Sunday, March 24, 2013

Michael Pettis: When do we call it a solvency crisis

In a very interesting column, Michael Pettis looks at how there can be a bank solvency crisis going on for years before the banks and regulators are willing to publicly acknowledge that there is a bank solvency crisis.

The example that Mr. Pettis focuses on is the handling of loans to Less Developed Countries (LDC).

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has written about the LDC experience extensively.  The key takeaways were market participants knew that from a book value perspective the banks were insolvent, this did not matter and banks can operate for years while rebuilding low or negative book capital levels.

Why did market participants know the banks had negative book capital levels as a result of the LDC loans?

Because the banks disclosed the size of their exposures to each Less Developed Country.  By simply taking the price that the loans traded for in the market, market participants had a way of approximating the value of these exposures and what the true book capital level was for each bank.

Compare and contrast this with the current situation where banks do not disclose their exposures.

There is no way for market participants to know just how negative the true book capital levels are for each bank.

To take one possibly illuminating example, I started my trading career during the Latin American debt crisis, which officially began in August 1982. 
I joined the market in 1987, when bankers and policymakers were still assuring everyone that the problem Latin America was facing was a liquidity problem.
Nobody believed them nor because of disclosure of the LDC loans did anyone have to believe them.

I have referred to the handling of the LDC loans and the Savings & Loans as Fed Chairman Paul Volcker's regulatory legacy.  He believed in handling solvency issues behind closed doors.

This philosophy ultimately resulted in what I refer to as the policy of financial failure contagion and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine (via Yves Smith:  do nothing that will harm the profits or reputations of big and/or politically connected banks).

This policy is built on the notion that financial contagion is minimized by hiding the truth behind closed doors.

As discussed above, this policy was absolutely the wrong conclusion to draw from the LDC loan experience.

The conclusions to have drawn are that markets understand that banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels and that markets can handle the truth.
As long as we could keep rolling loans over, they earnestly explained, the problem would eventually resolve itself at little to no relative cost (well, Latin America was struggling with unemployment, capital flight, hyperinflation and political turmoil, but I guess that doesn’t really count). 
It wasn’t until 1990 that the first formal debt forgiveness took place – known as the Mexican Brady Bond restructuring – and before the end of the decade nearly every country except Chile and Colombia had their own Brady bonds. 
Even those two countries, and all the others, had managed to obtain for themselves a significant amount of informal debt forgiveness through debt-equity swaps and debt repurchases at huge discounts from face value (some legal and some not quite legal). 
Why did it take so long for bankers and policymakers to recognize the truth – that this was not just a liquidity problem? 
Actually it didn’t. Most bankers knew by 1985-86 that the region was actually suffering from a generalized solvency problem, and among the big banks JP Morgan had been taking substantial provisions all along. 
No one could formally acknowledge the possibility of insolvency, however, because to have done so would have required that all of banks take much greater provisions than they already had. 
This would have created a problem. Of the top ten banks in America, only JP Morgan would not have been technically insolvent had the banks been forced to mark their LDC loan portfolios to market.
Mr. Pettis is confusing having negative book capital levels with being technically insolvent.

The banks all were technically insolvent as the book value of their liabilities exceeded the market value of their assets (the definition of technical insolvency).

Recognizing their losses would have had two impacts.  First, it would have in fact made the banks reported book capital levels negative.  Second and far more importantly, it would have hammered banker bonuses.  These bonuses couldn't be paid when banks have low or negative book capital levels.
In May 1987 Citibank, after many years of replenishing its capital, was able to announce suddenly and to the great surprise of the entire market that it had decided to take a huge amount of provisions against dodgy sovereign loans.
When it did so, Security Pacific became the poster bank for everyone knowing that its "true" book capital levels were massively negative.

However, everyone knew it would not be closed as it had a franchise that was capable of generating a significant amount of earnings even with a negative book capital level.
By 1989-90 the rest of the big American banks were also able to accept the write-offs without becoming technically insolvent. That is when everybody formally “discovered” that in fact the LDC debt crisis was a lot more than just a liquidity crisis.
No, this is when the regulators and bankers were willing to formally acknowledge the LDC debt crisis was a solvency crisis. It was well known by the market that it was a solvency crisis since 1982.
This is the key point. The American bankers weren’t stupid. They just could not formally acknowledge reality until they had built up sufficient capital through many years of high earnings – thanks in no small part to the help provided by the Fed in the form of distorted yield curves – to recognize the losses without becoming insolvent.
American bankers were not stupid.  They knew that formally acknowledging reality would end their lucrative bonuses.

This is exactly what has happened globally during our current bank solvency led financial crisis.  
And this matters to Europe. There is simply no way European banks, especially in Germany, can acknowledge the possibility of sovereign insolvency until they, too, have built up enough capital to absorb the losses. 
They have, unfortunately, been painfully slow to do so, even with yield-curve help from the ECB, and so I suspect that this is going to remain a “liquidity” problem for many more years. 
While it does, the debt-burdened countries of peripheral Europe are going to suffer a decade of weak growth, high unemployment, and contentious politics, all the while the debt growing faster than the economy.
Mr. Pettis re-iterates a series of points that your humble blogger has previously made.  These points boil down to two simple observations:

  1. when bankers are allowed to pay themselves bonuses, banks cannot rebuild their book capital levels quickly; and
  2. when banks are not required to recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system, the real economy and the borrowers suffer as a result.


Friday, March 22, 2013

Transparency benefit: Using big data to combat big risk

Regular readers of this blog know that your humble blogger has been calling for banks to be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The number one argument against this level of transparency by the banks, their lobbyists, many economists and disbelieving journalists is that this amount of data will overwhelm market participants.

This argument highlights a feature and not a bug of banks providing ultra transparency.

For their argument to be true, the large banks must be overwhelmed by and unable to make heads or tails out of their own data.  This indicates that the banks must be shrunk until they reach a size where they can understand and successfully utilize the information disclosed under ultra transparency.

Of course, if this argument against ultra transparency is false, it says that in the information age banks can make sense of big data.

In an excellent column in Advanced Trading, Andrew Waxman discusses how big data can be used to combat risk.  In doing so, he confirms why requiring banks to provide ultra transparency will end proprietary trading by the banks and lower banks' risk taking.

Everyone is talking about the use of "big data" these days and so now is a good time to reflect on the potential uses of big data by different industries and policy makers to solve some of their long standing issues. 
Here we look at how banks and regulators can use the principles of "big data" to solve some problems -- like how to identify traders who are taking undue risks, or investment salesmen who are fronting a Ponzi scheme.
Or proprietary trading or simply gambling by banks.
First, banks should leverage data to expose the objective reality of different traders’ performance. ... Mining trades’ data could similarly be done to challenge similarly held views about the value and consistency of different traders. It would be very useful to counteract with actual data the halo effect on occasion bestowed on certain traders by past heroic trading exploits. Such heroism, for example, achieved by successfully taking high levels of risk in a tough market, is often rewarded by supervisors with latitude to take greater risks. 
In certain cases, as seems to have been the case in the London Whale episode, such latitude can be disastrous. 
A disciplined data driven approach would serve to assess traders performance on a more objective basis relative, for example, to contextual factors such as: amount of risk taken relative to reward, performance of market benchmarks, volatility of returns over a longer run period. 
Such data by providing a more objective basis for performance assessment would enable better calibration of pay, risk limits, and trader mandates and would lay bare the reality behind a trader's reputation which may or may not have been fairly earned. 
Solid data analysis of ongoing performance should help to separate out myth from reality and help to prevent encouragement of excessive risk taking.... 
Can we identify manipulative or cheating patterns of behavior [think manipulating Libor]? Now this is a field of great promise because, underlying many of banks' top risks, are patterns of behavior that are hard to detect but that can lead to disaster....

Transparency is missing ingredient for bank creditors to participate in bail-ins

As reported by Reuters, Germany has decided that the time has come in the ongoing financial crisis that bank creditors and equity holders rather than taxpayers contribute to bailing out the banks.

While your humble blogger agrees that this should in fact happen, there is one small step that needs to be taken first.  That small step is that the banks need to be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details?

Why is transparency necessary?

The global financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

Under the FDR Framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Under the principle of caveat emptor, investors are responsible for all losses on their exposures.  This gives the investor an incentive to use the information that banks would disclose under ultra transparency  to independently assess the risk of the banks.  Based on this risk assessment, the investor would then adjust their exposure to an amount they could afford to lose given the risk.

Currently, banks are not transparent.  They are in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane 'black boxes'.  As a result, it is impossible for investors to independently assess the risk of the banks and adjust their exposures to what they can afford to lose.

To make the situation worse, governments have created a moral obligation to protect the investors and spare them from participating in a bail-in.

Governments are doing this by making investment recommendations about the banks.  For example, the bank regulators run annual stress tests and announce that the banks are well capitalized.

It is reasonable for an investor to rely on this representation as to the solvency of the banks.  This is what gives rise to the moral obligation to protect the investor from a solvency related bail-in as it is simply unfair for the government to say a bank is solvent and then turn around and say fooled you and take the investor's money.

The way to end the moral obligation to protect the investors and expose the investors to bail-in risk is to provide ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, investors have all the useful, relevant information they need so they are no longer reliant on the governments' investment recommendation.  This ends the moral obligation to protect the investor.

Please note that providing ultra transparency and weaning the investors off of the moral obligation cannot happen overnight.  We are looking at a period of 24-36 months to a) make the bank data available, b) let market participants assess this data and c) let market participants adjust their exposures based on their assessments.

To put this transition period into perspective, until there is ultra transparency, there is always going to be morally justifiable push-back to the notion of bank investor bail-ins.

Thursday, March 21, 2013

Hedge fund manager says JP Morgan's 'Whale' trade was a bet

The Wall Street Journal reports that a well known hedge fund manager says JP Morgan's 'Whale' trade was "not a hedge, it was a bet".

Regular readers know that it was a bet that would not have been taken had JP Morgan been required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures.

The bet would not have been taken because JP Morgan would have worried about the market trading against it.  This concern was confirmed by Jamie Dimon's actions when he tried to limit who had access to information about the trade out of concern that it was being leaked to the market.

Boaz Weinstein, a hedge-fund manager who traded opposite J.P. Morgan Chase Co.'s "London Whale," said a Senate report clearly indicates that the losing positions were "not a hedge, it was a bet." 
Asked at a hedge-fund conference in New York Thursday about how he formulated his trading position, Mr. Weinstein, founder of Saba Capital Management L.P., told attendees: "There was one index sitting out there [that] looked like a real mispricing" and "didn't make sense." 
It was an "easy and obvious trade to do," he said in a keynote talk at the Absolute Return Symposium, referring to the bank's outsize positions in an opaque corner of the credit markets that came to light last year....
Regulators and lawmakers have been scrutinizing the bank's trading in derivatives indexes that tracked the health of corporate credit, which ultimately saddled J.P. Morgan with more than $6 billion of losses. 
Regulators have focused on whether the bank was hedging its risks or making big bets on the future cost to insure against defaults by companies in the indexes.
Senators at a hearing last week questioned J.P. Morgan executives about whether the bank would be allowed such trades if new rules and regulations were in place, including the Volcker rule, a part of the Dodd-Frank regulatory overhaul that aims to curb banks from placing bets in the markets with their own money. 
The trades that hurt J.P. Morgan became a rallying cry for supporters of a stronger interpretation of the rule. J.P. Morgan proposed Friday to revamp the way it hedges its positions. 
According to quarterly data from the Federal Reserve, J.P. Morgan sold $101.3 billion more long-dated derivatives insuring against defaults by investment-grade companies as of March 31, 2012 than it had purchased. 
"It appears now that the notional [volume] was over $150 billion," Mr. Weinstein said. 
The Senate investigators said the volume was $157 billion. 
Mr. Weinstein said regulators might want to "have a rule that any time anyone wants to make an investment…. greater than $10 billion, the boss has to sign off on it." 
He added that the J.P. Morgan bets he and others traded against were "probably the largest investment ever in an item" and significant because one entity was "the entire other side of the trade." 
Asked why he didn't make as much money on the trade as some others on the winning side, Mr. Weinstein said he didn't want to put his whole fund into it. "We had quite a large trade on and the risk reward was fantastic. But we don't use leverage in that way."

Rather than tax deposits and threaten stability of financial system, use deposit guarantee as basis for ending financial crisis

A Reuters poll reveals that 20 out of 22 economists and bond strategists see the Cyprus deposit tax as undermining both the deposit guarantee and the stability of the EU financial system.

This poll confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about how a modern banking system is designed so that banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Why does this poll confirm this statement?

Because everyone in Cyprus already knows that the banks are insolvent (the book value of their liabilities exceeds the market value of their assets) even if the bank regulators have taken steps so that banks do not show this reality in their financial statements.

What is going to cause the run on the banks not only in Cyprus but across the EU is not the banks being insolvent or having a negative book capital level, rather it is the tax on the deposits to cover the losses that the banks' incurred.  This tax effectively ends the deposit guarantee which is suppose to protect depositors from bank losses.

So long as the deposit guarantee is in place, depositors are completely insensitive to the solvency/insolvency or book value of the bank.

This is behavior that was learned from the depositor's parents when they first opened up a bank account and asked how do they know they will be able to get their money back and were told that the government guarantees they can get their money back.

This behavior shows up when you ask people do they know what the total amount of shareholder equity at their bank was at the end of last quarter.  Virtually no one knows including the economists, regulators and central bankers who are campaigning for banks to hold more capital.

Why don't they know?  Because if you keep your deposits below the government guarantee, there is no reason to know or care.

This observation has important implications for how policymakers should respond to a financial crisis where there is a significant amount of excess debt in the financial system.

Your humble blogger was the first person in the world to talk about how deposit insurance makes it possible for the banks to protect the real economy by absorbing all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Yes, the banks will have negative book capital levels.  But absolutely no one cares (except the bankers as it restricts their cash bonuses).

Ending this financial crisis is easy.  Rather than destroying the deposit guarantee, use the deposit guarantee and have the banks absorb the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

A proposed levy on deposits in Cyprus would pose a threat to the financial stability of other vulnerable euro zone countries, according to a near-unanimous sample of analysts polled by Reuters. 
Twenty out of 22 economists and bond strategists surveyed since Monday said a tax on deposits risks undermining the banking systems of other countries threatened by the euro zone debt crisis....

In theory, euro zone deposits up to 100,000 euros are guaranteed, but analysts warned the proposal of a levy risked debasing that principle, literally overnight. 
"The risk is that ... bank customers no longer trust the guarantee for private deposits in all member states of the European Union," said Gernot Griebling, head of bond research at German bank LBBW. 
"In the case that rumors on solvency problems of another bank come up, this might lead to a bank run." 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who chairs meetings of euro zone finance ministers, said any bailout of Cyprus, one of the currency union's smallest economies, will have to involve some kind of levy on depositors.... 


German regulator finds flaws in how Deutsche Bank supervised Libor manipulation

Reuters reports that Bafin, the German market regulator, disapproved of Deutsche Bank's see no evil approach to supervising the manipulation of Libor.

It is standard operating practice at banks for senior managers to supervise in such a way that they can avoid taking responsibility by maximizing their use of the claim of plausible deniability.  As in, "we didn't know that the trader was telling the individual who made our Libor submission to submit false information".

The fact that Bafin is going to give Deutsche Bank a slap on the wrist for its involvement in manipulating Libor simply confirms that regulatory oversight is inadequate to prevent this type of behavior in the future.  The same is true for fines that are the equivalent of paying for a parking ticket.

Regular readers know that the manipulation of Libor highlights the need to bring transparency back to the financial system.

The only way to prevent Libor or similar benchmark interest rates from being manipulated in the future is for the banks to provide ultra transparency.

By disclosing their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures on an ongoing basis, banks that are looking to borrow make it possible for banks with deposits to lend to evaluate their risk and solvency.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the unsecured interbank lending market.

With ultra transparency, it is also possible to based Libor and similar benchmark interest rates off of actual transactions.  Market participants can use all the transaction of a subset.

With ultra transparency, there is no need for complex rules or regulatory oversight of Libor or similar benchmark interest rates.

German markets watchdog Bafin is set to rebuke Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) over how it supervised its contribution to the setting of inter-bank lending rates at the heart of the international rate-rigging scandal, several sources familiar with Bafin's investigation said. 
However, the watchdog's report will focus on "organizational flaws" at Germany's biggest lender rather than placing blame on Deutsche's co-chief executives Anshu Jain and Juergen Fitschen, or their predecessor Josef Ackermann, one of the sources said....

"It won't be much more than finger-wagging," the person said of the report, whose preliminary conclusions are due to be passed on to Berlin by the end of the month....

German financial daily Handelsblatt also said on Thursday, citing "insiders", that Bafin was focusing in on organizational issues at Deutsche and that there would be no consequences for current or former board members.

Bankers get one last bonus season before ....

Reuters reports that this is the last season of unlimited bonuses for bankers before the EU regulations that restrict banker pay kick in.

At a minimum, we can expect bankers to make the most of it.

The article would have you believe that next year will be different and banker pay will be dramatically less.  But is there any reason to believe that bankers will not game the pay regulations like they game every other complex regulation?

So the bankers won't report large bonus numbers, is that any reason to believe that their pay will drop?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger does not object to bankers being well compensated when the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

What your humble blogger objects to is yet another example of the substitution of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.  Our current financial crisis stands as testament to the simple fact that this substitution never produces the intended results and creates financial instability.

What makes the regulation of banker pay particularly galling is that banker pay is addressing a symptom and not the core problem.   The core problem is opacity.

Banker pay is as high as it is because of opacity.  Bankers are able to profit because investors do not have the information they need to properly assess the risk that the banks are taking.  As a result, investors are funding the banks too cheaply and bankers are pocketing this mis-pricing.

Bankers in Europe will have one final bonus season before they are barred from awarding themselves payouts worth more than their salary, EU lawmakers agreed on Wednesday, paving the way for the first cap of its kind globally. 
The cap is designed to address public anger at a bonus-driven culture many European politicians believe encouraged the risk-taking that led to the near-collapse of some of the region's biggest banks.....

The new rules will make it harder to award large payouts such as the bonus worth more than 17 million pounds ($25.7 million) cashed in this week by Rich Ricci, the head of Barclays' investment bank.... 
The rules, part of a wider capital regime for banks, allow bonuses of twice bankers' salary if shareholders agree. They represent the toughest bonus regime anywhere in the world. 
The cap has been softened to allow banks to pay up to a quarter of a banker's bonus in share options, bonds or other non-cash payments which attract a premium after five years. 
Payments made after more than five years would qualify for a bigger discount when calculating the size of the bonus, to make the total payment slightly more generous than foreseen by the cap....

The rules are also a setback for European banks, which had long argued that the curbs would put them at a disadvantage to U.S. rivals. 
"If you want to restrict bonuses we should do it on a global level," said Christian Clausen, president of the European Banking Federation lobby group told Reuters. 
"We have the risk that customers will do business with American banks that still pay high bonuses."

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Germany's policy: banking sector must contribute to recapitalizing banks

As the search for a solution on how to recapitalize Cyprus' banks continues, one thing has become clear.  Germany has adopted a new policy under which it will no longer contribute substantial funds to bailout another EU country's banking sector.

The new German policy can be summarized as:  the banking sector must contribute to recapitalizing the banks.

Regular readers know that this is what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis.

There is no legitimate reason why a government should issue debt to bailout the banks and Germany has correctly recognized this.

The question is how to get the banks to contribute 100% of the bailout funds.

What distinguishes my answer to this question from the approach initially proposed by Germany to Cyprus is how I handle the issue of how quickly the banks need to be recapitalized.

My approach recognizes that a modern banking system is designed so that banks do not have to be recapitalized immediately.  This is a very important point as it is the reason that banks can provide 100% of the bailout funds through retention of future earnings.

Banks are designed so that they can continue operating and supporting the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  This permits the banks to continue to make loans and handle payments.

Germany's approach of requiring the depositors to take a haircut is driven by their assuming that banks have to be recapitalized immediately.  Something that is not true, but has been obscured by Japan, the UK and the US pursuing policies of protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

Bernanke gets his wish, comeback of financial system's most toxic securities

The Retirement Plan Death Spiral has been overtaken as the most toxic side effect of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's zero interest rate policies by the comeback of the financial system's most toxic securities: synthetic collateralized debt obligations.

Regular readers will recall that these synthetic CDOs were at the heart of the financial crisis.  These were the securities that let Wall Street ,which knew that subprime mortgages were going bust faster than was assumed in the investors' pricing models, successfully "bet" on this knowledge.

The fact that these opaque, toxic securities which the regulators and market cannot value have re-emerged is the direct result of 5 years of zero interest rate policies.

Surely, investors and the financial system will have a better experience gambling on these securities this time around.

As reported by Bloomberg,

Derivatives that pool credit- default swaps to make magnified bets on corporate debt, popularized in the last credit bubble, are making a comeback as investors search farther afield for alternatives to bonds at record-low yields....
Synthetic credit, which amplified the financial crisis five years ago, is enticing investors after corporate-bond yields dropped to less than half the 20-year average. 
By betting on the degree to which a group of companies will default, a CDO may pay relative yields of more than 5 percentage points, four times that of a typical credit-swaps transaction on similar debt.
Please note the use of the word "betting".  An opaque security cannot be valued.  Therefore, buying it is simply an exercise in betting.
“That’s a valid strategy for this part of the credit cycle: Don’t stretch on credit quality, but rather leverage your exposure to better-quality credit,” Ashish Shah, the head of global credit investment at New York-based AllianceBernstein LP, which oversees $256 billion in fixed-income assets, said ....
Betting is not a valid investment strategy.  Betting is gambling.

The distinction between gambling and betting is subtle.

Gambling involves buying opaque, toxic securities and guessing what the value of their contents is.  Investing involves have transparency into all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so as to independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.
“Investors are in a desperate search for yield,” said David Knutson, a credit analyst at Legal & General Investment Management America. “CDO products offer incremental yield to plain-vanilla transactions.”...
Bernanke's zero interest rate policies deliberately make investors desperate when it comes to yield.  They are designed to be coercive and force investors to take more risk.

However, there is a real difference between taking more risk while investing and simply taking risk by gambling.
Sales of bespoke synthetic CDOs are climbing after the market all but shut down during the financial crisis in 2008.
Bernanke's legacy is the revival of the synthetic CDO market that produced the following spectacular results:
After the amount of credit protection sold through CDOs in that period climbed to about $1 trillion, investors took losses of up to 90 percent on deals that bet heavily on financial firms that failed during the crisis, including Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Icelandic banks. 
In the mortgage market, CDOs that packaged home-loan securities and were given top AAA ratings by S&P wiped out investors in a matter of months, according to a lawsuit by the Justice Department filed Feb. 4 in Los Angeles. 
Synthetic CDOs “enabled securitization to continue and expand even as the mortgage market dried up and provided speculators with a means of betting on the housing market,” the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee wrote in a 2012 report. “By layering on correlated risk, they spread and amplified exposure to losses when the housing market collapsed.”
And thanks to Fed Chairman Bernanke's policies, this particularly toxic security has, like Dracula, come back to life to suck the lifeblood out of the real economy.
As the Federal Reserve holds its benchmark interest rate near zero for a fifth year, investors including pension funds and hedge funds are again seeking out more structured debt or derivatives that offer greater yields than the bonds or loans underlying them....
Your humble blogger doesn't mind if hedge funds gamble on these opaque, toxic securities.  This is what investors in hedge funds expect.

However, pension funds and insurance companies should never be allowed to invest in opaque, toxic securities.  Regulators for pension funds and insurance companies have had 5 years to adopt regulations that would prevent this from occurring.
Trading in synthetic CDOs will continue to rebound even after global bank capital rules and the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act make derivatives more expensive to trade and hold, Peter Tchir, founder of New York-based TF Market Advisors, said in a March 15 e-mail to clients. 
“There’s going to be this bigger search for yield and spread, and tranches are a natural way to do it,” he said.
As previously pointed out by your humble blogger, global capital rules do not stop gambling on opaque securities.  

As previously pointed out by your humble blogger, Dodd-Frank also did nothing to restore transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  

As a result, investors have been coerced by the Fed to return to opaque areas where Wall Street can handsomely profit off of the investors inability to price the securities. 

EU's Rehn asks for suggestion on how to get credit flowing in EU again

In defending the EU's austerity policies, the EU's top economic official, Olli Rehn, asked for a suggestion on how to get credit flowing again in Europe that was both financially and politically feasible.

If EU policymakers actually saw themselves as being responsible to the citizens of the EU, this is easy:  require the banks to absorb upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

This would immediately restore growth in the EU and set the stage for credit to flow again.

Why?

Three primary reasons:

  1. It ends the diversion of capital the real economy needs for growth, reinvestment and social programs from servicing the excess debt.  With growth and reinvestment in the real economy resuming, demand for credit would naturally pick up.
  2. It ends the need for policies like zero interest rates, quantitative easing and austerity that create headwinds to economic growth.  With economic growth, demand for credit naturally picks up.
  3. It ends pricing distortions caused by 'zombie' loans.  One of the toxic side effects of the regulators engaging in forbearance and letting the banks use 'extend and pretend' to turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans is that it distorts the valuation of the collateral backing the 'zombie' loans.  As secured lenders, this valuation distortion acts as a barrier to new loans as bankers have a hard time valuing new collateral knowing how much collateral is in the hands of 'zombie' borrowers.  Eliminating the collateral valuation distortion eliminates a barrier to new lending.

If EU policymakers see themselves as being responsible only to bankers, 100% of the policies adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis support this notion, then getting credit flowing again in the EU is not only far more difficult, but virtually impossible.

Bankers will immediately realize that if the banks absorb the losses on the excess debt as they are designed to do this would be very bad for banker cash bonuses.  As a result, they will try to block this solution.

Bankers will propose and support any alternative to the banks recognizing upfront the losses and their cash bonuses being reduced.

For example, bankers proposed and endorsed the notion that bank losses should be paid for by taxpayers by having the sovereigns recapitalize the banks.  Never mind that this undermined the creditworthiness of the sovereigns and was completely unnecessary as banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

For example, bankers endorsed the notion that bank losses should be paid for by savers.  One way of getting the savers (actually all the taxpayers) to pay for the bank losses would be to tax their deposits at the banks.

Never mind that this tax violates the spirit of deposit insurance.  Never mind that this tax reintroduces bank runs that deposit insurance ended by making depositors not responsible for the losses that the bankers run up.

So long as the EU policymakers see themselves as being responsible to the bankers and not the citizens of the EU, EU policymakers will adopt a series of policies that will not get credit flowing again.

However, should EU policymakers ever decide that they represent the citizens of the EU, then it will be easy for them to adopt the necessary policies to get credit flowing again (Iceland did this at the beginning of the financial crisis and it worked).