Wednesday, April 17, 2013

IMF confirms solvency problem not fixed by response to financial crisis

According to a Guardian article, the IMF warns that the global economy still faces chronic risk until the excess debt in the global financial system is dealt with.

The International Monetary Fund has warned that the repair job on the world's battered financial system is only partly completed and said failure to finish the job risks propelling the crisis into a chronic new phase....

But with only a modest recovery in the global economy since the deep slump of 2008-09, the report said the improvement in financial market conditions could only be sustained through measures to address issues that posed risks both to financial stability and growth. 
"Continued improvements will require further balance sheet repair in the financial sector and a smooth unwinding of public and private debt overhangs. If progress in addressing these medium-term challenges falters, risks could reappear. The global financial crisis could morph into a more chronic phase marked by a deterioration of financial conditions and recurring bouts of financial stability."
A Bloomberg article gave an explicit example of the excess debt that needs to be dealt with.

As much as 20 percent of non-bank corporate debt in the weakest euro-area economies is unsustainable and may force companies to cut dividends and sell assets, dealing further blows to investor confidence, the International Monetary Fund said. 
Businesses (SXXP) in Italy, Spain and Portugal have the largest “debt overhang,” according to the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report released today, which analyzed 1,500 publicly traded non-financial European firms. 
Strains in the corporate sector may in turn hurt banks’ asset quality, the report showed. 
“Firms in the euro-area periphery have built a sizable debt overhang during the credit boom, on the back of high profit expectations and easy credit conditions,” the IMF said. Now they “face the challenge of reducing the debt overhang in an environment of lower growth and higher interest rates, in part related to financial fragmentation in the euro area.”
The IMF's findings are not a surprise as the global policymakers and financial regulators response to a bank solvency led financial crisis was not to address this excess debt.

Instead, they adopted the Japanese Model under which bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protect at all costs.  By doing this, the burden of the excess debt in the financial system has been placed on the real economy where it is diverting capital needed for growth and reinvestment to debt service.

As predicted by your humble blogger, the result has been a global Japanese-style economic slump.

Fortunately, the excess debt in the global financial system can still be dealt with.  This requires the global policymakers and financial regulators to abandon the failed Japanese Model and adopt the proven Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and allows it to resume growing.  

Adopting the Swedish Model ends the diversion of capital from the real economy to cover the debt service on the excess debt.  Instead, under the Swedish Model, all of the capital that the real economy generates for growth and reinvestment is retained for use by the real economy.

One of the many benefits of adopting the Swedish Model is that it ends the need for austerity and rewriting the social contract.

Update
From the Guardian, the IMF recommended that as part of cleaning up the banks, they adopt enhanced disclosure.
Enhanced disclosure for banks and conducting selective asset quality reviews will help restore confidence in bank balance sheets and improve market discipline

IOSCO: Benchmark interest rates should be based on real trades

Led by the CFTC's Gary Gensler, IOSCO is calling for benchmark interest rates like Libor to be based on observable transactions.

Regular readers will recall that this is precisely what your humble blogger recommended.

And what should be the source for these observable transactions?

The source should be the banks through their disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency is needed for two reasons:

  • It allows banks with deposits to lend or market participants looking to fund banks with the information they need to assess the risk and solvency of each bank looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen bank funding markets like the interbank lending market.
  • It allows market participants to use all of the observable transactions or a subset of the transactions as the basis for the benchmark interest rates.  It allows market participants to use all of the banks or a subset of the banks as the panel for the benchmark interest rates and not worry about a change in composition of the panel.
As reported by Bloomberg,
Global regulators said interbank lending rates and other so-called market benchmarks should be based on data from actual trades in a bid to restore credibility of indexes tarnished by price-fixing scandals. 
A panel led by U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Gary Gensler and U.K. Financial Conduct Authority Chief Executive Officer Martin Wheatley is also pushing for banks involved in benchmark setting to sign up to a code of conduct as part of a drive to make the process more robust. 
“To promote market integrity, it is critical that benchmark interest rates be anchored in observable transactions and supported by appropriate governance structures,” Gensler said in a statement on the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ website.....
Iosco, which brings together markets regulators for more than 100 nations to coordinate their rule-making, will seek industry feedback on the proposals through May 16, 2013. 
Benchmark setting is a process with “opportunities for abusive conduct,” through submission of “false and misleading data” or attempts to influence personnel charged with compiling data and publishing the rate, according to the Iosco report. 
The data used for rate-setting should be based on “observable transactions entered into at arm’s length between buyers and sellers,” according to the report, as the use of such “bona fide observable transactions” builds confidence, it said.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Rogoff & Reinhart and the crowding out of solutions that would end the financial crisis

Whether it is accurate or not, a paper was published that says the 90% debt threshold found by Rogoff & Reinhart was the result of an Excel spreadsheet error.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger previously debunked the implications of their study for how to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis by simply observing that it ignores the creation of a) the modern central bank and b) the adoption of deposit guarantees.

The combination of a modern central bank and deposit insurance makes it easy to handle a bank solvency crisis as the combination makes it possible for banks to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Simply, banks can both absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system to protect the real economy from the burden of servicing this debt and continue to provide the loans needed to support the real economy.

This means that the correct policy response to a bank solvency crisis is the Swedish Model under which banks recognize upfront all their losses on the excess public and private debt.

So why hasn't this policy been adopted anywhere besides Iceland (where it has been highly successful) to address the current bank solvency led financial crisis?

One of the reasons your humble blogger has discovered is that, even when fundamentally flawed, books written by economists from Harvard (This time its different) or Stanford (the Bankers' New Clothes) receive excessive amounts of attention in the mainstream media and from policymakers.

This attention crowds out consideration of alternative solutions, like adopting the Swedish Model, for ending our current financial crisis.

Sweden's economic elite pushing higher bank capital buffers

Bloomberg reports that Sweden's economic elite is pushing for banks to hold higher capital buffers.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has frequently debunked the myth of this easily manipulated, deceptive accounting construct known as bank capital.

My question is what part of this debunking are economists having a hard time understanding so that they stop pushing for higher bank capital requirements?

Paul Volcker says that no one knows what bank capital is.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital? No.

Sheila Bair says that bank capital is easily manipulated and therefore presents a deceptive picture of a bank's true risk. Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

The OECD says that bank capital is meaningless because as an accounting construct is is easy for both regulators and banks to manipulate.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No?

Dexia and other banks pass a regulatory stress test focused on capital adequacy with high marks and have to be nationalize shortly thereafter.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

George Akerlof won a Nobel Prize in Economics based partially on his work on accounting control fraud in banks.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

Financial regulators outside of Iceland did not require the banks to absorb the losses on their bad debt exposures at the beginning of the financial crisis.  They were worried that recognition of these losses would trigger bank runs.  This calls into question whether financial regulators are capable of requiring banks to absorb losses regardless of bank capital levels.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

Banks are designed because of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding to be able to operate and support the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels (see large US banks in mid-1980s when their book capital adjusted for exposure to loans to less developed countries).  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

The economic elite failed to predict the financial crisis and their policy recommendations since have not ended the financial crisis.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

Bank lobbyists understand that higher capital requirements, which the banks will game, is a great tradeoff if banks can retain their current opacity that allows them to gamble with taxpayer money and engage in activities like manipulating the global benchmark interest rates for personal profit.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

The best the economic elite can do to defend their call for banks to hold more capital is to trot out the story of the Emperor's New Clothes.  A story that even the youngest child knows is about transparency.

Oh, did I say that transparency is a necessary condition for bank capital to be meaningful?  No surprise, as transparency is the necessary condition for the invisible hand of the market to operate properly.

Sweden’s economic elite are debating whether governments with oversized bank industries need to demand even tougher capital standards than those agreed after the latest wave of regulatory tightening. 
Sweden’s requirement that its four biggest banks set aside at least 10 percent in core Tier 1 capital of risk-weighted assets this year, and a minimum of 12 percent from 2015, marks one of Europe’s most stringent regulatory overhauls. 
Yet some of the nation’s most influential economists now argue those rules may be too weak to protect the economy from losses. 
“Ideally, the capital requirements for banks should be raised substantially,” Assar Lindbeck, a research fellow at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics, said yesterday in an interview. 
Lindbeck is one of the main architects behind Sweden’s budget surplus rule and a former chairman of the Nobel Economics Foundation that selects laureates every October. 
He says a capital buffer as high as 20 percent might be called for.... 
According to Lindbeck, much of the work to protect taxpayers from banking industry risks should be done through stricter capital rules and curbs on investor rewards. 
“I can imagine the possibility of putting a stop to dividends for a couple of years to build up capital buffers to between 15 percent and 20 percent,” he said. “That may possibly raise interest rates, but we have to accept that. It’s much worse if we end up with a banking crisis.”...

Banks have so far amassed more capital than the regulatory minimum. Nordea’s core Tier 1 capital ratio reached 13.1 percent of risk-weighted assets at the end of last year, while Swedbank’s was 17.4 percent and SEB’s was 15.1 percent. Svenska Handelsbanken AB (SHBA) had a ratio of 18.4 percent in the final three months of 2012. The results put Sweden’s biggest banks at the top of capital rankings in the EU. 
Even those levels may still leave room for losses, given the unstable nature of banking, Lindbeck said. 
“The banking business is risky since it lends other people’s money and you then need a sizable buffer,” Lindbeck said. “It’s a misconstruction in the world’s banking system that they’re working with so little capital.”
It is a misconstruction that banks are allowed to operate behind a veil of opacity so that market participants cannot see the risks they are taking and act to restrain these risk.

Monday, April 15, 2013

European banks need to be recapitalized when?

In his Financial Times column, Jean Pisani-Ferry asserts that European banks need to be recapitalized now.

Why recapitalize now?
Europe also made two mistakes in responding to the crisis. First, it failed to recognise the true extent of its banking problem. It believed – or pretended to believe – that the guarantees and recapitalisations of 2008-2009 had addressed the issue whereas weaknesses were in fact much more widespread. Second, it failed to appreciate that excessive private-sector debt was not just an American problem. In Europe too many households and companies needed to deleverage....

The first priority is financial repair. Banks with weak balance sheets lend on too expensive terms or lend to insolvent borrowers to keep them afloat and do not grant credit to new firms. This prevents profitable investment and the growth of new, more efficient firms.
A comprehensive bank balance sheet assessment is needed....
The first priority should be a comprehensive bank balance sheet assessment and this can only by accomplished by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  With on-going disclosure of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assess each of the exposures.

Market participants can then exert discipline so that banks recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This market discipline ends the practice of lending to insolvent borrowers to keep them afloat.

This market discipline also rewards banks for making new loans to borrowers who can afford to repay the loans.
The ECB should not and will not accept undercapitalised – let alone insolvent – banks to fall under the common supervision. 
With this statement, Mr. Pisani-Ferry moves into the world of theory.  He assumes there are solvent banks in Europe.

In the real world, there is no such thing as a European bank that is not insolvent under the traditional definition of insolvency (the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities).  Supporting evidence for my statement comes from the need to nationalize several European banks that had passed the stress tests (for example, Dexia).

Mr. Pisani-Ferry also asserts that the ECB should not accept undercapitalized or insolvent banks.

As I discussed in a previous blog, were Walter Bagehot, who wrote the book on modern central banking, alive today he would recognize the existence of deposit insurance. This recognition would change his definition of bank solvency and result in the central bank acting as lender of last resort to banks with substantial negative book capital levels.

Mr. Bagehot would recognize that a bank that does not qualify for access to central bank funds is a bank where its interest income is not greater than its interest expense plus pre-banker bonus operating costs.
National authorities therefore have to initiate a recapitalisation of undercapitalised banks and a resolution of the insolvent ones. The moment is now. 
I agree that the moment for cleaning up the banking system is now.

Using the income driven approach to bank solvency, clearly those banks that are insolvent need to be resolved.

Using the income driven approach to bank solvency, those banks that are solvent should be required to retain 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings until such time as they have rebuilt their book capital levels to regulatory standards.

While this may take years, it is not a problem as banks can continue to make loans to support the real economy.

Sunday, April 14, 2013

How quickly do banks need to be recapitalized after recognizing losses?

How policymakers respond to a bank solvency led financial crisis is driven by how they answer the question: how quickly do banks need to be recapitalized after they recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Your humble blogger's response is that banks do not need to be immediately recapitalized.  Instead, banks can rebuild their book capital levels over several years by retaining 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings.

This is not the response that the global policymakers or financial regulators would give.  Nor is it the response that almost every economists would give, particularly those who are calling for banks to hold more capital.

The fact that I am in the minority in how I responded to this question puts the onus on me to show why I am right.

To show this, we need to start with a solvent, opaque bank.  The traditional definition of a solvent bank, which comes from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, is the market value of its assets is greater than the book value of its liabilities.

           Assets
                 Cash                           5
                 Bonds
                    Government          10
                    AAA-rated            15
                 Loans                    
                    Performing            70
                   Non-performing       0
           Total Assets                 100

            Liabilities & Equity
                Core Deposits           70
                Hot Money deposits  20
                Equity                       10
            Total Liab. & Equity   100

Not only is this bank solvent, but it has terrific capital ratios.  It shows a simple equity to asset ratio of 10%.  Its Basel I, II or III capital ratios are even better.

Unfortunately, it turns out that this opaque, solvent bank was heavily exposed to subprime mortgages, commercial real estate and other areas of the financial system that collapsed at the beginning of our financial crisis.  The effects on this bank of marking all of its assets to market are shown below [AAA-rated bonds suffer loss of 10; loans suffer loss of 10; equity absorbs loss on bonds and loans and declines by 20].


            Assets
                 Cash                           5
                 Bonds
                    Government          10
                    AAA-rated             5
                 Loans                    
                    Performing            45
                   Non-performing     15
           Total Assets                   80

            Liabilities & Equity
                Core Deposits           70
                Hot Money deposits  20
                Equity                      (10)
            Total Liab. & Equity     80


Clearly, this banks is insolvent as the market value of its assets (80) is less than the book value of its liabilities (90).

Please recall that this bank is also opaque.  It provides the required disclosures that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane would say results in its being like all the other banks, a 'black box'.

Naturally, this opacity is very important as it gives policymakers and financial regulators a choice:  make the bank publicly acknowledge and absorb its losses upfront or allow the bank to hide the true extent of its losses and slowly absorb them into earnings over the course of time.

Please note that regardless of which choice is made the bank is still insolvent under the traditional definition.

What the choice comes down to is when do the bank's financial statements reflect its true condition.  Now or at some point in time in the distant future.

If the financial regulators want to hide the true extent of the bank's losses, they can suspend mark to market and adopt mark to model accounting for its securities.  The financial regulators can also engage in regulatory forbearance and let banks practice 'extend and pretend' to turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans.

Both of these were done by global policymakers and financial regulators in response to our current financial crisis.

The impact of these actions is shown below for our now insolvent, opaque bank.


           Assets
                 Cash                           5
                 Bonds
                    Government          10
                    AAA-rated            14
                 Loans                    
                    Performing            65
                   Non-performing       4
           Total Assets                   98

            Liabilities & Equity
                Core Deposits           70
                Hot Money deposits  20
                Equity                         8
            Total Liab. & Equity     98

Please note that the bank's book capital, which is an accounting construct, no longer reflects the true condition of the bank (it is a positive 8 when the bank's true condition shows minus 10).

As Sheila Bair would say: as a result of measurement errors, this bank's capital is deceptive.  It doesn't present an accurate picture of the bank's risk or solvency.

Before going on, let me summarize three key points.
  • First, the bank is insolvent under the traditional definition of solvency regardless of what its financial statements show.  
  • Second, by fiddling with the accounting, policymakers and financial regulators are explicitly agreeing with me that a bank can operate and support the real economy even when it is insolvent under the traditional definition.
  • Third, by fiddling with the accounting, policymakers and financial regulators are explicitly agreeing with me that a bank that is currently insolvent under the traditional definition can generate and retain enough earnings so that it becomes solvent again.
So, why do global policymakers and financial regulators engage in hiding bank insolvency?

The answer to this question is driven by their answer to how quickly banks need to be recapitalized after recognizing losses.  They assert that banks need to be recapitalized as soon as possible after recognizing losses.

Why?

Because a bank that shows low or negative book capital levels is prone to bank runs or it is hampered in its ability to support the real economy.

Let me address bank runs first.

Why should this bank be any more susceptible to bank runs after it reveals the true extent of its losses than it is when the losses are being hidden?  Do global policymakers and financial regulators think that market participants missed the implosion of subprime securities, commercial real estate and other areas of the financial system?

What market participants don't know is the exact extent of the losses suffered by each bank.  Market participants are keenly aware of the fact that each bank suffered extensive losses.  Losses that if fully recognized upfront may in fact leave the bank with substantial negative book capital levels.

So why aren't depositors fleeing the banks?  Deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.

I break depositors into two groups: core and hot money.

Core depositors like individuals and SMEs have a long-term relationship with their bank.  They trust that even highly indebted governments will honor their deposit guarantees and protect them from any losses due to bank insolvency.  As Cyprus shows, hurting the SMEs devastates the economy so policymakers and financial regulators have a strong incentive not to do this.

As a result, core depositors don't care and probably couldn't tell you what the book capital level for their bank was at the end of last quarter.  They are with their bank for the long haul.

This is a key point because it is these depositors that are the key to the viability of the banking franchise.  It is their business that allows a bank to generate and retain the earnings that rebuild its book capital level and restore it to solvency over many years.

Hot money depositors are, as their name implies, only dealing with the bank as an investor.  At the first sign of problems and clearly this bank has problems, they are gone as soon as they can get their money out.

This group is in fact already engaged in a bank run.  A run that is slowed down to a jog by having their money tied up in time deposits.

So what does the bank look like after all of its hot money depositors have left?

            Assets
                 Cash                                   5
                 Bonds
                    Government                  10
                    AAA-rated                      5
                 Loans                    
                    Performing                    45
                   Non-performing             15
           Total Assets                           80

            Liabilities & Equity
                Funds from central banks  20
                Core Deposits                   70
                Hot Money deposits           0
                Equity                             (10)
            Total Liab. & Equity           80

Please note that under Walter Bagehot's principle for central banks acting as lender of last resort, central banks are suppose to lend freely against good collateral.  In this example, good collateral at 60 is 3 times greater than the size of the loan from the central bank.  So a bank run by hot money depositors is not a problem.

This example is all well and good, however, in the EU, the ECB is restricted to only lending to solvent banks.

Let's not kid ourselves.  The fact is that all the large banks in the EU, UK and US are insolvent whether their financial statements show it or not.

First, a bank that was not insolvent would provide ultra transparency to show it.  By disclosing its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the bank is saying it has nothing to hide.  This would give it an enormous competitive advantage in both access to and lower cost of funds over other large banks that don't make a similar level of disclosure.

Banks that don't provide ultra transparency are announcing they have something to hide and are far riskier.

Second, the existence of deposit guarantees would change Walter Bagehot's definition of solvency.  It would no longer be solvency as defined by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.  It would be adjusted for the existence of the deposit guarantee standing behind the core depositors.

The deposit guarantee implies a far higher level of "capital".  One way to reflect this is to subtract the guaranteed deposits from the solvency equation.  A bank is solvent if the market value of its assets exceeds the book value of its liabilities less guaranteed deposits.

In our example, our insolvent bank under the traditional definition of solvency is solvent after adjusting for the deposit guarantee [80 - (90 - 70) = 60].

This is very important.  As regular readers know, the time to resolve a bank is when the interest income from its performing assets does not exceed the combination of its interest expense and its pre-banker bonus cost of operations.

Please note, the ECB is already effectively using my modified definition of bank solvency and lending to banks that would be insolvent under the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's solvency definition under its promise to do whatever it takes.  There is no reason to believe that the ECB is fooled by EU policymakers and financial regulators playing games with the banks' financial statements.

Let me now address the issue of recognizing the losses would hurt the banks' ability to support the real economy.

Why?

As shown in the example, there is no reduction in the bank's ability to fund new loans after it absorbs its losses.  Cash didn't change.

Recognizing the losses actually improves a bank's ability to make loans.  As shown by Iceland, when the banks recognize upfront the losses on all the excess debt in the financial system, collateral values adjust to a sustainable level.  This is important as banks are senior secured lenders.

What limits the ability of banks to make new loans is an artificial construct:  regulators and their obsession with easily manipulated book capital.

Quite simply, it is not access to funding that hurts a bank's ability to fund new loans and support the real economy as it is the constraint on making new loans that the regulators force on the banks in the form of capital ratios.

It is the bank regulators who insist on a positive capital ratio even when the bank should be showing a negative book capital level.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

Deposits are not investments when banks aren't required to provide transparency

In his Telegraph column, Liam Halligan succinctly makes the point that deposits are not investments.

Regular readers know this is particularly true when banks are not required to provide transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

If depositors do not have the information needed to assess the risk of a bank and can reasonably rely on representations made the government (think passing a bank solvency stress test), they simply should never be included in a bail-in.

Investors in unsecured bank bonds or stock on the other hand are choosing to gamble on the solvency of the bank.  They are choosing to gamble because they are buying securities that are designed to place them at risk of losing their money.

The fact that investors in unsecured bank bonds or stock are blindly gambling because of the lack of transparency does not excuse them from the responsibility for losses on their investment exposures.

Rather, it suggests that these investors should instead practice the Wall Street Walk and find investments where there is transparency and they can assess the risk and value of the investment.

Yet as German Chancellor Angela Merkel quakes before her own increasingly outspoken electorate, with parliamentary opposition rising and federal elections looming in September, the screws are now being turned on Cyprus even more. 
How much can this Mediterranean mini-state take? Even before this latest cash demand, the Cypriot economy was officially forecast to shrink by an eye-watering 12pc over the next two years. 
Those with savings above €100,000 at the dominant Bank of Cyprus — including numerous local businesses, educational institutions and charities — are already in line to lose around two thirds of their deposits. 
With growth now likely to be even more negative, that horrendous asset-grab will be more draconian, with large savers at Laiki bank, the second biggest in Cyprus, likely to get nothing at all. 
At the risk of repeating myself, deposits are not investments. If you buy an equity or bond, exposing yourself to risk but also the prospect of a commercial return, then you stand to lose your money. Fair enough. 
If you put money in a bank, though, in a modern society that deposit should be guaranteed.  
To wilfully demonstrate otherwise is to incite deep social unrest, while undermining the very fabric of capitalism and wealth creation itself. 

Charles Hugh Smith: The real Cyprus template

Regular readers know that at the beginning of the financial crisis, global policymakers and regulators operating under the policy of financial failure containment adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

In a must read post, Charles Hugh Smith examines the Cyprus bank bailout and one of the ways that banks are protected.

It appears the key preliminary step of the Real Cyprus Template is that money-center banks in Germany and other "core" Eurozone nations pull their money out of the soon-to-implode "periphery" nation's banks before the banking crisis is announced. 
As David observed, "I think this explains a lot about something that has always puzzled me: why the delay in resolving Cyprus after the Greek haircut?" 
"The Cyprus situation had been simmering for at least a year when in March of 2013 it finally broke; Cyprus had a week to take care of its banking situation or else face a cutoff of access to the eurosystem by the ECB. 
This brought matters to a head; the Cyprus Bail-In was finally settled upon, where uninsured depositors in the two largest banks in Cyprus took major haircuts, and must wait for return of their money until the assets of the banks are run down. 
The banking problems in Cyprus had their roots in the Greek Sovereign Default, and were known by the general public for about a year prior to the recent default; a New York Times article dated April 11, 2012 lays out the particulars. 
Looking at Cyprus bank security assets in data provided by the ECB, the problems were visible earlier - right after the first Greek haircut in mid 2011, and a second haircut finalized in early 2012. This was a 11 billion euro hole in a system with 100 billion in assets total, centered upon two banks that held half the deposits in the system.....

So why did the eurozone wait so long to resolve the problematic Cypriot banks with their 11 billion euro hole that was clearly serious in the middle of 2011, and becoming blindingly obvious by 2012? 
Therein lies a story - it has to do with banking, and how banks make money. The explanation is a bit complicated, but bear with me. 
Bank deposits are grouped into 3 primary categories: deposits from households, from corporations, and from other banks. Households and corporations typically have a long standing relationship with their bank; they only move their deposits slowly, and most of this sort of depositor uses time deposits to maximize their interest income. Deposits from other banks are what we might term "hot money." They arrive quickly, and depart just as fast. But why would a bank deposit money with another bank? The simple explanation is: interest rate spreads. 
Let's imagine you ran a German bank, and you paid very low rates to your overnight depositors. You have a great deal of really cheap money on your hands. What are your options to make money? ....
RateDeposit Type & Location
0.55%German Overnight Deposit
1.1%Cyprus Overnight Deposit
2.8%Cyprus Savings Deposit (1 year)
4.9%Cyprus Time Deposit (1 year)
Now then, if the Bank of Cyprus doesn't go under, this is free money. ....  But the key to this free money is, your bank must be able to get its money out of Cyprus prior to any trouble. 
And the barrier to getting the bank's money back is those Time Deposits (the deposits paying the most interest) are stuck in Cyprus for a year. So in order to avoid loss, you have to see into the future one year and stop rolling your bank's time deposits one year before those Cyprus banks go under. Otherwise you will have collected that 4.9%, then suffered a 30-60% uninsured depositor haircut. And a haircut is not a good way to ensure your banker bonus for the year. 
So with this hypothetical strategy in mind and being mindful of the dangers of default and the timeline of when things occurred, take a look at the following chart of "foreign deposit sources" (deposits in Cyprus banks that originated from outside Cyprus) and see for yourself how well each foreign participant did in anticipating the eventual banking system crisis.... 
Looking at the timeline, even as late as the end of 2011, when it was clear Greece would default and the banking regulator had to know the banks in Cyprus were doomed, the amount of Eurozone-bank derived deposits in Cyprus was over 20 billion euros, a good portion of which would be subject to massive losses if the Cyprus Template were to be applied at that moment....

But at that moment, as a result of the "collecting the spread" strategy, some big chunk of that money were likely in time deposits, unable to be withdrawn. That money couldn't flee, not just yet. 
But as time passed, those Eurozone bank deposits were slowly reduced down to 10 billion euros, a reduction of 50%. Presumably, as the time deposits expired, the money was brought back to the fatherland....
At the same time, the ECB would have been increasing its funding of the Cyprus banks and hence its ability to force the bail-in.
In looking at the movement of capital prior to the default, we can give a grade to each participant, as a result of their apparent ability to assess the the danger to their deposits.
The clear winner: Eurozone Banks. Those guys were geniuses. They were the only participant to seriously reduce holdings prior to the default. 
ParticipantGrade
Eurozone [German & French] BanksB+/A-: almost perfect
Cyprus People & BusinessesF: completely unaware
Cyprus BanksC-: slightly more aware
Banks Outside EurozoneF: completely unaware
Russian MobstersF: completely unaware
So it is expected (and a bit sad) that households and businesses don't leave their banks readily, so its not surprising they stayed on board right up until the end. 
What is fascinating to me is that the banks that were NOT in the eurozone clearly had no idea what was coming, and the banks actually ON Cyprus only had an inkling, and that only at the last minute. 
Given both the timing and the form of the Cyprus bank resolution was in the hands of the ECB, as well as French and German politicians, is this astounding ability of the Eurozone banks to avoid losses truly a surprise?...

One last point. Since now we understand how perfectly the well-connected eurozone banking establishment identifies issues in member nation's banks, and how adept it is at avoiding uninsured depositor haircuts, we might find it useful to watch deposit flows of these Eurozone banks going forward.... 
We can now see there are two Cyprus Templates:
1. The public-relations/propaganda model
2. The real one, that enables "core" eurozone banks to pull their deposits out of periphery banks before the deposit expropriation and capital controls kick in. 
Why are we not surprised the entire charade and expropriation is rigged to benefit the core banks?

Greek PM: Deposits are safe

Reuters reports that the Greek PM is saying that uninsured deposits in Greek banks are safe due to the planned recapitalization of the Greek banking system.

The PM made the statement because of concerns raised by a merger of two Greek banks being called off due to the lack of new equity from private investors. [Regular readers know that the lack of new equity from private investors reflected the lack of transparency into the banks and the inability of the private investors to assess the risk and or solvency of the banks.]

Of course, the Greek PM has to say this.

The question is where is the proof that this is true.

If the Greek banks have been successfully recapitalized and all their losses recognized, then the banks disclosing their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details should simply confirm this fact.

The absence of the banks providing ultra transparency so that the safety of uninsured deposits can be confirmed is a big red flag.  Uninsured depositors should see this red flag waving and recognize that their deposits are at risk of a Cypriot style haircut.
Greek bank deposits are safe and the country's lenders are protected due to a recapitalization scheme which will be completed by the end of April, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras said on Saturday. 
In an interview with Imerisia, Samaras ruled out a tax on deposits over 100,000 euros ($131,000) allaying fears of austerity-hit Greeks that their savings may be at risk after a raid on Cyprus depositors as part of the island's bailout. 
"No, I'm categorical. There is no such issue. We have no reason to think about it," he said. "The Greek banking system is shielded due to the recapitalization."...

The banking sector was shaken this week by the unexpected suspension of National Bank's plans to integrate its newly acquired rival Eurobank after the lenders said they were unlikely to raise enough capital to stay private. 
Samaras said the deal depends on the recapitalization. Under the terms of the plan, a minimum amount of new equity must be raised from the market for the banks to remain privately run. 
"If the two banks raise the funds to recapitalize alone, then they will decide if they still want to merge. If they don't raise the demanded funds they will fall under the control of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund which will decide if their merger is beneficial," he said.

Thursday, April 11, 2013

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane and the campaign to reduce financial regulatory complexity

In case you missed his fabulous speech on Turning the Red Tape Tide, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane has elevated his campaign to reduce financial regulatory complexity.

Specifically, Mr. Haldane focuses on the pattern of regulation increasing at an exponential rate.
The facts are striking. 
In the UK, the Banking Act (1979) covered 52 sections and 75 pages. By the mid-1980s, the Financial Services Act (1986) and an updated Banking Act (1987) had expanded primary legislation to 110 sections (106 pages) and 212 sections (299 pages) respectively. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) took this to 433 sections or 321 pages. And the new Financial Services Act (2012) takes this to 695 sections or 534 pages – a tenfold increase in primary legislation in a generation. 
In the US, the picture is no less dramatic. Contrast the legislative responses in the two largest financial crises of the past century – the Great Depression and the Great Recession. The Great Depression spawned the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) – perhaps the single most important piece of financial legislation of the 20th  century. That ran to a mere 37 pages. 
As an aside, I disagree with Mr. Haldane that Glass-Steagall is the single most important piece of financial legislation of the 20th century.  That distinction belongs to the Securities Act (1933) which made the FDR Framework the foundation for our financial system.

It is the Securities Act that introduces the philosophy of disclosure.  This Act makes it the government's responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.
More recently, the Great Recession has spawned the Dodd-Frank Act (2010). It runs to 848 pages or more than 20 Glass-Steagalls. Once completed, Dodd-Frank might run to 30,000 pages of rulemaking.
Clearly, the facts speak for themselves that we have seen a tremendous increase in the number of financial regulations.   We have also seen a tremendous increase in the complexity of the individual regulations.

For example, as Mr. Haldane previously observed, you could calculate the Basel I capital requirements on the back of an envelope.  By the time Basel III capital requirements are done, you will need a powerful computer to handle the millions of assumptions.

What has caused this increase in both amount and complexity of regulation?
In this respect, financial regulation shares many evolutionary characteristics with elements of the legal framework – for example, the tax code. It too has been responsive to events and circumstance including crises, scandals, innovation and liberalisation. And for many of the same reasons, it too has resulted in a rising tide of rulebook complexity....
Viewed through the lens of history, it is not difficult to explain this evolution. As cracks have emerged in the plaster – for example, regulatory and tax loopholes – they have been papered over. Like a bad painter and decorator, new layers have been applied to support the layers below. These were rational responses to real problems. And for a time they will have filled cracks, reduced uncertainties, corrected incentives. 
Yet this evolutionary path leads inexorably towards a framework – whether regulatory or tax – which is a patchwork of make-do-and-mend. History locks in the idiosyncrasies and complexities of the past, generating a steadily rising tide of red tape. As the regulatory and tax codes attest, the resulting frameworks can be Byzantine in their complexity and Heath-Robinson in their design.
In short, regulation is a response to market failure and the complexity of the regulation is a direct result of the market failure that is being fixed.

For the financial system, the market failure the regulations are trying to address is opacity.

For example, regulators are proposing complex rules to limit interbank exposures so as to reduce the risk of financial contagion.

The risk of financial contagion would be reduced if the banks provided ultra transparency and disclosed on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, banks could assess each of the other banks they do business with and limit the risk of their exposure to these banks based on the riskiness of each bank.

Mr. Haldane then effectively renders complex financial legislation, like the Dodd-Frank Act and its resulting regulations, as much ado about nothing and heading in the wrong direction by simply observing
complex frameworks tend ultimately not to solve the problems for which they were a response. 
They may be ineffective. In filling old cracks, complex rulebooks tend to open up opportunities for new ones to emerge. Indeed, they may increase the likelihood of new loopholes or workarounds emerging. 
Regular readers know that the areas of the financial system that failed in the current financial crisis were those areas where the FDR Framework was not adhered to.

Rather, there was substitution of the combination of complex regulation and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.  Examples of these opaque areas include banks and structured finance securities.

Since August 9, 2007, it has been obvious that the FDR Framework was not adhered to and that transparency needs to be brought to all the opaque areas of the financial system.

Mr. Haldane offers an explanation for why that hasn't happened yet.
Resistance is strong, particularly among those who gain most from squeezing through the loopholes. 
There is also an in-built professional inertia among regulators [and] lawyers... with large amounts of human capital invested in complexity. 
In removing complexities, society’s gain would be their loss.
He then suggests that there is hope that we will in fact bring transparency to all the opaque areas of the financial system and adhere to the FDR Framework.
Nonetheless, in the light of the financial crisis, we may be nearing an inflection point, where the societal pendulum begins to swing in the opposite direction. There are certainly signs of the red tape tide beginning to turn in the area of financial regulation. A growing chorus of concern has emerged recently about complexities and inconsistencies in banking regulation.... 
For financial regulation, that means asking some big questions [and answering them in light of the banks providing ultra transparency as required under the FDR Framework]. 
Is risk-weighting of bank assets worth the costs? Are bank’s internal risk models more regulatory trouble than they are worth? Does complexity unduly advantage large incumbents over small new entrants? Are armies of supervisors and compliance officers a sign of success or failure?...
When market participants have access to each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the answer to the questions is easy: No, Yes, No (in fact, market discipline will reward banks that are less complex with a lower funding cost as they are more easily understood), Failure.
This could transform the regulatory framework, for the simpler, for the better.
Requiring banks to provide ultra transparency transforms the regulatory framework for the simpler and better because now the regulators can piggy-back off the analytical and disciplinary capabilities of the markets.

When market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank for themselves, or use third party experts to assess the risk for them, the focus is where it should be: on the risk each bank is taking.

The focus is on risk because under the FDR Framework, market participants know they are responsible for all loses on their exposures and therefore they have an incentive to limit their exposures to what they can afford to lose given the level of risk.

Not only does this end the risk of financial contagion, but market participants can help the regulators identify potential problems by highlight what they see as the risks of each bank.