Sunday, October 28, 2012

Beware more skeletons in the banks' cupboards

If there is one thing that has been learned from the financial crisis, it is that bad behavior was the norm for how bankers behaved.

The Guardian highlighted a few areas where this bad behavior occurred:

But Libor is not the only skeleton in the cupboard for this industry. 
Barclays, again, is the bank that reminded the City about the scale of the payment protection insurance mis-selling scandal, with its shock announcement earlier this month that it needed to put aside another £700m to cover the cost of claims. This takes the bill for the big banks up to nearly £10bn even before the updates due this week, when Lloyds is regarded as likely to need to stump up more on top of the £4.3bn the episode has already cost its shareholders. 
And Barclays, again, is the bank that best illustrates the new mis-selling scandal of interest rate swaps to small businesses. It will be in court tomorrow facing claims from Guardian Care Homes that it was mis-sold £70m of these swaps, which were intended to protect against rises in interest rates. The Wolverhampton care home operator claims to have lost £12m. 
Barclays is not alone in facing claims over interest rate swaps: the Financial Services Authority estimates that 44,000 businesses may have been mis-sold swaps. Every bank's third-quarter numbers this week will be scrutinised for signs of additional provisions to cover new claims. 
And then there are the new scandals just lurking in the background. 
Santander this week took a mish-mash of a provision – of £232m, no less – to cover "conduct remediation" and future regulatory changes. The bank did not spell it out, but only a small part of the £232m is likely cover interest rate swaps. Some will be the cost of helping the card insurer CPP pay out redress to bank customers sold identity-theft protection. On Friday CPP admitted it had made a £25m provision following an FSA investigation into the way the insurance was sold. Several banks used CPP to sell such insurance and may be forced to help cough up the compensation bill. 
Then there is the potential scandal brewing from the sale of interest-only mortgages taken out in the boom years and now described as a £100bn time-bomb, as customers may never be able to pay off the actual sums borrowed. 
What exactly are the likely losses associated with these mortgages?
It may not take much to tip this skeleton out of the cupboard, if customers start to complain they were not given proper advice or if the FSA decides to get heavy. 
In the runup to the crisis, up to a third of all mortgages were interest-only deals – a truly scary number if customers are unable to switch to a repayment mortgage when the moment comes; and as we report, the same claim firms that have helped drive PPI payouts to astronomical levels are now turning their attention to mortgage mis-selling. 
So much of the activity that has taken place in the banking industry is enough to spook even the hardiest soul. 
Regular readers know that the way to end spooky surprises is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Not only is the sunlight provided by this type of transparency the best disinfectant for bad bank behavior, but sunlight also reveals all the previously opaque corners of the financial system that need to be cleaned up. 

Hurricane Sandy and this blog

In case Hurricane Sandy knocks out your humble blogger' ability to publish new posts, I'll resume publishing posts as soon as I can.

Saturday, October 27, 2012

Neil Barofsky with Bill Moyer: Normal functioning capital markets require transparency

In the second part of his interview with Bill Moyer, Neil Barofsky lays out how normal functioning capital markets rely on transparency that the Too Big to Fail banks are not required to provide (hat tip Jesse's CAFÉ AMÉRICAIN).

BILL MOYERS: It was puzzling to outsiders like me that you had TARP money being used to concentrate further the size of these banks. 
NEIL BAROFSKY: And the granddaddy of all those transactions, Bank of America acquiring Merrill Lynch. And the important thing to remember here is this is not banks gone wild, banks taking the money and saying, "Party time, we're going to consolidate." They did this with the encouragement of the government. And in Bank of America, a little bit with a gun to the head to complete that transaction. 
This was the government policy created by the architects, Ben Bernanke who is chair of Federal Reserve, Tim Geithner, who was then the president of the New York Fed before becoming Treasury Secretary, and Hank Paulson. Their solution originally was to further concentrate the industry, to make the too big to fail banks bigger. 
The theory was you take a healthier bank and mix it up with a failing bank and you get something somewhere in between, which is better overall for the system. Which may have had some validity in the very, very short term, but has put us on a path, I believe, to being even more dangerous. 
Because you have institutions now that are just monstrous in size, over $2 trillion in assets by certain measures, close to $4 trillion by other measures. Terrifying. The idea that any of these institutions could ever be allowed to fail is pure fantasy, at this point. 
BILL MOYERS: Are you suggesting that we could have another crash? 
NEIL BAROFSKY: I think it's inevitable. I mean, I don't think how you can look at all the incentives that were in place going up to 2008 and see that in many ways they've only gotten worse and come to any other conclusion. 
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean incentives in place? 
NEIL BAROFSKY: So in a normal functioning capitalist utopia, where, you know, most markets are that don't have this too big to fail, this presumption of government bailout if a firm like a Citigroup amasses massive amounts of risk. And in so doing, they keep razor-thin capital to absorb potential losses, which basically means they're just borrowing tons and tons of money. 
And not have a lot of their own money at stake, but it's mostly borrowed money. And it is very opaque. It's not very transparent about how they're running their business. 
You would expect that creditors, people lending them money, counterparties, those on the other sides of their transactions would either stay away or really exact a premium. 
But the presumption of bailout changes that on its head and actually makes it go in the other direction. 
So it removes the incentive of the other market participants to impose what's known as market discipline. Because that's ideally in a capitalist society what happens is that the lenders and creditors and counterparties say, "Hey, we're not going to do business with you unless you clean house, slim down, be more transparent." 
But when there's a presumption of bailout, that disappears. Because all those other market players can feel safe in the presumption that if anything goes bad at Citigroup, Uncle Sam is going to come in and make their bets whole. 
Then you have the very real incentive for the executives at that institution to then pile on risk. Because they know that if the bets go well in the short term, they get paid. And they get paid very richly. But if it blows up and the risks go bad, no worry, the taxpayer's going to be on the other side of that bill. 
That's what happened to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, before they collapsed. That's what happened to our biggest banks and global banks before they collapsed. And if you maintain that system, it is foolhardy to think that those incentives and pressures are not once again going to carry the day.
Please re-read the highlight text as Mr. Barofsky lays out the case for why we need to require the banks to provide ultra transparency if we are ever going to end Too Big to Fail.

As he says, with the current absence of transparency, banks are 'black boxes' remember, market participants would normally charge a very large premium for doing business with these banks or they would stay away from them altogether.

However, the policy makers' and financial regulators' willingness to let the banks continue to be black boxes and bail them out changes the behavior of market participants.  Knowing that the government is going to protect them if the banks collapse, market participants are willing to fund the banks at rates that are far below what the banks should pay given their risk.

This insures that we will have another financial crisis.

The only way to end this way of doing business is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently assess the risk of the banks and adjust the amount and price of their exposure to each bank to reflect its risk and the market participant's ability to absorb losses given this level of risk.

This ends financial contagion and any excuse for a government bailing out its banks.

Bishop Justin Welby, Archbishop of Canterbury contender, says battered financial services sector cannot be repaired

Cutting through all the sound and fury that has surrounded banks and the issue of financial reform since the beginning of the financial crisis, a leading contender to become the next Archbishop of Canterbury observed that too much effort is going into 'putting Humpty back together again' when most of the activity pursued by Humpty has no socially useful purpose.

As reported by the Telegraph,
The frontrunner to become the next Archbishop of Canterbury has accused banks of having “no socially useful purpose” and being “exponents of anarchy” in a speech warning that the battered financial services industry cannot be repaired. 
The Rt Rev Justin Welby, Bishop of Durham, says the sector must be rebuilt “from the ruins” of the financial crisis to become something that “helps people rather than being there for people to help it”. 
Bishop Welby, who is a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards,... 
"But one principle seems to me to be clear, we cannot repair what was destroyed in 2008, we can only replace it with something that is dedicated to the support of human society, to the common good and to solidarity. 
"Financial services are crucial to human development, but they only do their job when the work they carry out is done in a way that is truly a service."...
"The task of all those involved in the supervision, the legislation for, and participation in the financial markets is to find that once in a generation leap of imagination that does not simply seek to repair what was destroyed in 2008, but to replace it with something that is of lasting value," he said in his speech. 
"Repair would be as inadequate a solution as beginning to put the stones of Coventry Cathedral back one on top of each other, to try and recreate what had been obliterated [during World War II]."

The foundation for replacing the sector with something that is of lasting value and making sure that banks truly provide a service is ultra transparency.

When banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the sunlight provided by this disclosure can act as the best disinfectant for bad behavior.

Bishop Welby said "too much effort is going into putting Humpty back together again, and it can't happen". 
He said banks were "exponents of anarchy" before the financial crisis in 2008 because they pursued "activity without purpose". 
The Bishop explained: "Activity without purpose is anarchy. It may not look like anarchy, it may in fact be very well organised anarchy but unless it has a serious and clear purpose activity is merely random. 
"One of the biggest faults in the pre 2008 financial markets was essentially they were exponents of anarchy in this sense. They involved wild and frantic activity, often by exceptionally intelligent people, working very long hours, but they had no socially useful purpose. 
"The industry was referred to as financial services, but in fact it served nothing. 
"In the UK, where most of it was housed, SME's still struggled to find finance, although they were based within close reach of the largest financial centre in the world."

Banks looking to strengthen hand and avoid sovereign debt restructuring

Knowing that it is a matter of time before they are forced to restructure all of their sovereign debt holdings, banks are trying to take steps to protect themselves.

According to an article in the International Financing Review, the Institute of International Finance, a leading bank lobbying group, is trying to change the terms on which sovereign debt is renegotiated.

For example, the banks would like official institutions that hold the debt, like the ECB, to also be required to incur losses.

The biggest change is the banks would like the governments to provide what would be the equivalent of ultra transparency for a government ('enhance data and policy transparency') so that the banks were not left in the dark about what is going on.

Your humble blogger is thrilled to see that banks are such big fans of ultra transparency.  Naturally, given that banks recognize the benefits of ultra transparency, banks should be leading the charge to provide ultra transparency about themselves.

I expect all 450 banks that are members of the IIF as part of their push to change the terms on which sovereign debt is renegotiated to voluntarily provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The world’s biggest banks are drawing up tactics to strengthen their hand in future sovereign debt restructurings, as they seek to avoid another situation similar to the Greek debt talks, when government pushed them into accepting to tens of billions of euros in writedowns. 
The Institute of International Finance, which represents 450 banks around the world that collectively represent the biggest buyers of government debt, has proposed changing the documentation of future bond sales after finding many aspects of the Greek restructuring flawed.
No doubt the banks found that the restructuring was flawed.  The restructuring resulted in the banks taking losses that were not directly paid for by the taxpayers.

If banks were forced to take additional losses on sovereign debt that were not paid for by the taxpayers, this could put the bankers' cash bonuses in jeopardy.

Clearly, something has to be done to retain the sanctity of and bankers' entitlement to their bonuses.
It called for the restoration of the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring” established by the IIF following sovereign debt crises in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. 
Moreover, it argued that the absence of open dialogue, transparent and good-faith negotiations, plus fair treatment of all investors, endangers the normalisation of market access and financial stability.
The most important principle underlying stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring is that the banks recognize upfront the losses that they will ultimately incur should they go through the long process of default and foreclosure on the bad debt.

In the case of Greece, the banks would write off 100% of the sovereign debt.  We are talking about a country that is in a depression with its society and economy falling apart.
The most practical measure the IIF proposes is adding aggregation clauses to documents, which would prevent minority investors – such as hedge funds – from blocking future agreements. 
“Fair treatment of all creditors is in the interest of both issuers and creditors,” the IIF said in a report. “It lessens the burden on all creditors and, by avoiding discrimination, encourages creditors to participate voluntarily in debt resolution.”
As I recall, this is not a problem for sovereign debt that is issued under the sovereign's laws (Greek debt subject to Greek laws).  It is a problem for sovereign debt that is issued under UK laws.

No matter how much the banks would like it, there is absolutely no reason that a sovereign should give up its right to change the terms on the debt issued under its own laws.
The report, written by the IIF’s Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Resolution, examined the Greek debt restructuring from the vantage point of private creditors. 
In particular, the report criticised the retroactive adoption of legislation that introduced a collective action mechanisms into Greek-law government bonds. The manoeuvre raised concerns about the sanctity of financial contracts, the report said. 
“The retroactive change in the legal framework governing sovereign debt instruments is worrisome and sets a bad precedent,” the report said....
Actually, any investor who buys a Greek-law or similar sovereign-law bond knows that the law can and will be changed to benefit the sovereign should it experience financial distress.  This was one of the risks of investing in these bonds that bankers were fully informed about prior to making an investment decision.
The group also demanded that sovereigns make a good-faith effort to negotiate with private creditors at an early stage, including providing enhanced data and policy transparency.
During the Greek PSI negotiations, private investors often felt like they were left in the dark, which limited an open, informed and productive dialogue between private creditors and the Greek authorities, the report said.
I am sure that it was not lost on regular readers that the banks would like enhanced data and policy transparency so that they did not feel like they were left in the dark.

This is the equivalent of asking the governments for ultra transparency.

Given that banks think ultra transparency is good for them, it must be equally good for every other market participants to have when it comes to assessing a bank.

As a result, the banks should take the lead and provide ultra transparency.

In a first, bank executives asked to give back bonuses when bank fails

In what appears to have been a first since the current global financial crisis began, executives at a high profile bank, in this case the Spanish bank Bankia, have been asked to give back their bonuses from the year prior to the bank's failing.

Up until now, banker bonuses have been protected at all costs.  Not only banker bonuses, but in the US, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner also tried to protect the bonuses of the employees who worked in the area of AIG that effectively bankrupted that firm.

Asking the bankers to repay their bonuses is a huge policy shift.

Once banker bonuses are no longer protected at all costs, then the idea that bank book capital levels don't have to be protected at all costs becomes viable.

Once bank book capital levels don't have to be protect at all costs, banks can actually be required to recognize all the losses hidden on and off their balance sheet that they would ultimately realize if the excess debt went through the long process of default and bankruptcy.

Once banks recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system, the burden of servicing this debt is lifted from the real economy.  This allows the real economy to grow as capital that is being used to service the excess debt can instead be used to purchase goods and services.

With the real economy growing, monetary policies like quantitative easing and zero interest rates can be ended.  This in turn will stimulate further growth as savers will now receive a return on their savings.

As reported by the Guardian,

Top executives at Spain's giant nationalised Bankia are to be ordered to pay back last year's annual bonuses as the bank admits to having run up record-breaking losses of €7bn (£5.6bn) in the first three quarters of this year. 
The size of the losses, the biggest ever reported by a Spanish bank, was revealed on the same day that recession-hit Spain also saw unemployment rise to above 25%. Some southern Spanish provinces are now reporting unemployment at almost 40%. 
Bankia will tell its executives to return the money in response to a petition from the European commission, which says they should not have been paid bonuses just months before the bank admitted it needed €23bn in bailout money. 
"We have received the instruction via the Bank of Spain and, effectively, those people will have to return their bonuses," a spokeswoman said....

The bonuses were agreed in April when the bank claimed 2011 profits of some €300m. 
But auditors refused to sign the accounts and the bank eventually recognised a €3bn loss.... 
It was not clear whether any of the Bankia executives would refuse to pay back their bonus....
Spain's government has since capped salary payments to executives at state-rescued banks.

Friday, October 26, 2012

Insurers must hold more capital to support residential mortgage-backed bonds

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has approved increasing the amount of capital that insures must set aside to support their investments in residential mortgage-backed bonds.

Regular readers weren't surprise by this action as they know that in its white paper on the Future of Mortgage Finance, the NAIC linked the amount of capital that insurers need to hold to the disclosure provided by the mortgage-backed bonds.

Specifically, bonds that provided observable event based reporting with all non-borrower privacy protected data fields disclosed required less capital than bonds that provided out-of-date disclosure using a subset of  these data fields.

State regulators agreed to require that insurers set aside more capital to support their investments in bonds backed by residential mortgages, a step they say will help insulate the industry from losses during a severe downturn. 
The increase was approved by a task force of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, an organization of state officials that sets solvency standards, in a conference call Friday. 
The changes would increase by an estimated $600 million to $800 million the total amount that insurers are expected to hold against securities backed by residential mortgages that aren't guaranteed by Fannie Mae and other government agencies, according to Wall Street and regulatory estimates. 
The change brings the required capital up to about 3.2% of the carrying value of insurers' holdings of the bonds from about 2.7%. 
The task force had said in recent meetings that it was acting out of concern that insurers may not have enough capital to cushion themselves from losses from subprime mortgages and other risky home loans should a severe recession hit. 
These bonds helped tip some banks and other financial firms into serious financial problems during the 2008 financial crisis. 
The American Council of Life Insurers, a major trade group, had maintained in comment letters in recent weeks that the proposed increase was too bearish, and didn't reflect improvements in the U.S. housing economy. Some industry executives have contended the proposed changes apply to many more bonds than they think is justified.... 
But on Friday's call, the proposed change was approved by a wide margin. The vote assured that the NAIC will adopt the news rules, which will be applied when insurers compile their 2012 financial statements.

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane calls for 'curbing King Kong banks'

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane in his speech 'on being the right size'  became the latest regulator to call for cutting the Too Big to Fail banks down to size.

Besides Mr. Haldane's typical insightful analysis, his speech reiterated many of the observations made by Paul Volcker on why the regulations proposed since the beginning of the current financial crisis are not going to be effective at dealing with the Too Big to Fail banks.

Regular readers know that there is only one way to right size these banks:  require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency harnesses the market in shrinking these global financial institutions.

For example, the market shrinks these banks by charging the banks more for their complexity.  It is one thing to say these big banks have 14,000+ subsidiaries, it is another to make these banks disclose the intimate details of each subsidiary so the market participants can assess their risk.

In addition, the market shrinks these banks by restraining proprietary trading.  Management and traders know that disclosing their positions limits how much can be earned from proprietary trading.  At a minimum, market participants can use programs similar to IBM's Watson to identify trades that appear to violate the Volcker Rule and call these trades to the regulators' attention.

More importantly, ultra transparency ends contagion in the financial system.  With ultra transparency, market participants have the information they need to independently assess the risk of each of these banks and adjust the amount of their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk assessment.

As reported by the Telegraph,
Andrew Haldane, the Bank’s executive director for financial stability, claimed that current bank reforms – including the Government’s plans to ringfence retail banks – do not go far enough and further measures should be considered. 
To address properly the “too-big-to-fail” problem, he said regulators should consider doubling banks’ loss-absorbing capital buffers to around 20pc, “placing limits on bank size”, or imposing a “full separation of investment and commercial banking” rather than a ring-fence.
Each of these alternatives has problems.

The OECD observed and your humble blogger has fully documented why the accounting construct known as bank capital is meaningless.  It bears repeating that bank capital is meaningless because it is easily manipulated by both banks and their regulators.

Limiting the size of banks sounds nice in theory, however, the question is whether it is size that makes the Too Big to Fail problematic or the risk that if they fail it will cause damage to the rest of the financial system.  The way to mitigate this risk is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Ring-fencing or full separation of investment and commercial banking sounds nice in theory, but the reason that Glass-Steagall fell was banks and their regulators had discovered that banks were bad holders of credit, interest and liquidity risk.  It was far more sensible for banks to originate and service loans and distribute these loans to investors who were better able to hold the loans.

The freezing of the structured finance market is a reflection of the failure to require that each deal provide observable event based reporting so that investors could know what they own.  The fact that the market froze does not say that it is a bad idea to have banks reducing their credit, interest and liquidity risk.
He added that the evidence pointed to the optimal size for a bank to be as small as $100bn (£62bn). ... 
Although banks claim to be more efficient the larger they are, Mr Haldane said the analysis ignored the cost of the implicit taxpayer guarantee that he calculated was worth $70bn a year for the world’s largest banks between 2002 and 2007, and $300bn a year now. 
Without the subsidy, “there is no longer evidence of economies of scale at bank sizes above $100bn. If anything, there is now evidence of dis-economies which rise with bank size, consistent with big banks becoming ‘too big to manage’,” he said. 
“Subtracting this subsidy, removing the state crutch, would suggest a dramatically lower socially-optimal banking scale. Like King Kong and Godzilla, these giants would arguably then be physiological impossibilities ... the weight transfer associated with a single step would have shattered their thigh bones.”
Mr. Haldane does have a wonderful way with words.

I know what his analysis suggests, but it is not clear to me that a bank that provides ultra transparency and operates as a utility doesn't have economies of scale when it gets larger than $100 billion.
Mr Haldane was warning that, despite regulators efforts to build regimes that allow banks to fail without taxpayer support, the risk is that – in the practical event of a giant lender’s imminent collapse – the government would discard the theory and step in. 
“Consider that trade-off when a big, complex bank hits the rocks,” Mr Haldane said. “On the one side is a simple, but certain, option – state bail-out. On the other is a complex, and less certain, option – resolution. If governments are risk-averse ... then bail-out may look attractive on the day. 
“The history of big bank failure is a history of the state blinking before private creditors.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as the point that Mr. Haldane makes is extremely important.

Our modern banking system is designed not to require government bailouts of the banks, however, there is a long tradition of bank regulators urging governments to bailout failing institutions (think Savings & Loans for example).
In his speech at the Institute of Directors, he argued that “one way of lessening that dilemma, and at the same making resolution more credible, is to act on the scale and structure of banking directly”....
The most direct way to act on scale and structure of banking is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It would be amazing how much the banks would change by simply shining the bright light of transparency on them and letting it act as the best disinfectant.
Mr Haldane warned of potential loopholes in the structure. “Today’s ring-fence [can become] tomorrow’s string vest,” he said. He also questioned whether banks would properly separate “cultures and capital” as long as the two operations remained under one roof.
Both of these loopholes were identified by Paul Volcker in his testimony before Parliament prior to Mr. Haldane's speech.

As I learned when working for Mr. Volcker, what he says might not be the word of god when it comes to banking, but it does come from closer to god given his 6'7" height.
Although he welcomed the progress made on bank reforms so far, he added: “Claims that they have solved the too-big-to-fail problem appear to me, however, premature, probably over-optimistic. Worse, they risk sending a false sense of crisis comfort.”
His comments were released shortly after Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, spoke out against the “vested interests” in banking and said that unfinished reforms were hampering economic recovery. 
“There are many vested interests working against change and push-back is intensifying,” she said. “It is interesting how some banks say the new regulations will be too burdensome, but then spend hundreds of millions of dollars lobbying to kill them.”
The leading unfinished reform that is hampering economic recovery and that is being strongly resisted by the banks is requiring them to provide ultra transparency.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency the market will force them to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This will take the burden of supporting this debt off of the real economy and, as shown by Iceland, result in the economy growing again as capital that was used for debt service is now used to buy goods and services.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency they will be forced to shrink dramatically.  Gone will be the subsidiaries to arbitrage rules and regulations.  Gone will be proprietary trading.  Gone will be behavior like manipulating Libor.
She added that progress was needed on resolution regimes to allow banks to fail and for regulators to coordinate and align their rules, particularly over new rules on bank structures such as ring-fencing or proprietary trading bans. “We need a global level discussion of the pros and cons of direct restrictions on business models,” she said.
Actually, we need to stop talking and simply implement ultra transparency.

David Einhorn: Headwinds from quantitative easing and zero interest rate policies overwhelm benefits

David Einhorn weighed in on QE and zero interest rate policies and made a very strong case for why the headwinds created in the real world by these monetary policies overwhelm any benefits shown in the Fed's economic model.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been making this point since these policies were announced.  I pointed out Walter Bagehot's, the father of modern central banking, rule not to reduce interest rates below 2% and Mark Twain's statement that he was more concerned about the return of his money than the return on his money.

In case anyone listening to or reading Mr. Einhorn's speech missed this point, Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge hammers it home while discussing this speech in his usual understated style.

David Einhorn knocks it out of the park with his very first statement during today's Buttonwood Gathering, in a segment dedicated to one thing only: explaining how the Fed's policies are not only not helping the economy, they are now actively destroying this country. 
"Sometimes you have to look at what is the base assumption. because sometimes you have a groupthink around the base assumption and everybody agrees to the same thing and acts reflexively and doesn't really challenge what is going on. I think we have reached that point with the monetary policy. 
The assumption is that if you want the economy to improve, if you want more jobs, if you want more consumption, what we need is ever-easing monetary policy. My point is that if one jelly donut is a fine thing to have, 35 jelly donuts is not a fine thing to have, and it gets to a point where it's not a question of diminishing returns but it actually turns out to be a drag. 
I think we have passed the point where incremental easing of Federal policy actually acts as a headwind to the economy and is actually slowing down our recovery, and I am alarmed by the reflexive groupthink of the leaders which is if we want a stronger economy, we need lower rates, we need more QE and other such measures."... 
At one point in the interview, Einhorn observes that traders and economists now have diametrically opposing views on the effectiveness of QE (no need to explain whose view is what). 
The reason for this dichotomy is simple, if crucial: we are now at a point where the entire practice of new-classical economics - the bedrock thinking of all modern soecity - is at risk of being exposed for a sham "science" which is and has always been absolutely flawed.... 
But back to Einhorn, who presents one of the most coherent explanations why QE, contrary to the Chairman's "best intentions" does nothing to stimulate the economy at the consumer level, and why it effectively serves as a hindrance to future growth: 
"Lower rates drive up the cost of commodities: oil and food. And money that is spent on oil is sent out of the country to the Mideast and it doesn't help, and takes out income from people's pockets that could otherwise be spent on other goods. 
The second [ZH: and this is by far the biggest thing that the Fed refuses to acknowledge] is that not being able to earn a safe return on savings, is causing people to hoard savings rather than consume. 
In other words if I know I am going to earn 3% in the bank I can spend that income and I can have visibility towards that, but if I know I'm going to earn zero in the bank, in order to figure out how much I need to save for retirement I need to save a much bigger number. Which means I can't spend much now, I need to save more now, to build up those savings for retirement. If I am already retired and I am on fixed income, my income has now really gone down and I have to hoard money so I can spread it out thinner over a longer part of my life. 
So by denying individuals savings or interest on income on their savings, it is causing hoarding which is driving down consumption which is hurting the economy."
Mr. Einhorn has just described what I refer to as the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  To make up for the lack of earnings on savings on the personal or pension level, individuals and companies need to put more money into savings and less into consumption.  This effectively deprives the real economy of the capital it needs for growth and puts it into a downward spiral.
As a reminder, in America consumption, not the government... is responsible for 70% of annual GDP. Is it any wonder that the Fed's own policies, done solely to protect the financial system, and to enrich those whose wealth is already primarily in the stock market (the infamous "1%"), are the cause of the ongoing catastrophe that is the destruction of America's middle class, which day after day sinks lower and lower?
Mr. Durden's comment describes the Fed's role in pursuing the Japanese Model and protecting bank book capital and banker bonuses.
Also, in direct debunking of all those Magic Money Tree (aka MMT) "economists" who say that government deficits are a great thing because the lead to higher savings, while maybe true on paper, Einhorn shows that the "expectations" component of behavior here is far more critical than what simplistic Econ 101 textbooks claim, especially the ones that were written long before anyone thought that the US would have a Zero Interest Rate Policy for at least 7 years (and likely more until the runaway inflation finally hits): 
In terms of the savings, I don't think it's a zero sum, because it's a multiplier on the behavior. It's not just the income I am not receiving now. It is the income I don't expect to receive in the future as well. Now we are four years into [ZIRP] with a promise of at least three more, so that's seven years, and you are getting a change in behavior on a multiplied basis.
Mr. Einhorn's describes a self-reinforcing negative dynamic.  The less money people expect to earn on their savings, the more they cut back on consumption and save.

Remember, one form of savings is paying down consumer credit.  This is effectively the risk-free rate of return for individuals.

Yes, some people are borrowing more.  Just look at student loans.  However, for people with the choice to consume or save (and these are the ones who drive the economy at the margin), Fed monetary policies are putting enormous pressure on them to save/pay off their debts.
Finally, and touching on the previous point of why theoretical economists' views differ so much from those who practically make a living by being right for a change, Einhorn is laconic: 
"It's very hard for economists with models, with very limited sample sets and empirical data to understand [that we've gone beyond the point of monetary policy diminishing returns.] I think you wind up with a different view from people like me in the real world who aren't just trying to figure out what do the models say, but how do people actually behave....  
We've opened up enormous tail risks of what happens if the Fed loses control, what happens if the Treasury loses control and these scare people and drive up risk premiums, and drive down P/E multiples and make companies defer long-term investments in the country because they are worried about significant tail risks these very aggressive policies are creating."... 
None of the what Einhorn said in today's Buttonwood gathering of course is news, as he simply reiterated everything he said in his letter to investors from Tuesday, which is just as effective at explaining how the Fed's solipsistic illogical methods are bankrupting America. The key section in that letter is the following excerpt:
 
It seems as if nothing will stop the money printing, and Chairman Bernanke in fact assures us that it will continue even after the economic recovery strengthens. Specifically, he says, “Even after the economy starts to recover more quickly, even after the unemployment rate begins to move down more decisively, we’re not going to rush to begin to tighten policy.” Apparently, anything less than a $40 billion per month subscription order for MBS is now considered ‘tightening’. He’s letting us know that what once looked like a purchasing spree of unimaginable proportions is now just the monthly budget.
Chairman Bernanke concedes that this policy hurts savers, then offers some verbal sleight-of-hand worthy of a three-card monte hustle: He says the savers are helped by low rates because low rates support higher asset values and promote a healthy and growing economy. He then goes on to say that because savers benefit from a healthy and growing economy, we must therefore have an accommodative policy. This in turn begs the question: Does an accommodative policy promote a healthy economy?
 As monetary policies are currently implemented, Mr. Einhorn, Walter Bagehot and I would argue no.
Chairman Bernanke argues that higher asset values create a wealth effect, which he again describes, “if people feel that their financial situation is better because their 401(k) looks better or for whatever reason, their house is worth more, they are more willing to go out and spend.”

We have just spent 15 years learning that a policy of creating asset bubbles is a bad idea, so it is hard to imagine why the Fed wants to create another one. 
But perhaps the more basic question is: How fruitful is the wealth effect? Is the additional spending that these volatile paper profits are intended to induce overwhelmed by the lost consumption of the many savers who are deprived of steady, recurring interest income? 
We have asked several well-known economists who publicly support the Fed’s policy and found that they don’t have good answers.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Europe risks Japan-style slump

The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports that Europe risks Japan-style slump as key measures of the European money supply and private credit are shrinking at an accelerating pace.

Regular readers are not surprised by this as it is the natural result of the European policy makers and financial regulators on-going choice to pursue the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Until the issue of excess debt in the financial system is addressed, the best Europe, the UK and the US can hope for is a Japan-style slump with frequent rounds of fiscal and monetary stimulus.

It is a testament to the political strength of the banks that policy makers continue to put protecting bank book capital and banker bonuses ahead of society.

Just like Iceland, Europe, the UK and the US can quickly end the Japan-style slump by adopting the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize upfront the losses on all the excess debt in the financial system that they would realize if the debt works its way through the long process of default and foreclosure.

My question is when are our policy makers going to put society ahead of banker cash bonuses?

The disappointing data came as the International Monetary Fund said Portugal faces "increasingly difficult" choices and may have to push through another round of austerity cuts. 
The IMF approved the next €1.5bn (£1.2bn) tranche of rescue loans for Portugal but warned that "adjustment fatigue" had become a serious problem. "Risks to the attainment of the programme's objectives have increased markedly. Social and political resistance to adjustment has heightened," it said.
No kidding.  Who would want austerity adopted when it is totally unnecessary?
The European Central Bank's data for September confirm fears that the tentative rebound in the money supply is stalling. The broad M3 gauge – watched by experts as an early warning signal for the economy one year ahead – shrank by €30bn and is now down by €143bn since April. This is highly unusual. 
"The message is clear," said Lars Christensen from Danske Bank. "The ECB needs to do real quantitative easing if it wants to stop the eurozone going the way of Japan." 
More QE will only accelerate the pace at which the eurozone goes the way of Japan.

The only way to stop going the way of Japan is to adopt the Swedish Model and deal with the excess debt in the financial system.
Loans to firms and households fell 1.3pc as banks continue to shrink their balance sheet to meet tougher rules.
Your humble blogger predicted that these tougher rules would exacerbate the difficulty in getting a loan by triggering a credit crunch.  In fact, the credit crunch has occurred.
The ECB's €1 trillion lending blitz to banks has not filtered through into private lending.
Nor will it ever.  The money was used to replace the deposits that are fleeing the eurozone banks where the deposits were at risk of being re-denominated into a less valuable currency.

Please keep in mind, the excess debt problem and the Japan-style slump could be addressed today simply by adopting the Swedish Model.