With full disclosure on an on-going basis of the loans, this could not have happened.

Did Barclays ever put in a system and correct the delinquency data?  If not, how could anyone price these securities today?
Barclays Capital neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing, though it consented to the fine. A spokeswoman for the bank declined comment.
No surprise here.  

Eurozone banks borrowing from ECB formally ends borrowing from central bank stigma

By flocking to the ECB's long term funding program, Eurozone banks have forever ended the idea that there is any stigma involved in borrowing from the central bank.

As reported in a Bloomberg article,
“The perceived stigma attached to central bank borrowing has not prevented euro-zone banks from making extensive use of the ECB’s offer,” said Martin van Vliet, an economist at ING Group in Amsterdam. “The take-up of loans is massive.”
This is very important because it is the stigma argument that central banks trot out as to why they cannot disclose the names of the banks that borrow from them.

The stigma argument goes: if we disclose the names of the borrowers, then they will be reluctant to borrow from us again when they need to.

Apparently the stigma argument was a fantasy of central bankers and had no basis in reality.

The size of the loan take-up will be virtually impossible for the borrowing banks to hide on an individual basis from the market.  It is pretty clear when a bank does not rollover its private market borrowings.

Please note, under the FDR Framework, banks would be required to provide ultra transparency on an on-going basis by disclosing their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This disclosure would have shown all central bank borrowings.

Fortunately, market participants are sophisticated enough to be able to use this data to understand the distinction between temporary borrowing from misestimating reserves from semi-permanent borrowing because the bank is a zombie.

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

UK's Vince Cable: "The threats posed by banking reform are exaggerated"

In his Guardian column, the UK's Vince Cable argues that the threats posed by banking reform are exaggerated.

This is true whether it applies to implementing the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking or requiring that banks provide ultra transparency by disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures.

The recent row over David Cameron's eurozone veto has exposed two radically different views of financial services and the City of London. 
One is that it is a vital national interest: a unique network of innovative firms and workaholic employees who generate shedloads of tax revenue for UK plc. The other is that it is a source of systemic instability, unfettered greed and industrial-scale tax dodging. Antagonists line up on either side of this divide: right versus left, Europhobes versus Europhiles. 
The uncomfortable truth is that both of these caricatures are true.... 
Facts should occasionally be allowed to intrude... 
Within the City itself there is a complex ecology, much of it uncontroversial. The UK is a world leader in professional business services, for example. The pensions and insurance industry has had its share of problems (pension mis-selling, Equitable Life) but it has a different maturity structure from banks and does not pose the same systemic risks. 
Even within the banking sector, which has caused so much reputational damage to the City, it is a small number of rogue institutions and the sub-caste of traders in investment banks who have caused most of the damage.
A small number of institutions, yes.  Unfortunately, they happen to be the largest global financial institutions.
After 2008 no sensible government (and few bankers) believe that the free-wheeling days of the past can continue.
While no sensible government may want the free-wheeling days of the past to continue, to date, no government has stepped up and required the one reform that would end the free-wheeling days:  requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.

As for the banks, their lobbyists would like to protect the status quo.  Four years into the crisis, the lobbyists have done a very good job as the banks have continued in their free-wheeling ways.
The issue is a practical one of how and where to regulate: nationally; globally, as with the Basel capital rules; or at the regional-EU level.
Actually, this is an issue brought up by the lobbyists looking to delay any reform and less any reform's bite.
The scale of British-based banks (with balance sheets valued around 500% of GDP) and the risk they pose to the UK taxpayer has meant that Britain has had to act ahead of other countries. 
That is why the government has moved to ringfence the "traditional" banking functions from "casino" investment banks following the Vickers report: tougher action than either the EU or the US. 
We led the way with a bank levy, and measures to expose bank top pay to greater transparency are also unilateral and necessarily so....
Comparing a ringfence to any action taken by the EU or the US is an unfair comparison.


As conceived by the European Commission and passed by the European Parliament, Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive would have required disclosure of the current performance for each asset backing a structured finance security.  It was the gold standard against which all other reforms proposed since the beginning of the solvency crisis failed by comparison.

Naturally, the City's lobbyists fought Article 122a.  When it was passed, EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy observed that it was the most heavily opposed legislation in EU history.


However, City's lobbyists did not stop fighting after the passage of Article 122a.  They turned to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors regulators which was in charge of implementing Article 122a.  The City's lobbyists got the regulators to agree to an interpretation of 'know what you own' that was consistent with the existing disclosure practices for what are known as opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage backed securities.
The issue of EU financial services regulation is, in any event, a sideshow compared to the much bigger question of averting a catastrophic outcome to the eurozone crisis and a deep European slump. 
And in the UK we need to put the whingeing of the City to one side and concentrate on delivering our core narrative, to achieve growth by rebalancing the UK economy. Towards advanced manufacturing, creative industries, higher education and professional services – and therefore with less reliance on banking – from London to provincial Britain. The bankers don't speak for Britain; the coalition will not put their interests above the rest of the country.
Great!  Given that ultra transparency ends the solvency crisis and the need for governments to bailout their banks, I expect that the coalition will champion its adoption.

Have we reached the end for the ability of regulators and central banks to hide the losses in the financial system?

As regular readers know, since the beginning of the solvency crisis in 2007, I have been saying that the global economy is in a downward spiral with no logical stopping point until such time as transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system (for starters, this includes banks and structured finance securities).

This prediction was based on two simple observations.

  • First, everyone knows that as a result of the credit bubble bursting the banks have hidden losses on their balance sheets (no we were not fooled by the end of mark to market accounting or adoption of extend and pretend under regulatory forbearance).  


  • Second, Japan has shown with its 2+ lost decades what happens to an economy when policymakers and regulators develop a pathological obsession with helping the banks hide their losses.

For almost 4 years, I have watched policymakers and financial regulators in the US, UK and Europe chose policies that reflect this same pathological obsession with the same or even worse results.

During that time period, I have continued to say that requiring ultra transparency is the simple solution that saves the global economy.  It worked for FDR and his administration and there is no reason to think it would not work now!!!

As I look at the Eurozone banks signing up for funds from the ECB, it has become clear that we have reached the end for the ability of regulators and central bankers to hide the losses in the global financial system.

The reality is that we have a global solvency crisis that central bankers are attacking with the only weapon they have:  massive liquidity.

The Eurozone banks loaded up on central bank funds because investors recognize the banks are insolvent and won't give banks any new funds.  In countries where there is doubt about the solvency of the government, we have been seeing runs on the banks (please note that as long as depositors think they can always get their money back under a government guarantee, depositors don't care about the solvency of the bank).

The crisis of confidence is escalating as the pace of investor/depositor flight is increasing; particularly with the regulator inspired credit crunch and its related economic slowdown and further increase in bad debt impacting the Eurozone.

The question is will the ongoing loss of confidence and related plunge in the economy finally overwhelm the policymakers and regulators pathological obsession with helping the banks to hide their losses?
-------

A quick question: When is a bank no longer a bank?  Is this point reached when a bank receives more of its funding from the central bank than it does from depositors and investors?