Friday, February 24, 2012

Europe's banks bleed from Greek debt crisis

A Reuter's article discussed the previously hidden losses that Eurozone banks were forced to recognize as a result of the Greek debt restructuring.

The scars of Greece's debt crisis were laid bare in heavy losses from a string of European banks on Thursday, and bosses warned the region's precarious finances would continue to threaten economic growth and earnings.
This warning of a threat to economic growth is entirely self serving for the bank bosses.  Even though no linkage actually exists, the threat ties together the level of bank earnings and economic growth.

This blog has documented several examples of financial institutions incurring losses, having negative book capital and continuing to make loans to support economic growth.  These examples include the US Savings and Loans in the mid-1980s.
From France to Germany, Britain to Belgium, four of the region's biggest banks lined up to reveal they lost more than 8 billion euros last year from their Greek bonds holdings. 
"We are in the worst economic crisis since 1929," Credit Agricole chief executive Jean-Paul Chifflet said...
According to the NY Fed, the solution that the FDR Administration came up with for breaking the back of the economic crisis that began in 1929 was to force banks to stop hiding and recognize their losses.
Europe's banks have already written down billions of euros from losses on Greek government bonds and loans, and a deal agreed this week with its creditors will inflict losses of 74 percent on bondholders. 
"We can't say that the writedowns are over," said Franklin Pichard, director at Barclays France. "Even if some can say that the worst is over, we are only at a new stage in terms of provisioning and not necessarily at the end."... 
Problems in Europe's banking sector are far wider than Greece.... 
The region's banks are still repairing the damage of the financial crisis and shrinking their assets. They must also find 115 billion euros by the middle of this year to shore up their balance sheets against future shocks. But any weakening in the economy will hit earnings and make that harder to achieve....
As this blog has repeatedly observed, requiring banks to build up their book capital before they have been required to recognize all of the losses hidden on and off their balance sheet is bad policy.

It does not restore confidence in the banking system.

It does reduce the availability of credit as banks restrict the amount of new lending consistent with achieving higher Tier I capital ratios.
European governments are hoping to avoid more state bailouts to prop up the banking sector, and to limit the fallout should any bank collapse.
As has been shown since the adoption of the Japanese model at the start of the bank solvency crisis, bailouts are a frequent occurrence.  Take Dexia as the latest example.

It is in fact the Japanese model that links the book capital level of the banks to sovereign debt.

Under the Japanese model, bank book capital levels are protected.  This introduces the notion that if bank book capital drops below a certain level the state must invest funds to boost the book capital level.

Under the Swedish model, European government would not have to do any more state bailouts.

The Swedish model recognizes that between deposit insurance and access to liquidity through the central bank, depositors do not need to worry about getting their funds back.  As a result, banks with negative book capital can remain in business until regulators close them down --- see US Savings and Loan example above.

Since banks with negative book capital can remain in business, there is no need for state bailouts.

Just how sizable are the losses being hidden by banks?

Following the confession by RBS's Stephen Hester that with permission from the regulators his bank is hiding losses on and off its balance sheet, the logical follow up questions are:

  • How sizable are the losses being hidden at each bank, throughout the UK, Eurozone and global banking system?
  • How long will it take to work through the hidden losses?

A Bloomberg article provides some insight for the size of the losses from the European commercial property market and how long it might take for the Eurozone banking system to work its way through these losses.

European landlords have 582.7 billion euros ($779 billion) of commercial property debt maturing by the end of 2013 at the same time regulators are urging banks to shrink their balance sheets. 
The maturing loans could trigger writedowns for banks that need to meet stricter capital standards under international accords and as the region’s sovereign debt crisis threatens to dent lender balance sheets. 
If banks demand repayment, it may lead to a surge in foreclosures and restrain economic growth in Europe. 
That’s why regulators are instead encouraging gradual sales of the loans to private-equity firms including Blackstone Group LP (BX) and Dallas-based Lone Star Funds....
European lenders can both avoid writing down the loans and shrink their balance sheets at the same time.

For non-performing loans that the banks want to continue to hide, they simply rollover the loans at maturity.

For performing loans, the banks either demand repayment or sell the loan.  Either way, the banks' reported risk adjusted assets decline and their Tier 1 capital ratio improves.

As this blog has said before, by not requiring the banks to realize their losses before they increase their capital ratios, the numbers reported by the banks are meaningless.  What is meaningful is that to achieve these meaningless numbers, banks are cutting back on extending credit to the real economy (the regulator driven credit crunch) and restraining economic growth.
Most European real-estate debt originated before markets plunged in 2007 is being held on bank balance sheets at 90 percent or more of face value, according to Conor Downey, a partner specializing in real estate and financial reform at law firm Paul Hastings. Potential buyers value them at 50 percent to 60 percent, he said. 
If we say the value is 50 percent, then, based on the 582.7 billion euro exposure, banks are sitting on roughly 291 billion euros of unrecognized, hidden losses.
A substantial “rebound in capital values appears to be at best delayed with no immediate prospects for any strong growth, so I think the banks are probably feeling fairly uncomfortable at the moment,” said Colin Lizieri, a real estate finance professor at Cambridge University.
So much for the gamble on redemption.
European commercial property prices rose 5.3 percent in 2010, according to data from Investment Property Databank Ltd., the latest available. That followed declines of 15.9 percent in 2008 and 2.2 percent in 2009 that left borrowers struggling to repay loans and banks trying to sell soured assets. 
New regulatory requirements mean banks have to increase core capital to 9 percent by June, which may restrict lending. That’s “not a very fortunate plan,” given current market conditions, European Central Bank Governing Council member Ewald Nowotny said last month....
It is worse than a not very fortunate plan.  It is a deliberate action by regulators that is causing significant damage to the real economy.
While relative yields on European commercial mortgage debt packaged into securities narrowed in the last two months, the spreads are wider than a year ago and five times the level in November 2007, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) data. 
Investors demand 505 basis points, or 5.05 percentage points, above lending benchmarks to hold the securities, down from 575 basis points at the end of 2011. The spread has widened from 365 basis points a year ago, the data show. 
European banks hold most of their loans on their books with just 112 billion euros, or 6 percent, securitized at the end of 2010, according to the latest figures from DTZ Research. 
Banks sold 20 billion euros of real-estate loans across Europe and the Middle East last year and a further 13 billion euros is on the market, CBRE Group Inc. said Feb. 21. A total of 20 billion euros will probably be sold this year, according to the broker.
Most of the property debt owned by European banks is secured against properties in unfavorable condition or unattractive locations. 
Suggesting that a 50% loss rate might be optimistic.
In the U.K., two thirds of the properties financed by banks are secured against non-prime property, according to a Dec. 30 report published by the Bank of England. 
Potential acquirers are instead focusing on prime assets, Natale Giostra, CBRE’s European head of debt advisory, said in December. 
Banks may add to the problem if they foreclose on borrowers because more inferior real estate would come onto the market and push down values, said Lizieri at Cambridge University. 
Banks that historically bundled property debt for sale are being discouraged by new rules that mean securitizations require higher levels of capital. Instead, they’re seeking to team up with other banks to package their loans into funds that can be sold. 
Funds “diversify - and therefore improve - each investors’ risk position,” Simon Gleeson, a lawyer at Clifford Chance LLP in London specializing in markets and regulation, said in an e- mail. “You need quite a large number of banks involved, and they need to trust each other only to put in assets of the specified quality. Building that trust may take time.”
Regulatory arbitrage to try to get rid of non-performing assets.
Banks are being “nudged” by regulators toward recognizing bad real estate loans, “but it’s going to end slowly,” said Bob Penn, a partner at Allen & Overy LLP in London. “Regulators report to their political masters and are sensitive to their wishes. They don’t want to drive economic growth off a cliff and they don’t want to trigger another crisis.”
So the blame for not adopting the Swedish model and requiring banks to recognize all of their losses up front is really on the politicians who were adamant that the banks hide their losses and fiscal and monetary policies be adopted that maximized the destruction of the real economy.

Honestly, the regulators pushed for the banks to hide their losses.  As this blog has previously stated, having financial institutions hide losses is the regulators default position.  Example of this abound including the US Savings and Loans.
Private-equity firms are seeking to pick up some of the slack. Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc sold 1.36 billion pounds ($2.14 billion) of commercial real-estate loans to a Blackstone fund in December at about 29 percent less than face value, two people with knowledge of the talks said, who declined to be identified because the deal was private.... 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc (LLOY), Britain’s second-biggest government-aided bank, sold more than 900 million pounds of mortgage-backed loans to Lone Star Funds in December. The loans may have been bought at a 40 percent discount, two people familiar with the matter said.
 For assets like non-prime shopping malls in Spain, “there’s virtually no buyers or at least there’s none unless there’s significantly lower prices,” said Harm Meijer, an analyst at JPMorgan in London. The investment bank expects “falling property prices or at best a flattish market for a long time” across Europe, according to a Jan. 11 note to investors.
Banks will put more distressed real estate up for sale in some parts of Europe this year, Meijer said, and Dutch offices and secondary U.K. properties will be among the assets sold. 
U.K. banks would have to write off billions of pounds if they “seriously attacked” their commercial property loan books through sales, Michael Marx, chief executive officer of Development Securities Plc, (DSC) said by e-mail. RBS said yesterday that its non-core division’s commercial real estate assets were impaired by 3.4 billion pounds in 2011.

Germany, the largest economy in Europe, is not immune, based on the performance of commercial mortgage backed securities issued there. Only 22 percent of German CMBS loans were repaid when they matured last year, compared with 74 percent in France and 38 percent in the U.K., Standard & Poor’s said in a January report.... 
PwC said that it will take 10 years for banks to sell up to 3 trillion euros of assets and expect a similar timeframe for their troubled real estate loans. 
That echoes earlier crises, said Meijer of JPMorgan. “We’ve heard from bankers in Germany that they only worked out the last of their problem loans from the 1970s in recent weeks.”
Please re-read the previous two comments about how long it will take to work out from under the commercial property exposure.

There is a reason that Japan has been pursuing the monetary and fiscal policies it has been for the last 2+ decades.  The reason is it takes forever for the banking system to generate enough capital to absorb the losses.

Thursday, February 23, 2012

RBS' Stephen Hester ends the myth of bank capital being there to absorb losses

In this blog's discussion of the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency crisis, your humble blogger noted that the central element of this model is banks only recognize losses as they generate the capital to absorb them.

As a result, bank book capital is not available to absorb losses on the excesses in the financial system and save Main Street and the real economy.

Never did I expect to read an article in which a banker confirms a) that regulators have adopted the Japanese model and b) that there are losses hidden on and off his bank's balance sheet.

Mr Hester said [RBS], which is 83pc owned by the state, had been "spooked" by the severity of the eurozone crisis into taking "an extra £1bn" of losses for 2011. 
"We got spooked by the dangers of the eurozone so we deliberately spent an extra £1bn that we hadn't planned on in losses to go even faster than we had planned in reducing risk. 
"You can say to me it's a slight Alice in Wonderland world, where extra losses is a good thing and I completely appreciate the difficulty in the communication of that, but those are the facts," said Mr Hester. 
The RBS chief admitted that since its £45bn bailout in 2008, the lender had taken losses when it could "afford" to and used profits to "finesse" its results. 
"We have to finesse it with our own profits as we go through. Each year we have, in a sense, a budget for making losses for clean-up – and the better or worse our profits are, the better or worse that budget is and the faster or slower that we can go," said Mr Hester, adding that the bank had "never" had sufficient capital to recognise all its losses upfront.
Please re-read Mr. Hester's comments as they confirm the UK's adoption of the Japanese model for handling bank solvency and the simple fact that regulators do not use bank capital to absorb losses.

The Volcker Rule: Insights into Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team

This blog has written a number of posts on the Volcker Rule (see here, here, here, and here) to provide some insight into how Wall Street's Proprietary Trading Protection Team operates and what this implies for how Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team is trying to prevent the adoption of ultra transparency.

In a NY Times Dealbook article, Jessie Eisinger looks at the current condition of the Volcker Rule and declares it as good as dead.

The Volcker Rule, named after Paul A. Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, is meant to bar financial institutions that are protected and subsidized by the federal government from trading for their own accounts. That is, it’s pretty simple: Traders shouldn’t speculate for their own personal gain...
Actually, as simple as this statement of the Volcker Rule is, it is more complicated than ultra transparency.  Under ultra transparency, banks disclose all of their current exposure details.

Under the Volcker Rule, there is a question of is a trader speculating or not.  Under ultra transparency, if a bank has an exposure the bank discloses all the information it has on the exposure consistent with protecting individual borrower privacy consistent with HIPAA patient privacy standards and corporate privacy as it relates to projections of future performance.
Yet bank lobbyists with complicit regulators and legislators took a simple concept and bloated it into a 530-page monstrosity of hopeless complexity and vagueness. 
Besides Wall Street, the members of the Protection Team include lobbyists, complicit regulators and legislators.
They couldn’t kill the rule. Instead, they are getting Congress and regulators to render it morbidly obese and bedridden. 
Of course, that is no accident. The biggest banks, which are in business today only because taxpayers bailed them out, want to protect their valuable franchises. 
“Most of the length, complexity and questions are in there because of industry lobbying,” said Dennis Kelleher ... The rule is “the bastard child of the lobbying industry,” he said. “You can’t demand and insist and lobby for all these rules and exemptions and then complain that it’s too long and complex.”
The banks are making sure the rule stays incapacitated.
By redefining the Volcker Rule so that it is now complex, the Protection Team makes it vulnerable to being squashed.

Fortunately, in its expanded form, ultra transparency still fits on one sheet of paper.
By Mr. Kelleher’s count, of the substantive responses, 13 were pro-reform, compared with 300 from the industry.
Based on your humble blogger's personal experience dealing with comments made on the Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive (this article requires commercial and investment banks, broadly defined, to know what they own when buying a structured finance security), this proportion of responses pro versus against reform is typical.


Unfortunately, as the Committee of European Bank Supervisors showed, regulators favor the preponderance of responses even when the responses were created using the same Word document and printed on different letterhead.

The regulators and legislators deserve some sympathy against such an onslaught. But only so much. Responsibility for the gross inadequacy of the Volcker Rule lies with them. They added the loopholes and exceptions. 
Regulators did so out of vanity. They are confident they will be smart enough to navigate all the complexities. 
Regulators have already testified that they wanted to carry out the rule in a nuanced fashion. 
They aspire to distinguish intentional proprietary trading from unintentional cases, a standard that is tantamount to pre-emptive surrender. That will make enforcement all but impossible without a trader stupidly putting something incriminating in an e-mail.
When it comes to ultra transparency, regulators are acting in a similar fashion.

For example, the Federal Reserve believes that putting over 100 of its PhD economists on the bank stress test exercise means it will be smart enough to catch all the ways that the banks can game the stress tests and determine which banks are solvent and which are not.

Hmmm...100 PhD economist versus the thousands of experts, including from the global banking competitors, the market could bring to bear doing stress tests on the data disclosed under ultra transparency.  Which one does common sense says will do a better job (hint:  PhD economists all believe that for markets to be good at pricing they have to be better at analysis than a group of economists)?
Even at this late hour, regulators still have a choice. The final rule is not in place. They could radically simplify it. The law could merely state that prop trading is illegal at banks backed by the government, and not explain what the inevitable exceptions and exemptions would be.... 
Second-best is to introduce some bright-line rules into this monstrosity. Then Volcker would not be hostage to whichever heavily lobbied regulators happen to be on staff at any given moment....
The regulators' choice should be to require banks to provide ultra transparency and comply with the simple description of the Volcker Rule used at the beginning of the article.  Market participants will exert discipline to reduce proprietary trading.
In all their pages of concerns, what is the anti-Volcker crowd most worried about? Nothing convincing. 
Actually, what the anti-Volcker and anti-ultra transparency crowd is most worried about is their paycheck.  It is much harder to make money when you no longer have the benefit of opacity.

RBS: 'the biggest balance sheet time bomb in history'

In a Guardian column, RBS boss Stephen Hester says that he took over 'the biggest balance sheet time bomb in history' and that the losses that have been taken are to defuse this time bomb.

Of course this raises the question of how will any outsider ever know if the bomb has been defused?

Because Mr. Hester or the government says so?

Sorry, market participants learned at the start of the financial crisis the importance of independent confirmation of the contents of a black box.

Ultimately, if Mr. Hester thinks he has successfully defused the balance sheet time bomb, he will be willing to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis the current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so that market participants can independently confirm this for themselves.

Draghi's bazooka: subordinating or bailing out unsecured Eurozone bank debt holders

By re-affirming its right to avoid a write-down on its Greek sovereign debt holdings, the ECB has triggered a long second look at Mario Draghi's bazooka, also known as the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO).

In his Telegraph column, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard observed
ECB boss Mario Draghi has sparked a blistering rally in global asset markets by lending banks as much as they want for three years at 1pc, but bond experts say the side-effects are toxic and the benefits are wearing off. 
"It's a sugar rush," said Alberto Gallo, European credit chief at RBS. "It lowers the risk of defaults, but also lowers recovery rates if things go wrong." 
Lenders must provide the ECB with collateral, at a haircut of up to 65pc, using up ever more of their balance sheets. The ECB has first claim on these assets, pushing other creditors down the pecking order. The longer it goes on, the worse it gets. 
"There is no such thing as a free lunch. Liquidity today comes at the price of subordination tomorrow," said Mr Gallo, warning that BBVA, BNP, Commerzbank, Intesa, Santander and Unicredit are all vulnerable....
I am not sure that I accept Mr. Gallo's analysis.

Remember that the event that triggered the need for the LTRO program was the freezing of both the interbank lending market and the unsecured bank debt market.  These markets froze because no one can evaluate the solvency or risk of any of the Eurozone banks.

The freezing of these markets was important, because the Eurozone banks have billions of euros of interbank loans and unsecured debt maturing.

The primary use of funds from the LTRO is to replace the maturing interbank loans and unsecured debt.

Clearly, as a senior secured lender, the ECB has a higher priority in a bankruptcy proceeding than the unsecured debt.  As Mr. Gallo observed, the unsecured debt holder has been subordinated.

However, this is a short term concern.  So long as the interbank and unsecured debt markets remain frozen, banks will continue to increase their LTRO exposure and pay off the maturing debt.  In the medium to long term, it is not too difficult to imagine the situation where the banks will have replaced all their interbank loans and unsecured debt with LTRO funds.

In addition, the concern over subordination assumes that each bank is solvent (the book value of each bank's liabilities minus the market value of each bank's assets does exceed the current book value of its equity).

If the banks are not solvent, subordination is not a problem as the banks do not have the capacity to repay the unsecured debt holders if the banks were liquidated instead.

Said a slightly different way, the unsecured debt holders are holding positions that are worth less than the par value they receive as a result of the LTRO funding.  In this case, the LTRO is actually a bailout of the unsecured Eurozone bank debt holders.

Back to the Telegraph column.
Mr Gallo said the LTRO has badly eroded the capital structure of banks, pushing many over the edge towards junk status....
In the absence of ultra transparency, it is not clear that the capital structure of the Eurozone banks is not already junk.  That is what the frozen interbank lending and unsecured debt markets are telling us.
Huw Van Steenis, Morgan Stanley's bank strategist, said the bazooka is no panacea even though it has averted a shock as lenders slash loan books in a frantic rush to meet core tier one capital ratios of 9pc by June. "The LTRO will not stop the Great Deleveraging," he said.

WSJ confirms regulatory policy driven credit crunch in Eurozone

As the dust settles over the latest Greek bailout proposal, market participants are beginning to look at what the implications are for Eurozone banks.

Specifically, they are looking at how much more in the way of assets the banks are going to have to dispose of to still reach a 9% Tier I capital ratio by June given the hit to their Tier I capital caused by writing down Greek sovereign debt.

Regular readers know that bank book capital was rendered meaningless at the beginning of the financial crisis when regulators adopted the policy of regulatory forbearance and mark-to-market accounting was suspended.

Since bank book capital is currently meaningless, a regulatory policy of requiring the banks to reach a 9% Tier I capital ratio is meaningless for restoring confidence in the banks, but is meaningful in terms of the credit crunch it precipitates.

Frankly, Eurozone banks are not capable of internally generating capital quickly enough to offset the losses on the Greek debt or the future losses on the debt of Portugal, Spain and maybe Italy.

At the same time, due to a lack of disclosure, investors are unwilling to invest in the banks.  Would you invest in a black box and hope to see both return on and return of your capital?

What all this means for the Eurozone banks is that they have to cut back on lending.

A WSJ article confirms this regulatory policy driven credit crunch in the Eurozone

World financial markets may have breathed a collective sigh of relief over the rescue package for Greece, but European bank stocks have fallen since the announcement Tuesday. 
After a fourth quarter in which many of the Continent's banking institutions wrote down tens of millions of euros on their exposure to Greece, 2012 is likely to be a year of retrenchment as they work to meet strict capital requirements....
The €130 billion ($172.3 billion) Greek package, agreed upon on Tuesday, calls for private investors to take a 53.5% haircut, more than the 50% agreed on in October. Real losses will be as much as 70% after factoring in lower interest rates paid on new debt investors will receive in exchange for their existing Greek bonds. 
Analysts now expect banks to stay in defensive mode, hoarding cash and cutting back on their reliance on debt. Lending is likely to be limited to domestic markets. 
"Top-tier euro-zone banks are building up stocks of short-term liquidity, paring down risk assets to meet tougher regulatory standards for capital adequacy, and tightening credit standards," Standard & Poor's said in a recent note. 
The so-called Basel III rules, agreed upon by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, call for international banks to hold core Tier 1 capital ratios—a measure of their ability to absorb losses—of at least 7%. The rules also impose new requirements for bank liquidity and leverage. 
The European Banking Authority requires European banks to reach a core Tier 1 ratio of 9% by June 2012.

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

PIMCO to quit structured finance trade group

According to a Bloomberg article, PIMCO is going to quit the American Securitization Forum (ASF), a structured finance trade group, because it does not fairly represent the opinions of investors.

This is not surprising given that ASF was created by the sell side's lobbying group Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).

As PIMCO has undoubtedly experience through its participation in the ECB's ABS data warehouse initiative, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME, another offspring of SIFMA and the former European Securitisation Forum) is just like ASF.

Based on the contributions that I have seen made by ASF, AFME and SIFMA to restarting the structured finance industry, it is clear that they are fighting to retain the current level of opacity in structured finance securities and the sell side's informational advantage.

For the last four years, your humble blogger has used a brown paper bag to show the current level of opacity exhibited by structured finance securities.  Simply put, market participants do not have access to current data on the performance of the underlying collateral.  Without this data, they are not investing, but gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

My solution has been to require all structured finance securities to provide observable event based disclosure.  An observable event for the underlying assets includes a payment, delinquency, default, bankruptcy or restructuring.  The day an observable event occurs, it is disclosed.  As a result, market participants always have access to current data on the performance of the underlying collateral and can value the structured finance security.

Pacific Investment Management Co. is quitting the American Securitization Forum (0150170D) after the trade group declined to issue a statement about investors’ views on the nationwide foreclosure settlement this month by five banks, two people with knowledge of the matter said. 
Pimco, manager of the world’s biggest bond fund, informed ASF Executive Director Tom Deutsch of its decision in early February, said the people, who requested anonymity because the talks were private. 
The episode underscored Pimco’s concern that the trade group doesn’t advocate for debt buyers as well as banks that underwrite mortgages, the people said....
This is not surprising because the lineage and heritage of ASF and AFME is as a direct descendent of the sell-side lobbying effort, SIFMA.
The ASF, which counted Pimco Managing Director Daniel Ivascyn as a board member, was founded in 2002 as part of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Wall Street’s biggest lobbying group. In 2010, the New York-based ASF decided to become independent of Sifma. 
Bondholders asked the ASF to publish a press release on their views of the pending foreclosure settlement after being denied last month by Sifma, which cited the “potential legal issues involving the commercial interests of many of our members.” Both organizations include banks that sell, underwrite, service and trade debt. 
U.S. Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan told reporters Feb. 9 that “a relatively small share, in the range of 15 percent, of the principal reduction” for homeowners resulting from the settlement will come from investor-owned loans. 
“Nothing in it requires any trustee or servicer to reduce principal where it’s not allowed legally by the underlying documents,” Donovan said. “The misunderstanding somehow that investors will be paying the banks’ share is just false.”

The ASF is among groups vying to influence policy makers amid the largest financial regulatory overhaul since the 1930s and following a crisis triggered partly by securitization, the packaging of assets such as mortgages into bonds. 
The organization helped spur industry-led reforms meant to revive the almost-frozen market for home-loan securities that aren’t backed by the government. In August, for example, its “Project Restart” initiative offered suggested best practices for new mortgage-bond contracts to aid in dealing with claims of faulty loans....
Based on my experience, there is a gap between actual best practices and what the trade groups claim are best practices.

For example, best practice for tracking a loan portfolio is observable event based reporting and monitoring. It is what banks do internally and it is how loan databases are designed to operate.

However, the trade groups represent that once per month disclosure is best practice (this is the frequency of disclosure for opaque, toxic subprime mortgage backed securities).  Clearly it is not because the supporting information systems are capable of reporting on an observable event basis.

To regular readers, it appears that the trade groups are trying to retain opacity in structured finance and protect Wall Street's informational advantage.

RMBS data warehouse needed if private investors are to replace Fannie and Freddie

Four years after the beginning of the financial crisis, the US government is finally taking the first steps towards addressing the issue of opaque residential mortgage backed securities.

Specifically, as discussed in a Bloomberg article, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has realized that an RMBS data warehouse must be constructed if investors are going to end their buyers' strike.

It is impossible to shrink Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac without these investors.

The only way that these investors are going to be willing to end their buyers' strike is if they are provided with all the useful, relevant information on the underlying collateral performance in an appropriate, timely manner.

For RMBS deals, this information is observable event based disclosure where an observable event with the underlying collateral that causes the information to market participants to be updated includes, but is not limited to, a payment, delinquency, default or bankruptcy.

It is only with observable event based disclosure that market participants have current information on the assets backing the security.

Without this information, market participants are left with the disclosure practices that exist for opaque, toxic mortgage backed securities.  We know how that turned out.

With no plan from Congress or the Obama administration to shutter Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the companies’ regulator told Congress today it will expand its oversight with a strategic plan to develop new systems and standards for home loans. 
The companies, which own or guarantee most of the nation’s mortgages, exist in an extended policy limbo that poses new risks to taxpayers and the housing market, said Edward J. DeMarco, acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
The mandate to protect taxpayers must be balanced with the need to invest in staff and infrastructure, he said. 
“Conservatorship can’t go on forever,” DeMarco said today in a telephone interview. “If we want to have a secondary mortgage market in the future without Fannie and Freddie we have to start investing.” 
The companies are “complex financial institutions with complex business processes, information technology structures and important human capital,” he said.

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

FHFA urges creation of a single utility-like platform for selling mortgages to investors

In a letter to Congress, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees Fannie and Freddie, called for the creation of a single utility-like platform for selling mortgages to investors.  Combined with efforts to standardize data, the platform could pave the way for restarting mortgage securitization and reducing government exposure to mortgages.

At the beginning of the financial crisis, your humble blogger proposed creating this mortgage database (it is a subset of the Mother of all Financial databases).

[Full disclosure:  your humble blogger has a patent that would cover the database being talked about by FHFA.]
FHFA identifies three strategic goals for the next phase of the conservatorships:
 Build.  Build a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market; 
 Contract. Gradually contract the Enterprises’ dominant presence in the marketplace while simplifying and shrinking their operations; and
 Maintain.   Maintain foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages.
“With the conservatorships operating for more than three years and no near-term resolution in
sight, it is time to update and extend the goals and directions of the conservatorships,”
DeMarco wrote.   
“FHFA is contemplating next steps to build an infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market that is consistent with existing policy proposals and will support any outcome of the leading legislative proposals.  FHFA looks forward to working with Congress and the Administration on a resolution of the conservatorships and a comprehensive review of the nation’s housing finance system,” said DeMarco.