Showing posts with label Shadow Banking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shadow Banking. Show all posts

Monday, November 26, 2012

China faces hidden risk of 'shadow finance' led financial crisis

It appears that China is going to experience its version of the 2008 structured finance meltdown that almost brought down the global financial system.  The Wall Street Journal carried an article that highlights how loans made by China's opaque shadow finance sector may be coming back to haunt its banks.

The solution for China, just like it was and is for shadow banking in the EU, UK and US, is to bring transparency to the shadow finance sector.

Specifically, China should require that there be observable event based reporting for all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying loans before the beginning of the next business day.

With this disclosure, investors could independently assess the risk of the loans and would know what they own.
Mr. Wang's case highlights the hidden risks to banks from their links to China's fast-growing "shadow-finance" industry, a term for all types of credit outside formal lending channels. 
Shadow finance in China totals about 20 trillion yuan, according to Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., or about a third the current size of the country's bank-lending market. In 2008, such informal lending represented only 5% of total bank lending. 
China's shadow-finance industry has experienced similar growth to the global shadow banking system in the years leading up to the financial crisis.
The sector is lightly regulated and opaque, raising concerns about massive loan defaults amid a softening economy, with ancillary effects on the country's banks. 
Just like the shadow banking system, China's shadow-finance industry is lightly regulated and opaque.  As a result, no one knows what is going on.
Banks often work with private lenders by selling loans to them or marketing investments on their behalf for a fee. 
"Regular banking and shadow banking are not isolated from each other. Many activities in the two systems feed into each other, and could influence each other if things start to deteriorate," wrote Xiao Gang, chairman of Bank of China Ltd., in an editorial in the China Daily newspaper. 
Although China Credit has the legal responsibility to repay investors, according to Chinese law, "for reputation's sake and potential social stability reasons, a portion of these loans can be banks' contingent liabilities," said David Cui, China strategist with Bank of America Corp.'s BAC -0.66% Merrill Lynch unit. 
Just like the shadow banking system, nobody knows what the exposure of the regulated banks are to the shadow banks.  As a result, nobody knows if the regular banks are solvent or insolvent.  This sets the stage for a systemic financial crisis.
Others agree. "Banks might be held liable if bank representatives didn't adequately evaluate the products' risks for their clients," said Peng Junming, a former official at the People's Bank of China who now runs his own investment firm, Empire Capital Management LLP.
With opacity and a lack of observable event based reporting, it is impossible for the banks to have adequately evaluated the products' risks for their clients.

Just like shadow banking leading up to the beginning of the financial crisis, China's version of shadow-finance is a powder keg ready to blow up.

Monday, November 19, 2012

Ultra-loose Fed policy increases bank funding risk

In his Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column, David Reilly concludes that the banks' heavy reliance on funding through repurchase agreements raises their risk and highlights why investors have to pay attention to the liability side of each bank's balance sheet.

This conclusion confirms why banks should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This is exactly the information that is needed to monitor bank funding risk.

What happens in the shadows doesn't always stay there. 
Part of the reason regulators continue to be so focused on the "shadow-banking" system—lending and investing activities that are banklike but operate outside the regulated financial system—is because it is often connected to the activities of regular banks.... 
Because banks and shadow-banking entities provide funds to each other through loans and financial products, such growth creates systemic risks as distress in one area "may easily spill over" to the other... 
And in some cases, the interconnections may be rising because of the superlow interest-rate environment. 
With bank profits being squeezed, many firms are looking to reduce their long-term debt, since this tends to be more expensive than shorter-term funding. 
In its place, banks rely more on short-term funding such as deposits, which have been soaring. But they are also increasing their use of short-term, repurchase, or repo, transactions. These involve a bank or investor borrowing or lending money on a short-term basis using securities as collateral. 
Indeed, among the biggest U.S. banks, repo financing is now almost as large as long-term debt outstanding. At the end of the third quarter, for example, combined long-term debt at J.P. Morgan Chase, JPM +2.68% Bank of America BAC +4.06% andCitigroup C +3.20% exceeded combined repurchase-agreement liabilities by just $44 billion. A year earlier, the difference was nearly $300 billion. 
The risk of rising dependence on repo financing is that any market disruption, say by the failure of an unregulated shadow entity, could ripple through regulated banks and create funding problems. 
In this, the [Financial Stability Board] is right to call for greater disclosure and transparency around these markets and the level of interconnections. 
Investors tend to focus on bank assets and the prospect for losses there. But with aggressive Federal Reserve policies starting to cause financial distortions, they need to keep just as close an eye on bank liabilities and how they are changing.
Which is why the banks should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose their exposure details.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Will regulators use transparency to shine light on shadow banking?

Bloomberg reports that global financial regulators led by the Financial Stability Board are looking to draft rules by the fall 2013 to reduce the risk of shadow banking.

My only question is: will the regulators use transparency to shine light on shadow banking?  Specifically, for structured finance securities ranging from covered bonds to securitizations, will the regulators require that these securities provide observable event based reporting so all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported before the beginning of the next business day?

Global regulators set a September 2013 deadline to present tougher rules for money-market mutual funds, repurchase agreements and other so-called shadow banking activities as part of a broader push to reduce risk in the financial system. 
The Financial Stability Board also said that it would issue draft rules next year targeted at non-bank institutions whose failure would roil the global economy. 
“Vigilant oversight of shadow banking activities will be required to respond to inevitable market mutations,” the FSB said in an e-mailed report. “The approach is designed to be proportionate to financial stability risks.”... 
The Basel-based FSB has estimated that global shadow-banking activities were worth about $60 trillion in 2010, as much as 30 percent of the total financial system. 
Supervisors class shadow banking activities as those that allow banks to carry out business off balance sheet, as well as those which allow investors to bypass lenders and the functions they traditionally fulfill on the markets.

Institutions identified by regulators as shadow banks also include some exchange traded funds, securitization structures, and monoline insurers, which specialize in products that apply to financial investments.... 
“There are a range of tools in the policy toolkit that could ensure the shadow banking system is taken out of the shadows,” Carney said.
But will transparency be one of these tools?

Sunday, September 9, 2012

Regulators must shine light on 'shadow banking'

In a Telegraph column, Lord Turner, head of the the UK's Financial Services Authority and member of the Financial Stability Board, calls for regulators to shine light on 'shadow banking'.

He proposes that regulators can do this by
considering five categories of further reforms focused specifically on shadow banking risks.  
The first category covers the risks shadow banking can pose to banks themselves. We need to ensure appropriate rules on consolidation of off-balance sheet exposures and appropriate capital regulation relating to bank exposures to non-bank financial institutions.  
The second is focused on money market funds. The working assumption is that if a money market fund promises to investors a constant net asset value, then it looks like a bank and quacks like a bank, and ought to be subject to bank-like liquidity and capital constraints, or to other regulatory rules which have equivalent economic effect.  
The third relates to the incentive problems inherent to the “originate and distribute” model. We need to ensure we are enforcing enough “skin-in-the-game” (and on a common enough basis across the world) to ensure strong incentives for good credit underwriting.  
The fourth stream of work is looking at other categories of firm, apart from money market funds, involved in shadow banking activities. It will identify where leverage and maturity transformation could enter the non-bank credit system, and propose appropriate controls if required.  
The fifth is focused not on specific institutions but on the complex web of secured funding markets – repo, prime broker finance, securities lending and cash collateral reinvestment – which interconnects commercial banks, broker dealers, asset managers, money market funds and hedge funds.  
There is a strong argument in principle that we should regulate “haircut” and margin practices in some of these markets, imposing minimum requirements that could constrain excessive exuberance in boom years. We need to consider carefully the options to achieve that objective.  
This reform programme, along with other relevant policy changes already in hand, will help to guard against the re-emergence of shadow banking risks. It is essential we maintain momentum and are adequately radical, not least because 10 years before the 2008 crisis we had a wake-up call but failed to respond adequately.
It is quite remarkable that Mr. Turner can call for shining light on 'shadow banking' and suggest five areas for reform without calling for transparency.

In fact, Mr. Turner's suggested reforms highlight what the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane called the 'Tower of Basel' problem.  This problem was addressing complexity in the financial system with further complexity.

Mr. Haldane called for not substituting mountains of regulations and regulators for the market where there were far simpler solutions that clearly fell in the category of 'less is more'.

Imagine that Mr. Turner has called for actually bringing transparency to 'shadow banking', rather than leaving 'shadow banking' in the shadows surrounded by so many rules that it is even more opaque than it currently is.  What would this have involved.

For structured finance securities, transparency requires that all activities, like a payment or default, involving the collateral backing an individual security are reported to all market participants before the beginning of the next business day.  This is the current information market participants need to value these 'opaque' securities and know what they own.

For financial institutions, transparency requires that banks disclose on an on-going basis, say before the beginning of the next business day, their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.   This is the current information market participants need to independently assess the risk of each 'black box' bank and to adjust their exposure to each bank based on this assessment.

Let's look at the impact of transparency on his proposed reforms.

Transparency eliminates the need for bank rules on consolidation or capital requirements for exposures.  With transparency, market participants can assess the risk of these exposures and exert market discipline to restrain the amount of each bank's exposure.

Transparency eliminates the need for money funds to have liquidity or capital constraints.  If money funds have to disclose their investments at the end of every business day, market participants can exert discipline on those funds that take on risk that threatens a constant net asset value.

Transparency eliminates the need for 'skin in the game' to enforce good underwriting standards.  With transparency, market participants can see exactly what underwriting standards were used and exactly how risky the loans are.

This allows the investor to chose their investment based on their risk/return preferences.  For example, some investors will want 'prime' loans and other investors will want 'sub-prime' loans.

Transparency reveals the complex web of interconnections in the financial system.  More importantly, it provides market participants with the information they need to assess the riskiness of each of their exposures.

Investors know that they are not going to be bailed out so investors adjust the amount of each of their exposures to what they can afford to lose based on the riskiness of the exposure.  It is this adjustment that ends the risk of contagion.

Finally, transparency ends any need for regulators to think about applying 'haircuts' or margin requirements in the secured funding market.  With access to all the useful, relevant information for assessing the risk of the borrower, market participants are fully capable of determining the appropriate 'haircut' for secured lending.

Monday, April 30, 2012

Bank of England's Paul Tucker wants regulators to set margin requirements

The Bank of England's Paul Tucker called for regulators to have the ability to set margin requirements on transactions in the shadow banking system.  Reuters reports that Mr. Tucker would like this ability to cool down the markets when they overheat.

In theory, regulators need to have a complete toolkit for taking away the punch bowl so the party doesn't get out of hand.

In practice, as demonstrated in the late 1990s by the US Fed, regulators are not going to use this authority.

Readers might recall in the late 1990s, the equity markets were experiencing a bubble.  A bubble whose magnitude could have been greatly diminished by the Fed.  

The Fed had and still has the right to change stock margin requirements under Regulation T.  Had the Fed raised stock margin requirements, as Mr. Tucker points out, it would have cooled down the market.

However, the Fed did not raise stock market requirements.  It did not for several reasons including 1) it is hard to recognize a bubble and hence the event that would trigger the need for raising margin requirements and 2) the believe that it could clean up the mess after the equity bubble popped.
Supervisors should have powers to demand more collateral on financial transactions in order to cool down overheated markets, Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker said on Friday. 
He and other regulators from across the world are looking at how to rein in the multi-trillion dollar "shadow-banking" sector which handles credit and leverage outside traditional banking....
The best way to rein in the "shadow-banking" system is by making it transparent.

This is easily accomplished by requiring ultra transparency.
"The authorities should be able to step in and set minimum haircut or margin levels for the collateralised financing markets, or segments of them," Tucker told a European Commission conference on regulating shadow banks.... 
The European Commission will propose EU-wide shadow bank regulation next year after a global regulatory body, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), completes work on policy recommendations for world leaders by November when G20 leaders meet. 
The FSB, of which Tucker is a member, said in an interim report on securities lending and repos on Friday there was a lack of transparency, potential risks from firesales of collateral assets, and insufficient rigour in collateral valuation and management practices.
Adopting ultra transparency addresses all of these issues.

For example, the potential for a fire sale of collateral is greatly reduced when the holder of the collateral can independently assess the risk of the borrower.  Based on this independent assessment, the holder of the collateral will require bigger haircuts well before regulators would think to step in.

Thursday, March 15, 2012

UK's FSA chief Turner wants radical rules to rein in shadow banking

In a Telegraph article, the head of the UK's Financial Services Authority called for radical change in the rules governing shadow banks.

Policymakers say the opaqueness of the $60 trillion shadow banking system - a web that includes money market funds, securities lending and repos - which operates alongside mainstream lenders contributed to the financial crisis.... 
The dangers of shadow banking were spotted over a decade ago but little was done. 
"This time we need to ensure that we are sufficiently radical," FSA Chairman Lord Turner said in a lecture at the Cass Business School. 
"Any system this complex will defy complete understanding, and any belief that we can precisely calibrate our response to it will therefore be a delusion," said Turner, who also sits on the FSB. 
Instead, regulators should play safe with a "bias to prudence" against such complex interconnectivity in the financial system.... 
The task of regulating shadow banks is challenging, not least in defining what is shadow banking and exactly how it has contributed to financial instability in the past, he said. 
Shadow banking is not "something parallel to and separate from the core banking system, but deeply intertwined with it". 
The FSB has defined shadow banking as involving credit intermediation outside the banking system and includes money market funds, conduits, securitisation lending and repos....
Since the task of regulating shadow banks is challenging, a prudent first step might be to bring ultra transparency to the shadow banks.  That way all market participants could see and independently assess what is going on.
Turner said shadow banking, on some measures, is a shadow of its former self following the collapse of securitised credit, shrinking money market funds, and smaller investment bank balance sheets.
Based on your humble blogger's best estimates, securitized credit has fall almost $3.5 trillion since the beginning of the financial crisis.
"And certainly the decline along these several dimensions suggest that the immediate risks are smaller, allowing us time to think through the appropriate policies," Turner said.
And time to implement ultra transparency to see what policies are actually necessary.