Wednesday, November 21, 2012

UK Chancellor urges Parliament not to "tear up" bank approved reforms

The Guardian reports that George Osborne, the UK's Chancellor, asked a parliament committee not to "tear up" the consensus on banking reform.

He asked the committee to support the idea of ring-fencing rather than complete separation of investment and retail banking.

In addition, the Chancellor asked the committee to focus on how banks could adopt something akin to the ethical standards of other professions like medicine.

Regular readers know that the committee can accomplish the goals of ring-fencing and enforcing ethical standards in the banking industry by simply requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  Under ultra transparency, the banks would be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, banks would stop taking proprietary bets as they would worry about market participants trading against their positions.  This easily achieves a major goal of the Vicker's commission of separating gambling from insured deposits.

With this disclosure, the culture of banks would be radically changed as sunlight is the best disinfectant.  Without the veil of opacity to hide their bad behavior, bankers would not engage in activities like manipulating Libor.  Ethical standards would effectively be forced on bankers and the market would act as a disciplinarian for violating these standards.

George Osborne, the chancellor, has urged the independent commission on banking standards to avoid "tearing up" the consensus on financial reform by pushing for a more radical separation of retail and investment banking. 
Appearing before the cross-party commission, chaired by the Conservative MP Andrew Tyrie, Osborne firmly rejected the idea that the reforms proposed by Sir John Vickers to "ringfence" retail banking will fail to tackle the culture that led to the crisis. 
"We have spent two years getting to this point … We are now on the verge of implementing ground-breaking legislation," he said on Wednesday. "I don't think this is the moment to tear up everything that's been done over the last two years."
Since all that ground-breaking legislation does not involve requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, it is most likely worthless.

The legislation is probably just like the Dodd-Frank Act in that it substitutes a combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.  A combination that our current financial crisis shows is prone to not working.

Everyone knows that transparency and market discipline works.  All you have to do is look at the financial system and see that the areas that broke down during our current crisis are characterized by opacity, much of it in the form of complex rules/regulations, and regulatory oversight.

The Chancellor is effectively asking Parliament to gamble with UK taxpayer funds and endorse a known failure (the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight) rather than a proven success (transparency and market discipline).
Rather than questioning the Vickers reforms, the chancellor urged the committee instead to examine how bankers could adopt something akin to the ethical standards imposed on other professions. 
"In the medical profession and the teaching profession, we expect certain standards, but which are administered by the profession," he said. 
Barclays, whose conduct in the Libor scandal prompted Downing Street to set up the commission on banking standards, has proposed a new professional body to police the ethics of finance workers....
No surprise that Barclays would recommend a complex rules based solution that protects opacity in the financial system and allows the bankers to continue to engage in misbehavior.

Frankly, no one cares about the ethics of finance workers.  It is easier to put in place a system that removes the need to rely on their ethics.

The system is requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  With this system, the bankers know if they do anything that might be ethically questionable they could find themselves on the front page of the news tomorrow.
Lord Turnbull, a former permanent secretary to the Treasury, warned that the so-called "enabling legislation" tabled by the government to implement the ringfencing of banks' retail operations gave too little detail about how the new regime would work. 
"You're not just asking us to buy a pig in a poke, you're just asking us to buy a poke – because there's not much pig in it at the moment," he said. 
The chancellor said it would be up to individual banks to decide what operations, in addition to customer banking, should sit inside the ringfence, which will enforce much stricter rules on how much capital they must hold....
But he said these specific demands could not be directly enshrined in legislation, because it would be a mistake to create a "Maginot Line", reflecting how banks operate in 2012, which could later be subverted, or become irrelevant, as the operation of the financial sector changed.
Don't you love the idea of banks shuttling pieces inside and outside the ring-fence.

One of the nice features of ultra transparency is that it adjusts to how the banks operate.  Regardless of where they have an exposure it is fully disclosed.  No ifs, no ands, no buts.

UK regulator says regulators can only reduce frequency of bank crises and taxpayer bailouts

Bloomberg reports that Lord Turner, the chairman of the UK's Financial Services Authority, told Parliament that regulators are only capable of reducing the frequency of bank crises and taxpayer bailouts.

This is confirmation that relying on financial regulators is simply betting with financial stability and the taxpayers' money.

Fortunately, our modern financial system is designed so that it doesn't have to rely on the financial regulators.  As everyone knows, our financial system is based on the philosophy of disclosure combined with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

It is this combination that effectively prevented a financial crisis for over 7 decades until the financial regulators let the bankers create vast opaque areas of the financial system.  It was these opaque areas like banks and structured finance securities where the crisis occurred.

The solution to end the reliance on financial regulators for ending banking crises is to strip them of their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on banks.  This is accomplished by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank and then adjust both the amount and price of their exposure to each bank based on this risk assessment.

It is this ability to adjust their exposure based on their independent assessment of risk that allows market participants to exert discipline on the banks to restrain risk taking.

This ability to adjust their exposure also permanently ends taxpayer bailouts as it ends the risk of financial contagion.  Each market participant knows that they will not be bailed out and sets their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk of each bank.

Lord Turner has confirmed that complex rules/regulations and supervision are an inferior substitute for transparency and market discipline.  Therefore, Parliament should focus its attention on restoring transparency and market discipline.

“The honest truth is that if you believe you have forever completely destroyed the possibility of a taxpayer input, we’re probably fooling ourselves,” Turner said at a hearing of the U.K. Parliament’s Commission on Banking Standards in London late yesterday. 
“But if we are successful, we are reducing the periodicity of a taxpayer input from once every 50 years to once every 200 years.”
Transparency and market discipline have already shown themselves to be more effective.  The transparent areas of the financial system did not experience a financial crisis even as the opaque areas like banks and structured finance blew up.
Turner, seen as a potential candidate to succeed Mervyn King as Governor of the Bank of England, said it has been a “learning process” over the last four years and his thinking has changed as the true extent of the financial crisis emerged. 
He said there is a need for a “belt and braces” approach to regulation and the key issue is ensuring banks have an adequate level of capital to protect themselves. 
“The core of resolvability is primary loss-absorbing capacity and bail-in-able debt,” Turner said. “And provided you have enough of that, then if proprietary trading activities produce losses, we can make sure those do not fall on the taxpayer or on a systemic shock to the industry, but are absorbed by the appropriate bail-in-able senior unsecured debt. That’s very important.”
Actually, the "belt and braces" approach to regulation should be to have the analytical ability of the market support the regulatory process.

This is easily achieved when banks are required to provide ultra transparency.

Then, the regulators can ask market participants, including banking competitors, what they see as the biggest risks at each bank.  This can supplement the regulators' internal analysis of the risk at each bank and be used to bring regulatory pressure along with market discipline to restrain risk taking.
Turner said that there is a need for both “structural proposals” to strengthen banks, such as those put forward by the ICB on the ring-fencing of consumer units, and “robust proposals” on capital and liquidity in the aftermath of the crisis. 
“We have to recognize that it was deeper and more fundamental and with more adverse consequences than was apparent in 2009,” he said. “As this crisis and post-crisis has gone on, like many people I’ve been increasingly aware of what a deep set of problems there are in our banking industry.”
The crisis exposed a deep set of problems in the banking industry that are the result of the lack of disclosure by banks that leaves them resembling "black boxes".

For example, one problem was market participants relying on the regulators to both properly assess the risk of each bank and communicate this risk.

Regulators will never properly communicate how risky a bank is because of concerns with the safety and soundness of the banking system.  They fear that if they say a bank is risky it will trigger a run on the bank.
Turner also said it’s too simple to blame investment banking alone for a decline in the “culture” of banking. 
“The culture of classic commercial banking was probably contaminated by three different things -- one of which was an investment banking culture that everything is there to be traded and make money from in the short term,” he said. Still, there were other issues -- the selling of financial products to the public without “appropriate constraints” and a too-heavy focus on return on equity,’’ he said.
“In many sectors of the economy there is nothing wrong” with a focus on ROE, “but I think applied to banking that is potentially dangerous,” Turner said. “That’s because in banking the easiest way to boost return on equity is simply to boost leverage, either in direct open ways or in a set of hidden ways.”
Actually, the culture was a product of opacity.  Opacity provided a veil to hide misbehavior behind.  Lord Turner acknowledges this fact.

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

An explanation for why the Swedish Model has not been adopted yet

I thought readers might be interested in the following from a post from Jesse's Café Américain.  

He provides a possible explanation for why global policy makers have continued to pursue the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis long after it has been shown not to work and why they have been so reluctant to adopt the Swedish Model and effectively bring an end to the current financial crisis.

A credibility trap occurs when the regulatory, political and informational functions of a society have been compromised by corruption and fraud, so that the leadership cannot effectively reform or even honestly address the situation without impairing and implicating, at least incidentally, a broad swath of the power structure, including themselves.

The status quo tolerates the corruption and the fraud because they have profited at least indirectly from it, and would like to continue to do so. Even relatively honest reformers within the power structure become susceptible to various forms of soft blackmail and coercion.

And so a failed policy and its support system become almost self-sustaining, long after it is seen by the people to have failed, and in failing become counterproductive. Admitting failure is not an option for those who receive their power from that system.

The continuity of the structural hierarchy must therefore be maintained at all costs, even to the point of becoming a painfully obvious hypocrisy.

The Banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, with balance restored to the economy, before there can be any sustained recovery.

Spain's banking problems highlight a global reality

In reporting on Spain's banking problems, the Wall Street Journal highlighted the global reality that until losses are realized on both public and private debt that is never going to be repaid the global economy is going to be in a Japan-style slump.

But the Wall Street Journal does not stop there, it points out that wherever there has been a recovery there has also been a deep debt restructuring (also known as adopting the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis).

It is one thing when your humble blogger makes this observation, and I have since the financial crisis began, it is entirely another when a mainstream media paper like the WSJ starts making this observation.
Spain’s banks are struggling with €182 billion ($232 billion) of bad debts, some 10.7% of their loan books. 
Until these debts are restructured and the Spanish banking sector’s bondholders are forced to eat their losses — including the sovereign and the various multi-national agencies like the European Central Bank, which holds considerable amounts of Spanish collateral — not much is going to be resolved. 
But Spain is merely a microcosm of the widespread problem of too much debt having been accumulated in the good times, now unable to be paid back.
So far, massive infusions of central bank liquidity have helped to stave off widespread bankruptcies, particularly in countries like the U.S. and U.K., where it’s been supplemented with massive fiscal transfers. 
But members of the Bank of England’s policy-setting committee are starting to realize the U.K. economy’s problems won’t be resolved anytime soon, or even in the next few years, by keeping interest rates at zero.
Regular readers know that the policy makers response of adopting the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and preserving bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs never works (except for the bankers).

The only solution that works is adopting the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize upfront the losses on all that debt that won't be paid back.
Deputy Governor Charlie Bean noted recently that a low-rate policy keeping dysfunctional businesses alive “inhibits the process of creative destruction as unprofitable firms are closed and the liberated resources shifted.” 
Governor Mervyn King has noted that monetary policy can only delay, not prevent, the necessary and painful restructuring....
Indeed, Spain and the U.K. highlight how much of the global economy’s current malaise — increasing stagnation of productivity, poor growth or outright recession — is down to the failure of policymakers to allow a resolution of that pile of bad debt.
It’s worth reflecting that wherever there has been recovery, it’s come on the back of deep debt restructuring and the consequent degree of short-term pain, be it in the Baltic states, Ireland or Iceland....
Please re-read the highlighted text as the Wall Street Journal has just confirmed what your humble blogger has been saying about the Swedish Model.
But John Hussman, a fund manager, warns that accounting rule changes and official indulgence in kicking non-performing loans down the road through “amend and pretend” measures mean that there’s a lot further to go before the mountain of unsupportable debt is resolved. And until it is, economies will continue to struggle on.
Economies struggling is the least of the bad outcomes that result from pursuing the Japanese Model.  As economies struggle, policy makers are tempted to rewrite the social contracts.

Bernanke says that Great Recession reduced US potential growth rate

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, in his speech to the New York Economic Club, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
says the devastating recession and its after-effects have reduced the potential growth rate some amount; he isn’t specific as to how much. 
And why is the potential growth rate for the economy important?
Before the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the U.S. economy was capable of growing at 2.5% a year at full employment without generating inflation. That’s what economists call “the potential growth rate.” It’s basically the rate of growth in the labor force plus the rate of growth in output per hour, or productivity. 
To the Fed, it’s the speed limit for growth once the economy returns, as it expects will happen a few years from now, to full employment.
And why has the potential growth rate declined?

Mr. Bernanke provides several reasons including
(4) The drop in business investment during the recession may retard future growth in productivity. (The more investment, the more likely output per hour of work is likely to rise.) 
(5) The shock of the worst recession since the Great Depression, with all the losses in real estate and stocks plus the distressingly slow recovery, may have reduced the willingness of investors and businesses to take risks, particularly the risk of starting a new business or applying new technologies.
And then he adds a couple of other reasons
But Mr. Bernanke, as he has repeatedly in the past, emphasized that today’s lousy economy reflects a lot more than this slowing in the U.S. economy’s long-run potential growth rate. 
For now, the U.S. economy is fighting substantial “headwinds” — housing, credit conditions that aren’t yet back to normal, Europe’s sovereign debt and banking mess and the “drag” from federal budget tightening — that are restraining economic growth and preventing the unemployment rate from falling faster.
In short, Mr. Bernanke has discovered that pursuing the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis leads to a Japan-style economic slump.

End the policies that support the Japanese Model and end the economic slump.

Regular readers know that the economic slump and the various "headwinds" Mr. Bernanke lists are all addressed by implementing the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

With losses recognized, families can stay in their houses and the housing market returns to functioning.

With losses recognized, credit conditions can return to normal as there is no need to pursue zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

With losses recognized, Europe's sovereign debt problem is addressed as the losses on this debt are included in the losses banks recognize.

With losses recognized, there is no need for federal budget tightening as the economy begins to grow again and generate additional tax revenue.  At the same time, the need for economic stabilizer programs is reduced as more people are working.

Germany's trouble with the truth

In a der Spiegel column, Stefan Kaiser explains why the German government will continue to resist recognizing the losses on the Greek debt, but how eventually, only after the size of the losses has gotten bigger, the losses will have to be recognized.

His argument suggests that the transition from the failed Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis to the Swedish Model is inevitable.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  By definition the policies pursued under this model do not allow for losses on bad debt to be recognized.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the bad debt in the financial system.

I agree that adoption of the Swedish Model is inevitable.  However, Japan shows that while it is inevitable, at the urging of the bankers, policy makers will push the moment of when the Swedish Model is adopted as far as possible into the future.

This delay guarantees maximum damage to the real economy and the social contract it supports.  It also guarantees maximum bonuses paid to bankers.
At some point, even the best tricks -- the aimless chatter of "other solutions," the putting-off of painful decisions -- don't help any longer. 
At some point, Greece's rescuers in Berlin, Brussels or Paris will have to admit that saving the country is going to cost a lot of money..... the money will simply be a loss for Germany and the other creditor nations. 
They'll have to make it up some other way, such as raising taxes or cutting expenditures.
Under the Japanese Model, the only options for making up a loss from writing down bad debt hurt the taxpayers:  either through higher taxes or less government expenditures.

Under the Swedish Model, a third option for paying for the losses is introduced.  An option that doesn't hurt taxpayers at all.  That option is that banks "pay" for the losses.

The way that banks pay for the losses is through retention of 100% of future earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.

It is common sense that the banks should pay as nobody forced them to extend credit beyond the capacity of the borrower to repay.
There's just one problem, though. This moment of insight and clarity is still a long way off.  
For the time being, it seems as though the euro-zone countries are just going to keep carrying along as they have been. That is, muddling onward and delaying reality for as long as possible. 
This pushing off adopting the Swedish Model is extremely expensive.

It shifts the burden of the excess debt onto the real economy.  As your humble blogger predicted at the outset of the financial crisis, until the losses are realized, the global economy will be in a Japan-style economic slump with a bias towards spiraling downwards that is periodically interrupted by fiscal and monetary stimulus programs.
Angela Merkel is the master of this strategy. The German chancellor wants to push back Greece's necessary payday by at least 10 months. That's because she hopes to be re-elected in the fall of 2013.... 
That means when the euro finance ministers meet on Tuesday to free up the next tranche of Greece's second rescue package, they will only resolve as much as is absolutely necessary to get through the next months. 
They would also rather not have to ask the question as to where the additional nearly €33 billion that it's going to cost by allowing Greece to push back its savings targets again is supposed to come from. And they're less willing than ever to think about long-term solutions, like a debt haircut. 
But this is cowardly and dishonest. Citizens are only going to grow angrier with their politicians....
In Japan, this anger is shown by the high turnover in prime ministers.

In the EU, this anger is being shown by protests.
Like no other government, Germany has stirred up sentiment against Greece and produced arguments about how important it is to be tough on countries in debt. Now it will be that much more difficult for Germany to explain why it all of a sudden makes sense to give money to the very same places.
This is one of the many problems associated with pursuing the Japanese Model.  It is very difficult for a politician to acknowledge that they were wrong in pursuing the Japanese Model even when the facts are clear to the electorate.

Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the Germany government is capable of handling the truth about the debt situation in Greece, Portugal, Spain, France, the UK and the US.

More unfortunately, in their unwillingness to acknowledge the truth, the German government is managing to jeopardize the German real economy and Germany's social contract.
The only hope for an end to this mess is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which obviously takes its principles seriously. For example, the IMF may only give money to indebted countries if they can foreseeably repay the credit and, at the end of the lending program, be able to look out for themselves once more.
How ironic that the IMF is the only hope.  As Asian and Latin American countries will tell you, heading into the financial crisis the IMF's role was to collect sovereign debts for the large western economies regardless of the pain inflicted on their real economy and society.
But this is exactly what Greece cannot do. By all economic logic, the country won't be able to reduce its debt load to 120 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP)by 2020 as planned. At the moment, the country's debt burden lies around 177 percent, and by 2014 it will even be up to 190 percent. 
To recover from such monumental numbers, neither lowering interest rates for old credit nor other tricks that the government is suggesting will work. 
It will actually take either a gigantic economic boom or a so-called debt haircut. This means that the creditors, chief among them the euro countries, would have to release Greece from a big segment of its debts. 
As there isn't an economic boom anywhere in sight, another haircut is going to be the only way out. At least, that's how the IMF and virtually every serious economist sees it. Only the politicians responsible for the situation want to see it otherwise. 
There is no way around it, though. Germany and the other creditor countries will have to pay for Greece. Whether it's called a haircut, bankruptcy, debt forgiveness or a transfer is irrelevant. The only important thing now is that the policymakers find the courage to reveal the truth to their people.
Which means explaining that the Japanese Model and its related policies have failed.  In place of the Japanese Model, the government is going to pursue the Swedish Model and its related policies going forward.

Self-deception in Berlin impedes resolving Greek problem

Der Spiegel carried an interesting article on how the German government's unwillingness to face up to the losses on Greek debt is causing it to throw good money after bad even when other EU countries and the IMF are saying debt reduction is the way to go.

Regular readers know that Germany's leadership has chosen to implement the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under the Japanese Model, policies are adopted to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

Bailouts of first banks and then sovereigns are an example of these policies.

Please note that under the Japanese Model debt does not go away.  Rather, the burden of debt service on the excess debt in the financial system is transferred to the real economy.  This deprives the real economy of the capital it needs for reinvestment and growth as capital is instead diverted to paying on the debt.

The alternative to the Japanese Model is the Swedish Model.  Under the Swedish Model, the banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and the social contract.

A modern financial system is designed to support the Swedish Model.  Banks with low or negative book capital levels can continue in operations and support the real economy because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  As a result, there is no need for policies like bailouts to "protect" the financial system as the financial system is designed to be robust in the face of losses.
With elections approaching in 2013, Berlin is blocking a workable solution for Greece. German leaders are eager to avoid angering voters by giving more money to Athens, but their European partners are losing their patience. 
Wolfgang Schäuble is as master of portraying political chaos as a strategy. "We need a solution that lasts for a while with Greece," the German finance minister announced last Thursday. But the truth is that he is determined to continue pursuing Germany's approach of muddling along through the euro crisis, much to the annoyance of Germany's partners. 
In Brussels and at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), there is a growing realization that it's time for honesty, especially because the German government also wants Greece to remain in the monetary union. "Things cannot go on this way," says a European Union diplomat. The IMF is openly demanding a "real solution," and yet that is precisely the opposite of what is happening at the moment.
The Greek rescue is a tale of self-deception.
The Japanese Model is built on self-deception.
In May 2010, officials said that a bailout package worth €110 billion ($140 billion) was sufficient. It is now clear that even the second bailout package, worth a total of €130 billion, is too small -- and this is based on calculations that are only about six months old. 
But now there is another shortfall, this time of €33 billion. It's a disaster for Schäuble and Chancellor Angela Merkel. In the run-up to German parliamentary elections next year, both politicians are determined not to confront taxpayers with a real, and therefore expensive, summary of costs.....
A similar type of self-deception is also going on in the US where politicians are trying to argue that the taxpayer broke even on the bailouts.  In the US, the analysis always conveniently ignores that direct cash injection was only one form of bailout (artificially low interest rates being an example of an indirect bailout).
In the midst of all this, it is clear that Greece cannot support its debt burden, most recently more than €300 billion, in the long term. 
Greece is not alone.  There is also Ireland, Portugal, Spain, France, the UK and the US.

The existence of this debt burden which cannot be supported in the long run is is why I continue to say that every day policy makers have the choice of abandoning the failed Japanese Model and adopting the Swedish Model.
But the chance of eventually recouping the money it lends is the IMF's condition for continuing to take part in the bailout program. IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has made it clear that she has had enough of deceptive maneuvers in Europe. 
For Merkel and Schäuble, an IMF withdrawal would be tantamount to an admission of failure, and not just because it was the German government that once insisted that the respected organization participate in Europe's programs. It would also signify the loss of close to €20 billion in promised aid for Greece. The euro countries would have to jump in, with Germany alone having to contribute about €6 billion. Even a political grand master like Schäuble probably couldn't spin that as a strategy anymore.

Monday, November 19, 2012

France loses AAA-rating at same time UK bank risk managers reduce worries about high impact EU event

From the you cannot make this stuff up file:

As reported by the Guardian:
Threat to the financial system from sovereign risk was the biggest concern of 94% of those asked by the Bank of England – but fears over a 'high impact event' have fallen.

The eurozone crisis will not go away. More than nine out of 10 risk managers at financial firms asked about the greatest threat to the financial system cite sovereign risk. In the second half of 2012, it was the biggest concern of 94% of those asked by the Bank of England, while 77% were most worried about the risk of the economic downturn. 
"Sovereign risk is now cited by a greater proportion of respondents than previously recorded for any risk," the bank's systemic risk survey found. 
Yet, while the prospect of a eurozone meltdown is uppermost in bankers' minds, the overall concern about a "high impact" event is falling dramatically. 
Some 20% still feel the probability of such an event is high or very high but this is a 16 percentage point fall in the last six months while 34% now believe such an event is a low probability, a rise of 11 percentage points. 
Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that Moody's has downgraded France (is this a high impact event?)

France lost its top credit rating with Moody’s Investors Service, dealing a blow to President Francois Hollande’s efforts to show budget credibility in the face of a stalled economy. 
France was cut to Aa1 from Aaa, the rating company said today. 
The Moody’s downgrade follows one by Standard & Poor’s in January and increases pressure on Hollande to find ways to bolster growth in Europe’s second-largest economy in the midst of the region’s three year-old debt crisis. 
“The timing of this sort of announcement is awkward,” said Nicolas Veron, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “This downgrade comes a few days after announcements of structural reforms that are probably the strongest for a long time in France but it also signals that while they are ambitious the recent announcement of reforms is not enough to reassure investors that France is on the right track.” 
Moody’s said its decision to downgrade the rating and maintain the negative outlook reflects France’s long-term economic growth outlook is negatively affected by multiple structural challenges and the fiscal outlook is uncertain as a result of its deteriorating economic prospects.

Ultra-loose Fed policy increases bank funding risk

In his Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column, David Reilly concludes that the banks' heavy reliance on funding through repurchase agreements raises their risk and highlights why investors have to pay attention to the liability side of each bank's balance sheet.

This conclusion confirms why banks should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This is exactly the information that is needed to monitor bank funding risk.

What happens in the shadows doesn't always stay there. 
Part of the reason regulators continue to be so focused on the "shadow-banking" system—lending and investing activities that are banklike but operate outside the regulated financial system—is because it is often connected to the activities of regular banks.... 
Because banks and shadow-banking entities provide funds to each other through loans and financial products, such growth creates systemic risks as distress in one area "may easily spill over" to the other... 
And in some cases, the interconnections may be rising because of the superlow interest-rate environment. 
With bank profits being squeezed, many firms are looking to reduce their long-term debt, since this tends to be more expensive than shorter-term funding. 
In its place, banks rely more on short-term funding such as deposits, which have been soaring. But they are also increasing their use of short-term, repurchase, or repo, transactions. These involve a bank or investor borrowing or lending money on a short-term basis using securities as collateral. 
Indeed, among the biggest U.S. banks, repo financing is now almost as large as long-term debt outstanding. At the end of the third quarter, for example, combined long-term debt at J.P. Morgan Chase, JPM +2.68% Bank of America BAC +4.06% andCitigroup C +3.20% exceeded combined repurchase-agreement liabilities by just $44 billion. A year earlier, the difference was nearly $300 billion. 
The risk of rising dependence on repo financing is that any market disruption, say by the failure of an unregulated shadow entity, could ripple through regulated banks and create funding problems. 
In this, the [Financial Stability Board] is right to call for greater disclosure and transparency around these markets and the level of interconnections. 
Investors tend to focus on bank assets and the prospect for losses there. But with aggressive Federal Reserve policies starting to cause financial distortions, they need to keep just as close an eye on bank liabilities and how they are changing.
Which is why the banks should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose their exposure details.

Portugal bailout on track except for collapsing economy

Reuters reports that according to the EU and IMF everything is on track with the Portugal bailout with the exception of its collapsing economy.

To anyone who isn't an adherent to pursuing the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs, an economy that is shrinking uncontrollably would be a problem.

Fortunately, both the EU and IMF officials are adherents to pursuing the Japanese Model and therefore they don't see it as a problem.

For the rest of us, the collapse of Portugal's economy is a problem (but then again, so is the collapse of the Greek economy).

This economic collapse was also completely predictable as under the Japanese Model the economy of Portugal is not large enough to support the burden of the excess debt in the financial system that has been placed on it.

Your humble blogger is left to wonder if we are going to have to watch the collapse of both the Spanish and French economies under the Japanese Model before the EU and IMF stops pursuing the Japanese Model and adopts the Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This preserves the real economy in places like Greece, Portugal, Spain and France as well as the social contract that exists in these countries.

Portugal's EU and IMF lenders gave Portugal thumbs up for the next tranche of their bailout funds on Monday, but warned of significant risks at home and abroad to the recession-hit, debt-laden country. 
"The program is broadly on track, despite stronger headwinds," the European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund said in a joint statement. 
"Rising unemployment, lower incomes, and uncertainty are weighing on confidence, while the recession in the euro area is beginning to bear on export dynamics,"... 
"While downside risks to growth are significant, the program's macroeconomic framework remains appropriate." 
EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn also said that "confidence in Portugal's prospects continues to grow, both among its institutional partners and market participants. This bodes well for Portugal's full return to market financing."
Maybe I missed something, but who would lend money to a country that cannot repay the loan because its economy is shrinking?