The number one casualty from the Libor interest rate manipulation scandal is the whole premise underlying Dodd-Frank and the Vickers Recommendations that financial regulators will use their expanded powers to protect the financial system.
What we saw with the manipulation of the Libor interest rates are regulators who didn't use their current powers and sat by and watched the banks engage in conduct that was detrimental to the financial system.
Their excuse was they were willing to overlook criminal conduct out of concern that exposing this conduct would make the financial crisis worse.
Of course, this defense does not address the question of why the financial regulators did not bring up the manipulation of Libor interest rates prior to the debate over the Dodd-Frank Act or to the UK's Independent Commission on Banking.
It would appear that the financial regulators were covering up for the banks and by doing so dramatically effected how the Dodd-Frank legislation or the Independent Commission on Banking recommendations reshape the financial system.
After all, look what happened after Barclays confessed to manipulating Libor.
The Financial Times' Martin Wolf showed how the recommendations for reshaping the financial system would have been changed had the Libor interest rate manipulation been disclosed. To the list of reforms championed by the Vickers Commission, he added transparency.
Transparency is needed not only to prevent bad behavior by bankers, but to ensure good behavior on the part of regulators too.
The FDR Framework is the backbone for a 21st century financial system. Under this framework, governments ensure that every market participant has access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner. Market participants have an incentive to analyze this data because they are responsible for all gains and losses.
Showing posts with label Independent Commission on Banking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Independent Commission on Banking. Show all posts
Monday, July 16, 2012
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
George Osborne needs to end "bankers' welfare"
In a Guardian column, Lydia Prieg observes that much more needs to be done to end the too big to fail bank problem and address instability in the financial system than simply adopting the recommendations of the Vickers' Report.
Regular readers know that the simple solution for ending the too big to fail problem and addressing instability in the financial system is to require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
Market participants will use this information to exert market discipline and shrink the banks.
For example, by requiring the banks to disclose their trading positions, the banks will have an incentive to eliminate all their proprietary trades rather than risk having the market trade against them. This shrinks the banks.
Market participants will also use this information to adjust the amount and pricing of their exposure to the banks consistent with what the market participant can afford to lose knowing that they will not be bailed out. This eliminates the too big to fail problem because the market participants have already adjust their exposures for the possibility of failure.
Regular readers know that the simple solution for ending the too big to fail problem and addressing instability in the financial system is to require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
Market participants will use this information to exert market discipline and shrink the banks.
For example, by requiring the banks to disclose their trading positions, the banks will have an incentive to eliminate all their proprietary trades rather than risk having the market trade against them. This shrinks the banks.
Market participants will also use this information to adjust the amount and pricing of their exposure to the banks consistent with what the market participant can afford to lose knowing that they will not be bailed out. This eliminates the too big to fail problem because the market participants have already adjust their exposures for the possibility of failure.
The chancellor, George Osborne, responding to the Vickers report, seems to think it's "mission accomplished" on banking. But the report's proposed reforms don't address the inherent instability of the banking system.
The main lesson of the financial crisis, illustrated in spectacular fashion, was that banks had been given too much regulatory freedom, profiting at the expense of taxpayers and customers alike.
Politicians, economists and journalists lined up to agree that robust regulation was necessary to stabilise the economy and ensure the mistakes of the past could not be repeated. Three years and after pledging approximately £1tn in support of the sector, we are no closer to stabilising the financial system.That is a direct result of not requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency. Without ultra transparency, the losses on the banks' balance sheets remain hidden, but continue to undermine the financial system.
The Independent Commission on Banking was launched last year with the promise it would address systemic risk in the banking sector. However, all that was proposed in the final Vickers report was the ringfencing of retail banking away from investment banking activities, and banks being asked to hold more capital aside in case of trouble. While both of these initiatives should be welcomed, they do not address what caused the scale of the banking crisis.
The problem remains the same as it did in 2008, a banking industry that is too big to fail. It is a problem that was acknowledged by Vince Cable before he became the business secretary.
In the last 25 years we have allowed banks to balloon in size. Until the 1970s, banks' assets as a percentage of UK GDP remained steady at approximately 50%. By 2006, after decades of deregulation, banks' assets as a percentage of UK GDP were more than 500%.
These large interconnected institutions dwarf the rest of the UK's economic activity, and when they are threatened we have no option but to bail them out.That is why ultra transparency is needed. It directly addresses the interconnected institution problem.
Given this reality, even outright separation between retail and investment banking – which is not what the government has proposed – would not address the inherent instability in the financial system.
Lehman Brothers didn't have a single retail bank, but its collapse sent shockwaves through the global economy because of the size and reach of its operations.
So Britain's bloated mega-banks will remain fundamentally unaltered despite the continued threat they pose to the economy. And taxpayers will continue to subsidise them, as government guarantees enable them to access finance at a significantly lower rate than would otherwise be possible....
The media is unhelpfully reporting that the commission's proposals are the most radical reforms the banking sector has seen in the past century. But this is only a reflection of the excessive freedoms we have granted banks in the past; it does not mean that our problems are now solved.Actually, it is a reflection of the fact that the last crisis of this magnitude that required major reform of the financial system was the Great Depression.
The commission's recommendations, welcomed by the government, opposition and the banking industry, make plenty of political sense but very little economic sense. It is time to bring an end to the bankers' private welfare state.
Monday, September 12, 2011
UK's Independent Commission on Banking Recommendations and Disclosure
Lost amid all the discussion about the UK's Independent Commission on Banking recommendations is the fact that successful implementation of these recommendations will require financial institutions to disclose their current asset and liability-level data.
The ICB separated the retail deposit taking bank from the casino bank. However, in doing so, it makes disclosure a requirement.
For example, the retail deposit taking bank will have to meet higher capital standards. These standards can be met in part by using "bail-in" or "contingent convertible" bonds. No investor is going to buy these bonds if they cannot assess the risk they will be converted to equity.
The information investors are going to need is current asset and liability-level data updated on a daily basis. Otherwise, buying these bonds would be no different than buying opaque, toxic structured finance securities.
For example, the casino bank is going to have to disclose its current asset and liability-level data otherwise no investor would invest in its debt. Without this data, how would an investor know if the casino bank was solvent or not?
The ICB separated the retail deposit taking bank from the casino bank. However, in doing so, it makes disclosure a requirement.
For example, the retail deposit taking bank will have to meet higher capital standards. These standards can be met in part by using "bail-in" or "contingent convertible" bonds. No investor is going to buy these bonds if they cannot assess the risk they will be converted to equity.
The information investors are going to need is current asset and liability-level data updated on a daily basis. Otherwise, buying these bonds would be no different than buying opaque, toxic structured finance securities.
For example, the casino bank is going to have to disclose its current asset and liability-level data otherwise no investor would invest in its debt. Without this data, how would an investor know if the casino bank was solvent or not?
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