Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Is the banking system healthy?

The Washington Post carried an article in which it asked the question of is the banking system healthy and then tried to explain why it is despite the fact that bank stocks trade at depressed levels.

Regular readers know that in the absence of banks providing ultra transparency and disclosing their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it is impossible to tell if the banks are healthy.

What is known is that financial regulators suspended mark to market accounting and engaged in regulatory forbearance that allows the banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and transform non-performing loans to 'zombie' loans.

The fact that neither of these policies have been reversed and the banks don't voluntarily provide ultra transparency suggests the banks are hiding massive amounts of losses.

In addition, as the article notes, the banks have tremendous potential for litigation related losses.  Despite a number of get out of jail free cards from the Obama Administration, see mortgage servicing and mortgage backed securities, there are numerous other examples of bad bank behavior, like manipulating Libor, that could give rise to losses that render the banks insolvent/needing to be closed.

On paper, the nation’s banks are making a comeback: More money is being set aside in case of trouble, there are fewer losses on loans and there is less reliance on volatile funding. 
What has happened on paper has been incredibly good for the bankers in terms of the bonuses that they have received.

Put that is only on paper that is easily manipulated by both the banks and their regulators to provide the impression of financial health when in fact the bank could be insolvent (see all the EU banks that failed shortly after the regulators pronounced them well-capitalized as a result of a stress test).
Too bad the markets don’t seem to care.
The market aren't fooled by paper.

One of the reasons that nobody is fooled is that each of the banks knows how much it is hiding in the way of losses on its balance sheet as a result of regulatory forbearance and suspension of mark to market accounting.

Another reason that the market is not fooled is that banks with deposits to lend know that in the absence of ultra transparency they cannot evaluate the solvency and risk of banks that are looking to borrow.  As a result, the unsecured interbank lending market remains frozen.  This is a red flag!
Despite the strides banks have made to repair their balance sheets since the financial crisis, their stocks are trading below book value. Wall Street remains skeptical about the overall health of these institutions, even as profits have soared in the past year. 
But why? 
“Investors expect more losses ahead,” said Mark Williams, a former bank examiner who teaches finance at Boston University. “Many of these banks still have loans that could go bad if the economy goes south.”...
Investors know that with current disclosure practices the banks are black boxes that cannot be evaluated.  Investors cannot determine how many zombie loans a bank has or make an estimate how many loans will go bad if the economy goes south.

What investors do know is the fact that banks refuse to provide ultra transparency so investors can answer these questions.  This is a big red flag that banks have something to hide.
The largest banks have also been engulfed in a sea of litigation with no clear end in sight, Williams said. Dozens of cases brought by investors who claim they were misled about securities deals are still winding through the courts. 
Meanwhile, prosecutors have yet to reach agreements with many of the banks, including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Citigroup, being investigated for manipulating the global interest rate known as Libor. Resolution of these investigations could take another year at least, placing an ominous cloud over some of the nation’s largest institutions. 
Regulators, nonetheless, are encouraged by gains in the banking system that point to continued improvement of a once beleaguered industry. 
Testifying before the Senate Banking Committee last week, Thomas Curry, the comptroller of the currency, said conditions at the more than 1,800 banks his agency supervises continue to improve.
One of the problems that led to the financial crisis was bank regulators making misleading statements about the financial condition of the banks.

Mr. Curry's commets are an example of this.  Investors know that the banks could all be insolvent and Mr. Curry would be saying that their condition is improving as conveying the true financial condition of the banks violates the principle of say nothing bad about the banks for fear of risking the safety and soundness of the financial system.

The way to end the regulators saying anything about the banks is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  Then there is no reason for the regulators to offer an opinion as market participants can assess the solvency and risk of each bank for themselves.
“The banking system is arguably as strong as it has ever been,” Mark Zandi, Moody’s Analytics chief economist, said. “Capital is at record levels, and there is ample liquidity. Credit quality is good and improving rapidly.”
The counter argument could also be made:  the banking system has never been weaker as low interest rates are reducing bank net interest margins and earnings, credit quality continues to deteriorate as unemployment rates remain at elevated levels, and bank book capital has no basis in reality as a result of suspension of mark to market accounting and regulatory forbearance.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Matt Taibbi discovers policy of financial failure contagion

In his typical eloquent prose, Matt Taibbi discovers the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine (from Yves Smith, nothing should be done the hurts the profits or reputation of a bank that is either too big or politically connected), in his article on Too Big to Jail banks and bankers.

Mr. Taibbi discovered the policy when talking about both money laundering and the Libor interest rate manipulation.

In the same vein, there's only one thing worse than a totally corrupt bank: many corrupt banks. 
If the HSBC deal showed how much dastardly crap the state could tolerate from one bank, Breuer was back a week later to show that the government would go just as easy on banks that team up with other banks to perpetrate even bigger scandals. 
On December 19th, 2012, he announced that the Justice Department was essentially letting Swiss banking giant UBS off the hook for its part in what is likely the biggest financial scam of all time. 
The so-called LIBOR scandal, which is at the heart of the UBS settlement, makes Enron look like a parking violation. 
Many of the world's biggest banks, including Switzerland's UBS, Britain's Barclays and the Royal Bank of Scotland, got together and secretly conspired to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR, which measures the rate at which banks lend to each other. 
Many, if not most, interest rates are pegged to LIBOR. The prices of hundreds of trillions of dollars of financial products are tied to LIBOR, everything from commercial loans to credit cards to mortgages to municipal bonds to swaps and currencies.... 
These are the world's biggest banks getting together every morning to essentially fix the price of money. Low LIBOR rates are an indicator that banks are strong and healthy. 
These banks were faking the results of their daily physicals. In banking terms, they were juicing. 
Two different types of manipulation took place. In 2008, during the heat of the global crash, banks artificially submitted low rates in order to present an image of financial soundness to the markets. But at other times over the course of years, individual traders schemed to move rates up or down in order to profit on individual trades. 
There is nobody anywhere growing weed strong enough to help the human mind grasp the enormity of this crime. It's a conspiracy so massive that the lawyers who are suing the banks are having an extremely difficult time figuring out how to calculate the damage. 
Here's how it works: Every morning, 16 of the world's largest banks submit numbers to a London­based panel indicating what interest rates they're charging other banks to borrow money and what they themselves are charged. The LIBOR panel then takes those 16 different interest rates, tosses out the four highest and the four lowest, and averages out the remaining eight to create that day's LIBOR rates – the basis for interest rates almost everywhere in the world. 
The fact that the LIBOR panel tosses out the four highest and lowest numbers every day is an important detail, because it means that it is difficult to artificially influence the final rate unless multiple banks are conspiring with each other. 
One bank lying its ass off and reporting that banks are lending money to each other basically for free doesn't move the needle much. To really be sure you're creating an artificially low or high interest rate, you need a bunch of banks on board – and it turns out that they were. 
For perhaps as far back as 20 years, banks have been submitting phony numbers, often in concert with other banks. 
They did it for a variety of reasons, but the big one, typically, is that a bank trader is holding some investment tied to LIBOR – bundles of currencies, municipal bonds, mortgages, whatever – that would earn more money if the interest rate was lower. 
So what would happen is, some schmuck trader at Bank X would call the LIBOR submitter and offer him cash, booze, a blow job or just a pat on the back to get him to submit a fake number that day. 
The scandal first blew up last year when the British megabank Barclays admitted to its part in the fixing of LIBOR rates. British regulators released a cache of disgusting e-mails showing traders from many different banks cheerfully monkeying around with your credit-card bills, your mortgage rates, your tax bill, your IRA account, etc., so that they could make out better on some sordid trade they had on that day. 
In one case, a trader from an unnamed bank sent an e-mail to a Barclays trader thanking him for helping to fix interest rates and promising a kickass bottle of bubbly for his efforts: 
"Dude. I owe you big time! Come over one day after work, and I'm opening a bottle of Bollinger." 
UBS was the next bank to confess, and its settlement – $1.5 billion in fines – was much the same, only the e-mails released were, if anything, more disgusting and damning. 
The British Financial Services Authority – equivalent to our SEC – discovered thousands of requests to fudge rates over a period of years involving dozens of different individuals and multiple banks. 
In many cases, the misdeeds were committed more or less openly, in writing, with traders and brokers baldly offering bribes in texts and e-mails with an obvious unconcern for punishment that later, sadly, proved justified. 
"I will fucking do one humongous deal with you," begged one UBS trader who wanted a broker to fix the rate. "I'll pay, you know, $50,000, $100,000." 
British regulators aren't hiding the size of the scandal. 
The UBS settlement demonstrated, without a doubt, that the LIBOR scandal involved more than just one or two banks, and probably involved hundreds of people at many of the world's largest and most prestigious financial institutions – in other words, a truly epic case of anti-competitive collusion that called into question whether the world's biggest banks are innovating a new, not-entirely capitalist form of high finance. 
"We have said there are five further institutions under investigation," says Christopher Hamilton of the FSA. "And there is a large number of individuals as well." (At press time, another bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, also settled for LIBOR-related offenses.) 
This dovetailed with what Bob Diamond, the former head of Barclays, told the British Parliament the day after he stepped down last year. "There is an industrywide problem coming out now," he said. 
Michael Hausfeld, a famed class-action lawyer who is suing the banks over LIBOR on behalf of cities like Baltimore whose investments lost money when interest rates were lowered, says the public still hasn't grasped the importance of comments like Diamond's. "Diamond essentially said, 'This is an industrywide problem,'" Hausfeld says. "But nobody has defined what this is yet." 
Hausfeld's point – that Diamond's "industrywide problem" might be more than just a few guys messing with rates; it could be a systemic effort to pervert capitalism itself – underscores the extreme miscalculation of both recent no-prosecution deals.
At HSBC, the bank did more than avert its eyes to a few shady transactions. It repeatedly defied government orders as it made a conscious, years-long effort to completely stop discriminating between illegitimate and legitimate money. And when it somehow talked the U.S. government into crafting a settlement over these offenses with the lunatic aim of preserving the bank's license, it succeeded, finally, in making crime mainstream. 
UBS, meanwhile, was a similarly elemental case, in which the offenses­ didn't just violate the letter of the law – they threatened the integrity of the competitive system. If you're going to let hundreds of boozed-up bankers spend every morning sending goofball e-mails to each other, giving each other super­hero nicknames while they rigged the cost of money (spelling-challenged UBS traders dubbed themselves, among other things, "captain caos," the "three muscateers" and "Superman"), you might as well give up on capitalism entirely and just declare the 16 biggest banks in the world the International Bureau of Prices. 
Thus, in the space of just a few weeks, regulators in Britain and America teamed up to declare near-total surrender to both crime and monopoly. This was more than a couple of cases of letting rich guys walk. These were major policy decisions that will reverberate for the next generation. 
Even worse than the actual settlements was the explanation Breuer offered for them. "In the world today of large institutions, where much of the financial world is based on confidence," he said, "a right resolution is to ensure that counter-parties don't flee an institution, that jobs are not lost, that there's not some world economic event that's disproportionate to the resolution we want."
 ie, the policy of financial failure contagion and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine.
In other words, Breuer is saying the banks have us by the balls, that the social cost of putting their executives in jail might end up being larger than the cost of letting them get away with, well, anything. 
This is bullshit, and exactly the opposite of the truth, but it's what our current government believes. 
From JonBenet to O.J. to Robert Blake, Americans have long understood that the rich get good lawyers and get off, while the poor suck eggs and do time. 
But this is something different. This is the government admitting to being afraid to prosecute the very powerful – something it never did even in the heydays of Al Capone or Pablo Escobar, something it didn't do even with Richard Nixon. And when you admit that some people are too important to prosecute, it's just a few short steps to the obvious corollary – that everybody else is unimportant enough to jail. 
An arrestable class and an unarrestable class. We always suspected it, now it's admitted. So what do we do?
This is why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency.  By making them disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it subjects the banks to the discipline that national financial and judicial regulators are unwilling to do.

Specifically, it subjects them to market discipline.  Market discipline that has no time for banks that engage in money laundering or manipulating interest rates.

Fear of unknown toxic exposures make weaker Danish banks unattractive


Bloomberg reports that there are no buyers for the weaker Danish banks because of fear of unknown toxic exposures.

This highlights how the global financial regulators have still not addressed the issue that market participants cannot tell which banks are solvent and which are not.

Regular readers know that solving this issue requires all banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With ultra transparency, market participants can independently assess the solvency of each bank and fear of unknown toxic exposures is eliminated.

The man who correctly predicted the failures that triggered Denmark’s banking crisis two years ago is now warning that a surge in bad loans will drag down more regional lenders too far gone to attract buyers. 
Aggregate impairments will continue to rise this year, with fatal consequences for the country’s weakest banks, according to Nicholas Rohde, founder of Copenhagen-based Niro Invest Aps. 
It was Rohde’s financial model that identified the noxious cocktail of bad assets lurking on the balance sheet of Amagerbanken A/S well before its 2011 failure....
“There are some banks that are unattractive, either because they’re small or in a remote part of Denmark,” Rohde said in a telephone interview. “Or because it’s not clear how many skeletons remain in the closet.” 
One lender fighting for life is Vestjysk Bank A/S, Denmark’s ninth-largest. The Financial Supervisory Authority’s most recent visit uncovered additional writedowns that left the Lemvig, Denmark-based lender only 350 million kroner ($62 million) shy of being shut down, the bank said in a Feb. 1 statement to the stock exchange....
Does anyone believe a) the bank regulators just discovered these write downs or b) that the amount of the write downs just happened to be less than would have required the bank to be shut down?

Global bank regulators have been engaged in regulatory forbearance since the beginning of the financial crisis.  As a result, banks have been transforming non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans and hiding from the market the bank's true financial condition.

The only way to end this regulatory forbearance is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It ends banks playing the 'extend and pretend' game.
The FSA in April began requiring banks to value collateral at prices they could expect to get within six months, driving up industry-wide writedowns by 50 percent in the six months through June. 
The Copenhagen-based regulator imposed the new rule, dubbed “extreme” by Nordea Bank AB Chief Executive Officer Christian Clausen, after inspections showed banks failed to adequately account for real estate declines. 
The financial watchdog has defended its approach as the best way to spur consolidation in an industry frozen by fears of hidden bad loans.

“The rules are set up to make sure you don’t take into consideration that things might get better,” Kristian Vie Madsen, deputy director at the FSA in Copenhagen, said in a phone interview. “There have been some banks where the effects have been larger. If you go to another bank and try to sell your assets, they would not accept a more positive, forward-looking evaluation.”
The only way for making the banks come clean is to require them to provide ultra transparency.  With market participants able to see what is on and off bank balance sheets, banks are forced to come clean and properly value their exposures.

Monday, February 18, 2013

Elizabeth Warren discovers the policy of financial failure containment

In her first public session of the Senate Banking Committee, Senator Elizabeth Warren discovered the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine (from Yves Smith, do nothing that hurts the profitability or reputation of a bank that is big and/or politically connected).

Senator Warren discovered the policy of financial failure containment as she tried to understand why no banker has gone to jail as a result of the frauds, including money laundering, that have been going on in the banking sector.

As reported by MarketWatch,
In her first hearing as a U.S. senator Thursday, Elizabeth Warren criticized federal regulators for settling civil cases with Wall Street banks instead of taking them to trial. 
“I want to note that there are district attorneys and U.S. attorneys who are out there everyday squeezing ordinary citizens on sometimes very thin grounds and taking them to trial to ‘make an example,’ as they put it,” she told bank regulators testifying at a Senate Banking Committee hearing. “I am really concerned that too-big-to-fail has become too-big-for-trial.”....
Warren acknowledged that trials are expensive but she insisted that if an agency is unwilling to go to trial it is because they are “too timid” or lack resources. She said that the consequence is that if large financial institutions can break the law and “drag in billions” in profits and settle, then they don’t have much incentive to follow the law. 
“Every time there is a settlement and not a trial, it means we didn’t have the days and days and days of testimony about what those financial institutions were up to,” Warren said....
Regular readers know that the Pecora Commission through its days and days of testimony set the stage for the implementation of the FDR Framework in the 1930s.

It is important to have this testimony as it highlights why transparency is needed in all the opaque corners of the financial system.
Warren asked bank regulators how tough they are and raised the question about when was the last time any regulator took a Wall Street bank to trial. 
“Anybody?” she asked.... 
Thomas Curry, the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates national banks and thrifts, said the agency has not had to bring big banks to trial “as a practical matter” to achieve the regulator’s supervisory goals.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Curry is going to describe how the policy of financial failure containment and the Geithner Doctrine operate.
Curry added that the agency has had a fair number of consent orders “so we don’t have to bring people to a trial.” He said the primary motive of the agency’s enforcement actions is to identify the problem and demand a solution to it on an “on-going” basis.
And there we have the policy of financial failure containment.

Regulators find a problem and ask that banks stop.  If the banks don't stop because stopping would hurt their profitability, they ask again.  This cycle can continue indefinitely (see Matt Taibbi and his discussion of how HSBC continued to launder money despite repeated enforcement actions).
Big banks include J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (NYSE:JPM) , Citigroup Inc. (NYSE:C)   and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE:GS)
And here we have a list of the banks that the Geithner Doctrine applies to.
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Elisse Walter said that she believes the agency has a “very vigorous enforcement program” and that the commission looks at the distinction between what could be achieved in trial vs. what the SEC could obtain without a trial. 
An SEC spokesman said the agency is “fully prepared” to go to trial every time the commission files a lawsuit. However, he added that there is “no reason” under the SEC’s authority to delay justice and relief for investors when the agency can “get it all without a trial.”...
What could be achieved in a trial is that the bank's actions are made public and as a result of pushback, Congress takes legislative action so that if it happens again it is defined as illegal with strict penalties.
“As you know among our remedies are penalties, but the penalties we can receive are limited and we have asked for additional authority to raise penalties,” Walter said.
It is not the size of the penalty that is the issue, the issue is that Wall Street never has to say it was guilty.

By not having to say it is guilty, Wall Street is able to treat the penalties as a simple cost of doing business and violating the law for gain.
Last month Warren and Rep. Elijah Cummings, a Democrat from Maryland, sent a letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Curry seeking documents about a series of mortgage settlements with large banks over foreclosure abuses stemming from the so-called robo-signing scandal. 
The Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reached settlements last month with 13 big banks over the abuses. 
The two lawmakers sought the information to “identify the scope of the harms found” to establish “confidence in the sufficiency and integrity of the settlement”
Under the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine, the settlement continued giving the big banks get out of jail free cards and pushing the losses from the banks' activities onto society.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Accountants struggle with how to value bank assets and liabilities

Reuters reports on how the accounting profession is struggling with how to have banks value their assets and liabilities so that they present a fair picture of each bank's current financial condition.

This is a classic example of what I call the 'lost in translation effect'.

As banks move from historical cost of the individual asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details to fair value of these exposures for purposes of financial reporting, most of the relevant information is lost.

For example, one way that the information is lost is mark to make believe for exposures for which there is not a deep, liquid market.  Another way that information is lost is regulatory forbearance under which the banks engage in 'extend and pretend' and change non-performing loans to 'zombie' loans.

Regardless, the struggles of the accounting profession highlight why banks should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can mark these exposures to market and adjust the financial statements so they present a fair picture of each bank's financial condition.

Traveling

On the road, so my posts will be limited for the next week.

Friday, February 15, 2013

Parliament committee concludes that monetary policy experiments put taxpayers at risk for no known benefit

The Telegraph reports that Parliament's Public Account Committee has concluded that monetary policies like quantitative easing that are backed by the taxpayer put the taxpayer at risk for no known benefit.

The Treasury has put billions of pounds of taxpayer money at risk by sticking state guarantees on “a series of expensive experiments” that it does not fully understand, an influential group of MPs has warned. 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) claimed the Chancellor’s department does not have any clear goals for either the Bank of England’s £375bn quantitative easing (QE) programme or its £80bn Funding for Lending scheme (FLS), both of which are backed by the taxpayer, and had no means of monitoring their progress. 
Margaret Hodge, chair of the committee, said: “The Treasury has not convinced us it understands either the risks it has taken on by indemnifying the Bank against losses on QE or the expected economic benefits... The Treasury seems to be embarking on a series of expensive experiments, indemnified with taxpayers’ money.” 
Experiments that are likely to end badly.  After all, if these monetary policy experiments worked, why isn't Japan, which has implemented these policies, experiencing tremendous economic growth?
The Treasury has resorted to providing guarantees and indemnities in an attempt to drive the recovery without increasing public borrowing. However, such “contingent liabilities” carry a risk of loss as the state has pledged to bear some or all of the downside. 
With QE, the taxpayer has fully indemnified the Bank. Under the FLS, high street lenders can swap risky bundles of loans for low-risk Treasury bills. Both schemes were designed to help boost growth, but carry the potential for losses..... 
Giving evidence to the committee in October, Sir Nicholas Macpherson, the Treasury’s Permanent Secretary, described QE as “an experiment, and we won’t know the ultimate answer for many years”. Although the scheme was in profit in 2011/2012, he warned that there was a risk of losses from QE. 
“At some point interest rates will start rising... and at that point you could sustain quite big losses. My guess is that it will all wash out in the end, “ he said....
The size of the losses should the central banks try to resell the bonds they bought under quantitative easing will be orders of magnitude larger than the interest income generate on the bonds.

Fortunately, because central banks have zero "cost" to carry the bonds, they can hold the bonds to maturity and never realize the loss.  Of course, this assumes that the central banks have other ways of reducing the money supply that don't cost money.

In the US, Chairman Bernanke has continued to say that the Fed won't have to sell, it can manage the money supply by paying more interest on the excess reserves in the banking system and therefore control the potential inflationary impact of these reserves.  The problem with this is that it effectively recognizes the losses on the bonds purchased under QE (the alternative to paying interest is to sell the bonds and reduce reserves that way).
The PAC urged the Treasury to “provide more transparency on what QE is seeking to achieve”, and to work with the Bank to “understand and publish data on the effects and benefits of the measure”. 
The very last thing that the central banks want to do is provide more transparency on what QE is seeking to achieve and publish data on its effects and benefits.

Doing so will highlight that QE and its related zero interest rate policies are creating an economic headwind (recall the Retirement Plan Death Spiral) that is causing both consumer and business demand to shrink.

The conclusion will be that these economic experiments in monetary policy, while shown to be very effective by the central banks' models that didn't predict the financial crisis, are a real world disaster.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Iceland regaining investment grade rating confirms Swedish Model is solution to financial crisis

The Guardian reports that Fitch has upgraded Iceland's debt so that it is now investment grade.

Why is this important?

Two reasons.

First, note the direction of travel of Iceland's credit rating is from junk to investment grade.  A clear sign that Iceland's economy is improving.  Compare and contrast this with Greece and Spain where full fledge depressions are setting in.

Second, the debt rating upgrade confirms that the Swedish Model adopted by Iceland for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis works and the Japanese Model which Greece and Spain adopted does not.

This result was to be expected (or at least is should have been expected by the readers of this blog as your humble blogger has championed the Swedish Model and documented that even when not perfectly executed it has worked every place it has been used).

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and the social safety net.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all cost.  This puts the burden of the excess debt on the real economy and capital needed for growth and reinvestment is diverted to debt service.  The result is at best a prolonged Japan-style economic slump and at worse adoption of austerity measures that lead to a depression.

Iceland's rehabilitation after several years as a pariah in the global financial markets gathered pace last night after ratings agency Fitch said the island nation's debts had regained investment grade status. 
Fitch said Iceland's debts had been upgraded to BBB from junk after a strong recovery from the financial crisis. 
Reykjavik's meteoric recovery comes after its 300,000 residents were told they would be locked out of the world's financial markets for decades after they refused to rescue a group of bankrupt banks in 2008. 
Unlike Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the Icelandic government let the country's banks become insolvent rather than spend tens of billions of pounds on bailout funds.
Ireland, which spent more than €40bn rescuing its banks, recently re-negotiated a series of loans with the EU that will mean its debt payments stretch beyond 2050. 
Spain could still be forced to accept an EU bailout after a further deterioration in the financial stability of its major banks, which have only recently revealed the full extent of they bad loans they made in the run up to the banking crisis. 
Paul Rawkins, senior director in Fitch's Sovereign Rating Group, said: "The restoration of Iceland's long-term foreign currency rating to investment grade reflects the progress that has been made in restoring macroeconomic stability, pushing ahead with structural reform and rebuilding sovereign creditworthiness since the 2008 banking and currency crisis. 
"Iceland has successfully exited its IMF programme and gained renewed access to international capital markets. A promising economic recovery is under way, financial sector restructuring is well-advanced, while public debt/GDP appears to be close to peaking on the back of a robust fiscal consolidation programme."

Robert Shiller: Capitalism and Financial Innovation

At the 2012 CFA Institute Financial Analysts Seminar, Yale professor Robert Shiller laid out his views on capitalism and financial innovation.

Professor Shiller channeled his inner Gary Gorton, another Yale Professor whose work on informationally insensitive debt and safe assets your humble blogger has previously debunked, and talked about the benefits of financial innovation, in particular securitization.

According to Professor Shiller,
The ideas I posit are basically an appreciation of financial innovation. Today, cynicism and skepticism regarding financial innovation abound.
Your humble blogger is neither a cynic or a skeptic.  I simply subscribe to Yves Smith's maxim:  nobody on Wall Street is compensated for creating low margin, transparent products.

Financial innovation is primarily about how to create opacity so that the bankers can extract excess rent from investors who are gambling on the value of the opaque innovation rather than investing in a transparent investment.
Even former Fed chairman Paul Volcker contributes to these views. A couple years ago, he famously said that he couldn’t think of any useful financial innovation within recent memory besides ATMs. 
What Volcker says gets a big audience, but I couldn’t disagree with him more.
Which puts the burden on Professor Shiller to show a financial innovation that is actually useful for something other than extracting excess rent from investors (we'll get to that when he talks about securitization).
Our civilization is built on financial innovation. Finance begets and supports almost all activities; it makes the world turn in a modern and civilized way. 
Innovation is necessary if finance is to remain relevant as a means of achieving society’s goals. Perhaps what I have to say will help the finance community defend itself better and encourage finance professionals to assume personal responsibility for their role in making markets more efficient....
This is quite a statement as most people would think that it is the real economy and its inventions that built our civilization.

Finance certainly has a role in supporting the real economy, but it is not at all clear that it is financial innovation that lead the real economy and its inventions and built our civilization.
Securitization was an innovation that blew up in the latest crisis because the process was fraught with errors. 
The most notable error in securitization was in real estate—the subprime loan securitization, which blew up because people didn’t appreciate the risk that home prices would fall. 
It is misleading to say that people didn't appreciate the risk that home prices would fall as a drop in home prices is not what caused the losses on these securities.

What caused the losses was that the borrowers were not making payments on their mortgages.

Since the value of these securities is based on the ongoing payments on the mortgages, so long as the borrowers are paying on their mortgages, the security is performing regardless of what is happening to the price of the house the mortgage is secured against.

Perhaps Professor Shiller never heard the expression "opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed securities".


What made these securities so dangerous to investors' wealth was that opacity hid their true toxicity.

Specifically, the lack of observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or delinquency on the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day made it impossible for market participants to know what they were buying or know what they owned.

Your humble blogger has demonstrated this numerous times using a Brown Paper Bag to represent a security using current industry disclosure practices and a Clear Plastic Bag to represent a security using observable event based reporting.

As a concept, however, securitization will survive because it is a means through which a large number of people benefit.
I happen to agree with Professor Shiller that securitization will survive.  The question is whether it will survive in its current opaque form that allows bankers to extract excess rent from investors or in a transparent form where it supports society.
Securitization is an innovation designed to solve an asymmetric information problem.
Actually, as Wall Street uses securitization, it is an innovation designed to create an asymmetric information problem.

The asymmetry is that Wall Street has the information on the current performance of the underlying collateral (they see these securities as if they are Clear Plastic Bags) and the rest of the market place has out of date performance information (they see these securities as they truly are, Brown Paper Bags).

This information asymmetry effectively lets Wall Street trade on tomorrow's news today.

As the financial crisis showed, Wall Street is more than willing to take advantage of this information asymmetry at the expense of the investors.
In the case of the mortgage market, mortgages and thus mortgage-backed bonds require a lot of analysis that many investors are unable to do, so without securitization, those investors would forgo investing in this market.
By securitizing mortgages, tranches of similar credit quality are created, allowing a large swath of the general investing population to buy mortgage-backed bonds that they otherwise would not buy. 
Professor Shiller's observation about the need for analysis reminds me of Professor Gorton's theory on informationally insensitive debt.

Professor Gorton cited bank deposits as an example of informationally insensitive debt.  There is one small problem with this example.  Bank deposits are insured and depositors are very sensitive to this fact.  Confirmation of this can be seen in Greece and Spain where doubts have arisen about whether deposit insurance will be honored and depositors have pulled their money.

Regular readers know that our financial system is based on the FDR Framework under which the government is responsible for ensuring that all useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner and investors are given the incentive to use this information as they are responsible for all losses on their investments.

Investors know this.  As a result, if investors cannot assess the information on the mortgages themselves, rather than forgo making an investment they simply engage third party experts who can assess the information.

Individuals hire portfolio managers.  Portfolio managers, if they or their organization cannot do the analysis themselves, hire third party experts.

The simple point is that if there is transparency and all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner, it is used by investors so they can make a fully informed investment decision for any type of investment.

Unfortunately, current securitizations are opaque and there is no information for investors to analyze.  As a result, buying or selling these securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a Brown Paper Bag.
Thus, mortgage securitization creates a financial market that allows many people to buy homes that they otherwise might not be able to buy, and it also lowers mortgage rates. 
Isn't one of the problems we have is that people bought houses that they couldn't afford?
The theory of finance involves asymmetric information as one of the elements that financial professionals have to engineer and design around. 
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Professor Shiller has effectively praised Wall Street for creating high margin, opaque products where Wall Street has an asymmetric information advantage.

What is good for society is when financial products are designed to eliminate asymmetric information.

UK regulator warns banks not to leave Libor panel

The Wall Street Journal reports that the UK's Financial Service Authority as part of overhauling Libor in the wake of the manipulation scandal is telling banks not to leave the Libor interest rate setting panel.

As a practical matter, the fact that a regulator has to twist arms to keep banks on the interest rate setting panel is a clear signal that how benchmark interest rates like Libor, Euribor and Tibor are calculated is fundamentally flawed.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger suggested and the Wheatley Review refused to publish that Libor be based on actual transactions that were disclosed as part of each bank disclosing its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.  The result is that the unsecured inter-bank lending market unfreezes and remains unfrozen.

With this information and a flow of transactions in the unsecured inter-bank lending market, there is no need to worry about banks being on a panel.  Market participants can chose to base Libor off of all the transactions disclosed by the banks or a subset.

Several banks planned to withdraw from the panel that sets a key benchmark interest rate but scrapped the idea after the U.K.'s financial regulator strongly warned them against doing so, according to people familiar with the matter. 
The Financial Services Authority recently sent letters to a handful of major banks—including France's BNP Paribas and the Netherlands' Rabobank Group—warning them not to pull out of the panel that sets the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, these people said. 
The letters came after executives at those banks privately informed the British Bankers' Association, the trade organization that oversees Libor, that they planned to exit the rate-setting panel. 
The letters show the British regulator going to unusual lengths to try to salvage Libor.
The reputation of the ubiquitous benchmark, which underpins interest rates on trillions of dollars of financial products world-wide, has been marred by banks' efforts to manipulate it. Regulators and policy makers worry that if a parade of banks leaves the panels that set Libor, it will further damage the benchmark's credibility. 
Actually, everyone assumes that these benchmark interest rates are being manipulated today.  As a result, banks leaving the panel has no impact on the benchmark interest rates' credibility.
But banks are increasingly wary of being involved in setting Libor and other benchmarks, which generally are based on estimates of how much it would cost one bank to borrow from its peers. 
A dearth of lending between banks in the current tumultuous environment makes it difficult for banks to come up with accurate estimates of their borrowing costs, industry executives say. 
The dearth of lending is the direct result of the fact that banks are, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, "black boxes".  Banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk and solvency of the banks looking to borrow and therefore are unwilling to lend.
And the scandal surrounding banks' attempted rate manipulation means some lenders perceive their continued participation in setting the benchmarks as a potential liability....
Actually, every bank that engaged in manipulating the benchmark interest rate is exposed to a potential liability that would render them insolvent.
The FSA letters have ruffled feathers, with some industry officials perceiving them as strong-arm tactics. 
In one letter, the FSA left the impression among one bank's executives that pulling out of Libor would damage its relationship with the FSA and could negatively influence the bank's standing in the agency's ongoing investigation into rate manipulation, according to a senior bank executive who read the letter. 
The executive said the letter's blunt tone caused the bank to drop its plans to withdraw, at least for now....