Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Paul Volcker explains how to fix big banks and financial system

In David Brodwin's must read US News column, he looks at Paul Volcker's explanation of how to fix big banks and the financial system.

Mr. Volcker observed:

The erosion of confidence and trust in the financial world, in the financial authorities that oversee it, and in government generally is palpable. That can't be healthy for markets or for the regulatory community....
Regular readers know that transparency is the foundation for confidence and trust in the financial world.

The global financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).  Confidence and trust is one the end results of implementing this framework.

This end result occurs because market participants have confidence and trust in their decisions when they have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to independently assess the risk of and value an investment so they can make a fully informed decision.

Confidence and trust are shattered when there is opacity in large corners of the financial system and financial authorities insist on substituting their judgement for each market participant's independent analysis.
Volcker sees two main threats to our banking system: first, our ongoing failure to regulate it adequately in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, and second, the development of unrealistic and dangerous expectations for the role of the Fed. 
Volcker begins by affirming that modern financial markets have lost the ability to self-regulate, and that "market discipline alone" fails to "restrain episodes of unsustainable exuberance before the point of crisis." 
Your humble blogger disagrees with Mr. Volcker that modern financial markets have lost the ability to either self-regulate or exert market discipline.

For either of these to occur, there must be transparency because without transparency it is impossible to assess risk.

How can markets exert discipline and restrain bank risk taking when they do not have access to a bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details?

How can markets exert discipline and restrain bank risk taking when the regulators, who have an information monopoly on the current exposure details, say banks are low risk?

No one should expect markets to exert discipline and restrain bank risk taking when bank disclosure regulations allowed them to be "black boxes" and regulators out of concern for the safety and soundness of the financial system misrepresent the riskiness of the banks.

It is not surprising that confidence and trust in the financial system and financial authorities are eroding.  Market participants have reason to believe they are being lied to.

If the banks are in the great financial condition that the financial authorities claim, then the authorities should insist that the banks provide transparency so market participants can independently confirm this fact.

By not requiring the banks to provide transparency 6 years after the financial crisis began, the financial authorities are effectively waving a large red warning flag.
Yet, the so called Dodd-Frank Act does not solve the problem, he says. It provides both too much regulation and too little.... 
Despite the extensive regulation in Dodd-Frank, the bill is badly compromised by loopholes that prevent it from being fully and effectively implemented. Volcker writes: 
"The present overlaps and loopholes in Dodd-Frank and other regulations provide a wonderful obstacle course that plays into the hands of lobbyists resisting change. The end result is to undercut the market need for clarity and the broader interest of citizens and taxpayers."...
The Dodd-Frank Act uses complex regulations and regulatory oversight as a substitute for transparency and market discipline.

Unfortunately, we are in our current financial crisis because complex regulations and regulatory oversight does not prevent a financial crisis like transparency and market discipline does.

Your humble blogger likes to cite in support of this statement the simple fact that the financial crisis occurred in all the opaque corners of the financial system (think banks and structured finance securities).  In these opaque corners the financial system froze (think unsecured interbank lending).

By contrast, the transparent parts of the financial system continued to operate (think stock and corporate markets excluding banks).  For every seller, there was a willing buyer.  The price might not have been what the seller really wanted, but there was a private buyer.

Your humble blogger has frequently said that most of the Dodd-Frank Act should be repealed (with the exception of the Volcker Rule and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).  It should be replaced with a requirement that the SEC implement the Securities Acts of the 1930s and require banks to disclose their current exposure details.

As JP Morgan showed with the London Whale trade, when a bank's exposure details are known, it quickly exits any risky position.

It is remarkable what transparency and the resulting clarity it brings can do.
We can't simply return to the rules of the past, says Volcker. 
The world has changed too much. Financial markets and institutions are larger, more complex, more interconnected and "more fragile." Hedge funds and other non-banks play a much larger role in the system and regulated commercial banks play a proportionally smaller role. 
The old regulatory structures will not give us the stability we need in the system and its major institutional components.
Actually, we can return to the rules of the past when the rules concern ensuring transparency in the financial markets.

Please recall that under the FDR Framework's principle of caveat emptor market participants are responsible for all losses on their exposures.  It is this responsibility that ends financial contagion and fears of interconnectedness.

Quite simply, since they are responsible for losses on their exposures, market participants have an incentive to limit their exposures to what they can afford to lose.  This goes for investors and for banks too.

When all market participants are responsible for their losses, there is financial stability.  A bank can fail without any worries about financial contagion because market participants have limited their exposure to what they can afford to lose.

However, this doesn't work when banks are opaque black boxes that financial authorities say have a low risk profile.  In this case, market participants over invest as they did in the run-up to our current financial crisis.

Fixing the big banks and the financial system is simple: bring back transparency.

Who should bear the pain?

In his Bloomberg column, Matthew Klein examines the question of "who should bear the pain" when it comes to absorbing losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

For the global financial system, which is based on the FDR Framework, losses are the responsibility of the market participants who have exposure to the investment.

The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

Under the FDR Framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that all useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner.  Market participants are responsible for all the losses on their exposures under the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

Because market participants know they are responsible for losses, they have an incentive to independently assess the risk of any investment and limit their exposure to any one investment to what they can afford to lose.

The result of market participants assessing risk and limiting their exposure is they charge more and reduce the amount of their exposure as the risk of an investment increases.  This is very important as it is the mechanism by which market discipline is exerted.

Regular readers know that under the FDR Framework, banks are responsible for the losses on their exposures just like any other market participant.

Banks do have one unique feature, since the 1930s banks have been designed so that they can absorb upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and still continue to operate and support the real economy.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers become the banks' silent equity partners when they have low or negative book capital levels.


Please note, under the FDR Framework, taxpayers are not responsible for bailing out market participants including banks for their losses.  This is particularly true of banks because a bailout is simply making explicit what is already the implicit role of taxpayers being the banks' silent equity partners when they have low or negative book capital levels.

So why is Mr. Klein asking the question of who should bear the pain?

Because bailing out the banks has proved irresistible to policy makers and regulators.


If banks are designed to absorb losses upfront to protect the real economy and the social contract, why did bailing out the banks at the beginning of our current financial crisis prove irresistible to Paulson, Geithner, Bernanke et al?

Mr. Klein provided the answer in a tweet when he observed about the banks' ability to recognize losses that it:
Only works if they are sufficiently capitalized to absorb the loss.
Please re-read Mr. Klein's tweet as it highlights an artificial constraint imposed by financial regulators and economists that was not put in place by the designers of our financial system: the myth that banks need positive book capital to operate.

Bank book capital is an accounting construct and by definition can have a positive or negative value.  It is the account through which any losses taken by the bank flows.

Since it is an accounting construct, it is easy to manipulate.

For example, regulators can manipulate it by engaging in regulatory forbearance and letting banks practice extend and pretend to turn non-performing loans into zombie loans.  The result is no losses flowing through the book capital account.

The fact that the losses are not flowing through the bank's book capital account does not mean that the losses do not exist.

The fact that existing losses are not flowing through the bank's book capital account also does not mean that market participants are unaware of these losses.

The losses on loans to Less Developed Countries is a classic example of investors knowing losses exist and regulators working with the banks to keep the losses from flowing through the book capital accounts.

The activity by regulators was unnecessary.

Market participants simply adjusted each bank's reported book capital level for an estimate of the bank's losses on its loans to Less Developed Countries.  This adjustment showed a number of large banks had very low or, in Security Pacific's case, negative book capital levels.

When Citi finally acknowledged and took the loss on the loans to Less Developed Countries through its book capital account, market participants reacted positively because the level of losses was consistent with their estimate.  Market participants didn't care what the level of Citi's book capital was.

Despite its negative adjusted book capital level, there wasn't a run on Security Pacific by either depositors or wholesale investors.

The reason there wasn't a run is that for banks the critical measure of a bank's viability is whether its income (from performing assets plus fees) exceeds its expenses.  If this measure is positive, the bank can continue to operate as it has the ability to generate earnings and rebuild its book capital level.

Why should it make any difference to market participants if a bank absorbs losses and has to rebuild its book capital level from a negative level rather than a slightly positive level?  It doesn't.

What does make a difference is if a bank has to disclose its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With these details, market participants are able to assess whether the bank has recognized all of its losses and to exert restraint on its risk taking.

Without ultra transparency, market participants have no idea if a bank has recognized all the losses that regulators have allowed the bank to hide on and off its balance sheet.

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Barclays disclosure of size of its capital shortfall highlights need for banks to provide transparency

At the same time that Barclays disclosed it was planning on raising capital by issuing more shares, it also disclosed that it faced a far larger capital shortfall than the market anticipated.

Regular readers know that bank capital is an easily manipulated accounting construct.  As an accounting construct, it is the balance sheet account through which losses incurred by the bank flow.

Barclays' disclosure reveals just how easy it is for a bank to manipulate its book capital level by deferring the recognition of losses.  

Since the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007, financial regulators have let banks like Barclays defer recognition of losses.  First, there is the policy of regulatory forbearance that allows the banks to engage in extend and pretend and turn non-performing loans into zombie loans.  Second, there has also been the suspension of mark-to-market accounting so securities are held on the balance sheet at acquisition cost and not their current value.

From Jill Treanor at the Guardian,

The size of the cash call on investors – in the form of a rights issue, which will be launched in September – is bigger than expected and follows a request by the Bank of England that it meet a new measure of financial health, known as the leverage ratio. Barclays shares were volatile in early trading, falling around 6% to 290p after the larger-than-expected rights issue was announced. 
"After careful consideration of the options, the board and I have determined that Barclays should respond quickly and decisively to meet this new target. We have developed a bold and balanced plan to do so," said Jenkins, who was promoted to chief executive only 11 months in the wake of the Libor-rigging crisis. 
The size of the capital gap identified by the Bank of England of £12.8bn is almost double the amount the City had been expecting ....
By disclosing that it has a far larger capital shortfall, Barclays raises the question of what other losses are hidden on and off its balance sheet?

The only way for the market to know for sure is if Barclays discloses its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Without this level of disclosure, Barclays is effectively waving a big red flag in front of the market and announcing that it is still hiding losses.

Confirmation of this comes from a Bloomberg report,
“If you’re doing a rights issue, then you have to clear the decks and present investors with a clear balance sheet,” said Mike Trippitt, a London-based analyst at Numis Securities Ltd. who downgraded Barclays to sell this month in anticipation of a rights offering. 
“You can’t do a rights issue and then follow it up with additional provisioning in the next quarter. My only concern is that they haven’t done enough.”

Monday, July 29, 2013

Did capitalism fail?

Almost 6 years after the beginning of the financial crisis, economists and political scientists are trying to answer the question: did capitalism fail?

Their response was no.

According to the economists, what failed was relying on the idea of a mechanistic rational market in the presence of imperfect knowledge.  According to the political scientists, what failed were the institutions that were suppose to oversee the market.

While both the economists and political scientists are on the right track, neither appears to understand the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) and on which most of the global financial system is based.

As a result, their recommendations for how to prevent future crisis are unlikely to work.

Economist Roman Frydman said in his keynote address to the European Financial Congress
“I would like to pin a significant share of the blame on economists,” Frydman said. “It was their ideas concerning the role and functioning of financial markets in capitalist economies that provided the supposedly scientific underpinning for policy decisions and financial innovations that made the crisis much more likely, if not inevitable.”... 
These theories created a faith in the mechanistic rational market that was a key cause of the crisis, Frydman suggested, deriding the ”unsuccessful – and largely American – experiment in viewing the macroeconomy and financial markets as machines.” 
This view failed because it doesn’t account for imperfect knowledge... 
This conclusion as to the cause of the financial crisis resulting from imperfect knowledge would lead a reader to think that Mr. Frydman would champion the need to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

However, this was not his conclusion.

Instead, he offered up the theory of imperfect knowledge economics.  This theory
relates risk to participants’ perceptions of the gap between an asset price and its range of historical benchmark levels: as asset prices rise well above or fall well below most participants’ perceptions of these levels, those who are betting on further movement away from the benchmark should perceive an increased risk in doing so. 
Despite its name, this is a theory of reversion to the mean in pricing of financial assets that makes the government responsible for limiting how far an asset's price can vary from its historic mean so that when price does revert to the mean there isn't a systemic financial crisis.

But is the government up to this task?

Political scientists Nolan McCarty and Keith Poole would say no.

In their book, Political Bubbles: Financial Crises and the Failure of American Democracy, they explain why government is not up to the task.
Three I’s: ideology, institutions and interests.... the effects of ideology, interests and institutions are pro-cyclical. 
By political bubble, they mean a set of policy biases that foster and amplify the market behaviors that generate financial crises. Rather than counteract the actions of private economic actors, these factors complement and exacerbate their effects. The political bubble is an intrinsic part of answering what went wrong.... 
Political will to do the right thing has to swim against an onrushing tide of Wall Street contributions and the ever-present temptation to “monetize” public service. 
Where does belief in ideology end and the effect of green-colored glasses begin? Using former Senator Phil Gramm (who went on to make millions of dollars at UBS) as an example, the authors confess that, “Somewhat sadly, it can be difficult to disentangle the political influence of ideology from the influence of venality and greed.” 
What happened after the 2008 crisis? 
Widespread illegality was left unpunished. 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, but that legislation only tinkered at the margins of the existing banking regulatory framework, left Wall Street banks structurally all-but-untouched, and for the most part kicked the can back to the very regulators who had failed to prevent the crisis in the first place.
Regular readers will recall that this is exactly the same conclusion as the Nyberg Report on the Irish Financial Crisis reached.

In absence of transparency, banks and insurers wary of Freddie Mac risk sharing deal

Reuters reported that banks and insurers are wary of Freddie Mac's inaugural risk sharing deal.

Banks and insurers had good reason to be wary of this deal because it provides the same level of transparency that opaque, toxic sub-prime RMBS deals offer:  none.

This lack of transparency means that investors in the deal are blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

This lack of transparency is ironic because under the guidance of the FHFA Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are constructing a securitization platform.  The purpose of the securitization platform is to provide disclosure to market participants.

So in theory, Freddie Mac is aware that it needs to provide observable event based disclosure under which any activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral is reported to market participants before the next business day.

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have highlighted the fact that there is already an existing securitization platform, the EU Data Warehouse, that is fully capable of doing everything the Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae joint venture would do.

Since a securitization platform that is endorsed by the ECB already exists, why is the joint venture building another one at taxpayer expense?

Why is the FHFA not requiring that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae use the EU Data Warehouse and bring disclosure to the US RMBS market sooner rather than allowing them to delay and build their own?  After all, the FHFA could regulate the EU Data Warehouse's activities in the US as easily as regulate the joint venture's securitization platform.

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have also highlighted the fact that the EU Data Warehouse has set the global price for any securitization platform providing this type of service.  The EU Data Warehouse set its price at a break-even level.

If the EU Data Warehouse is willing to operate at effectively a break-even level, where are the earnings to repay the US taxpayer for building the securitization platform?

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have also highlighted the fact that a securitization platform can be a stand-alone business.  There is no reason it needs to be owned by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have highlighted to Congress, where there is bi-partisian support for a securitization platform as shown in the House and Senate bills, that given the existence of the EU Data Warehouse there is no real justification for building another securitization platform.

Sunday, July 28, 2013

Truth of transparency and liquidity

In an excellent column, Dan Collins looks at a study done on the CFTC's Swaps Execution Facilities rules and finds that the biases of the different market participants drive their responses.

For example, he finds that Wall Street objects to transparency and prefers opaque, over the counter markets.

Please note, this study only looks at one form of transparency: pricing transparency.  There is a second, much more important form of transparency: valuation transparency.

To understand the relationship between the two forms of transparency, it is necessary to look at the investment process that separates investing from gambling.

  1. Independent assessment of all the useful, relevant information about an investment by market participants so they can understand the risk of and value the investment.  Doing this assessment requires valuation transparency.
  2. Collection of the price Wall Street is willing to buy and/or sell the security at. Accessing this information requires pricing transparency.
  3. Comparing the independent valuation to the price shown by Wall Street to make a buy, sell or hold portfolio management decision.
In the absence of valuation transparency, it is impossible to complete Step 1 of the investment process.  Simply buying or selling based on prices shown by Wall Street without having completed Step 1 is gambling on the contents of brown paper bag.

When it comes to liquidity in a market, markets with transparency are naturally more liquid as there are more investors than there are gamblers.

Mr. Collins also finds in the CFTC study that Wall Street objects to transparency claiming it will reduce liquidity.  A claim that he thoroughly debunks.
The whole point of the Dodd Frank Act as it relates to swaps was to move this opaque over-the-counter trading on exchange or at least into a clearinghouse and executed through an electronic facility so there is a clear and transparent paper trail....

It is too early to tell if the CFTC got it right and the results of the study correctly point out that its respondents based their responses on their self-interest. For example, of the respondents that think the CFTC did not go far enough, 90% said there were “too many holes” in the rules; of the respondents who though the CFTC went too far , 92% said rules had “excessive transparency.” 
The report states “Reasons for discontent are broad and contradictory — ranging from those who feel the final rules are prone to gaming, to those who think excessive transparency will damage liquidity.” 
There is a lot to take in here but let’s hone in on the above statement: “excessive transparency will damage liquidity.” 
This sounds counterintuitive. How can seeing more prices and quotes harm liquidity? 
Transparency should always help liquidity unless what that transparency shows is a gamed market. 
Transparency provides confidence that a counterparty can see definitively where price is at in a particular market and how liquid the market is so he knows his risk. 
When the Chicago Board of Trade launched interest rate futures in the late 1970s it harmed the liquidity in the cash treasury market  because end users could all of a sudden access a more efficient market with narrower bid/ask spreads. 
It is not nearly as complex as the investment banking lobbyists would have you believe. It is about competition. 
Just think of shopping for a car and going into a dealership where the salesman offers you the sticker price. Now imagine that you can go online and see every price that this car is offered at in a competitive marketplace. 
The fact that this has been such a struggle is testament to the lobbying efforts of the major investment banks who have basically been able to run a rigged game....
We pointed out recently the irony that the same folks who berated the industry and regulators over making the regulated futures world more transparent with electronic trading have fought that same transparency in the OTC markets they controlled. 
As I mentioned above, it is not that complicated. 
In fact it is simple; excessive transparency will hurt the liquidity of an inefficient market but help the liquidity of a more efficient market.

How much capital should banks have?

In a Vox EU column, the IMF's Lev Ratnovski tries to answer the question: "how much capital should banks have?".

His conclusion after studying the level of non-performing loans and then estimating losses in prior economic crises: 9% on a simple leverage ratio basis and 18% under Basel III.

Of course, Mr. Ratnovski assumes that regulators will actually require banks to recognize the losses on their exposure to excess debt.  History shows that this is not the case.

In addition, regular readers know that the amount of capital that each bank should have is the amount of capital that the market requires given the riskiness of each bank's exposures.

So that the market can assess the riskiness of each bank's exposures and exert discipline on each bank to achieve an appropriate level of capitalization, each bank must disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

During the early 1900s when banks were required to disclose their exposure details, market discipline on the banks resulted in an average simple leverage ratios that exceeded 10%.  A level that is consistent with Mr. Ratnovski's analysis.

Friday, July 26, 2013

Setting the gold standard for judging quality of country's financial regulations

In his Reuter's blog, Felix Salmon establishes the standard for judging the quality of a country's financial regulation.
Here’s a quick and dirty way of judging the quality of your country’s financial regulation: to what extent do you create and impose tougher-than-international standards? 
By their nature, international standards are the lowest-common-denominator. 
Individual countries can and should extend them and create their own rules; when those rules turn out to work well, sometimes the international community will start adopting them more broadly....
Please re-read Mr. Salmon's standard for judging the quality of a country's financial regulation and his observation about how rules that work well are copied.

In the 1930s, the US adopted the FDR Framework as the basis for its financial system.  The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

US adoption of the FDR Framework was best exemplified by the 1930s Securities Acts that created the SEC and required that all publicly traded securities disclose all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants could independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

As a result of the Securities Acts, the US had the highest regulatory standards and became know for having the most transparent financial markets.

And why wouldn't your want to have the most transparent markets?

Finance is based on the idea that when market participants have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner they can do a better job of assessing the risk of a security and assign it a higher cost than a similar security that is opaque.  So why would any country want to put itself at a disadvantage by having its participants in the real economy pay more to access funding?

The financial crisis exposed the "myth" that US markets were still transparent.

Rather than continue to set tougher than international standards, over the last 30 years the US regulators decided in areas like derivatives to join the race to the bottom.  As a result, large areas of the financial system became opaque.

While this opacity was very good for bank profitability and banker bonuses, this opacity was very bad for all the other market participants.
Overall, I’d say the US is not doing a great job on the regulatory front. 
Dodd-Frank created a lot of noise, but ultimately was much less important than Basel III; what’s more, the banks are now driving the rule-making process so as to effectively neuter most of it. 
Confirmation of your humble blogger's observation about the true intent of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Meanwhile, in lots of other corners of the regulatory universe, you can see the forces of capture at work: one prime example is the way in which the FHFA — the regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — has hired a prominent insurance-industry lobbyist to help it regulate the very insurers he not only used to represent, but still represents. 
The fact is that regulation is one of those things that doesn’t have a natural political constituency: rich banks are good at lobbying against it, while there are no effective or well-resourced lobbyists on the other side....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Salmon makes a very important point about the lack of a permanent, effective lobby for regulation and transparency.

However, a permanent lobby for regulation should not be needed.

Please recall that under the FDR Framework, it is the government's responsibility for ensuring transparency.  It was well recognized at the time the FDR Framework was adopted that a lack of transparency resulted in a systemic financial crisis, the Great Depression.

Under the Securities Acts, the government must ensure that all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner.

Please note the Securities Acts do not say most of the useful, relevant information.  The Acts say "all" the useful, relevant information.  Government is told to error on the side of disclosing too much information.

Please note the Securities Acts do not say useful, relevant information to all market participants.  They say all the useful, relevant information.  This ensures that information that experts could use as part of their assessment of the risk of a security is made available.  Again, government is told to error on the side of disclosing too much information.

Please note the Securities Acts do not say that the government should perform a cost/benefit analysis when it is ensuring that all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner.

It was known at the time the Securities Acts were passed and has been shown with the current financial crisis that the cost of a systemic financial crisis is far greater than the cost of providing all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

The benefit of having transparency and not having another systemic financial crisis far outweighs the cost of providing transparency.  This is why there is no need for a permanent lobby to tell the government that it needs to ensure there is transparency.

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Swallowing the bankers' line

Earlier this month, Robert Jenkins, former external member of the Bank of England's financial policy committee, observed:
I fear that the banks have bamboozled government into believing that society must choose between safety and growth, between safer banks and bank shareholder value, and between a safer financial framework and a competitive City of London. These are all false choices.
Please re-read the highlighted text and ask the question of how could this have come to pass.

In his Project Syndicate commentary, Professor Simon Johnson offers a series of potential explanations for how banks have bamboozled government.

There are three possible explanations for what has gone wrong. 
One is that financial reform is inherently complicated. But, though many technical details need to be fleshed out, some of the world’s smartest people work in the relevant regulatory agencies. They are more than capable of writing and enforcing rules – that is, when this is what they are really asked to do. 
Your humble blogger wonders when the regulators within the SEC decided that they were not really being asked to ensure transparency in the financial system?

Regular readers know the SEC was ground zero for the financial crisis and it was the failure of the SEC to ensure transparency that created the conditions for the financial crisis.  Specifically, the SEC allowed opacity for both banks and structured finance securities.

For banks to be transparent, they must disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This was the law in the UK since the 1870s and the standard in the US in the 1930s when the SEC was created.  Clearly, by the start of the financial crisis in 2007, this was no longer true.

For structured finance securities to be transparent, they must disclose on an observable event based basis.  Every observable event like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying assets must be reported to all market participants before the beginning of the next business day.  Clearly by the start of the financial crisis in 2007, this was not true as opaque, toxic sub-prime RMBS deals report on a once per month basis.
The second explanation focuses on conflict among agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, both within and across countries. Again, there is an element of truth to this; but we have also seen a great deal of coordination even on the most complex topics – such as how much equity big banks should have, or how the potential failure of such a firm should be handled. 
Another source of conflict is the regulatory race to the bottom.
That leaves the final explanation: those in charge of financial reform really did not want to make rapid progress.  
In both the US and Europe, government leaders are gripped by one overriding fear: that their economies will slip back into recession – or worse.  
The big banks play on this fear, arguing that financial reform will cause them to become unprofitable and make them unable to lend, or that there will be some other dire unintended consequence. There has been a veritable avalanche of lobbying on this point, which has resulted in top officials moving slowly, for fear of damaging the economy.
Professor Johnson has nicely explained that fear is why the banks were successful in bamboozling government leaders.

But did the government leaders actually have anything to fear?  After all, the first response to the financial crisis was to put the banking system on life support.

Regular readers know that the answer has always been no  There was nothing to fear, but fear itself.

Our financial system was designed to survive even the failure of the SEC to ensure transparency.  Our financial system was designed to survive a massive credit bubble with the creation of excess debt that was well beyond the borrowers' capacity to repay.

Our financial system was designed to survive because it has a safety valve to release its excesses while protecting the real economy.

This safety valve is the ability of banks to absorb upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and service the real economy.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Of course, because government leaders swallowed the bankers' line, we have never used the safety valve.

Instead, we have protected bank book capital levels and banker bonuses while at the same time burdening the real economy with servicing the excess debt.  The result has been economic stagnation, an unwinding of the social contract and an increase in inequality.

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

Old-fashion regulators miss the foundation of finance

In his Bloomberg column, Clive Crook asks is the financial system any safer now than in 2008?

His answer is no because regulators miss what is new in finance because they are trapped in the old model of the financial system.
Insurance prevents bank runs, but encourages risky lending because depositors no longer care whether their bank is prudent or reckless. Once you insure deposits, therefore, you also must regulate banks more strictly (setting rules for bank capital, among other things). 
That’s the old model for systemic safety in finance: deposit insurance plus bank regulation.
Please re-read Mr. Crook's old model for systemic safety in finance because that is not actually the old model.  Mr. Crook leaves out transparency.

Regular readers know that our financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).  The FDR Framework model for systemic safety is deposit insurance plus bank regulation plus transparency (an equivalent way to describe the FDR Framework model for systemic safety is deposit insurance plus regulatory discipline plus market discipline).

Because of the presence of transparency and the market discipline transparency enables, the FDR Framework model for systemic safety is vastly different from the model suggested by Mr. Crook.  It also leads to vastly different conclusions about how to interpret the financial crisis and fix the financial system.

Under Mr. Crook's model, there was a different kind of bank run that brought down the financial system.  In support of this different kind of bank run he cites the academic work of Yale Professor Gary Gorton.

As Mr. Crook explains, a new form of finance emerged that the old model of deposit insurance plus bank regulation could not handle.

The archetype of the new form of non-deposit bank funding is “repo.” 
In a repurchase transaction, a bank or other borrower sells a security in return for cash, promising to buy it back later at a higher price. The transfer of cash is akin to a short-term deposit; the price difference is the repo equivalent of paying interest. In addition, the loan is “collateralized,” because the bank or other borrower loses the security if it breaks its promise to repurchase. There’s an extra margin of safety because the collateral is typically worth more than the loan -- this margin, called the “haircut,” serves a purpose similar to capital for a deposit-taking bank. 
So what’s the problem? 
Essentially, when fear gripped the capital market, securities deemed safe when they were pledged as collateral suddenly looked unsafe. The market for collateralized short-term funding therefore seized up. Borrowers couldn’t borrow and had to liquidate assets instead. As forced sellers, many lost money; with too little loss-absorbing capital, some faced insolvency. Fear spread, further driving down the prices of securities, adding to the panic. 
It was a run, but not one that traditional financial regulation could have stopped.
This is a wonderful story and entirely consistent with a model for systemic safety in finance that leaves out transparency.  It also leads to the wrong conclusion: a need for more regulation.

When you use the FDR Framework model for systemic safety in finance that has actually been in place since the 1930s, you realize that the "run on the repo" was in fact a reflection of opacity.  Opacity in the structured finance securities being pledge and opacity in the borrowing bank.

Opacity in the structured finance security being pledge meant that the security could not be valued.  Opacity in the banks meant that it was impossible for any bank (or investor) with funds to lend to tell which of the other banks was solvent and which was insolvent.

This ability to distinguish solvent from insolvent banks is important, because when you engage in a repo with an insolvent bank you expect to end up with the collateral.

So let me see, we have opaque banks trying to raise money against opaque securities.  Is there any surprise that this form of financing collapsed?

When you apply the FDR Framework model for systemic safety in finance that has existed since the 1930s, your conclusion is we need to bring transparency to both structured finance securities and banks.

To date, we have made no progress on transparency.  Instead, we have pursued a bunch of meaningless regulations that would not prevent the same crisis from recurring in the financial system.