Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Like US and Irish financial regulators, Spain's missed or downplayed problems in banking sector

The NY Times carried a terrific article exploring yet another example of financial regulators publicly downplaying the risks in their banking systems.

This article confirmed a principal finding of the Nyberg report on the Irish financial crisis that the current structure of bank supervision causes financial instability because it suppresses expressing dissenting opinions on the riskiness of the financial system to the public.

While your humble blogger appreciates that regulators don't want to say anything that would cause market participants to question the safety and soundness of the banks or potentially trigger a bank run, this lack of criticism creates several problems.

First, it contributes to market participants mis-pricing the risk of the banks.  Since the regulators have an informational monopoly on the data needed to fully assess the risk of the banks, the regulators statements influence the perception of risk at the banks.

Second, it undermines the credibility of the government when it comes to dealing with a financial crisis.  Has anyone else noticed a cycle under which policymakers and financial regulators roll out a solution, sound the all clear and then repeat the exercise when the solution is shown as inadequate?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger proposed a new model for bank supervision that ends these problems.  The model is based on the idea of ending the financial regulators' information monopoly.

Specifically, it requires the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can assess the risk of each bank for themselves.

As a result, regulators do not have to offer up an opinion on the banks.  In fact, the regulators can easily piggyback off of the markets' analytical capability in their internal assessment of the banks.

It ends the cycle of inadequate solutions.  In particular, it ends the perception that governments and banks are hiding something.

As Spain edged closer to a real estate and banking crisis that led to its recent bank bailout, Spanish financial leaders in influential positions mostly played down concerns that something might go terribly wrong. 
The optimism of Spanish central bankers who went on to top jobs at the International Monetary Fund echoes the attitudes of officials in the United States who misjudged the force of a housing collapse several years ago that crippled banks and the economy. And it underscores the complications that can arise when government officials take watchdog roles at international agencies that pass judgment on the policies they once directed....
From their lofty perches, first at Spain’s central bank and then as the I.M.F.’s top executives assessing global banking risk, José Viñals and Jaime Caruana were well positioned to sound alarms about the looming bank debacle. 
But at a news conference in Washington in April 2010, when analysts were raising red flags about failing Spanish real estate loans, Mr. Viñals — who a year earlier had succeeded Mr. Caruana — offered assurances. The Spanish system was “fundamentally sound,” he said, and its needs for cash “very small.” 
A year later, as the banking crisis showed little sign of improving, Mr. Viñals again called for calm, saying the market panic that had led to bailouts in Ireland and Portugal would not infect Spain. 
Now that the recent failure of Bankia, the big mortgage lender, has prompted a 100 billion euro (about $125 billion) European rescue, it is clear that Mr. Viñals’s forecasts were too sanguine. 
Mr. Caruana was no more prescient. Pressed at an I.M.F. news conference in July 2008 about falling house prices in Spain, he acknowledged there might be loan losses. But he said, “The financial system in Spain is able to cope with that and is properly capitalized.”...
The names have changed, but the same story could be told of senior bank regulators in Ireland and the US.
Certainly, Spanish officials were slow to acknowledge the depths of the problem. 
In early May, Rodrigo Rato, then the executive chairman of Bankia, told journalists that the bank was in a situation of “great robustness, both in terms of solvency and liquidity.” 
Even after the bank’s bailout a few days later, Spain’s economy minister predicted that no more than 15 billion euros of public funds would be required to clean up the banks....
Officials everywhere have been slow to acknowledge the depths of the problem.
Most prominent by far was Mr. Rato, now better known for his disastrous two-year run at the helm of Bankia. In 2004, he was picked to lead the I.M.F. after winning global recognition during an eight-year run supervising Spain’s growth burst as the country’s economy minister. 
Until he left the fund three years later, Mr. Rato was better known for praising Spain’s economic miracle — one that relied largely on revenue driven by real estate to drive growth and balance budgets — than questioning its sustainability. 
He considered himself the intellectual father of that miracle, as he made clear in a 2004 speech, citing his reforms as marking “a new era in economic policy” for Spain. Mr. Rato, too, declined to be interviewed for this article. 
There were many others, of course, who did not foresee the Spanish banking blowup. 
Topping the list is Europe’s main bank overseer, the European Banking Authority. 
In December 2011, the authority concluded that Spain’s two strongest institutions — Santander and BBVA — would need to raise more money than the 1.3 billion euros that was required of Bankia, which would need to be rescued just six months later.... 
In Spain, the increase in house prices between 2000 and 2007 was particularly extreme — so much so that as early as 2006, a team of inspectors within the Bank of Spain sent a cautionary report to the government. 
The study criticized the “passive attitude” of Mr. Caruana, who led the central bank from 2000 to 2006, and the extraordinary acceleration of loans to homebuyers and real estate developers. 
The inspectors also warned of Spanish banks engaging in unusually heavy short-term borrowing at levels far beyond their deposits. 
The 2006 report painted a much darker picture than Mr. Rato and the I.M.F. saw a short time later when the fund made its own assessment in 2007 of Spain’s economic and financial health — and the Bank of Spain’s ability to rein in excesses. 
The analysis praised the “dynamism of Spain’s financial system,” and said that “its strong, prudential supervision and regulation remain a forte of the economy.”...
In fact, up through the 2008 global financial crisis, Bank of Spain officials had become the toast of the international regulatory circuit for their innovations. Most notable of those was a so-called dynamic provisioning policy, a set of rules that forces banks to set aside extra cash during good economic times to protect against the inevitable rainy days.
For a time, Spanish financial institutions were hailed as paragons of responsible banking — having set aside over 110 billion euros in reserves. 
But José Garcia Montalvo, a real estate specialist based in Barcelona, says that this figure could have been higher — and the banks better prepared for the housing collapse when it came. 
The reserves proved insufficient, he said, because the Spanish central bank in 2004, led then by Mr. Caruana, succumbed to bank lobbying and pressure from Europe by halving the amount that banks had to set aside to 15 percent of overall loans, from 30 percent. 
From that point, Spanish bank lending, already growing at 14 percent annually, went into overdrive — up 27 percent in 2005 and an additional 25 percent in 2006.
Yet another replay of the Irish experience.
Mr. Caruana’s career has since thrived. After just three years at the I.M.F., he left in 2009 for one of the plum global finance jobs: chief executive of the Bank for International Settlements, the Basel-based regulatory body that serves as a forum for the world’s central banks. 
Last weekend, in a speech that explored the roots of the financial crisis, Mr. Caruana highlighted the economic distortions caused by frantic real estate lending, and he called for banks to be quicker to recognize losses and raise capital — although he did not mention Spain by name

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

Mervyn King: Recovery still five years away

The Telegraph reported that Mervyn King warns

Britain is facing at least five more years of financial pain ... which pushed his earlier prediction for a full recovery back by three years, [reflecting] the scale of problems in the eurozone as well as his fears for the global economy. 
Addressing MPs at the Treasury Select Committee (TSC), Sir Mervyn said: “When this crisis began in 2007, most people did not believe we would still be here. I don’t think we’re yet half way through this. I’ve always said that and I’m still saying it. My estimate of how long it will take to recover is expanding all the time. 
“We have to regard this as a long-term project to get back to where we were, but we’re nowhere near starting that yet. We’re in a deep crisis with enormous challenges.” 
The Governor added that the Bank had not ruled out cutting rates from their current historic low of 0.5pc right down to zero, reflecting policies in countries like the US and Japan. “It may well be the case that if conditions in money markets and deposit rates change then we could well reduce it,” he said.
Regular readers are not surprised by Mr. King's statement as they reflect the simple reality of policymakers having chosen the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

By choosing to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses, the result is the burden of dealing with the excess debt in the financial system falls on the real economy.  This burden is more than the real economy can support and results in a downward economic contraction spiral.

You chose the Japanese model, you get the last 2+ decades of Japanese economic performance.


Despite failure of Fed, ECB attempts to gain bank supervisory powers

Despite the clear failure of the Federal Reserve in its bank supervisory role both before and after the beginning of the financial crisis, the ECB is attempting to gain bank supervisory authority.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger worked for the Federal Reserve.  Based on my observations then and what I have seen occur since, the combination of monetary and bank supervisory authority in one organization does not result in 1 + 1= 2, but rather 1 + 1= -2.

Ask a simple question:  did combining monetary and supervisory authority result in the US and its banks avoiding the financial crisis?

The answer is an emphatic NO!

Given that the result of combining monetary and bank supervisory authority was a disaster, why should a lender of last resort be involved in bank supervision.  The argument is that the lender of last resort needs the intimate knowledge of a bank it lends money to that can only be gained from supervision.

As everyone other than a current or former central banker knows, 21st century information technology is a substitute for and an improvement on direct supervision.

If banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, using 21st century information technology, all market participants, including central banks, can have an intimate knowledge of the bank.  No supervisory authority required.

More importantly, by not having supervisory responsibility, it allows the lender of last resort to be objective.

With supervisory responsibility comes many forms of capture including capture of the monetary authority.

First, there is regulatory capture that takes the form of the banks 'working' with the regulators on how to interpret the bank exposure details.  The Nyberg report on the Irish financial crisis documented how banks use this relationship to influence the regulator's assessment of risk in the banks' favor.

Second, there is the regulatory capture that comes from underestimating the size of the losses at a bank. In this case, the regulator finds itself in an awkward position.  Does it publicly acknowledge that it failed in its supervisory role?

Despite his many contributions in the conduct of monetary policy, Paul Volcker's central bank legacy includes the doctrine of not only not disclosing this information to the public, but trying to find a solution behind closed doors.

As your humble blogger previously discussed, this doctrine was first used when the Loans to Less Developed Countries (LDC) crisis hit.

Rather than acknowledge the losses on the banks' books, the Fed became a charter member of the Opacity Protection Team by actively supporting opacity with regards to the losses.  Specifically, the Fed adopted regulatory forbearance that allowed the banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' activities so as to postpone recognition of the losses.

While this was going on, monetary policy focused on lowering interest rates.  A policy that just happens to boost bank profitability by increasing the interest rate spread between the performing assets on the banks' balance sheet and their cost of funds.

After several years, John Reed at Citi lead the bank write-down of these loans.  Not only did acknowledgement of the losses not result in a run on the banks, but bank stock prices rose.

This was seen by the Fed as confirmation of the Volcker Doctrine.

Unfortunately, what was taken as confirmation of the success of the Volcker Doctrine in fact reflects a complete misreading of what actually happened.

Prior to the LDC crisis, banks disclosed their gross exposures to different countries.  When the crisis hit, bank analysts were able to track the prices at which LDC loans were sold to investors.  By combining the pre-crisis exposures with loan sale prices, the bank analysts could make a guess as to the real value of the loans at each bank.

Despite the fact that the Fed was deliberately assisting the banks in lying about their financial condition, the market had enough information to approximate the losses and their impact.  Clearly, the market was not concerned that this analysis showed that the large money center banks were insolvent.

The reason that bank stock prices increased when the losses were finally announced was that the size of the losses confirmed what the market expected.

Jumping to our current financial crisis, you can see that the Fed is once again implementing the Volcker Rule with expansionary monetary policy.

While I am sure that the banks like how the Fed has responded, why would the EU want to risk this happening with the ECB?

Surprise! Banking group overseeing Libor resists change despite manipulation of rate

Bloomberg reports that

The U.K. bankers and regulators charged with reviewing Libor in the wake of regulatory probes are resisting calls to overhaul the rate because structural changes risk invalidating trillions of dollars of contracts. 
The group, established by the British Bankers’ Association in March after probes into allegations that traders rigged the London interbank offered rate, may propose a code of conduct for banks and impose greater scrutiny of Libor’s correlation with other financial data over time, according to three people with knowledge of the discussions who asked not to be identified because the talks are private. 
It won’t propose structural changes such as basing the rate on actual trades or taking away oversight of the benchmark from the BBA, the people said. 
Libor is determined by a daily poll that asks banks to estimate how much it would cost them to borrow from each other for different timeframes and in different currencies.
This is a solution that preserves the current flawed method for calculating Libor for no apparent benefit.  


Market participants assumed that Libor reflected what it actually costs banks to borrow from each other for different timeframes and in different currencies.  Market participants didn't assume that Libor was unrelated to what it cost banks to borrow from each other and rather was a made up rate designed to maximize bank profitability.

As a result, your humble blogger suspects that the 'potential' for invalidating trillions of dollars of contracts is a fear based lobbying effort with no basis in reality. After all, doing nothing now that Libor has been exposed as manipulated should also require invalidating trillions of dollars of contracts given they were based on the assumption of that Libor reflected reality.
Because banks’ submissions aren’t based on real trades, academics and lawyers say they are open to manipulation by traders. At least a dozen firms are being probed by regulators worldwide for colluding to rig the rate, the benchmark for $350 trillion of securities. 

It is not surprising that the Opacity Protection Team is objecting to replacing how Libor is determined.  Currently, the banks can use opacity and easily manipulated the rate for their benefit. 


Regular readers will recall that your humble blogger pointed out that basing Libor off of real trades is easily done under ultra transparency (where banks have to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details).  Not only can Libor be based off of real trades, but the ability of market participants to confirm the pricing of these trades immediately restores confidence in Libor.

“I don’t see a significant enhancement to the reputation of Libor without basing it on actual transactions,” said Rosa Abrantes-Metz, an economist with Global Economics Group, a New York-based consultancy, an associate professor with New York University’s Stern School of Business and the co-author of a 2008 paper entitled “Libor Manipulation?” 
“It would only be disruptive if current quotes are inaccurate,” so resistance “is suspicious,” she said.
A move to a benchmark based on actual transactions could be gradual, and a change shouldn’t result in major disruption as long as banks’ submissions reflected their true borrowing costs, she said.

Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Abrantes-Metz nicely summarizes what your humble blogger has been saying about Libor.
“Keeping things as they are would leave a lingering cloud over the benchmark,” said Daniel Sheard, chief investment officer of GAM U.K. Ltd., an asset manager that oversees about $60 billion. “I am yet to hear a valid argument for why it can’t be based on actual trades. Given the huge number of transactions that use Libor as a reference, it is very important to re-establish credibility.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Sheard has summarized and offered support for my proposal for fixing Libor.

Finally,

“Sadly the response looks to be very consistent with the response of policy makers to the banking disasters we’ve seen over the last four years -- cosmetic changes, but nothing substantial happens,” said Richard Werner, a finance professor at the University of Southampton. “It’s insufficient and doesn’t really go to the heart of the problem.”

Monday, June 25, 2012

Central bankers 'shocked' that prospect of Japanese-like lost decades looms over developed economies

Bloomberg reports that
Central bankers are finding it easier to support their economies than to spur expansion as the prospect of Japanese-like lost decades looms across the developed world.
Please re-read the highlighted text as the central bankers are confirming what your humble blogger predicted would be the result of adopting the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese model, bank book capital levels are preserved at all costs.  The result is the pursuit of policies that cause incredible amounts of harm to the real economy.

Examples of these policies range from regulatory forbearance (under which the banks use 'extend and pretend' techniques to keep zombie borrowers alive - it easier for zombies to get loans than creditworthy borrowers) to quantitative easing (under which central bank intervention distorts pricing of risk assets and investors react by focusing on return of their capital and not return on their capital) to zero interest rate policies (under which individuals in or approaching retirement cut back on their consumption so as to preserve their savings).

Another round of loosely correlated global stimulus has begun after the Federal Reserve extended its Operation Twist program and counterparts from Japan to Europe consider more monetary easing of their own. The Bank of Israel today joined those injecting stimulus by reducing its benchmark interest rate for the first time in five months, in part to insulate its economy from “potential negative consequences” elsewhere. 
The rub is that even as they renew their rescue efforts, policy makers are postponing forecasts for fuller recoveries and run the risk that their latest actions pack a smaller punch. 
This raises the prospect of longer-term anemic expansion akin to the doldrums Japan has suffered since the early 1990s. 
“Japan’s experience shows central banks can mitigate the worst effects of the current environment, but it’s going to be very hard for them to stimulate demand,” said Peter Dixon, global equities economist at Commerzbank AG in London. He predicts a lengthy period of “sluggish growth and high unemployment” in the debt-ridden industrial nations.
Japan's experience shows that if the losses hidden on and off bank balance sheets are not recognized, the burden this places on the real economy requires extraordinary fiscal and monetary policy efforts to offset.  Whenever there is a let up in these efforts to stimulate the economy, the burden causes the economy to contract.

The worry for international policy makers is that Japan’s recent past reflects their future. 
Its economy stagnated in the early 1990s after the BOJ boosted borrowing costs to rein in a surge in inflation, real-estate and equity prices. With banks hobbled by bad debt from the bursting of the asset bubble, the BOJ lowered its main rate to near zero in 1999. 
After flooding the banking system with cash from 2001 to 2006, the central bank now has deployed its second round of QE. The moves haven’t ignited growth, with GDP rising at an average rate of 0.75 percent in the past 20 years, according to IMF data. 
Consumer prices fell in eight of the past 13 years, and inflation hasn’t exceeded 1 percent since 1997. Unadjusted for price changes, the size of the economy last year was the smallest since 1990 and had contracted 10 percent from its peak in 1997.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes what happens from pursuing the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.
ECB economists say the U.S. and euro-area are “rather unlikely to tread the same path of Japan” because they had different pre-crisis debt imbalances, according to their May monthly bulletin.
So far, the experience has been very similar.

This is not surprising because it is not the pre-crisis debt imbalances that shape the recovery.  It is the fact that the banking systems are hiding and not recognizing their losses that shapes the recovery.
Japan’s experience nevertheless demonstrates the importance of repairing financial sectors before trying to generate a sustainable recovery and shows that delaying reforms may mean fragile economic growth, they wrote.
The only way to repair the financial sector is by adopting the Swedish model with ultra transparency.

Under the Swedish model, the banks recognize all the losses on the excesses in the financial sector today.  This takes the burden off the real economy to carry the excess debt and results in growth.

Subsequently, the banks rebuild their bank book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

Under ultra transparency, banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can confirm that all the losses have been realized and exert discipline to restrain future risk taking by the banks.


BIS adopts Swedish model as Banks need 'push' to avoid prolonging crisis

Bloomberg reports that the Bank for International Settlements, the central banks' bank, has adopted the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.
Banks will need a “healthy push” by governments to fix balance sheets, abandon risky businesses and serve the public to avoid prolonging the financial crisis... 
Almost four years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., lenders still hold overvalued assets and are postponing necessary recapitalizations while relying on official funding, especially in Europe... 
 Banks are also returning to risks akin to those that led to the crisis .... and governments need to put more pressure on them by enacting and enforcing new rules. 
“Public policy must move banks to adopt business models that are less risky, more sustainable and more clearly in the public interest,” the BIS said in the report. 
“Governments can give the banking sector a healthy push in this direction...
Please re-read the highlighted text as the BIS has summarized why and called for policymakers to adopt the Swedish model with ultra transparency.

It is only under the Swedish model with ultra transparency that

  • Banks are required to fix their balance sheets;
  • Banks are subjected to market discipline to adopt less risky business models; and
  • Banks focus on activities that support the growth of the real economy.
Ultra transparency is the lever to effect these changes as banks are required to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can independently assess the banks and exert discipline to force the banks to clean up their balance sheets, reduce their risk and support the real economy.

Finally, your humble blogger is pleased to note that pursuing the Swedish model with ultra transparency is no longer an idea being proposed and championed by a fringe blog, but rather it is an idea that has now officially moved into the mainstream and been championed by a leading international regulatory institution.


Sunday, June 24, 2012

BIS: money printing putting global economy at risk

In a Telegraph article, the Bank for International Settlement says that the combination of low interest rates and money printing is putting the UK economy at risk (since the ECB and Fed are pursuing the same policies, it is the global economy at risk).

The BIS solution is the Swedish model with ultra transparency put forth by your humble blogger.

Confirming what I have been saying about the policies pursued under the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis, the BIS says

artificially low rates and inflated asset prices could also be holding back growth by masking lenders' bad debts and deterring them from cleaning up their balance sheets. 
"Prolonged and aggressive monetary accommodation may delay the return to a self-sustaining recovery," BIS said. "It can undermine the perceived need to deal with banks' impaired assets." 
Please re-read the highlighted text as the whole goal of the Japanese model is to protect bank book equity levels.  By definition this means that banks do not recognize their bad debt let alone clean up their balance sheets.

Instead, under policies like regulatory forbearance, banks engage in the practice of 'extend and pretend' to keep zombie borrowers from defaulting.

At the same time, policymakers pray for a miracle.
Political pressure for loose monetary policy, including quantitative easing (QE), also threatened to damage central banks' credibility and destroy their independence, BIS said. 
The world's financial regulator spelt out the risks of relying too heavily on the likes of the Bank of England and other central banks as it pressed Europe's leaders to step up their efforts to fix the eurozone's problems. 
"The extraordinary persistence of loose monetary policy is largely the result of insufficient action by governments in addressing structural problems," it stated. "Simply put: central banks are being cornered into prolonging monetary stimulus as governments drag their feet and adjustment is delayed. This intense pressure puts at risk the central banks' price stability objective, their credibility and, ultimately, their independence."
Enough of the excuse making, the Fed chose these policies.  It was not force to engage in zero interest rate and other destructive policies.  These policies are a product of the lessons the Fed Chairman learned from studying the Great Depression.  Lessons and policies that the co-author of the book on monetary policy, Anna Schwartz, said were wrong for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

The analysis came as part of a wider warning from BIS that governments, banks and households struggling with too much debt were dragging down the world's economy and that more needs to be done to make the banking system safer. 
"The world is now five years on from the outbreak of the financial crisis, yet the global economy is still unbalanced and seemingly becoming more so," it stated. "Big banks continue to have an interest in driving up their leverage without enough regard for the consequences of failure: because of their systemic weight, they expect the public sector to cover the downside. 
"Another worrying sign is that trading, after a brief crisis-induced squeeze, has again become a major source of income for large banks. These conditions are moving the financial sector towards the same high risk profile it had before the crisis." 
Stephen Cecchetti, head of BIS's monetary and economic department, said central banks should not be expected to carry the entire load of supporting growth and debt reduction. 
"In the middle of all this we find the overburdened central banks, pushed to use what power they have to contain the damage," he said. "But there are very clear limits to what central banks can do." 
Low rates have allowed borrowers who will never be able to repay their debts to limp on, BIS said, encouraging "wasteful support of effectively insolvent borrowers and banks". It cited the high level of forbearance by Britain's banks that was identified by regulators last year, and resulted in the largest quarterly corporate debt write-off in UK history after lenders were told to be more honest about their positions.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes the result of adopting the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  The burden of too much debt is shifted to the real economy which contracts under the burden.
BIS also recommended governments took action to "reduce household debt to sustainable levels" as "the recovery cannot become self-sustaining until the debt of households is brought down to a level that can actually be repaid".

Please re-read the highlighted text as this is the policy recommendation that your humble blogger has been making.

The BIS is recommending adoption of the Swedish model with ultra transparency.  Under the Swedish models, banks recognize all the loss on the excesses in the financial system today.  Recognizing the losses requires bringing down borrower debt levels to what can actually be repaid.

BIS: limits to what central banks can do

A Bloomberg article reports that the Bank for International Settlements said

Central banks in developed nations are confronting the limits of their ability to aid economic recovery as government efforts to strengthen their finances fall short... 
“Central banks are being cornered into prolonging monetary stimulus as governments drag their feet and adjustment is delayed,” the Basel, Switzerland-based BIS said in its annual report, published today. “Both conventionally and unconventionally accommodative monetary policies are palliatives and have their limits.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as this is exactly what your humble blogger has been saying about all the policies implemented under the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

This policies are all palliatives designed to buy time as the policymakers pray for a miracle.
While central banks’ actions were key to limiting damage from the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., interest rates are now “as low as they can go” and debt purchases have swollen central bank balance sheets, the BIS said....
Actually, beyond extending liquidity, the evidence suggests that conventional and unconventional central bank actions like zero interest rate policies have made the situation far worse.

For example, Walter Bagehot, who wrote the book on modern central banking in the 1870s, said that interest rates needed to be at least 2%.

For example, economist Anna Schwartz, who co-authored with Milton Friedman the book on monetary policy, said that the Fed had not learned the lessons of the Great Depression and was following the wrong policies.
“In the middle of all this we find the overburdened central banks, pushed to use what power they have to contain the damage,” Stephen Cecchetti, BIS economic adviser, said on a conference call. “There are very clear limits to what central banks can do. It’s critical for the health of the global economy to break the vicious cycles and reduce the pressure on central banks.”
Regular readers know that in a modern banking system it is bank book capital that is suppose to protect the real economy by absorbing the damage from the losses on the excesses in the financial system.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.  With these in place, a bank with negative book capital levels can continue to operate and support the real economy.  Over time, it can rebuild it book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.
The BIS was formed in 1930 and acts as a central bank for the world’s monetary authorities. It said extraordinary measures have reduced incentives for politicians and other borrowers to repair balance sheets, and created the illusion that central banks can do much more to stoke growth and redress imbalances. 
Central bank policy “buys time” in the short term for banks and governments to tackle debt overhangs, the BIS said....
This only works if the governments adopt the Swedish model with ultra transparency.

Under the Swedish model, the banks are required to recognize all of their losses today.  Subsequently, they rebuild their book capital levels.

With ultra transparency, market participants can confirm that all the losses have been recognized and exert discipline to constrain risk-taking by the banks while they are rebuilding their book capital levels.

So long as the governments continue to implement the Japanese model and protect bank book capital levels, then all the time that is purchased at great cost by the central bank is used for is to pray for a miracle.

UK "Funding for Lending" scheme shows how desperate regulators are to restart structured finance

Desperation for restarting securitization has set in across the EU.

In the UK, the Treasury and the Bank of England are pursuing a 'funding for lending' scheme while the Financial Policy Committee is considering reducing bank liquidity requirements.  The involvement of the Bank of England in the 'funding for lending' scheme is occurring despite Mervyn King's objection to taking credit risk onto the central bank's balance sheet.

Meanwhile, the ECB is endorsing an ABS data warehouse that has indicated it will provide loan level performance disclosure less frequently than is available on opaque sub-prime mortgage backed securities.  This less frequent disclosure is the equivalent of changing the challenge from valuing the contents of a brown paper bag with a label on it to valuing the contents of a black box with a label on it.  In either case, buying the contents is blindly betting.

The ECB confirmed that it is being driven to take desperate acts like endorsing the ABS data warehouse by reducing the rating a structured finance security needs to qualify as collateral in an effort to increase funding to the banks.

Why is it so important to restart securitization?

Because securitization was the source of funding for loans to small and medium size enterprises and individuals with less than perfect credit prior to the beginning of the financial crisis and the precipitous decline in the securitization market.  These loans are necessary for economic growth.

Who is funding the loans now in the absence of the securitization market?

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the only balance sheet that has been willing to fund these loans has been the central banks.  The ECB has taken on considerable exposure through both covered bonds and pledges of retained securitization transactions.

Bank balance sheets are not available to absorb these loans as the EU financial regulators have been pursuing a 9% Tier I capital requirement.

What does it take to restart the securitization market?

That each deal provide observable event based reporting on its underlying collateral.  Any activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral should be reported before the beginning of the business day after it occurs.

How come your humble blogger is the only one calling for observable event based reporting?

The sell-side doesn't want observable event based reporting as it benefits from opacity and the fact that the buy-side cannot value the securities.

The few investors left in the market cannot call for observable event based reporting as it puts their jobs at risk.  Calling for observable event based reporting focuses attention on the fact that they are currently blindly betting and have no way to know what they own (see brown paper bag above).  If the investors who provided them with funds realized this, they would undoubtedly want their money back and hence the asset management related jobs would disappear.

What that leaves is your humble blogger up against Wall Street.  It really is an unfair fight.  A guy with a non-verbal learning disability that makes it difficult to communicate with family members pitted against the highest paid salesforce in the world.

As I see it, I have all the advantages.  With the brown paper bag and the clear plastic bag to show what is currently wrong with the industry and what it takes to fix it, I have an solution that a 5 year old understands.

Saturday, June 23, 2012

Regulator explains why new model of bank supervision based on ultra transparency needed

The Guardian carried an interesting interview with a regulator at the UK's Financial Services Authority.

During the interview, he confirms what your humble blogger has said in earlier posts is wrong with the financial regulatory model.  Specifically, regulators do not publicly disclose the risks the banks are taking despite their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information.

Since the information monopoly makes market participants dependent on the regulators to assess the risk of the banks, the failure to communicate the true risk means that the market participants mis-price their exposures to the banks relative to the risk of the banks.  Typically, too much exposure at too low a price.

He also confirms that it is not the regulator's role to approve/disapprove of any position a bank takes and the regulator tries to insure that the bank has enough capital to absorb any loss that might result from the position.

"The biggest surprise for readers if they saw what I see? The sheer size of the financial sector and range of products and services; how big these banks are and how interconnected the financial system has become. 
This was something that came to light in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Take the payment system that you and I rely on in our everyday lives, the plumbing of the financial system if you will. This has become so intricate and interconnected that contagion can spread rapidly. 
The payments system is like a giant spider's web with the central bank at the centre with rings of banks going out. If several of these banks are suffering a crisis at the same time, you begin to worry about whether the day-to-day running of the economy is under threat. Derivatives also threw a lot of uncertainty during the crisis....
In describing the interconnectedness of the financial system, he identifies one of the primary reasons for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.

It is important that each bank has access to the information it needs on every other bank to adjust its exposure to these banks to reflect what it can afford to lose given these banks' risks.

By adjusting their exposure to what they can afford to lose, the banks reduce the risk of contagion.
"The big UK banks have, on average, 20 regulators permanently assigned to them. For global banks with a big UK presence, it can be five to 10 people. It's the same for insurance companies, asset management firms and so forth.....
If there were ultra transparency, how many people would be looking at the big banks?  First, there are the competitors, then there are analysts, then ...

There is a reason that markets do a better job of analyzing data and why the regulators' monopoly on all the useful, relevant information that would be available through ultra transparency must be ended.
"However, there are only so many ways you can ask the same question about the risks firms are exposed to. At some point you can arrive at an impasse; we can't predict the future either....
Please note that assessing the riskiness of a bank does not require predicting the future.  It involves understanding how much the bank could lose. 
"One interesting dilemma for regulators is that you can bring about the thing you are trying to prevent, simply by talking about it. 
Say, we are worried about sovereign debt in southern European countries and we feel our banks should try to lower their exposure there – not lend money to businesses in these countries, for instance. If we actually come out and do this, that almost starts the problem by creating panic. And you can be sure that the prime ministers of these countries will be on the phone to our prime minister right away. Even though we are independent, that pressure will come down on us. 
"Another thing is that, if we tell banks to get rid of, say, some of the government bonds they have from a particular country, that will drive down the price of those bonds, lowering the value of their remaining bonds and actually perpetuating the problem.
Confirmation of why the regulators do not approve or disapprove of a position taken by the bank and that the focus is on trying to answer the question of 'does the bank have enough capital to absorb any losses coming from the area of concern'. 
"No, of course I don't like being called an idiot. There are bright people working across the financial sector who missed a lot of tell-tale signs and got caught up in the credit bubble. There were mistakes made by both sides. 
Banks have been so wrong about their risks. There was a clamour for light-touch regulation, to leave the industry in peace, because they knew best. 
People blame the regulators for missing all sorts of things in years past, and there were regulatory failures. 
But the senior management and risk people inside the banks themselves, they should have caught them in the first place. Then again, those risk officers who did issue warnings in those years may have been let go.
Confirmation of why there needs to be ultra transparency so that the market can assess the risk of the banks.