Showing posts with label Utter Transparency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Utter Transparency. Show all posts

Monday, December 12, 2011

RBS reports highlights unacceptable risk of relying on regulators alone and not in combination with market discipline

The bottom-line of the Financial Services Authority's report on Royal Bank of Scotland is it highlights that it is an unacceptable to the global financial system to rely on regulators alone to prevent excessive financial risk from destroying the financial system.

The report highlights why ultra transparency is needed to end regulatory oversight as a substitute for market discipline.

By requiring banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, regulators make it possible for market participants to exert market discipline on banks.

Without this level of disclosure, market participants are forced to rely on regulators to properly assess this data and convey the actual riskiness of each bank.  The report highlights numerous reasons why the regulators might fail to properly assess the data and even more reasons why they might not convey the actual riskiness of each bank.

A Guardian article on the report reveals how hard it will be to get regulators to give up their information monopoly and stop gambling with financial stability.

The Financial Services Authority has criticised the "light touch" regulation that was encouraged by the Labour government as it called for an overhaul of the rules regulating bankers. 
In a long-awaited 452-page report into what went wrong at Royal Bank of Scotland, Lord Turner, chairman of the FSA said ... 
"In a market economy, companies take risks on behalf of shareholders and if they make mistakes, it is for shareholders to sanction the management and board by firing them. 
"But banks are different, because excessive risk-taking by banks, for instance through aggressive acquisitions, can result in bank failure, taxpayer losses, and wider economic harm. Their failure is a public concern, not just a concern for shareholders," he added....
What makes banks different is that the regulators actively assist them in withholding all the useful, relevant information on each bank from market participants.

In the absence of disclosure of each banks' current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants do not have the information they need to assess the risk of each bank.

If market participants cannot assess the risk of a bank, they cannot exert market discipline... fire the board or management for excessive risk taking.
RBS chairman Sir Philip Hampton said: "Taxpayers should never have had to rescue RBS. The FSA are right to have given the British public its assessment of events and factors that led to RBS requiring government assistance. The FSA's views are an important contribution to the debate on how banks should be managed and regulated in the future."
The report is very important because its seals the argument for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency to all market participants.
Turner ... cites six reasons for the bank's collapse: 
• significant weaknesses in RBS's capital position, as a result of management decisions and permitted by an inadequate global regulatory capital framework
•over-reliance on risky short-term wholesale funding, which was permitted by an inadequate approach to the regulation of liquidity
• concerns and uncertainties about RBS's underlying asset quality because of little fundamental analysis by the FSA
• substantial losses in credit trading activities, which eroded market confidence and both the bank and the regulator underestimated how bad the losses were
• the ABN Amro acquisition took place with "inadequate due diligence"
• an overall systemic crisis in which the banks in worse relative positions were extremely vulnerable to failure. RBS was one such bank....
Ultra transparency would have positively addressed everyone of these reasons before these reasons allowed RBS to collapse.
Turner admits to failings at the FSA. "The report concludes that the FSA was too focused on conduct regulation at the time and its prudential supervision of major banks was inadequate. The FSA operated a flawed supervisory approach which failed adequately to challenge the judgment and risk assessments of the management of RBS. 
"This approach reflected widely held, but mistaken assumptions about the stability of financial systems and existed against a backdrop of political pressures for a 'light touch' regulatory regime," he said.
There is no doubt that the FSA operated a flawed supervisory approach.  However, the cure is not to make the regulators the sole body that can challenge the judgment and risk assessments of management.  This solution suggests that the regulators are still better than the market at analysis.  This is simply not believable or true.

The solution is requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.

Lord Turner does everyone a great service by acknowledging that regulators operate against a backdrop of political pressure.

The only way to eliminate political pressure in the assessment of the risk of banks is by requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.  Market participants, who are not subject to political pressure, will use the data to assess the riskiness of the banks.

RBS report makes the case for ultra transparency [updated]

The Financial Services Authority's report on the failure of RBS makes the case for requiring banks to provide market participants with ultra transparency by making on-going disclosure of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Like the Nyberg Report on the Irish Financial Crisis, the FSA report documents why giving financial regulators a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information creates financial instability.  This financial instability is the direct result of market participants being dependent on the financial regulators to accurately assess this information and communicate the risk of each bank.

Just like in Ireland, the bank, RBS, was able to lobby against and suppress anything resembling a negative assessment.

Fixing the financial system requires eliminating for all time the ability of banks to lobby their regulators and as a result have markets misinformed about the true risk of the banks.

This can only be achieved by requiring ultra transparency which shatters the regulators' information monopoly and allows the market to make its own assessment of the risk of each bank.

A Telegraph article highlights the main points of the FSA report.

Why Royal Bank of Scotland failed:- Significant weaknesses in RBS’s capital position
- Over-reliance on risky short-term funding
- Market fears about RBS’s asset quality
With ultra transparency, fear would have been replace with knowledge.

With ultra transparency, market participants could monitor each bank's asset quality and if they see an increase in risk exert market discipline.  It is this market discipline that would have prevented excessive risk taking in the first place. 
- Substantial losses from credit trading
- The acquisition of ABN Amro
- The systemic financial crisis
- Underlying deficiencies in the way RBS was run 
What needs to change:- Greater personal responsibility for bank executives and directors in future failures. Must risk “personal consequences”.
- Rules to put emphasis on executives and boards to avoid bank failures.
- Rewards for bank executives must take more account of risk and be different from those for senior managers at non-bank businesses.
- Increased powers to ban those involved in failures from working in the financial services industry.
- Greater powers to block bank takeovers in future.
No surprises here.  Regular readers did not expect that the FSA would voluntarily give up its information monopoly.

The FSA recommendations go along way towards showing just how ineffective a regulator it is. 
How the FSA got it so wrong:- Regulator had just six staff overseeing RBS in August 2007. It now has 23.
Excuse me, but if there were ultra transparency, I would be willing to bet that the number of market participants 'overseeing' RBS would be multiples of the staff that FSA has assigned.

One of the major problems with regulators having an information monopoly is that they have to replace the analytical ability of all the market participants.  No matter how well intentioned, for obvious reasons they cannot do that.

The time has come to let the market analyze each bank's risk and for the regulators to piggy-back off of the market's analysis. 
- FSA officials were barred from meeting one-on-one with RBS’s non-executive directors.
- Regulator was never given full access to RBS’s “Board pack” containing detailed financial information on the bank.
- Regulators warnings to board were removed by Sir Fred Goodwin from a letter to the RBS board, as where concerns about the corporate lending risks the bank was taking.  
- FSA did not challenge strongly enough “vigour of pushback” by RBS against its oversight.
A prime example of a bank suppressing regulatory oversight.

Clearly the system must be change by offering ultra transparency so that bank's can no longer suppress regulatory oversight.  Even if they did, it wouldn't have as large a negative effect as banks would still be subject to market discipline (something they are currently not subject to as it is blocked by the regulators' information monopoly).
- Regulator was worried about being accused of “heavy-handed, gold-plating”.
Just like the Nyberg report finding in Ireland, regulators are seen as heavily influenced by politics.  They are run by political appointees and have to report to politicians.

The result is that they are sensitive to being accused of 'heavy-handed, gold-plating' and as a result do not communicate the true risk of the banks to the market.

Requiring ultra transparency ends this.

Update
The Guardian article titled Financial Services Authority caught napping over Royal Bank of Scotland really drives home the need for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.
A series of regulatory failings by the Financial Services Authority in the run up to the taxpayer bailout of Royal Bank of Scotland will be revealed today ...
Scheduled for release at 6am, the FSA's report will repeat its findings from a year ago that "bad decisions" rather than "dishonesty" led to the near-collapse of the bank in 2008 – a conclusion that City sources believe will make it difficult for the business secretary to use his powers to bar Goodwin or other former board members. 
FSA chairman Lord Turner, who has been critical of the "light touch"approach to regulation that was endorsed by Gordon Brown, will again highlight this as one of the reasons the regulator allowed RBS to get so close to the brink of collapse.
The problems created by light touch regulation would not have been nearly so bad had banks been required to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Market participants could have analyzed this disclosure and assessed the riskiness of each bank.  Based on this assessment, market participants could have adjusted the amount and pricing of their exposure to each bank.

As a result, market participants would have only had at risk what they could afford to lose and there would have been no need for a bailout.
This conclusion will allow the chancellor to blame the previous government for the taxpayer bailout and support his arguments for breaking up the FSA.... 

Sunday, December 11, 2011

Did the Chairman of RBS just offer to provide ultra transparency?

In his Telegraph column, Sir Philip Hampton, Chairman of Royal Bank of Scotland, observed that RBS will be a business with a 'high standards of transparency'.

The high standard of transparency is ultra transparency.

Implementing ultra transparency would require RBS to disclose on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Not an unreasonable standard of transparency for a bank that the Financial Services Authority report will show that the regulators did not properly supervise.

Not an unreasonable standard of transparency for a bank that is majority owned by the taxpayers.

Not an unreasonable standard of transparency for a bank that wants to set a new standard for corporate performance and behavior.
When Stephen Hester and I took over the leadership of RBS three years ago, we reviewed much of the same ground. The task was to stabilise the bank and put it back on a sustainable footing. We had to understand what had gone wrong and which staff had to be held accountable for their part in the bank’s failure. 
The change programme at RBS has been huge. We have aggressively reduced the bank’s exposures, substantially reducing a balance sheet that was once the world’s biggest. We have fundamentally changed the way we pay our staff. Bonuses are not only smaller, but linked to the long-term strategy of the bank as they always should have been in the past. 
Importantly, we are undertaking a huge transformation of the way we support our customers. There has been no shortage of examples of how banks failed their customers in recent years. Through our industry-leading customer charter and reforms right across our businesses we are seeking constant enhancements to the service we provide the people who rely on us. We are working to become Britain’s most helpful bank and we will become vastly more open and transparent as we progress. 
The result of all of this is an RBS that is greatly changed from the bank I walked into three years ago or the one that is described in today’s report. Our leadership is new, with all senior executives who were responsible for the bank’s crisis no longer in the company. We are safer and stronger with capital and liquidity levels among the strongest in Europe. 
But RBS is not yet the bank that we want it to be. The new RBS that we are building will be a business with high standards of transparency, customer support, and community responsibility. We want to show that the painful lessons of this crisis can be applied to the creation of an organisation that sets a new standard for corporate performance and behaviour. 

RBS failure to grasp scale of sub-prime exposure highlights need for utter transparency

A Telegraph article discusses how prior to its collapse RBS failed to understand exactly how large its exposure to sub-prime securities actually was.

Regular readers know that this would not have been a problem if banks were required to provide utter transparency.  With on-going disclosure of its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, RBS and all market participants would have know exactly what its exposure to sub-prime securities was.

This is a point worth re-emphasizing.  What we are talking about are easily known historical facts.  These sub-prime exposures were tracked by RBS' internal information systems (its back office).

There should have been no mystery.

More importantly, this information needed to have been disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner so that regulators and the market could properly assess the risk of RBS.

Had this information been disclosed, and the same goes for ABN Amro, it is both possible and probable that the ill-fated acquisition would never have taken place.

Royal Bank of Scotland managers failed to give shareholders and analysts an accurate picture of its sub-prime mortgage exposure in early 2007 as they had little idea of the scale of the problems the bank faced.

RBS report heralds tighter rules for Bank of England

The Telegraph ran an interesting article on the impending release of the report on RBS.  The article noted how the failures of the Financial Services Authority in supervising RBS will impact the Bank of England, which is absorbing the FSA's bank supervision responsibilities.

Specifically, the report will provide ammunition for much tougher oversight of the central bank.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger believes that opacity in the financial system cannot be eliminated unless bank regulators are required to provide utter transparency too.

In a financial system characterized by utter transparency, banks would disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Included in the liability disclosure would be any borrowing from the central bank regardless of whether it is from the discount window or some other central bank liquidity program.

All market participants need banks to provide utter transparency if they are going to have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for assessing each bank.  For example, they could assess if the loans from the central bank were for temporary liquidity or to prop up an insolvent bank.

It is only with the ability to independently assess each bank that the market participants can adjust the amount and price of their exposure to each bank to reflect this assessment.

With this independent assessment comes the end of reliance on the regulators for their assessment of a bank's solvency.  With the end of reliance on the regulators' assessment of solvency comes an end to needing to bailout investors in banks.  Investors willingly accept the potential for gains as well as losses.

With utter transparency, bank supervisors truly can focus on analysis of the banks and not on rule writing.  As this blog has previously mentioned, bank supervisors will be able to tap the analytical ability of the market, including a bank's competitors, for help in their analysis of each bank.

So what type of information would bank regulators disclose if banks are already providing ultra transparency?

The results of their bank examinations.

One of the benefits of disclosing the findings of their bank examinations is that market discipline can reinforce regulatory oversight in getting banks to address risks.

Disclosing the results of the bank examinations eliminates the situation where a bank can appeal to a more senior regulator to have the results of the examination overturned.

Please note, utter transparency does not have to apply to monetary policy (although I suspect it would be beneficial if it did).

Bank officials and other senior regulators are concerned the Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) report into RBS’s failure will provide ammunition for those calling for much tougher oversight of the central bank. 
The Treasury Select Committee (TSC) and the key Parliamentary joint steering committee overseeing the passage of next year’s Financial Services Bill are expected to use the report’s findings to push for more powers to ensure the accountability of the Bank to politicians in the event of a future crisis.... 
Publication of the FSA’s report follows a political backlash last December after Lord Turner, the regulator’s chairman, said the document could not be published.
George Osborne, the Chancellor, and Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the TSC, reacted with fury, forcing the FSA into an embarrassing U-turn on the issue. 
“Parliament should never be expected to go through this sort of to-do again. These powerful regulatory bodies need a higher level of accountability and a stronger duty to explain what they have done,” said Mr Tyrie last week. 
Last month, the TSC released a report on the Bank that slammed its governance structure as “weak” and called for a beefing up of its Court, the Bank’s governing body, with the appointment of more independent directors. 
The TSC also argued the Chancellor should be handed an override clause to enable the government to take charge of the central bank if a major lender were to come close to the brink of failing. 
Bank officials are understood to be prepared to make concessions. However, one source said Sir Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank, was “fighting like an alley cat” against some of the more sweeping changes. 
A draft of the Financial Services Bill is set to be published as early as this week and the RBS report will be seen as an important piece of evidence for those who say the new regulations must include tougher provisions to ensure that bodies such as the Bank and the new Financial Conduct Authority are held accountable for their actions.