Monday, May 28, 2012

Investors have lost confidence in Spain

According to a Telegraph report, Nicholas Spiro, at Spiro Sovereign Strategy observed
The Spanish crisis has reached a tipping point. Investors have lost confidence in Spain. 
The botched bail-out of Bankia was the trigger for this morning's abrupt sell-off - a sell-off that threatens to turn into a rout unless bold and decisive measures are swiftly taken by eurozone policymakers to shore up the bloc's endangered sovereigns and their banks. 
Spain has become the focal point for market anxiety about the pernicious links between distressed sovereigns and their banks. 
Although Spain's banking woes are much less severe than Ireland's, the same negative feedback loop that felled Ireland in 2010 is undermining confidence in Spain. 
What is most concerning, and what necessitates speedy action on the part of the eurozone, is that the Rajoy government is stuck in a rut. It is in a 'damned if it does and damned if it doesn't situation'.
Regular readers know that adoption of the Swedish model with ultra transparency is the only solution that successfully addresses all of the concerns expressed by Mr. Spiro.

It separates sovereigns from their banks as future retained earnings become the source for rebuilding the banks' book equity levels.

It ends the undermining of confidence in Spain by ending the need for Spain's governments to make statements about how bad the situation with its banks is and risk having these statements being shown as false within days.  With ultra transparency, the market participants assess exactly what is going on with the banks for themselves.


By unnecessarily bailing out its banks, Spain runs out of money

As reported in the Telegraph by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Spain has run out of money as it does not have the financial capacity to bail out is banks.

The direct result of the decision to unnecessarily put capital into its banks is that Spain, like Ireland and Greece, will have to turn to the EU, ECB and IMF for funding.

Your humble blogger has consistently maintained that this decision is only beneficial for bankers.  It is truly detrimental to Spain's real economy and its citizens.

That policymakers endorse bailing out banker bonuses and hurting their citizens is not surprising.  Policymakers engage bankers and former bankers to provide advice.


By definition, bankers are great salesmen whose every utterance is 100% reflects and is focused on advancing their self-interest.  


Whether the bankers' self-interest is also in Spain or any other country's best interest is a separate question that policymakers have to answer for themselves before accepting the bankers' advice.

Since the beginning of this financial crisis, there has always been an alternative to advancing the bankers' self-interest and saving bankers' bonuses.

The alternative has been the adoption of the Swedish model with ultra transparency.  Under this policy, banks would be required to recognize all the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets.

Premier Mariano Rajoy and his inner circle have allegedly accepted that Spain will have to call on Europe's EFSF bail-out fund to rescue the banking system, even though this means subjecting his country to foreign suzerainty. 
Since it is in the bankers' interest that this occurs, you have to wonder who told the press.
Mr Rajoy denies the story, not surprisingly since it would be a devastating climb-down, and not all options are yet exhausted.
"There will not be any (outside) rescue for the Spanish banking system," he said.
Which is absolutely true if the Spanish government adopts the Swedish model with ultra transparency.
Fine, so where is the €23.5bn for the Bankia rescue going to come from? The state's Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) is down to €5.3bn, and there are many other candidates for that soup kitchen. 
Spain must somehow rustle up €20bn or more on the debt markets. This will push the budget deficit back into the danger zone, though Madrid will no doubt try to keep it off books – or seek backdoor funds from the ECB to cap borrowing costs. Nobody will be fooled....
Actually, under the Swedish model with ultra transparency, the source of the 23.5 billion euros is retention of future bank earnings.

The IIF provided a study which shows that future bank earnings would be sufficient to rebuild the Spanish banks' book capital levels after absorbing over 200 billion euros of losses in under 4 years.
This all has a very Irish feel to me, without Irish speed and transparency. Spanish taxpayers are swallowing the losses of the banking elites, sparing creditors their haircuts.
As shown by Ireland, exactly the wrong strategy.
Barclays Capital says Spain's housing crash is only half way through. Home prices will have to fall at least 20pc more to clear the 1m overhang of excess properties. If so, the banking costs for the Spanish state are going to be huge. 
The Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels puts likely write-offs at €270bn. We could see Spain's public debt surge into triple digits in short order.
Only if Spain unnecessarily recapitalizes the banks.
A Spanish economist sent me an email over the weekend after the Bankia details came out saying: 
"It looks like game over for the sovereign and the financial sector at the same time. Unless we get a Deus ex Machina, we'll be discussing much more seriously the benefits of a return to the peseta in no time."
The Swedish model with ultra transparency solves this problem.

Bankia writedowns cast doubt on Spain's bank estimates

A Bloomberg article confirmed your humble blogger's prediction that the Spanish government would undermine its credibility by making misleading statements about the true extent of the troubled assets in the Spanish banking system.

Spain’s two-week effort to overhaul its lenders and estimate for what it will cost taxpayers may already look out of date. 
Economy Minister Luis de Guindos said May 11 that a law tightening provisioning rules, his second in three months, would require public funds of less than 15 billion euros ($19 billion).  
BFA-Bankia, the bank nationalized the same week, said on May 25 it was taking 8.5 billion euros of provisions on top of those demanded by the two decrees, as it sought a 19 billion- euro state bailout.... 
“They’ve done two reforms already and there will probably be more; I don’t know how many more,” Javier Diaz-Gimenez, a professor at the IESE business school in Madrid, said in a telephone interview. “They have zero credibility.”...
Please re-read the highlighted text because it summarizes why Spain and every other country must require their banks to provide ultra transparency.

It is only when the banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants have the information they need to independently assess the banks.  It is only when market participants can conduct an independent assessment that they trust they know the condition of a bank.
“They are trying to do the minimum all the time and kick the can down the road,” Juan Rubio-Ramirez, an economics professor at Duke University and visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, said by phone yesterday. 
This is a direct reflection of policymakers and financial regulators having adopted the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  The policies adopted under this model are all about kicking the can down the road and praying for a miracle to solve the problem.
Efforts so far have focused on assets linked to the real estate industry, while the government and executives including Banco Santander SA Chief Executive Alfredo Saenz have said that household mortgages don’t pose a risk. Spain’s unemployment rate exceeds 24 percent and the economy is suffering its second recession since 2009. 
“Mortgages get paid in good times and in bad,” Saenz said on April 27. “Anyone raising this problem as one of the issues for the Spanish financial system is saying something stupid.”
Bankia may have cast doubt on that position by setting aside another 2.2 billion euros in provisions for individual loans, most of which are residential mortgages.....

Unemployed people don't pay their mortgages after they have exhausted their savings.

As part of de Guindos’s latest overhaul, Spain has commissioned Oliver Wyman Ltd. and Roland Berger AG to carry out a stress test on all Spanish banks’ entire loan book. That will be followed by a detailed audit carried out by three companies. 
“There should be a higher level of non-real estate provisions, whether that’s done through legislation or informally on the back of this external review,” Nomura’s Quinn said in a telephone interview. “There will be pressure for every domestic Spanish bank, except Santander and BBVA, to raise capital if you assume the kind of provisioning we’ve seen in Bankia.”
In the absence of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, neither the stress tests nor the detailed audit will restore the banks' or the government's credibility. 

Secret plan for Brussels to takeover ailing EU banks

The Telegraph carried an interesting article on a plan being developed in Brussels for both EU-wide deposit insurance and an ability to seize ailing banks in the EU.

Regular readers know that as part of the blueprint to save the financial system, your humble blogger has been advocating the creation of an EU-wide deposit insurance mechanism.  The initial source of funding for this mechanism being the available procedes from the European Financial Stability Fund and the European Stability Mechanism.

Regular readers also know that as part of the blueprint to save the financial system, I think an EU-wide ability to seize banks is unnecessary.

In a modern banking system with deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding banks can operate and make loans to support the real economy for years with negative book capital levels.  During this time, they can rebuild their book capital levels through retention of earnings.

If a bank is incapable of generating earnings, then the national government in its host nation should oversee its resolution.

Struggling European banks could be seized and controlled by Brussels as part of secret plans being drawn up, it has emerged. 
Politicians hope the proposals, which would be funded by a new tax on banks, will stem the rapid escalation in the debt crisis witnessed in recent weeks.
Please note, this plan will do nothing to address the escalation in the debt crisis caused by the EU politicians creating redenomination risk by insisting that Greece has to leave the EU if it rejects austerity.
The plan is being formulated alongside Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti's desire for a guarantee on bank deposits. 
Mr. Monti confirms your humble blogger's observation that so long as depositors think that the sovereign can perform on its deposit guarantee or that the sovereign is backstop by an entity that can perform on the deposit guarantee, depositors will leave their money in the banking system.

As soon as depositors believe that the deposit guarantee might not be honored, then you have a run on the banks.
The annual levy would be placed into a "deposit guarantee scheme", with the fund - backed by the EU, ECB or European Stability Mechanism - also having the power to take over struggling banks. 
"Once you have got to a point intellectually where you are comfortable with a central European guarantee on all bank deposits, it takes only another small step to accept that this fund should have broader powers," the Sunday Times quoted one financier working on the plans as saying.
As everyone knows, 100% of the advice offered by financiers/bankers is in their best interest.  The critical question that regulators and policymakers have to ask is this advice also in the EU's best interest?

Is the ability to take over struggling banks in the EU's best interest?

Alternatively, it takes only another small step to accept that this fund should only guarantee deposits at EU financial institutions that provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, the deposit guarantee scheme could piggy-back off the market's assessment of the risk of each bank and charge the bank a deposit insurance premium that reflects the risk of the bank.

Confirming bank bailouts are unnecessary, Bankia bailout 'investment, not loan'

The Telegraph had an article that confirms that government bailouts of banks in a modern financial system, a system with deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, is completely unnecessary and detrimental to the health of the real economy.

The president of Spanish lender Bankia says the €23.5bn in state aid it will receive in the country's biggest-ever bank bailout will be treated as an investment to make profit for the government and not as a loan. 
In a statement released on Sunday, Jose Ignacio Goirigolzarri appeared to be trying to reassure markets after the press questioned what he meant by comments the day before that "we don't need to talk about giving any of it back". 
He says Bankia's responsibility is not to return that capital, but "to generate value and profitability for that contribution". 
Given that management sees the bailout as an investment, why didn't management get the money from the private sector?

Is the investment from the government at terms that are far more favorable than the private sector would offer?  If so, this is a bad deal for Spanish taxpayers.

Are there any private investors who are willing to invest in Bankia?  In the absence of ultra transparency, why would they because they have no way to assess the risk?
The news came after it was revealed that Bankia expects to sell off its vast portfolio of industrial holdings, that includes a stake in the parent company of British Airways and Iberia.
Why haven't these already been sold to absorb the losses the government and previous Bankia management team knew were on Bankia's balance sheet?
Mr Goirigolzarri, who took over as president of Bankia earlier this month, outlined plans a day after it emerged Spain's fourth largest saving bank would need a bail-out fund of a further €19bn (£15bn) from the government. 
Bankia would be "solid, efficient and profitable" after the recapitalisation Mr Goirigolzarri said, adding that the government and Bank of Spain fully backed the plan.
Confirmation that Bankia is fully capable of retaining future earnings and rebuilding its book capital level without the government bailout.

This is a very important point.  The IIF suggested that recognizing all the losses in and recapitalizing the Spanish banking sector could be accomplished in as little as 4 years if banks retained all of their earnings.
The bank's new management has identified €15.6bn in provisions it must make against potential future losses, the vast majority in toxic property loans. Last week Bankia had to revise its 2011 results to show a net loss of €2.979bn instead of the €209m it originally reported.
Without Bankia providing ultra transparency, is there any reason that market participants should believe this level of provisioning is adequate?

Sunday, May 27, 2012

NY Times' Peter Eavis Part II: Dark nooks in JP Morgan's fortress balance sheet

In a NY Times Dealbook article, Peter Eavis explores the issue of how are assets that don't trade very much valued on a bank balance sheet.

Regular readers will recall that your humble blogger has been calling for ultra transparency to be applied in this area.  For example, I have been calling for observable event based reporting for all structured finance securities (an example being a subprime mortgage backed security).

With observable event based reporting market participants always know the current status of the underlying collateral (reporting takes place on the business day after an event like a payment, delinquency, default or modification takes place with the underlying collateral).  This is the data that is necessary if an investor is going to be able to independently assess the security and know what they own.

When there is ultra transparency, market participants can independently assess value.  As a result, even if a security does not trade very often, price can still be determined by the market and not by internal bank models.

Banks get to play a fun game every quarter that could be called Guess the Value of Your Assets!
With ultra transparency, the market will also estimate the value of the bank's assets.  The result of the market's estimate reveals whether the bank is conservative or aggressive in its valuations.
JPMorgan Chase plays it more than its peers. 
The bank’s claim that it has a “fortress balance sheet” took a knock after its high-rolling traders racked up more than $2 billion of losses on some derivatives bets. It will be telling to see how the losses – and the trades themselves – show up in crucial areas of JPMorgan’s balance sheet for the second quarter. 
One place to focus on will be disclosures for the bank’s “Level 3” assets. That’s the accounting designation given to assets that don’t trade much. Banks set the value of these assets – which can be bonds, loans, stocks or derivatives — mostly according to their own models. 
Level 3 assets became a problem during the financial crisis. When markets dried up, banks no longer had reliable prices for many assets. This prompted fears that bank balance sheets were getting weighed down with hard-to-sell positions of questionable value. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as opacity plays into the fears about banks in two ways.

First, there were the opaque, hard to value assets.

Second, there were the opaque, bank balance sheets that prevented market participants from knowing what was on them.

Both of these areas require ultra transparency so that market participants can independently assess and value them.
At the end of 2008, Citigroup had $146 billion of Level 3 assets. That was equivalent to 455 percent of Citigroup’s tangible common equity, a conservative measure of a bank’s capital. At the same time, Bank of America was at 121 percent, and JPMorgan was at 164 percent.
Things have changed. In the first quarter, Citigroup’s Level 3 assets were 39 percent of its tangible common equity, and Bank of America’s were equivalent to 33 percent. But JPMorgan has remained somewhat elevated. Its $109.2 billion of Level 3 assets were 84 percent of its tangible common equity in the first quarter. ...
Right now, the vast majority of the bank’s $252 billion of credit derivatives are classified as Level 2, which may still involve some guesswork by banks. But the bet is so big that it’s reportedly skewing the indicated market prices of such credit derivatives. 
Does JPMorgan rely heavily on those prices? Or will valuing the trade place more emphasis on what it thinks prices should be? 
I wonder if JP Morgan includes the $75 billion of European residential mortgage-backed securities in Level 2 or Level 3 assets.  After all, according to the International Financing Review, JP Morgan trades these assets between its CIO and an affiliate.

NY Times' Peter Eavis: Part I - JP Morgan's deficient disclosure

In a NY Times Dealbook article, Peter Eavis examines what JP Morgan disclosed about its losing trade and concludes that there needs to be trade position level disclosure.

Regular readers recognize this as a call for ultra transparency under which the banks would be required to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

So many questions still dangle over JPMorgan Chase’s disastrous credit bet. Here is one more: Why is it so hard to find answers in the bank’s public financial filings?
Since JPMorgan announced more than $2 billion of losses on the trade earlier this month, the bank has largely relied on its chief executive, Jamie Dimon, to talk about the bet. 
He has not provided meaningful specifics when analysts have asked for them. And JPMorgan has neither released new filings with details about the mechanics of the trade nor used existing disclosures to help outsiders get to the bottom of what is going on.
This is par for the course on Wall Street. Bank filings rarely contain data that could give warning of a trading blowup. And when a big bet does go bad, banks usually stay tight-lipped about it.
But JPMorgan’s problems may show the need for better disclosure about trading positions....
Please re-read the highlighted text because this is Mr. Eavis' call for ultra transparency.
But beyond inadequate value-at-risk information, a lot seems missing from JPMorgan’s disclosures about its hedges — the trades the bank makes to offset risks elsewhere...
Even Jamie Dimon wanted to see these trades when he demanded to 'see the positions'.
Why does hedge disclosure matter? 
Investors might have asked questions earlier about what was going on at the chief investment office if JPMorgan had more clearly broken out its hedging activity. 
In particular, outsiders might have seen how much protection was sold as a hedge and pressed the bank for answers. 
Selling protection is effectively the same as buying more bonds; if the bonds go down in value, so will the sold protection. So how can that be a hedge, investors might have asked? And if the sold protection was a modification to an existing hedge to make it less bearish, what was going wrong with the initial hedge? ...
JPMorgan is reluctant to provide the nitty-gritty details of the broken hedge because it fears other market players will bet against the trade if they know its characteristics, making the bank’s losses even bigger.
One of the reasons that requiring ultra transparency will reduce, if not eliminate, banks betting or engaging in activities where opacity is a key element of profitability.
Still, company disclosure requirements are not intended for the convenience of management, nor are they meant to protect a company’s bottom line. Instead, public companies are required to release standardized financial statements so investors have information to make independent judgments. 
It is only with ultra transparency that investors have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for making a full informed independent judgment.
In other words, when disclosure works well, company executives do not get to have full control over the flow of information — even on bad trades.

Saturday, May 26, 2012

Felix Salmon joins the bandwagon supporting ultra transparency

In his post on Why JP Morgan's gamblers need to be spun off, Felix Salmon puts forth the principle that the Too Big to Fail should not have any trading desk that needs to operate in secrecy to succeed.

Regular readers know that this is simply a restatement of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Ultra transparency effectively puts an end to these trading desks.

There’s a much deeper issue here as well — which is whether big commercial banks should have hotshot trading desks staffed by the likes of Achilles Macris and Bruno Iksil at all. 
Both Peter Eavis and Jonathan Weil have new columns decrying the opacity of JP Morgan’s public disclosures: the bank seems to make it as difficult as possible for its owners to find out just how much risk it’s taking and where. 
And not just its owners, either: the owners’ representatives on the board, JP Morgan’s risk committee, is deliberately staffed by muppets. 
There’s a good reason for that, of course: hedge funds need to operate in secrecy, because if the market can work out what their positions are, it will move sharply against them. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis.
JP Morgan’s CIO is a hedge fund in all respects except the fees it charges, and clearly the CIO (and the CEO) want its activities to be effectively unsupervised. That’s almost certainly the reason that the CIO is effectively based in London: it’s largely outside the scope of US regulators, there, while UK regulators tend not to care too much about the actions of foreign banks, when those actions don’t present a big risk to the UK economy.
As long as regulators have an information monopoly, it will always be possible for the banks to hide the risk of their positions.

This is a result of the simple fact that regulators do not approve or disapprove of individual positions.  Rather, they try to guess if the bank is adequately capitalized to absorb any potential losses from a given position.
So here’s another principle, which might be helpful alongside the Volcker Rule, in any principles-based regulatory regime: if you’re a too-big-to-fail commercial bank, you shouldn’t have any desk which needs to operate in secrecy in order to do its job effectively.
Agreed.  Thanks for the support of ultra transparency as it ends the secrecy needed to by these desk to operate effectively.

Bloomberg's William Pesek explains why the EU should adopt the Swedish model

Bloomberg columnist William Pesek uses the 1997 Asian financial crisis to illustrate why the EU should adopt the Swedish model.

Fifteen years on, the world finds itself upside down. In 1997, Asia sent contagion to the West; since 2008, Europe and the U.S. have returned the favor by sending turmoil eastward. 
Now, Europe is looking to deep-pocketed Asian nations for help. It should be doing something else: learning the lessons from Asia’s collapse and impressive revival. 
Asia showed the world the danger of ill-timed austerity, denial and slavish devotion to conventional economic policies amid very unconventional circumstances. 
Why, then, is Europe resorting to a crisis-response toolbox that Asia clearly demonstrated doesn’t work?
Because Europe has chosen the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  The crisis-response toolbox reflects this choice.
Europe is still putting politics ahead of economics....
Not surprising given how much the finance industry spends both on lobbying and donations to influence the political process.
Europe is forgetting that the quicker you deal with the root of financial problems, however painful that may be, the quicker you can recover from them. ...
The Swedish model is focused on quickly dealing with the root of the financial problems and it has a track record of promoting fast recovery (Iceland being the most recent example).

Wall Street rescuing Main Street does in fact concentrate the pain on Wall Street.
Korea came clean rapidly about the true magnitude of its public and private indebtedness, retooled its economy and improved competitiveness. Greece has done little heavy lifting, be it restructuring debt, defaulting or leaving the euro. Denial and delay are setting the euro zone back. 
Korea adopted the Swedish model.
Seoul’s post-1997 reforms are paying big dividends 15 years later. Today, when the nation tosses around the marketing slogan “Dynamic Korea,” no one is laughing. ... 
Where will Spain be in, say, 2027? Will it be a top 14 economy, as Korea is today? Will its consumers be using euros or pesetas? It’s anyone’s guess. Europe’s failure to heed Asia’s lessons doesn’t leave me optimistic.

Bankia bailout shows why it is important to 'go in and have a good look at the assets'

As reported by Bloomberg,
The Bankia (BKIA) group, a Spanish lender nationalized earlier this month, will seek 19 billion euros ($23.8 billion) of government funds as it provisions against real estate and non-property loans.... 
The group needs a further 4 billion euros to cover real estate on top of provisions already ordered by the government, and 5.5 billion euros for the rest of its loan book, it said. 
The unraveling of Bankia has deepened concern about the health of Spain’s banks and increased the government’s financing costs as it struggles with the debt crisis. 
The restructuring costs for BFA, which come on top of 4.5 billion euros from a first government bailout, compare with a May 11 estimate from Economy Minister Luis de Guindos that less than 15 billion euros of public funds would be needed to support the whole industry.
Since reality has turned out to be radically different than the government minister suggested, there is a very good reason to doubt anything that the government has to say about the banks going forward.
“Bankia is the tip of an iceberg as we’ve been saying all along,” said Tobias Blattner, an economist at Daiwa Capital Markets in London, in a phone interview yesterday. “It’s a very large institution, it’s systemically important and it needs to be dealt with properly.”...
Which is why your humble blogger has been saying that Bankia should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose all of its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  That way, the market can assess just how insolvent it is.

At the same time, because Spain has a modern financial system with deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, the government does not have to bail out Bankia.  Rather, it can let Bankia rebuild it book capital levels through retention of future earnings.

If Bankia is representative of the Spanish banking system, the IIF has done a study that indicates it will take about 4 years for Bankia to retain enough earnings to rebuild its capital base.
Bankia announced yesterday a restated 2011 loss of 2.98 billion euros, “without reservations from auditors.”...
It is not surprising that the auditors would have no reservations.  Through the end of 2011, Bankia was operating under regulatory forbearance and was allowed to engage in practices like 'extend and pretend'.  As a result, there was no need for Bankia's financial statements to reflect the permanent loss of value on many of its loans.
De Guindos told parliament on May 23 that Spain would provide as much public money as necessary for the Bankia group as he said it was a “specific case,” without any read-across for the rest of the industry.
There is no read-across of course if one assumes that borrowers do not approach multiple banks to see which will give them the lowest cost loan.

There is no read-across of course if one assumes that Bankia had a monopoly on all the bad real estate related to Spain's real estate bubble.

There is no read-across of course if one assumes that Mr. De Guindos knows what he is talking about after Bankia asked for a bigger bailout than he thought the entire Spanish banking system would need.
“It’s a big number for the restructuring, much more than the government had previously required, and shows the importance of going in and having a good look at the assets,” said Daragh Quinn, an analyst at Nomura International in Madrid.
Please re-read the highlighted text as here is an analyst saying why ultra transparency is needed.  The simple fact is that market participants don't believe either the government or the bank!