Thursday, July 26, 2012

BBA 'warned weekly' in 2008 that banks manipulating Libor

The BBC reports that according to a compiler of the Libor interest rates, the British Bankers' Association was 'warned weekly' that Libor was being distorted.

Regular readers know that the simple fix is to require all banks that are Libor panel members to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off balance sheet exposure details.

With these details, Libor can be calculated off of actual trades.

With these details, the interbank lending market will unfreeze and remain liquid as banks with funds to lend can assess the current condition and risk of any bank looking to borrow.

The report confirms that Libor was designed to be easy for the banks to manipulate without fear of being held to account.

A former member of the Libor compilation team at Thomson Reuters says it regularly warned senior BBA staff about the problem. 
Its reports regularly highlighted the implausible rate submissions of several banks involved in the Libor process. 
The BBA denied these had amounted to warnings of wrong-doing.
Each day the six-man team at Thomson Reuters would calculate the various Libor interest rates, based on estimates submitted by staff from a panel of banks about how much it would cost them to borrow in the financial markets, in various currencies and for various durations. 
The highest and lowest estimates were discarded as outliers and the average rate derived from the remaining ones, and then published. 
The warning reports from the Libor team were passed to John Ewan, the BBA's head of Libor, who now works for Thomson Reuters....
Mr Ewan told the Libor team he would look into the repeated evidence of unusual Libor submissions, which were coming increasingly frequently from several banks. 
"I wouldn't say he took no action," the Libor rate-compiler assured the BBC. 
"He took notice of them. Action was taken. But the BBA was not very effectual at the time."...
The member of the Libor compilation team told the BBC that, for six months in 2008, it became very obvious that something fishy was going on. 
"Definitely, it was a daily thing," the former employee said. 
"For three-month Libor, one bank might say 4.5%, Barclays 5%, UBS 3.5%." 
"We would ask 'what's all that about?' and phone them up," the compiler said....
The former employee told the BBC that the suspicious rate submissions to the Thomson Reuters team became particularly obvious after the collapse of the US investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008, which had to be bailed out by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
"After that all bets were off," the Libor rate-compiler said. 
"You'd be making calls for half an hour each day, saying 'you've quoted this, other banks are higher, do you want to revise your rate?" 
"A number of banks were quoting wildly differently," the person pointed out. 
The rate-compiler said it became obvious to quite a few money-market traders that something was fishy, because the team would receive calls from traders querying the quotes submitted by other banks. 
"It is not possible to hide what was happening," the compiler said. 
"I think all the guys who were contributing on a daily basis and involved in the trades would have known. 
"They would have been saying: 'He's quoting nonsense, why should I be quoting a real rate if he is quoting nonsense?" the rate-compiler explained. 
And how many people in bank dealing rooms would have been aware of all this? 
"Across 16 banks you've got to be looking at 150 to 160 people [maybe] half that were involved in day to day trading and querying [other banks quoted rates]," the person said....
In response to these points, the BBA acknowledged that it had been told of some misgivings by the Libor team. 
"As part of the process Thomson Reuters queries rates which fall outside normal tolerances," said a BBA spokeswoman. 
"In 2008 reports from Thomson Reuters were submitted to the independent foreign exchange and money market (FX&MM) committee which was then able to request further information from submitting banks. 
"The BBA was at no time aware that rates were being manipulated but, as a result of the overall picture [of which Thomson Reuters' reports played a part] of a widely dysfunctional market - the BBA launched its 2008 consultation," she added. 
During 2008, the BBA initiated a review of the Libor-setting process, a review which it is now known was initially regarded by the Bank of England as wholly inadequate. 
From the perspective of someone working in the Libor team, the rate-compiler said the BBA did not seem on the ball. 
"I think the BBA was totally ineffectual," the former employee said.
It was suppose to be.
"It should have known what was happening and should have been jumping up and down.
"No-one was standing up and saying 'this is wrong'," the rate-compiler added.

Sandy Weill calls for Swedish model and 'repudiates Geithner and Bernanke's entire financial strategy'

In his blog post, George Washington explains how Sandy Weill's call for transparency and breaking up the big banks repudiates the entire strategy for handling the bank solvency led financial crisis that Tim Geithner and Ben Bernanke have been pursuing.

Regular readers know that they have been pursuing the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Regular readers know this model has never worked and only makes the ultimate cost of fixing the problem orders of magnitude bigger.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has championed the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis since the beginning of the financial crisis.  Under the Swedish model, banks recognize all of their losses today and subsequently rebuild their book equity through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

Under the Swedish model, banks have to mark all their assets to market.  In addition, they need to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

These details are important as they let market participants confirm that the bank has recognized all of its losses.

In addition, these details allow market participants to exert discipline so that banks do not take excessive risk while rebuilding their book capital levels (ultra transparency prevents the 'gambling on redemption' behavior shown during the US Savings & Loan Crisis).

In his statement, Sandy Weill effectively calls for adoption of the Swedish model.

It is - justifiably - big news that former Citi CEO Sandy Weill said that we should break up the big banks, and separate traditional depository banking from speculative investing. 
Indeed, even congress members are confronting top government officials on why they haven't done this. 
But Weill said 3 other equally important things today. 
First, Weill told CNBC that the financial crisis was largely caused by too much leverage, and that we should reduce leverage to between 12-15 times. (Background.) 
Secondly, Weill said that we have to restore transparency, so that nothing is hidden off balance sheet. (Leading economist Anna Schwartz told the Wall Street journal in 2008: “The Fed … has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible.”) 
Regular readers know that the only way to restore the credibility of financial firms' balance sheets is for them to provide ultra transparency..
Third, Weill said that assets must be marked to market every day. 
If banks have to mark their assets to market, they will end up recognizing all the losses currently hidden on their balance sheets.  The very heart of the Swedish model.


Financial regulators are to blame for on-going economic slump

In his Telegraph column, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard concludes that the reason we are in an economic slump is that financial regulators are pursuing higher bank capital ratios and as a result, banks have stopped lending to support the real economy.

This confirms what your humble blogger has been saying.  It was fully predictable, and I did, that the real economy would suffer as a result of the financial regulators pursuing a meaningless 9% or higher Tier 1 capital ratio.

The pursuit of higher bank capital ratios is a classic example of the damaging policies that the financial, academic and regulatory complex (FARC) supports.

It is time for a change of course.

Britain is contracting as fast or even faster that those eurozone states – Spain, Italy – imposing far tougher fiscal austerity. This has caused some consternation.... 
Regulators have choked the British banking system even more violently than European regulators have choked the eurozone banking system.... 
Professor Tim Congdon has been arguing all along that the regulatory assault on banks across the world over the last four years is the biggest single reason why the global economy has failed to recover. I think he is probably right.
The policy is pro-cyclical folly and is asphyxiating the M3/M4 money supply almost everywhere. 
Forcing banks to raise more capital is for booms not busts, ideally according to some sort of sliding scale or lean-against-the wind principle. 
The Europeans forced banks to raise core Tier 1 capital ratios to 9pc by a deadline last month – ie, find a friendly Gulf sheikh (fewer of them around than you might think) or shrink lending. 
No wonder eurozone banks have slashed their balance sheets by €4 trillion since the Great Recession – crippling Club Med in the process. But the British have gone even further, and to make matters worse we have a higher sensititivity to credit than Germany or France.... 
British banks have deleveraged drastically. ... It is why there is a perpetual lending crunch. 
Regulatory overkill is the biggest single reason why Britain is in a deep double-dip recession.

Rep. Jeb Hensarling: first prominent Republican to call for banks to have "transparent balance sheets"

In his Wall Street Journal column, Congressman Jeb Hensarling showed there is bipartisan support for requiring banks to provide transparency.

Regular readers know that transparency is the simple solution that renders the vast majority of the Dodd-Frank Act unnecessary.

Mr. Hensarling focuses on the tremendous amount of prescriptive regulation that the Dodd-Frank Act generates and concludes that requiring banks to provide transparency would be more effective.
After an all-night session, Democrats (who then held the House majority) produced a 2,300-page behemoth they touted as a panacea for financial crises.... "too big to fail" is actually enshrined into law, and Dodd-Frank's voluminous rules are proving to be some of the most confusing, complex and harmful our capital markets have ever seen. 
Dodd-Frank was based largely on the premise that regulators lacked the authority to prevent Wall Street from taking outsize risks. But that was the wrong diagnosis—and it led, inevitably, to a prescription for the wrong remedy.
One of the primary beneficiaries of Dodd-Frank is the financial, academic, regulatory complex (FARC).  With this Act, FARC grew immensely in size and power.

First, implementation of Dodd-Frank required significant growth in the prescriptive regulation industry at both the agencies writing the laws and at the banks in terms of personnel to advise on and implement the regulation.

Second, implementation of Dodd-Frank increased FARC's power because it made the financial markets more dependent on FARC to ensure they functioned properly.
Before the crisis, regulatory mistakes and incompetence abounded—but almost no examples of a lack of regulatory authority can be found.
This was true in the US where we practiced intrusive regulation and in the UK where they practiced light-touch regulation.
Federal regulations were not the solution to the crisis but its principal cause....
These regulations were the cause to the extent that we substituted prescriptive regulations for transparency.
Having incorrectly diagnosed the problem, Dodd-Frank's authors wrote 400 new regulations. These generally fall into one of two categories: those that create uncertainty and those that create economic harm.
A prime example is the so-called Volcker rule. This 300-page proposal (to limit the kinds of investments banks can make) is not yet finalized by regulators. The proposal includes roughly 1,300 questions covering nearly 400 topics—and is so confusing that it elicited more than 18,000 comment letters from market participants and the public....
Regular readers know the simple way to implement the Volcker Rule is to require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants, including regulators, could see if the banks were engaging in proprietary trades that are banned under the Volcker Rule.

Rather than a 300 page proposal with roughly 1,300 questions covering nearly 400 topics, the result would have been a two page proposal saying no proprietary trading and ultra transparency for monitoring compliance.

The financial, academic, regulatory complex prefers the 300-page proposal and is fighting against the 2-page proposal with ultra transparency.
The House Financial Services Committee estimates that private-sector job creators will have to spend 24,180,856 hours each year to comply with Dodd-Frank—and that's only for the 224 rules that have been written to date. 
William Isaac, a former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has predicted that hundreds if not thousands of community financial institutions will ultimately buckle under the regulatory load. 
As one community banker in my native Texas remarked, "My major risks are not credit risks, risks of theft, risks of some robber coming in with a gun in my office; my number one risk is federal regulatory risk."....
In short, the financial, academic, regulatory complex's growth is damaging as it favors the Too Big to Fail banks at the expense of the community bankers.
So where do we go from here? For starters, the president should work with Congress to phase out the government-sponsored enterprises and transition them to the private market....
Your humble blogger has argued that the key to doing this is to require that structured finance securities and covered bonds provide observable event based reporting.  All activities like payments or defaults involving the underlying collateral are reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

With observable event based reporting, investors can assess the risk of and value covered bonds and structured finance securities and, if they buy them, know what they own.

Currently we do not have observable event based reporting.  As a result, the private label mortgage backed securities market is closed and we are dependent on the government-sponsored enterprises.
Next, Dodd-Frank's bailout authority must be repealed. The way to address the risks posed by financial institutions would be more transparent balance sheets and a meaningful application of capital and liquidity standards. As long as companies have enough capital to cover their risks and absorb potential losses, we don't need federal regulators micromanaging credit allocation....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Congressman Hensarling nicely summarizes the simple fact that transparency works to prevent financial problems from occurring.

When banks are required to provide ultra transparency, market participants can assess the risks the banks are taking and can exert discipline on the banks to restrain their risk taking.  At the same time, market participants can exert discipline on the banks to have capital that is meaningful in relation to the risk the banks are taking.
If Americans want the jobs and economic growth that flow from innovative, competitive and transparent capital markets, we should commit to making this anniversary Dodd-Frank's last.
And replace it with an Act that restores transparency to the financial system.

At a minimum, this Act would require that banks provide ultra transparency and that asset backed deals ranging from covered bonds to structured finance securities provide observable event based reporting.








Wednesday, July 25, 2012

Barclays admits that Libor scandal 'decimated' trust in banks

As reported by the Telegraph, Barclays

has admitted the public’s trust in banks has “been decimated and needs to be rebuilt” as it set out measures aimed at rebuilding its reputation in the wake of Libor rigging.
Regular readers know that there is only one action that Barclays has to take if it ever wants to rebuild its reputation:  provide ultra transparency.

It is only by disclosing on an on-going basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that Barclays is providing market participants with the information they need to independently assess Barclays.  With the ability to independently assess Barclays comes the ability to Trust, but Verify.

Any action other than providing ultra transparency is simply putting lipstick on a pig.

Britain’s second-largest lender on Tuesday said the scandal that saw chief executive Bob Diamond and chairman Marcus Agius resign showed “banks need to revisit fundamentally the basis on which they operate, and how they add value to society”. 
Describing the “daunting” task ahead of it, Barclays said it needed a culture change that would see it “affirming key values” with “reinforcing mechanisms” to ensure staff behaved appropriately. Alluding to management and pay, it added “visible leadership” and rewards would have to be aligned to these values....
Hence the reason for adopting ultra transparency.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant and insures that staff behave appropriately.
“Barclays has a real opportunity to use the events of the past weeks to drive a change in its values and practices. I look forward to hearing views on the changes that should be made,” Mr Salz said. “I hope that this review will significantly assist Barclays in rebuilding trust and reaffirming its position as one of our leading institutions.”...
Consider this post your humble blogger's view on the change that should be made.


And by the way, consider it also former Citigroup head Sandy Weill's view as he called for banks to be "completely transparent". 

ECB's cheap loans have allowed banks to defer recognition of losses on bad assets

The Telegraph reports that according to accountants KPMG,

more than €1.5 trillion (£1.16 trillion) of non-performing loans are currently sat on European bank balance sheets.
Please re-read the highlighted text again as the losses hidden on the European bank balance sheets are staggering.

KPMG has just confirmed that the EU banking system is insolvent.

Much more importantly, KPMG has just confirmed a) that depositors don't care whether their bank is solvent or not so long as they trust in the deposit guarantee, b) that banks can continue to operate and support the real economy so long as they have access to central bank funding and c) the roadblock to banks absorbing their losses is the Financial, Academic, Regulatory complex (FARC or the Opacity Protection Team).
Graham Martin, corporate finance partner at the firm, said a “confluence of factors” had restricted the much-anticipated flow of transactions in this market. 
“Perhaps the most powerful factor in delaying much-needed de-leveraging by European banks has been the European Central Bank’s injection of more than €1 trillion of long-term refinancing operations in December 2011 and February 2012,” he added....
However, the ECB’s three-year money has largely been used by banks to strengthen their balance sheets through profitable carry trades, reducing the pressure on them to sell non-core assets at non-desirous prices.” 
A more powerful factor has been the financial regulators pushing for banks to achieve a meaningless 9% Tier I capital ratio.  The ratio is meaningless because the losses are still hidden on the balance sheet in the form of zombie loans.
Despite this, research from KPMG suggests the non-performing loan market is likely to become one of the most actively traded debt classes over the next 12 months.
This won't happen so long as the financial regulators keep moving the Tier I capital ratio up.
Jonathan Hunt, associate director at KPMG, said: “While consumer debt has traditionally been the easiest asset to sell, banks are increasingly seeking to sell different asset classes. 
“In the UK and Europe for example, over the past six months many vendors have focused on the disposal of commercial real estate, leveraged and residential mortgage loans through both clean and structured trades. Further, increasingly more challenging and longer-dated assets, such as infrastructure finance, shipping and transport loans are also coming to market.”

Sandy Weill calls for ultra transparency and breaking up the big banks

CNBC reports that Sandy Weill is calling for ultra transparency and breaking up the big banks.
Former Citigroup Chairman & CEO Sanford I. Weill, the man who invented the financial supermarket, called for the breakup of big banks in an interview on CNBC Wednesday. 
“What we should probably do is go and split up investment banking from banking, have banks be deposit takers, have banks make commercial loans and real estate loans, have banks do something that’s not going to risk the taxpayer dollars, that’s not too big to fail,” Weill told CNBC’s “Squawk Box.” 
He added: “If they want to hedge what they’re doing with their investments, let them do it in a way that’s going to be market-to-market so they’re never going to be hit.” 
He essentially called for the return of the Glass–Steagall Act, which imposed banking reforms that split banks from other financial institutions such as insurance companies. 
“I’m suggesting that they be broken up so that the taxpayer will never be at risk, the depositors won’t be at risk, the leverage of the banks will be something reasonable, and the investment banks can do trading, they’re not subject to a Volker rule (the Volcker rule explained), they can make some mistakes, but they’ll have everything that clears with each other every single night so they can be market-to-market,” Weill said. 
He said banks should be split off entirely from investment banks, and they should operate with a leverage ratio of 12 times to 15 times of what they have on their balance sheets. 
Banks should also be completely transparent, Weill said, with everything on balance sheet. “There should be no such thing as off balance sheet,” he said.
Please re-read the highlighted text and Mr. Weill's call for banks to be completely transparent on everything.  
If banks hedge in any way, Weill added, positions should be market-to-market (market-to-market explained) and cleared through an exchange.
Weill said that by breaking up banks, they would be “much” more profitable....
“I want to see us be a leader, and what we’re doing now is not going to make us a leader,” he said.

FSA's Lord Turner: Libor now honest

As reported by Reuters, the head of the UK's FSA, Lord Turner, is saying that Libor is now honest and that replacing Libor interest rates would be problematic.

It is great that Libor is currently being reported honestly.  To ensure that it is always reported honestly a couple of changes need to be made.

First, banks on the Libor panel must be required to disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Market participants, particularly the banks with deposits to lend, can use this information to assess the risk of each bank on the panel.

To make it easy for market participants to access the exposure details, they should be collected, standardized and disseminated by the "Mother of All Financial Databases".  This is a data warehouse coordinated and overseen by a conflict of interest free independent third party focused on optimizing transparency in the financial system.

This ability to assess the risk of each bank on the panel will unfreeze the interbank lending market and keep it functioning in the future.

Second, Libor should be based off of actual trades by the bank panel members.  For those maturities or currencies where there are not trades, there are a variety of ways to estimate what the interest rate would be if there had been any trades.

Dishonesty uncovered in setting Libor benchmark interest rates is now in the past and replacing them would be problematic, the head of Financial Services Authority said on Tuesday. 
The discovery that bankers rigged the global rates determining the value of assets worth more than $500 trillion has put regulators under fire for failing to spot the problem in 2008 and set off a debate over whether the system should be replaced. 
"I think it has been pretty robust since 2009 and 2010," FSA Chairman Adair Turner told a Bloomberg News event. "People are trying to do it as honestly as they can."... 
Turner said that since early 2011, banks have had to attest to the quality of their Libor submission process to the regulator. 
"I would be very amazed if at the moment there is anything remotely like the problems of the past in terms of deliberate manipulation," Turner said. 
Your humble blogger prefers that we move to a system where rigging Libor is not possible.  There is absolutely no reason to remain dependent on the honesty of people who have already shown a willingness to lie for profit and/or to enhance the market's perception of their financial strength and be amazed if they lie again.
In the distant past it would have been harder to spot manipulation of the benchmark interest rates, which originated in the 1960s, but any rigging would also have had a smaller impact, Turner said. 
At any point in time, had data on actual trades been disclosed to the market, it would have been easy to spot manipulation.
Because so many contracts were now linked to Libor estimates, it would create a major problem if there were an attempt to switch to a benchmark based on actual transactions, he said.
Therefore, Libor should be fixed.  The simple solution to fixing Libor is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

I am sure that the banks and their co-conspirators, the financial regulatory industry, will fight this.  The banks and the financial regulatory industry believe a series of one-off prescriptive regulations that protect opacity and are designed to try to mimic transparency is actually better than requiring transparency.

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Former rating agency worker: no fundamental changes have been made since the financial crisis hit

In a Guardian interview, a former rating agency worker expresses fear for the stability of the financial system by noting that there has been no fundamental change since the financial crisis hit.

Regular readers know there has been one change.  The prescriptive financial regulatory industry has grown by leaps and bounds.  Look at all the detailed regulations that are being churned out under Dodd-Frank.  By doing so, they have protected opacity across large areas of the financial system.

"I was on holiday in the runup to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when the crisis exploded. I remember opening up the paper every day and going: 'Oh my god.' It was terrifying, absolutely terrifying. We came so close to a global meltdown. .... 
Now here we are four years later, and the most incredible thing has happened – we've learned nothing from the whole thing. Everybody pretends it's all OK. ... 
"If you had told people at the height of the crisis that four years later we'd have had no fundamental changes, nobody would have believed you. Such was the panic and fear. But there we are. We went from 'We nearly died from this' to 'We survived this'. 
It is a real testament to the power of the prescriptive financial regulatory industry that they were able to block the return of transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  Instead, we have a bunch of one-off regulations that attempt to achieve what transparency would do.  


For example, we have issuers retaining an interest in structured finance securities.  The reasoning being that this will give the issuers an incentive to underwrite less toxic junk.

If there were true transparency into the underlying collateral, investors would not care whether the issuers retained an interest or not.  With true transparency that includes observable event based reporting, investors could assess the risk of the underlying collateral and know what they own.

If a deal includes high risk assets, the investor would demand a return that compensated them for the risk of the assets.
"Have you read Gillian Tett's Fool's Gold about the crisis? It was exactly like that. You had bankers who did not understand their own complex financial products but thought that they did, and then raters who took their word for it. And nothing has fundamentally changed.  
"As most people understand by now, lots of sub-prime mortgages were bundled by banks into financial products and sold on to investors. These believed they bought a very safe thing because the products had been rated triple A, which meant that there was only a 1% or so chance of a default. 
"When the crisis hit, it hit hard, reality kicked in and the rating agencies suddenly downgraded triple A products to junk status in a matter of days. I won't call it fraud; I will call it a 'desperate revision of history'. 
In the absence of transparency into the underlying collateral, investors turned to the rating agencies who  failed to inform the investors that they had no better access to information on the underlying collateral than did the investors.

This was not clarified until the fall of 2007.
"Overall, it was more incompetence than outright fraud. .... As far as the rating agencies were concerned, it was incompetence brought on by short-termist, bottom-line thinking by senior management who just wanted to make money. That meant rating as much as possible, as often as possible.... 
"When asked about the crisis, rating agencies use the defence that the bankers who designed those complex financial products did not understand them themselves. So how can rating agencies be blamed for not understanding them either**? 
"But you shouldn't just rely on the information given to you by the people whose product or company you are rating.... 
"With every new financial product, raters should be asking: have the products been tested properly? Are they modelled for all possible conditions, so boom as well as bust times? Do we even know what it does in every phase of the economic cycle? Do we know how the product is likely to evolve over time, how will it behave when it develops into a bubble?
Investors should be asking the same questions.  In addition, investors should not invest unless they are sure that there is transparency so that they have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can make a fully informed investment decision.

Former HSBC chairman Lord Green: banking industry not 'corrupt'

As reported by the Telegraph,

The Trade Minister and former HSBC chairman [Lord Green] acknowledges "failures" at the bank under his stewardship but denies the industry as a whole is corrupt.
Between money laundering and the Libor interest rate manipulation (and a long list of other scandals), it is abundantly clear that the industry as a whole is corrupt and not to be trusted.

With money laundering for drug lords and terrorists, the banks have shown just how pervasive the corruption is.

With Libor, the banks have shown that it is standard operating procedure to lie.  Lying to make money is okay.  Lying to present the bank's financial condition in a more favorable light is okay.

What remains a great mystery is that policymakers and financial regulators continue to listen to former or current bankers who rose to their positions in the banking industry in the last ten years by thriving in an environment dominated by corruption and lying.